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Based on 18 months of fieldwork in Bamyan and West Kabul, Afghanistan among ethnic Hazara
civil society activists, I examine civil society groups’ protests and memorialization activities as
social and political acts of collective and cultural trauma generation and dissemination. The
activists’ protests seek to secure greater rights, security and infrastructural development in
Hazara populated areas, and memorialize past rights violations and atrocities against Hazaras.
Through protests, literature and social media, the retelling of traumatic events inculcates and
spreads collective trauma. And the framing of these past events as a present existential threat
merges with a widespread sense that Hazara history and culture have been quietly erased by a
Pashtun-dominated Afghan state apparatus. Both the constant recounting of collective traumas
and the perception of having been excluded from Afghan history and history-writing confirm a
need to write and speak about the Hazara past through frames specific to Hazaras’ victimization.,
including an ongoing genocide which began over 100 years ago. Hazara activist history-telling
also draws on Bamyan’s ancient past, to make a claim to their being Afghanistan’s
autochthonous people as well as heirs to cosmopolitan, religiously tolerant and non-violent
Buddhist and Silk Road traditions. Yet the ancient past is also depicted as having been traumatic,
in that the early ancestors of the Hazaras are held to have suffered under Muslim and Mongol
invaders. Affective and symbolic echoes of Shi’a traditions of martyrdom and victimization are
also to be found in Hazara protest and memorialization. Layered on top of all this is language
appealing to a Western audience, giving emphasis to Hazaras’ purportedly inherent peacefulness
and their recent embrace of human rights and genocide recognition. Hazara activists express a
Hazara exceptionalism based on the idea that their people are particular to Afghanistan as an
autochthonous group mixed with later migrations and different religious groups which thrived on
the Silk Road and are hence imbued with a peacefulness and cosmopolitanism others lack. They
provide as evidence a mix of written and mythological historical sources.
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Chapter One
An Introduction to Cultural Trauma

In this dissertation, I present research on civil society (joma’e maidani) activists, from the
Hazara ethnicity, living in Afghanistan. My main goal is to demonstrate the ways, and the
methods used by, these activists, mainly within Hazara communities, to spread particular
narratives of collective trauma, history, and memory in order to seek sociopolitical gains, both
for the community at large and for themselves as individuals. Through their work, a Hazara
identity is emerging on the basis of shared traumatic memory and the closely-linked sense that
Hazaras historically were, and continue to be, targeted as an exceptional people for oppression in
Afghanistan. Both because they say they are descended from an ancient, cosmopolitan people of
the Silk Road, and because they state they have been influenced, since the 1980s and ‘90s, by
Hazara leaders who activists say stress universalizing ideals of democratic inclusion and human
rights, Hazara activists claim yet another kind of exceptionality: that they, the Hazaras, are by
way of particular cultural attributes the best-prepared of all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups to
promote peace, respect for human rights, gender equality, and universal education. Such
universalizing ideals are also promoted by foreign actors today — development organizations
and NGOs. Activist claims that they have long been exposed to and even followed such ideals
further their argument, among themselves and the Hazara community, that they are the people
with the greatest ability to promote and live by such ideals when compared to other ethnic
groups.
All this should sound familiar to Central Asianist scholars and the Hazaras themselves. In
this dissertation I go a step further still, to say that Hazaras’ narratives of shared persecution bear
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a strong resemblance, in their emphasis on martyrdom and providential leadership, to
foundational Shi’a (to which sect the majority of Hazaras belong) histories and legends, such as
that of the treacherous murders of Hussein and his followers. Hazara activists weave together
with these claims concerning current universals and ancient cosmopolitanisms narratives about
the justice of Shi’ism as a religion and the injustices suffered by the early protagonists of this
sect.
All of these points are tied together by the themes of collective memory and its use by
activists to instill a cultural trauma. What makes collective trauma a cultural trauma in this case
is not just the dominance of narratives of oppression in discourses of what it means to be Hazara.
Activists also often focus on the loss of Hazara culture under the pressure of outside hostility,
creating feelings that the very existence of Hazara identity and culture are at stake.
Hazara politicians promote some of these narratives when it is politically expedient. All
the same, Hazaras activists seeking recognition for past persecution and current discrimination
face a constant battle with the Afghan state, sometimes with those same politicians who, they
claim, despite being Hazara co-ethnics, are most interested in their own self-aggrandizement. In
other words, many activists expressed the sentiment that Hazara politicians play a sort of double
game. Hazara politicians, they said, must agree, at least to a certain extent, with a state that
chooses often to ignore Hazara-specific issues in order to ally with major politicians. They also
must speak of the problems brought up by the activists, as otherwise they lose local support.
Hence activists show distrust for the main Hazara politicians as they attempt to satisfy both
central state concerns, and local Hazara concerns. Afghanistan has an extremely centralized
government, and many positions are made via appointment. Others, however, such as
parliamentarians, are voted on. Politicians seek both appointments and elected positions at
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different points throughout their career. Activists hence can believe politicians are only
concerned with self-aggrandizement, whether they are strengthening ties with the political elite
above them or appearing to work on those issues that the activists find important.
I focus on Markaz Bamyan, or Bamyan, Center, the Provincial seat of Bamyan Province,
the unofficial capital of the “Hazara homeland.” Yet evidence points also to Hazaras in the rest
of Afghanistan, neighboring countries, and the world sharing the emergent identity being created
by Hazara activists, based on ideas of suffering, of loss of history and the need to recover the
past and maintain inviolable ties to a homeland. In these other locales such themes are all
overlaid with Shi’a motifs of the just frequently losing their fight against oppression as well as a
belief in their own, inborn cultural competence for human rights and gender equality. An
extremely large Hazara population resides in Kabul and many activists are among them. Hazaras
are also in most big cities of Afghanistan. Iran, Pakistan, Europe, Australia, the United States,
India, and even Indonesia are all home to activists.
Locally, the sites of Hazara identity-building and the spread of trauma include protests
organized by activists; speeches at conferences, in conjunction with protests, or simply as standalone events organized by activists but also supported by NGOs; written publications such as
newspapers and fliers; and even informal settings, such as in gatherings in university dorm
rooms or among family and friends. As Shi’a mosques also serve as informal meeting halls,
many meetings and even speeches and events are held within their walls, even if the mullahs are
not directly involved in the civil society projects. Activists also make extensive use of social
media: Facebook, Twitter, various blogs and informational websites. Often Hazara activist social
media posts, seeking a larger audience outside Afghanistan, appeal more to universal ideals, and
quote not only Hazara leaders, such as Abdul Ali Mazari — the founder of their political and
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mujahedin party, Hizb-e-Wahdat — but also international figures such as Nelson Mandela,
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Religious themes concerning justice also appear. A
seasonal tempo marks social media posting — the birthday or anniversary of the death of a leader
like Mazari or King fosters reflection on their legacies, while a religious holiday fosters
reflection on the attributes of Ali, Hussein, or Mohammad, the most important religious figures
for Shi’a Muslims. Even as my civil society activist informants live mainly in Bamyan, they
stand at the center of a worldwide Hazara movement.
The civil society activists come from different social backgrounds, and yet most converge
in Bamyan as university students or professors and NGO workers. Some actually work with
organizations that are designed to promote civil society in the Western sense, and receive money
from foreign donors, although in a subsequent chapter, it will be shown that this perceived loss
of independence can be understood as problematic by some activists. Usually these organizations
work on “capacity building,” holding training events to improve civil society, people’s
knowledge of their rights, with a focus on women’s rights, and training in laws intended to
protect the most vulnerable members of society. Others work for civil society organizations
which are more grassroots and locally funded, and so deal more with protest movements than
other types of trainings. Greater numbers work for one of the many development NGOs active in
Bamyan, focusing on agricultural development, women’s income generation projects,
educational projects, tourism projects, sanitation and clean water projects, and many other
development projects. Working on development projects and hoping to improve the situation of
the people of Bamyan streamlines very well with the desire to bring attention to the
discrimination faced by Hazaras. Many journalists in Bamyan consider themselves activists, as
do a number of university professors, although conflicts of interests often mean they are not the
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main organizers. Finally, much of the “rank and file” of the activists are university students or
recent graduates. I worked closely with both activist leaders, who welcomed me to their planning
meetings, and the “rank and file” who were also eager to speak with me.
Those closely involved in work with political parties are not generally activists, and most
of the activists have little patience for political parties. There are a variety of reasons for this,
which include a belief among activists that politics in general is corrupt, as well as the lack of
any real opposition platforms, as parties are largely personality based. One commonality all but
one of the main activists I know share is this distrust of politics, and the belief that politics
somehow made activism unclean. Save the one who works directly for the government, those
who cooperate with a political party or government official do so with trepidation. They fear the
reaction of other activists who might interpret this as a betrayal of civil society ideals.
Some in the Bamyan community perceive activists as working purely for their own selfaggrandizement. Activists benefit from their activities, but telling the story of their people
motivates them, as does helping their people in some way. Activists partaking in such activities
not only disseminate narratives of trauma; they sometimes feel traumatized themselves. While
the activists certainly wish to improve the situation of their ethnic group, Hazara, first, and their
nation, Afghanistan, second, it cannot be denied that many also fully realize their activities
provide them with benefits. They might gain political connections, become well known in the
Hazara community, or benefit from becoming part of a network in a country where many
opportunities are still obtained through client-patron relationships. Yet I cannot underscore
enough my realization, through their many interactions with me, through hours upon hours of
interviews and time spent together, that the activists themselves are deeply, personally invested
in improving the situation of their people, and believe that the suffering experienced by Hazaras
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throughout their history needs to be acknowledged. Because these Hazara activists work for both
societal and personal gain, one way they can be understood is as “social entrepreneurs.” They
seek to change, improve, and perhaps create a new society, even as they seek personal gain. Yet
they can also be considered “moral entrepreneurs,” drawing on the study of morality and norms
by Cass Sunstein (1996), with the idea that while some norms in a society are moral, some are
not — and there are individuals that go about the process of changing amoral norms. Hazara
activists are changing society, and as they consider such issues as human and gender rights, and
equal rights for Hazaras, they are certainly attacking norms in Afghanistan which they consider
amoral. Hence, they are entrepreneurs, a vanguard, seeking to change social and moral aspects of
their society.
My involvement with the activists happened through chance. I intended to work with
people in Bamyan involved in development projects, but at the time, I did not realize the extent
to which the categories of activists and development workers overlap. I began to gravitate more
towards the stories told to me by the activists, and as I found certain themes repeated — that of
the genocide of the Hazaras, their stolen history, their competence for universal ideals that they
claimed other groups in Afghanistan were lacking, I realized that there was an important
movement happening. If so many people wanted to tell me these stories, I would be wise to
listen. The activists certainly saw in me an opportunity. They wanted someone who would tell
their story to the West, who would serve as an ally, who would hopefully do something to bring
US and other international assistance they feel they need as a group targeted by discrimination.
In a way, this worked to my advantage, as many people wanted to talk to me. I was concerned,
however — were the stories they told only for my ears? I soon found out that in most cases, what
they told me was very much in line with what they were telling the people of Bamyan, and the
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greater Hazara community. I found that also on social media, what the activists told me was very
much in line with the stories and themes represented through that forum. When some of my
informants, who are scholars, speak to a non-Afghan audience, they do code-switch between the
Western and Afghan/Hazara audiences. But for some reason, perhaps because I was physically in
Bamyan and spoke Dari, I basically received the same information that the community did. I
might go more in-depth on certain issues during one-on-one interviews, but I never found any
glaring discrepancies.
Hazaras occupy a disenfranchised role in many ways in Afghan society due to several
factors. To give a brief overview, historically they have been oppressed by a state in which
power has traditionally been held by other ethnic groups. In particular, since the late 1800s,
Hazaras have been relegated to positions of manual laborers and servants, and at times, they
were enslaved. The then-ruler of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, undertook a centralization
campaign throughout the country, including a brutal war against the semi-autonomous Hazaras.
Many who survived were displaced or fled, creating a large diaspora of Hazaras eking out a
living in the cities, mainly Kabul, but also northern Mazar-e-Sharif, western Herat, and others.
Hazaras have had a particularly difficult time realizing social mobility because their ethnic
differences have become racialized — with distinctive somatic features, Hazaras are said to have
descended from Chingiz Khan’s invading army. At the same time, there are sectarian issues, as
Afghanistan is a majority Sunni country, while most Hazaras are Shi’a. Being different — as
ethnically Hazara, racially asiatic, and religiously Shi’a — exposes Hazaras to widespread
prejudice in Afghanistan.
Hazaras improved their situation after 2001 to some degree. After the United States and
NATO defeat of the Taliban regime, they are certainly one of the groups which has most

7

benefitted from international involvement in Afghanistan. The Taliban, as a Sunni extremist
group, denied rights to, and persecuted, Hazaras, but the history of Hazara oppression does not
start with the Taliban, as they were also an excluded minority for many years prior. Today, many
attend school and universities in unprecedented numbers, and go on to find coveted positions in
government agencies and NGOs. However, most in the community agree that they still face a
multitude of problems. Activists stage protests addressing a variety of issues, from lack of
infrastructure and security, to specific prejudice against Hazaras. These protests all serve, I
argue, to shape a particular Hazara identity based around the idea that they are a traumatized
people. History is remembered, recollected, and retold with focus on the suffering of Hazaras.
Activists relate current situations back to this past suffering. They tie these narratives of
tragedies and suffering, in some ways, to the narratives of Karbala and the martyrdom of
Hussein, one of the most important Shi’a religious figures, which is a common aspect of many
Shi’a communities throughout the world. And yet, Hazara activist narratives differ from those of
other Shi’as. They reach back to the loss of an ancient, Silk Road-based, Buddhist culture as part
of their trauma. They argue that the coming of Chingiz Khan also resulted in suffering for their
ancestors. And, activists say that Hussein was a figure who lived over one thousand years ago, in
a different part of the world. The suffering of Hazaras is recent, beginning several hundred years
ago and, according to the activists, continues today. Therefore, while activists use parallels to
Hussein, they also make use of other particular, and even more ancient, historical narratives
when presenting their suffering. Many also reject the idea that this is a pan-Shi’a suffering,
claiming that the oppression of Hazaras is very specific to Afghanistan and that other Shi’as,
particularly Iranians, have not done enough to support the Hazaras.
I argue that Hazaras face, and participate in, the construction of a new trauma, a cultural
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trauma, by the activists themselves. Through the activists’ strong voices in their communities,
the historical and recent difficulties of Hazaras come to be widely shared among the population,
in Bamyan, in Kabul, and in other Hazara communities throughout the world, including
diasporas. This is ostensibly the goal of the activists: to ensure that the traumas and persecutions
are never forgotten, so that Hazaras are galvanized to demand a better situation from the Afghan
state. It is open to question just how successful the activists have been in spreading cultural
trauma through the population. What seems safer to say is that the activists have a voice in their
communities, at times mobilize large numbers of people, and are actively seeking to spread their
message. Even if not every Hazara is ready to declare her/himself fully a member of a
traumatized group, the activists whose work is the main subject of this dissertation are
unquestionably committed to this vision of the Hazara ethno-national group.
I consider the subjectivity of the activists as they go about their project, including a
variety factors. How does the history they know and are relearning, based on oppression, and are
trying to spread among their community, affect the activists’ subjective worldview? How does
their status as traditionally low class subjects, and coming to realize that they are the victims of
numerous massacres and episodes of ethnic cleansing, impact their subjective worldview?
Furthermore, I will consider how their membership in a specific, millenarian religious sect, as
well as their purported participation in universal values and the upholding of human rights,
impacts their subjectivity. Finally, there is the other side — the fact that while many have been
victims, some have also been fighters and have committed acts of violence not in line with their
meta-narrative of Hazara victimhood. Having been both victim and perpetrator at the same time
also impacts their subjectivity. But most importantly, I will examine how, by the construction
and dissemination of a collective, cultural trauma, the activists attempt to persuade the rest of the
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Hazara population to accept this narrative. Finally, how do all of these points affect their belief
that they are members of an Afghan nation, without any intention to pursue secession?
At base, getting a fuller understanding of how the specific historical suffering and
traumas of Hazaras live on in Hazara activist discourse demands a well-developed theory of
trauma’s relationship to memory, collective trauma, and cultural trauma, matters to which I turn
next.

Trauma: Personal and Collective
Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, in The Empire of Trauma (2009), write that it has become
commonplace to refer to the relation of present suffering to past violence through the language of
trauma — that is, the aftermath of a tragic event that leaves an imprint upon an individual,
whether it be victim, witness, responder or perpetrator. For Fassin and Rechtman, trauma is also
“the collective imprint on a group of a historical experience that may have occurred decades,
generations, or even centuries ago” (xi). Trauma is something intensely personal, in that violent
events always happen to individuals, and yet it may also be something that is experienced as a
group when an event has touched a large number of individuals who identify with this group.
One might even say that all of Afghanistan has been traumatized by a conflict that has continued,
almost without respite, since the late 1970s. This coexistence of individual and collective
experiences begs the question of how trauma comes to be experienced by an entire society, rather
than a large or small number of individuals. An example that will resonate with Americans is the
9/11 attacks. How did the mass killings on September 11, 2001 transcend the direct experience
of a large number of people in New York City and Washington D.C. to become an event that was
traumatic to nearly every American?
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Cathy Caruth, in her well cited psychoanalytic description of trauma, asserts that what
causes trauma is not being part of, or directly affected by, an event but rather one’s memories of
the event (1995). One needs distance, time, a period of “latency,” before trauma can be
experienced. After this period, when one begins to relive events in one’s memory, and reflect
upon how it interplays with one’s past life, one truly becomes traumatized, or escapes relatively
unscathed. Also figuring into this might be outside factors and influences during the period of
latency, events, interactions with people, and perhaps exposure to media. This could be true for
both bodily and psychological harm. Even as certain events may be considered inherently
traumatogenic, what turns the event into a psychological trauma is the meaning which the
traumatized subject attaches to it, based on the person’s almost unconscious evaluation of the
difference between life before and after, as well as the specific context in which they experienced
the event. Hence, some people show greater psychological “resilience” than others in responses
to a trauma-inducing event, based on personal temperament and past experiences. In other words,
this process is mediated by certain outside as well inner factors, which together with the
particular “set of subjective meanings” the person has given to events in his life, including this
one, determine the extent to which it will be “traumatic,” (Goldberg 1995). Some events are
almost necessarily going to be traumatic but the individuals who experience them will differ in
the level of traumatization they manifest, and in how this traumatization manifests, depending
upon what mediating factors intervened during the period of latency.
As we move on to discuss collective trauma, experienced by people who did not directly
experience the event, the mediating factors assume added importance. Such mediating factors
might include media, activist work, the input of people close to the individual in question,
affiliation with groups that aim to remember the trauma (or forget it), and later, similar
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seemingly traumatic events, among other possibilities. It is these which either mute or spread the
trauma. In this sense, not every large-scale traumatic event results in collective trauma.
The understanding of a collective trauma which impacts some group that shares a level of
cohesiveness can be understood the same way. First, however, we might explore the idea of
collective memory, in general, before moving on to talk about collective trauma and cultural
trauma. One of the earliest theorists of collective memory and historical memory, Maurice
Halbwachs, posits that individuals are constantly twining together, melding, their personal
memories, group memories, and historical memories. Personal memories are always mediated
by, fit into, and contrasted with those memories of other members of a group to which one
belongs. Events we “remember” may be an amalgamation of recollections of others about the
event, transposed onto our memory. Likewise, historical and personal (or autobiographical)
memory are never two completely separate events, running side by side. One places one’s
personal memories within the context of larger historical events happening at the time, giving
different flavor and meaning to what one actually saw, or thinks one saw. The personal is hence
always inextricably entwined with the historical. These interactions allow for some type of
group, collective, memory to come to be (Halbwachs 1980).
There are many mediations that impact this collective remembering and its interaction
with group remembering, perhaps more today than in the past. The process might be sped up as
media, print, television, and social media, give a platform to all sorts of voices, several of which
usually become dominant. The events of 9/11 illustrate this. There was surely a feeling, as the
attacks were unfolding, that this was important, but exactly how was in the moment unclear.
Media sources shaped the narrative, as did political/government ones, stressing that this was one
of those lines in history which will always demarcate a serious change in the “way things are.” I
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was outside of the United States, in a village in Uzbekistan training to be a Peace Corps
volunteer at the time of the event. I remained for several more weeks until, with the impending
invasion of neighboring Afghanistan, the decision was made to evacuate. I knew 9/11 was
important, but I did not feel myself seriously personally affected, besides the difficulties of
returning to the United States and having suddenly to seek employment. People all across
America, however, told me they were personally traumatized, even when they did not live in the
targeted cities or know anyone personally affected by the attacks. A family member, who lived
in Arizona, called me to task for being insensitive to what the American people had gone
through. It seemed I missed some key mediation — mourning, memorials, certain media
portrayals, and I could not “catch up.” To this day, I have a hard time joining in discussions
about this event and how it affected Americans. Ron Eyerman writes, “Collective memory is
conceived as the outcome, a conversational process in which individuals locate themselves. This
dialogic process is one of negotiation for both individuals and the collective itself,” (Eyerman
2004: 7). It seems I missed some key part of the process whereby a morning of mass killings in
two American cities became the collective trauma, “9/11.”

The Victim of Trauma: Individual and Collective
Fassin and Rechtman offer insight into how the “traumatized victim” became a positive
archetype over the course of the past hundred years or so, as opposed to a victim too weak to
handle a difficult situation. They posit that in recent years, a shift has occurred in society’s
widespread reception of said individual. In the past, the victim was someone to be questioned,
shunned, and viewed as illegitimate, someone who had some underlying problem that meant they
weren’t up to difficult tasks — for example, soldiers demonstrating the neurosis of shell-shock
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used to be suspect of using the condition to avoid return to duty (5). Today, PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder) while perhaps not a fully accepted condition, as some soldiers within
the military still face stigma, is generally accepted by greater society as acceptable. Today,
PTSD is also a recognized psychological disorder not only experienced by soldiers, but also by
people who have experienced any number of violent or disturbing events.
The concept of collective trauma is also largely accepted today as a given, as something
that people who are part of a collective will potentially, even likely, experience, even should they
not be directly exposed to an event. Fassin and Rechtman too turn to 9/11 to exemplify that
“trauma is commonplace in the contemporary world, an established truth” (Fassin and
Rechtman: 2). In Afghanistan the situation is a bit different, and may differ among ethnic groups.
Among Hazara activists I found that there was a need to protect those most traumatized by the
years of war, as well as by social violence often experienced by vulnerable groups such as
women and children. People were reluctant to introduce me to someone who had experienced
something traumatic simply for the sake of my research, and people often hid their scars, both
psychological and physical, until we had become trusted friends. Among Hazaras, there is not
the complete embracing of the victim as a legitimate category for the individual, but the
classification of victim for the entire population, for the collective, is treated as something
obvious because of the Hazaras’ historical oppression. Victim becomes something very few
individuals will admit to as being part of their identity to the outsider, whereas the collective
group claims victimhood almost with pride. This might relate to Hazaras’ particular history, their
Shi’a faith, or both. I can say that Pashtuns seemed, in my estimation as well as that of several
scholars, including Thomas Barfield and my husband Andrea Chiovenda, both via personal
communication, to reject a group victimhood narrative. In Afghanistan, this seems more
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particular to Hazaras.
Not only geographical distance but gaps in time can be transcended by collective trauma,
so that events and situations from generations ago can still be understood to be sources of
trauma. I have noticed this myself in debates between friends, family, and acquaintances
concerning the position of African Americans in U.S. society. In what sense can African
Americans still be subject to feeling “traumatized” by slavery, four or five generations or more
after emancipation? A key dynamic here is that the harm did not disappear with slavery’s end but
continued for decades later through the denial to African Americans of equal citizenship rights
and the perpetuation of unequal socioeconomic endowments. African American feelings of
collective trauma around slavery seem indissociable from their never having been justly
compensated for being enslaved or made whole from its harms but, quite the opposite, having
had to bear the badge of popular racism and being subject to laws aiming to keep blacks “in their
place.”
Hazaras occupy an analogous if not identical historical space. Hazaras in Afghanistan and
Afro-descendants in the United States have both suffered violence, disrespect and exploitation.
Yet, for both, things have improved to a degree to which many non-blacks and non-Hazaras
think they should “get over it,” with the implication that clinging to past harms is a way of
seeking special favors. There are other Afghans who side with Hazaras in saying that, both
psychologically and socially, the imprint of such experiences remains, just as movements such as
Black Lives Matter attract supporters of all races. And yet, Hazaras still see themselves as
victims, while non-Hazaras can harbor implicit and sometimes explicit prejudices that prevent
Hazaras from realizing their full potential in Afghanistan.
Collective trauma, then, is something that is largely accepted as a reality, and yet may be
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viewed with suspicion when minority group members are perceived to be trying to take unfair
advantage of a difficult past to secure present entitlements. A key variable is the treatment which
collective trauma receives through media outlets: favorable media portrayals may lead to easier
acceptance of claims of collective trauma, by both minority and mainstream groups. One needs
only look as far as the outpouring of support on social media and elsewhere for “people” of
France and Belgium following the terror attacks of late 2015 and early 2016 to see this. My own
observations seem to indicate that when the victims are more “like us,” the Westerners, and
when the perpetrator has Islamist sympathies, the media portrays the event as the targeting of a
group, a group to which “we Westerners” belong and hence also might take part in
traumatization. If the perpetrator is “like us”, another “Westerner,” he or she is presented as
someone who has gone mad, who is possibly a victim of some sort of mental illness. The feeling
that “we” are under attack in these cases does not appear in media descriptions of the event to
such an extent.
Trauma, in some circumstances, may be felt well beyond the immediate victims, and
media plays a part in spreading the feelings that a group should be traumatized. The question as
to whether trauma can be passed through generations is more contentious — many individuals
claim to feel great psychological pain because of the suffering of their collective ancestors, while
others deny the legitimacy of these feelings. Below, is a passage from my fieldnotes with Qasim
(all names are pseudonyms, unless the individual is a public figure or they asked specifically to
be referred to by their actual name), an informant who was raised in Quetta, Pakistan among the
Hazara community there, and then traveled to Bamyan for work. Qasim and I met at a protest
planning meeting, and he was always willing to talk to me after that, at least once every couple
of weeks. Sometimes we held long conversations/interviews in my quarters, and sometimes at
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his workplace, although the privacy offered in my quarters was preferable — there were always
some things informants did not want overheard. We spoke a mix of Dari in English in this case.
Having grown up partially in Pakistan Qasim had a strong English education, and so we switched
between the languages, discussing ideas and terms in one or the other depending on the context.
In this passage, Qasim speaks at length about the real, recent problems and traumatic events he
has experienced. But in the end of the passage, he brings up points that indicate this is a
collective, if not cultural, trauma he is describing. He says that, with the destruction by the
Taliban of the Buddha statues, Hazaras’ former gods were destroyed, and along with them, part
of their culture. He also relates the entire passage to the genocide that he says Hazaras have
experienced for at least one hundred years. He relates current events to past difficulties faced by
Hazaras, weaving together a single narrative that allowed them to claim genocide is still
happening. This was a common mode of expressing for many activists — the claim that they are
targeted now, but that they were also targeted over one hundred years ago, and that these events
are continuous. In this way, all Hazaras become victims of Abdur Rahman’s purported genocide.

Qasim was raised mainly in Quetta, Pakistan. He was tall, thin, in his late twenties, had
short dark hair, and a habit of sucking on his teeth as he thought about a particular point.
He spoke very cultivated English, and liked to practice language with me. His father was
from the Panjab district of Bamyan, an extremely rural area, while his mother came from
the Lal District in neighboring Ghor Province. The both moved to Mashhad while Zahir
Shah was still in power (so sometime before 1973). There, they met and married, and had
several children. Qasim attended school in Iran until fifth grade, when his family moved
to Quetta, Pakistan, as they believed there would be more educational opportunities for
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the children there. (Iran is well known for barring Afghan children from school, whereas
in Pakistan, Hazaras have been a diaspora long enough that they are recognized as an
official minority group). “Now, we feel Quetta is too dangerous, with the suicide
bombings and targeted shootings of Hazaras, but what can we do? Now we have roots
there. We have a house, and while my parents want to sell, who wants to buy a house in
Hazara Town in Quetta?” Qasim pondered.
Qasim finished high school at an Iranian school in Quetta, and then decided he
wanted to get to know his homeland, so he moved to Bamyan hoping to enroll in
university. However, he found the konkur, the mandatory entrance exam, difficult to pass
as it focused on different subjects than those he learned in school in Quetta. He could not
speak Pashto at all, and said as the school he attended in Quetta was dedicated to the arts,
he was also unable to pass many of the science sections. Luckily, with his very good
English (common in Pakistan, as a former British colony), he found a job with Save the
Children.
“Melissa, I want to leave Afghanistan. I am so afraid of what will happen after
2014, after the withdrawal of troops. I don’t need a luxurious life; I don’t need to go to
Europe. I would be fine in Indonesia or Turkey. I am sick of these Muslim countries
(questioning revealed that since these countries offered, he had heard, more freedom as to
how one can practice religion than Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iran, where a significant
amount of legislation is based on religious tenets, he knew he would have more freedom
to do a he liked in these countries, which are also home to Muslim majorities).
“Working for Save the Children, I think a lot about the problems and danger for
children — but we Hazaras all face problems. I mean, children are never safe here. But a
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close friend of mine was targeted and killed in Quetta for being Hazara…just forty
minutes after I said good-bye to him. For these reasons, while I am not looking to live in
luxury, I need to leave. But I cannot live in Iran because they are racist and insult Hazaras
and deny them rights. I cannot live in Quetta because of the extreme risk of death for
Hazaras and for all Shi’as. And I cannot live in Afghanistan because of the insecurity and
because I don’t know what will happen after 2014 (after most foreign troops were to be
withdrawn), and because every time we travel from Bamyan, we are risking death.
Security is bad here — one takes one’s life into one’s hands every time they move. Three
years ago I tried to escape in a ship, but it sunk off the coast of Turkey. We were rescued
and put in jail. I told the Turks, I do not want luxury, I can stay here. But they did not
accept this.
“But here in Afghanistan, we have many problems because of Pashtuns. With our
looks, we cannot escape identification from them. Second, as Shi’as, we have problems.
Ayatollah Mohseni (one of the main religious and political figures among Shi’as in
Afghanistan) is always bringing up Sunni-Shi’a differences, making it worse for us. They
say, when a Pashtun picks up a gun, he becomes a Taliban, and when he puts it down
again, he is again a Pashtun. That is what we deal with. But the government is no better.
It is when the Americans came that Hazaras came to be human, not animal, for the first
time. We support Americans. When others wanted to burn the American flag, we stopped
them. Hazaras have never killed one U.S. soldier. But we have suffered. The loss of the
Buddhas was, after all, the loss of our former god. What greater loss can there be? But we
Hazaras cannot have an independent country, surrounded as we are. So maybe we should
all just leave Afghanistan. We are distinguishable from the other Afghans, so we will
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never be free, and others will always kill us. We will never live without fear here. My
brother moved to Turkey and he is happy, because it is the first time he feels he is treated
as a human, not a low Hazara. Hazaras are like the untouchables of India. Now, when we
start to get something, education, some opportunities, the others become angry.
Professors at Kabul say that for three hundred years we have been laborers — so what
right do we have for education now? It is dangerous to go to Kabul, to go to Quetta, to go
anywhere, for Hazaras. And if you leave, Iran is racist and Quetta is hell. Or you drown
on a boat to Australia. This is still a genocide, just like it has been for over one hundred
years.”

Qasim’s story is one in which he, and his people, are regularly denied rights because of their
ethnicity. They have problems attending school, and they have problems finding jobs. Worse,
their life is fraught with danger and fear. Every time they travel, they believe they face the
possibility of kidnapping or death. Post-2014, they believed that they would be attacked
immediately by the Pashtun Taliban (which did not happen, although danger during road travel
between cities increased). The situation in Quetta, Pakistan, however, is no better, with suicide
bombings and targeted killings. Qasim does not feel safe in Quetta or Afghanistan, and believes
the level of discrimination against Hazaras in Iran is unbearable. He gives a litany of problems
Hazaras face, discrimination, as well as possible insecurity and killing. All this, for Qasim, is the
continuation of a genocide against Hazaras, which started with Abdur Rahman in the late 1800s.
In the end, this is the root of the problem for Qasim, and he can find no other solution than a life
outside of Afghanistan. Not every activist wants to leave, but many, if given the chance, would
leave, because they believe the problems, which most summed up as genocide, are too great to
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tackle. Hazaras are faced with a difficult choice: Stay and try to improve life as Afghan citizens,
though they do not feel accepted as such? Or leave in search of a life without fear? Who
believing themselves to face genocide would actually stay? And yet many Hazaras, like Qasim,
actually do stay. They hope that the racialized differences, which Qasim alludes to when he says
Hazaras are “distinguishable from other Afghans,” are somehow surmountable, somehow not too
difficult to be overcome. For the time, Qasim stays. He sends money from his moderately wellpaying job in Afghanistan to his family in Quetta. But he has given up on the idea of coexistence,
and knows racially he does not blend in.

Cultural Trauma
A collective trauma can, with time, become cultural trauma, which is not a further development
of a collective trauma, but rather a collective trauma with certain attributes that affect, and
endanger, the very cultural and meaning making core of a group. Cultural trauma, succinctly put
by Ron Eyerman, occurs when a group has “a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the
social fabric…. (2001:2).1 The trauma can then become interwoven into the new identity of the
group as it tries to re-invent itself. This loss of identity and meaning means that the group will
search for new identity and meaning, and the new identity and meaning found, or rather
constructed, can be predicated upon the very idea that a trauma was suffered. This can be
expressed through language of eternal victimization, through a language of the strength of the
survivor, or through some combination of both. This search for new signification, when what
was previously available to a group has been erased or made untenable, is what Eyerman refers
to when he states trauma can be a “cultural process.” As a cultural process, “trauma is mediated
through various forms of representation and linked to the reformation of collective identity and
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the reworking of collective memory” (2001:1).
As Caruth wrote that trauma is not inherent to an event itself, but rather arises after a
period of latency and is actually the memory of the event, a collective trauma is not the direct
experience of a traumatic event, but rather the formation of a collective memory of a trauma.
Should the memory show that the people somehow acted outside of their cultural norms, and
their ideas as to what morals are important for their culture — that they somehow, as a group,
committed a violation so bad it went against their very identity — a cultural trauma might also
be formed. The people in question could believe that others have threatened or harmed their
culture, or that they themselves have done this. Here, then is the difference between collective
trauma, in which people feel trauma as group, but it does not signify an existential threat to who
they are culturally. This memory of a traumatic event goes on to impact the formation of a group
identity of a people (Alexander 2004, Alexander 2012, Eyerman 2001). In other words, an event
happens that is traumatic, and some individuals experience it directly. Perhaps such large
numbers of people experience the event, which came to be traumatic, that it seems natural a
collective memory will be formed that deeply influences its affect for future generations and
impacts their actions, their choices of representation, even their very identity. Or perhaps
relatively few people suffered the event, but it was spread, through mediators, so that a large
number came to be collectively traumatized. It is the nature of the event which will determine
whether it is a cultural trauma, whether the culture of the people was somehow perceived or
actually threatened. In the case of the Hazaras, after the events of the later 1800s, Hazara culture
was at least partially destroyed, social structures dismantled, and religious practices banned. And
at the same time, Hazaras today are using trauma as a significant marker in an identity-building
project. These two points together, in my view, define a movement as cultural trauma.
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The most obvious example is the Holocaust, which was certainly a cultural trauma for
Jews in Europe and worldwide, in that it not only resulted in the deaths of millions, but deeply
impacted group identity in ways which continue to be felt by all group members, and
furthermore, has been expanded into a sort of universal trauma felt throughout a large portion of
the world (Alexander 2001:197). This might be the best example of an event that was almost
inherently traumatic for the collective (and for individuals that experienced it firsthand,
development of trauma was almost guaranteed). But even when the group is threatened in such a
purely existential way, and the horror so great as to be incomprehensible, time and different
mediations can show different incarnations of a collective memory. In the case of the Holocaust,
initial narratives focused on a “Nazi-as-incarnation-of-evil” narrative, and a Western progressive
narrative that led to positive developments such as international organizations being formed to
try to avoid the ramifications of such events in the future. It was only later that witness narratives
by those interned in the camps became a common form of mediation, and the focus became the
victim and the survivor. From this, the cultural trauma, the way we understand the Holocaust
today, has grown (Alexander 2012).2 This took time, and several groups working to promote
their own narrative, their own “take” on the event, before one was settled upon as the current
dominant narrative. Not that the various narratives were in conflict with each other, they simply
had different actors disseminating them with different political goals. Those groups spreading a
particular narrative that is most appealing to the larger population for some reason, and that has
the ability to reach a large number of people, are more likely to have their “version” of the
memory take hold among the collective.
Theorists of cultural trauma have put forth specific criteria for a collective memory to be
considered as such: Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander (2004: 44) states that a memory must be “a)
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laden with negative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as violating a society’s
existence or one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions.” Sociologist Piotr
Sztompka (2004: 158-161) says of cultural traumas that they must be brought about by a change
that is sudden and rapid, that it must be wide and comprehensive, that it must be radical, deep,
fundamental, or touch the core of personal life, and that it must be unexpected, surprising, by
those who experience it. Smelser writes that a cultural trauma “refers to an invasive and
overwhelming event that is believed to undermine or overwhelm one or several ingredients of a
culture or a culture as a whole,” (Smelser 2001: 38). A trap that these theorists of cultural trauma
seem to fall into is the claim that the cultural trauma results from “an event”, or in the case of
Sztompka, “a sudden and rapid change.” In fact, the examples most often given do seem to relate
to events that can be described as discrete: the Holocaust, the end of socialism in the Eastern
bloc, the rape of Nanjing, the partition of India, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
However, such a strong focus on a singular event, particularly, if as Sztompka claims, the event
must include a sudden, rapid change, can exclude cases when a group seems to be suffering a
trauma that is not sudden but continues in the form of systemic oppression marked by a series of
events — as is the case for Hazaras.
Eyerman, in fact, writes that, with respect to African American identity, “the ‘trauma’ in
question is slavery, not as an institution or even experience, but as collective memory….”
(Eyerman 2001:1). Clearly, the enslavement of millions of Africans and their descendants was
not sudden (except for perhaps those who were transported on slave ships), nor, for most who
experienced it, was rapid change involved. The trauma was rather a long-term, deeply entrenched
social system of oppression, to which certain events might be attached, but which overall was
extended. Eyerman does qualify that an event, the disappointment that occurred after freed slaves
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and other blacks, post-civil war, were not integrated into American society, spurred the building
of a new, African American identity. But trauma indicates event, and the event can be something
drawn out, such as slavery.
The same can be said for Hazaras. Although the wars and rebellions experienced in the
late 1800s were a traumatic event, and occurred rapidly, Hazaras went on to experience years of
social exclusion and oppression, which can’t be consigned to a sudden event, but rather a long,
drawn out series of events. The idea of the sudden event seems to be an attempt to unnaturally
relate the cultural or collective trauma of a group to the individual, psychological trauma of a
singular person. While there are some aspects in common, trying to create a perfect fit between
individual and group trauma fosters a model that does not adequately take into account the
differences that must surely also occur. And anyways, it seems that a person exposed to abuse for
a long period of time, those rare individuals who are held captive against their will for periods of
years, for example, cannot be excluded from potentially experiencing trauma, especially when
we define trauma as the memory of the event and not the event itself. Therefore, it is here that I
make a break with these main theorists of cultural trauma.3 Hazaras surely cannot agree which
particular event it was which has most threatened their culture.
Many Hazaras, with a history of enslavement, oppression, mass killing, kidnapping, loss
of land, and ethnic cleansing, believe that they have lost what was once the essence of being
Hazara. Furthermore, Hazaras are experiencing similar problems in two countries which are
home to significant diasporas: Pakistan, where they are increasingly targeted for violence
because of their Shi’a faith, and Iran, where they have suffered discrimination in spite of a shared
Shi’a faith. When one adds to this current anti-immigration sentiment in places such as Australia
and Europe, where large numbers seek asylum, it becomes clear how activists and other Hazaras
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are left feeling that they have no place to call their own. Many among the community are hence
trying to reclaim, or remake, what it means to be Hazara. Central to their project is the suffering
to which Hazaras have been subjected.
Cultural trauma can be an intergenerational project, whereby a collective trauma
experienced by a group is passed on to its descendants. However, this is not always the case.
Many Hazara youth in Bamyan are relearning about what exactly happened to Hazara culture
and way of life from activists, and are hence picking up a trauma that, for many, had been lost or
forgotten in much of the general population in the intervening years of subservience and conflict.
Hazara activists are (re)creating their history and spreading their version of history. Alongside
this history comes, for many, an experience of cultural trauma, or, more abstractly, the feeling
that culture itself has been traumatized.
The term “cultural trauma” is appropriate for Hazaras on several different levels. First, in
some way, the identity, meaning, and social structure, of the group was lost or severely
threatened. In this sense, it is as if the culture, as well as the individuals who experienced the
event, and the collectivity with whom the story has been shared, are all traumatized. Individuals,
the group, and the very culture have all faced an existential threat. The upheaval experienced by
society was so great that the people’s very existence was threatened. As the story of this event,
this upheaval, is retold, it results in cultural trauma. Those doing the retelling might be quite far
removed from the event: temporally, as the event might have happened several hundred years
ago; spatially, as those affected might consider themselves part of the group that experienced the
event but were not close to where the event actually took place; or relationally — that is, the
group relationship might be “imagined” in Benedict Anderson’s terms, so no one really related to
the hearer was affected. An existential threat to the group, turned into narratives and retold, are
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the makings of cultural trauma. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are a good example
for the second two points, as while the United States was not actually faced with an existential
threat, mediators created the impression that it was, and this impression continues to this day.
The cultural trauma is hence leading to some sort of social change which is likely going
to be contested within the group. It is usually spurred by a social movement (in this case, that of
the activists), and many in the community might not be open to bringing such issues to the
forefront of their concerns, especially initially. Cultural trauma is not, then, a “discovery” one
makes but is rather a construct, worked in discursively and promoted socially. Hazara activists
discuss what their cultural trauma entails, debate it, while at the same time their points are
mediated by Hazara politicians and sometimes greater Afghan society. During, by way of, and
after this discursive exchange, a clearer model of a specific cultural trauma and its attributes
emerges. Through this process, the political aspects of cultural trauma become clearer. Activists
and other Hazara power brokers constantly discuss, argue about, try out, use for a while, and
discard after a period of time or sometimes right away, particular trauma narratives depending
upon how useful they are. Some narratives work against Hazara causes, and these are discussed
and, if such realization is made, discarded. In the case of the Hazaras, we will see what types of
changes are occurring, and what changes activists are pushing for. The question of the
community’s reception of cultural trauma messages is important, too, though, not having done a
systematic opinion survey, my evidence base here is less certain and complete.

Hazaras and Cultural Trauma Theory
Finally, all of this upheaval, all of this loss and change, does not mean that the groups involved
are left with a blank slate. Upheaval, as opposed to continuity, is often, if not always, a driver for
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the traumatogenesis of a cultural trauma. At the most extreme pole, trauma itself becomes an
important addition to the culture beset by trauma, but of course, it is sown with shreds and
patches of custom, some social structures that remain, and language, unchanged or remnants.
Cultures might be threatened, torn apart, social structures eradicated, but remnants and
memories, and patterns exist. At the same time, new cultural ideals are borrowed. Historically, a
particular Hazara feudal social system was completely destroyed by the Afghan state. But a
system in which certain individuals maintained power over others was re-implemented by the
state. The traditional feudal leaders were removed, and in their place were instated individuals
who had cooperated with the government when the Hazaras were subdued.4 Furthermore,
religious narratives remain strong and lend themselves particularly well to creation of trauma.
And finally, many, especially activists, are embracing, or at least paying lip service, to
universalizing (often promoted as Western although not necessarily so) ideals such as human
rights, gender equality, education, and so on. This is another strand. This mix of old and new are
cultural artifacts and cultural importations upon which a trauma-based identity is being
overwritten by the activists.
In part, the activists appear to promote a “culture of trauma,” repeating histories, ancient
and recent, that fit with the idea that they are oppressed, their way of life has been destroyed, to
an extent unknown by any other group in Afghanistan. This fits in very well with Shi’a
narratives of victimhood and martyrdom. On the other hand, activists want to show that they are
the future of Afghanistan, exceptional not only in their suffering but in the propensity for change.
Ironically, one might relate to the other — if Hazara culture was so completely destroyed, it
makes sense that they would be open to new ways of doing things. Hence they stress their
openness to universal values, to multiculturalism, to tolerance, to gender equality. And yet at the
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same time, they make the circular claim that many of these values are actually ancient, original
values that they have always carried with them.
These criteria can apply to events that happened to most, if not all, groups in Afghanistan
today. That is to say, while other groups have not experienced such extreme events such as
genocide, enslavement, and years of systemic oppression, all have experienced the past forty
years of warfare. Hazaras seem to be the singular group of people, though, who are taking the
memory of past cataclysms and using them to construct and promote cultural trauma. The
reasons for this might relate to a much longer history of traumatic events to draw on, to religious
narratives that tend to glorify martyrdom in the name of justice, or other unknown factors. This
trend among Hazaras was apparent not only from speaking with Hazaras, but also by listening to
common refrains by members of other ethnicities. Friends who were not Hazara, and particularly
those who lived in areas where ethnicity was mixed, seemed generally aware that they were
witnessing some sort of Hazara identity-building project. This project was met with a mixture of
admiration, fear, and sometimes disgust, often combined and expressed by the same person.
Zafar, a prominent political figure who was very knowledgeable about the various political and
social movements happening in the capital city, summed up this feeling as we sat in his office
sipping green tea, eating nuts and raisins, and discussing my research during a trip to Kabul.

These Hazaras, they are impressive. They are getting educated. They are achieving top
political positions. They are even successful in business. And you can’t deny that they
have had a difficult time, that historically they have suffered. But can’t they understand?
(Pauses). I mean, don’t they realize, when they talk so much about these difficulties they
experienced, when they are so outspoken about it, that they alienate everyone else?

29

Perhaps it would be better if they were a bit more restrained.

Zafar’s unease, echoed by so many, signals the very potency of the Hazara movement, and the
fact that those civil society activists heading the movement are, in fact, successful in reaching a
larger population. It also indicates that cultural trauma is something constructed volitionally, and
is specific to Hazaras more than to Afghans as a whole. What might bring Hazaras together as a
political force could also drive a wedge between them and their potential allies in Afghanistan.
When Hazara activists take their movement online, clashes with other ethnic groups can
become more heated. For example, in May 2016, large protests broke out because a power line,
known as TUTAP for the countries it would traverse (Turkmenistan – Uzbekistan – Tajikistan –
Afghanistan – Pakistan), be routed through the Salang Pass, avoiding Bamyan.5 Information
emerged that Bamyan had been considered as a potential route, and that both Bamyan and Salang
routes offered both advantages and disadvantages. In the end, the Salang route was chosen. The
lack of reliable electricity in Markaz Bamyan has long been a sore point for Hazaras. On
Facebook, when Hazaras would voice their discontent concerning the decision to use the Salang
route, other ethnicities would fire back, accusing Hazaras of claiming discrimination that had
been already eradicated, just to benefit at the expense of others. Some non-Hazaras involved in
these online arguments claimed that Hazaras have a harmful culture of martyrdom or victimhood
that they persist in using politically to the detriment of other groups. The issues expanded, with
people of other groups pointing out they also suffer from underdevelopment and insecurity, but
do not disrupt things with large protests because of it but rather focus on bringing the country
together.6 Hazaras answer that they are targeted by insurgents of other groups specifically
because of their ethnicity, and are denied infrastructure because of their ethnicity. One individual
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who posted, Ali, who is of mixed ethnicity, stated, “So, the goal of this protest — which blocked
roads throughout Kabul and led to hundreds, maybe thousands, of shops and businesses being
closed, was to bring electricity to Bamyan, except now the government has suspended work on
TUTAP for six months. Now, more people will continue to be without reliable power for
longer.” Ahmad, a Hazara, answered, “The protest didn’t block the roads. The government did.”
Then Yaqub, of unknown ethnicity but probably not Hazara, chimed in, “Administration blocked
roads because of your racist and uncivilized protests.” Yaqub seems to be playing a “reverse
racism” card, which holds that when Hazaras bring up race, they are the ones who are racist.
(Another post said in answer to a Hazara, “Whatever you say doesn’t count, you are just another
racist Hazara.”). Far from being “uncivilized,” the protests were not only peaceful but actually
moved with their own teams of garbage collectors to clean up as the more than 4,000 protesters
moved through the city. My experience has indicated that many who discriminate against them
commonly call Hazaras “uncivilized,” because non-Hazaras think it morally improper that
Hazaras take more liberal attitudes towards many issues, such as women’s seclusion. Other, even
more offensive comments about Hazaras also commonly materialize in on-line forums, referring
to their slanted eyes, flat noses, or as “mushkhur (mouse eater,” a very common derogative
epithet against Hazaras).

Carrier Groups, Movement Intellectuals, Social Entrepreneurs
No matter how traumatizing, violent and oppressive, events themselves do not create lasting,
intergenerationally-transmitted cultural traumas. Rather, the mediation of people who re-tell the
stories of past traumas must happen for this to occur (Smelser 2001). A smaller group, who serve
as “agents” of the trauma, spread the trauma throughout the group at large. They might do so
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intentionally, or it might be an unintended consequence of other goals they have. For example,
some Hazara activists believe that memorialization of Hazara genocide and mass killing is of the
utmost importance, and seem to work directly towards the spread of trauma. Others were more
concerned with addressing issues of underdevelopment, but their narratives almost always
include the years of discrimination which resulted in underdevelopment of Hazara areas. The
spread of trauma in this case seems to be more of a side-effect. However, involvement by the
activists in one or another type of issue is usually not mutually exclusive.
Alexander bases his description of agents on Weber’s concept of “carrier groups,” which
Weber described in reference to religious movements. Alexander writes of carrier groups:

Carrier groups have both ideal and material interests, they are situated at particular places
in the social structure, and they have particular discursive talents for articulating their
claims — for what might be called “meaning making” — in the public sphere. Carrier
groups may be elites, but they may also be denigrated or marginalized classes. They may
be prestigious religious leaders or groups whom the majority has designated as spiritual
pariahs. A carrier group can be generational, representing the perspectives and interests
of a younger generation against an older one. It can be national, pitting one’s own nation
against a putative enemy. It can be social, representing one particular social sector or
organization against others in a fragmented and polarized social order (Alexander 2004:
11).

In many ways, Alexander’s definition of carrier groups fits Hazara civil society activists. They
are of a certain generation and occupy a certain place in the social structure — most are young
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and have high school or university education. Educational attainments give them a degree of
influence that most other young adults not have. This also gives them access to positions, for
example, with foreign and local development NGOs, which confer respect from the community.
Yet in Afghanistan more generally, as Hazara, they almost by definition come from a denigrated
class. They are certainly not religious leaders. Though some have been trained as mullahs, none
currently works as a mullah. They might sometimes cooperate with the religious establishment
but, more often, younger members denounce the religious establishment as backwards, as
working against Hazara interests, as concerned simply with spreading Shi’a (or Iranian) interests.
In this way, many consider them religious pariahs, and are wary of them, even as they are given
a grudging respect for working for greater rights and conditions for all people in the community.
They are sometimes guilty of pitting one ethnic group against another, as they tend to cast their
problems in terms of oppression at the hands of a Pashtun ruling elite, a theme to which I will
return. And generally, they do have material and ideal interests. They very much want to
improve their community, to improve all of Afghanistan, to make it a place with peace, security,
and equal opportunities for all. But there are also material gains activists can realize, as they
become part of their own particular “in-group”.
Eyerman’s elaborates on the idea of the carrier group as follows:

[I]ntellectuals, in the term’s widest sense, play a significant role. Intellectual here will
refer to a socially constructed, historically conditioned role rather than to a structurally
determined position or a personality type. Although bound up with particular individuals,
the notion will refer more to what they do than who they are. Generally speaking,
intellectuals mediate between the cultural and political spheres that characterize modern
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societies, not so much representing and giving voice to their own ideas and interests, but
rather articulating ideas to and for others. Intellectuals are mediators and translators
between spheres of activity and differently situated social groups, including the
situadedness in time and space. Intellectuals in this sense can be film directors and
singers of songs, as well as college professors. In addition, social movements produce
“movement intellectuals” who may lack the formal education usually associated with the
term intellectual, but whose role in articulating the aims and values of a movement allow
one to call them by that name (Eyerman 2001: 3-4).

This description fits, as Hazara activists are certainly mediators between the cultural and
political. They claim that Hazaras are culturally more open to universal ideals such as human
rights, seeking a political goal to ameliorate the systemic social exclusion of Hazaras. And they
use Shi’a religious patterns and idioms to try to promote their political goals to the larger
population. They stand between politicians, both Hazara and non-Hazara, and the Hazara masses,
and attempt to pursue certain goals with respect to each. And while some are certainly
intellectuals, many more have a basic degree and a job that requires some education, although
nothing too advanced. In fact, they know who the “real” Hazara intellectuals are, and they
respect and defer to those intellectuals’ work on Hazara history by translating and summarizing it
for the rest of the population. In these senses, they are surely mediators.
To me, the labels of social or moral entrepreneur fit best. An entrepreneur can be
someone working for his own interest while at the same time advancing the interest of society as
a whole, whether through business or non-governmental organizations. The civil society activists
always work as mediators between the people, the government, international actors, and others,
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while also seeking more selfish aims. Hence, it is never clear whether their self-aggrandizement
was selfless or selfish. In seeking to become leaders of a movement, is it their own leadership or
the movement which they seek to promote? I feel certain that most of my informants sincerely
want to help their communities while also sincerely wanting to become as successful as they
could as activists.
In this dissertation, then, I examine would-be agents of cultural trauma, self-described
Hazara civil society activists, described by me as social/moral entrepreneurs, as they seek to
construct, promote, and spread a cultural trauma for the larger group, Hazaras as a whole. I
consider the particular media through which these activists promote cultural trauma and the types
of representation they use, and what historical and cultural contexts lead the activists to choose
certain concepts, tropes and narratives. All traumatic events, all instances of collective
remembering and all social movements, unfold in a particular way because of the cultural
signifiers and historical contexts available to the actors. James Wertsch posits that there is a
tension between active agents, in this case, the activists, and the cultural tools they use to create
collective realities (Wertsch 2002:11). Cultural tools might include actual tools, such as social
media, which provide specific ways to interact and spread ideas, or cultural narratives, such as
the Karbala Paradigm, rooted in the story of the martyrdom of the Shi’a sect’s founder, Hussein,
at the hands of a corrupt and unjust ruler. Wertsch is drawing upon Bakhtin’s perspective that
every utterance is multivocal, inclusive of a speaker, a listener, and the voice or voices which are
“heard” before the speaker utters the word (Wertsch 2002:16, Bakhtin 1981). A basis of shared
knowledge makes these media or concepts or narratives “cultural.” Activists are speaking to a
people who have already “heard” the voices of the martyrs of Karbala on many prior occasions.
Similarly, when they meet with each other, they rely upon their fellow activists being already
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familiar with “Western” human rights universals and exemplars such as King, Gandhi and
Mandela. The power of their speech is thus enhanced by both Shi’a and Western-derived
epistemologies and traditions. Much is, then, already “heard” by the listeners. Because Shi’a
ideals and narrative archetypes speak particularly “loudly” for much of the Hazara audience, I
devote particular attention to how activists are influenced by Shi’a thought and speak through
Shi’a idioms and paradigms.
Therefore, Hazara civil society activists have available to them several paths to choose
from in representing cultural trauma, several cultural tools to choose from, per Wertsch, or, as
Bakhtin might say, several sets of “voices,” which add significance to all their communications.
Activists take two very different modes of understanding the world, the Karbala Paradigm and
the rights and liberal “universals” promoted by Western actors in Afghanistan today, and
reconcile these to form a seamless whole. Similarly, Hazara activists merge the cultural trauma
of Shi’a rituals that commemorate and make felt the suffering of martyrs with much more recent
mass killings, displacements and political martyrdoms. Hence, the two are woven together in the
minds of many Hazaras. Among Hazara activists, the two concepts enter into a discursive
relationship in the Hazara identity project. Hazaras seem to be predisposed to a “trauma”
narrative as Shi’as, while at the same time, they make the claim that they are inherently more
open to the universal ideals promoted by the West in Afghanistan, both because they claim
descent from the cosmopolitan, Silk Road culture that dominated the region centuries ago, and
because their main political leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, spoke of the importance of human rights
and gender equality. At the same time, the death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban is
interpreted as a martyrdom in the tradition of the martyrdom of Hussein.
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The Plan of the Dissertation
The next chapter will provide an overview of Bamyan. It will explain why it, in particular, is an
important place for Hazaras, and why activists’ activities take on a certain flavor in this province.
A background of Hazaras’ interactions with the Afghan state will also be presented, to explain
their claims of oppression and even genocide. This chapter will set the stage, so the reader can
understand how the particular collective and cultural trauma of the Hazara activists came to be.
The third chapter will provide a more in-depth look at cultural trauma as it relates to
Hazaras particularly. Those aspects of Hazara history and identity which shape and flavor trauma
will be considered. Furthermore, different types of trauma will be introduced. In some cases,
trauma can come from having harmed others as well as being harmed. This is all the more
important to bring up when activists are promoting narratives of peaceful protest, human rights,
and equality. At times, a disconnect exists between an individuals’ past actions and current
worldview.
The fourth chapter introduces the activists’ work, goals, and views in a more in-depth
fashion. I examine the way that the activists view civil society and its role in greater society, and
consider several “case studies” of important protests the activists were engaged in while I was in
Bamyan. Activists view “politics” as a polluting factor, and stress that what they do is somehow
inherently not political. It seemed necessary then to examine the seeming contradiction of
pursuing political aims through “non-political” means.
The fifth chapter considers the Karbala Paradigm, gives a background of Shi’ism, and
delves into the role that religion plays in activists’ lives. The Karbala Paradigm — the idea that
all Shi’as live with, and model their lives after, certain narratives concerning martyrdom and
justice — became key in understanding how the activists talk about Hazara trauma to the greater
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population. Understanding activists’ religious viewpoint, and how they use religious narratives in
their project, is vital to understand how they connect with other Hazaras.
The sixth chapter considers one event — a memorial protest and march for the
anniversary of the Afshar Massacre (1993), in which several hundred to several thousand
Hazaras were killed in the civil war (1992-1996) in Kabul. The memorial events are compared
directly to the holy days of Muharram and Ashura, when Shi’as remember the death of Imam
Hussein, their most important religious figure after Mohammad and possibly Ali. I consider this
to be a collective-memory building event which makes clear use of the Karbala Paradigm.
In the seventh chapter, I consider the role of martyrdom as it is used by activists in their
project. The most important Hazara martyr is Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of the Hazara mujahedin
and political party Hizb-e-Wahdat, which succeeded in uniting Hazaras under ethnic auspices for
the first time. Mazari, and other important Hazara martyrs, will be compared to Hussein and Ali,
to show that this, too, represents a continuation of the Karbala Paradigm.
Finally, the eighth chapter addresses history. Against the Hazara claim that their history,
along with their culture, has been stolen or erased by the Afghan state, I examine new ways that
Hazaras are (re)constructing their history. The idea that their history has been stolen or destroyed
is a key factor in Hazara narratives of cultural trauma. Then, I consider two points of contention
from the ancient past — whether or not Hazaras can be considered descendants from the ancient
Buddhist inhabitants of Bamyan, and whether they should be considered descendants of Mongol
invaders. I then discuss both the ways in which, and the reasons why, Hazara activists recast both
of these aspects of history, contrary to what is often popularly accepted, asserting that they are
descended from early Buddhists and that they are likely not descended from Mongols. It will be
shown that many view outside insistence on Mongol descent as one more instance of
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discrimination against Hazaras, as Mongols are often cast as “murderers” and “killers” (despite it
being hundreds of years since they invaded Afghanistan). The idea that Hazaras are descended
from Buddhists, who they describe as peaceful, serves as a foil to the Mongol narrative. Through
this narrative, Hazaras attempt to regain control of their history.
The primary concern of this dissertation will not be the establishment of the “truth” of an
event, such as numbers killed or injured, whether it happened exactly as those telling the story of
the event claim it did, and in some cases, whether it happened at all. Where there are
discrepancies in numbers or versions of events that I am aware of, I will bring awareness to these
discrepancies and try to analyze why they exist. More important is the way that the
representation of certain events come to hold an important meaning concerning what it means to
be Hazara today, and how this meaning comes to define and make salient the “groupness” of
“Hazara” for Hazaras themselves. The following is from my field notes. It provides an example
as to how a trauma can be experienced collectively when no one present has actually experienced
the traumatic event in question:

Watching the film commemorating the Afshar Massacre, I was struck by the reactions of
those around me. Tears ran down the faces of people who had not only not been in the
Afshar section of Kabul when it was bombed during the civil war, but who likely did not
even know anyone with connections to the area. It did not matter; Hazara ethnic feeling
was strong enough that this was seen as an attack on all present. I was also affected, and
cried, but I can’t claim the same affect as that experienced by Hazaras. I noted that in the
short talk before the showing, it was stated that between 4,000 and 7,000 Hazaras were
killed in the attack. All official accounts, from organizations such as Human Rights
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Watch, (2005), for example, stated much lower casualty numbers, from the hundreds to
no more than 2,000. It is possible the numbers were much higher, that people were
simply uncounted, or that women who were missing were not reported because of issues
relating to honor. But I could never get a firm answer from my informants when I later
asked for their sources for these high numbers, and I soon gave up this line of questioning
so as not to lose credibility and seem that I did not believe them or was working against
their interests. In the end, after all, it did not seem to matter. The same number of people
were experiencing the event through the film, tears streaming down their faces, and
hearing the figures 4,000-7,000 killed.

I am not seeking to tell a “truth” about what happened, but rather describe the actions, accounts,
and subjective experiences of a particular category – Hazara civil society activists, who are one
of several categories (as Hazara political leaders can also be said to be representing this cultural
trauma as well, as well as others), although perhaps the most vocal, working towards the current
construction of a cultural trauma and framing it as an integral part of Hazara current and future
identity.
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Chapter Two
Bamyan: A Land of Peace and a Land of Conflict

Markaz Bamyan is a conglomeration of settlements, stretching out in about a fifty-kilometer
radius from the center itself, which is a mile and a half stretch of road, along which sits a bazaar.
At first glance this bazaar area seems inconsequential. It can be walked from one end to the other
in no more than 45 minutes. A few small crossroads intersect with the main road. But the bazaar
is surrounded by several villages, some quite old and others which emerged from the dusty
ground recently, mainly to accommodate returned refugees. A plateau close-by has been
developed, to accommodate government and office buildings as well as housing, and is now
known as Shahr-e-Nau, or New City. The New Zealand PRT, or Provincial Reconstruction
Team, was located here, as is UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)
headquarters. The proximity of these two important foreign institutions likely explains why the
Shahr-e-Nau area is being developed. The university has two sites — an old one that is near the
bazaar, and a new one located about a forty-five minute walk through a steep ravine that
stretches north-west from the bazaar. NGO offices are mainly located in the bazaar itself, as well
as in Shahr-e Nau and in some of the closer residential areas. The main such area is Zargaron,
which is on a hill rising up from one end of the bazaar. The bazaar area and surrounding villages
(many located as far as a forty-five minutes’ drive from the bazaar), with an estimated population
of 60,000, is Markaz Bamyan and it “suburbs.”
As home to the university, the PRT, UNAMA Bamyan headquarters, the governor’s
office, and many NGOs and development organizations, this small place is important. While
difficult to get to, it still serves as a gateway for travelers to the rest of the province from Kabul,
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meaning economically, for the region, it plays an important role. I chose it for my fieldsite
because it is where civil society activists would organize and stage protests against the
government or UNAMA for not giving for attention to problems faced by Hazaras. The activists
are linked to the university, to the NGOs, sometimes to the government. Many of them are
students, professors, NGO and development workers, with a few government civil servants
thrown in. Even though there is an active civil society in other districts of Bamyan, it was
essential that I be at the provincial seat, where most of the action was happening.
Bamyan not only is valuable as a government seat, economic gateway, and main bazaar
for the region but it is also a place which contains physical reminders for Hazaras of who they
are as a people. It was home to the giant Buddha statues destroyed by the Taliban, whose empty
niches are located directly behind the bazaar — no more than a five to ten-minute walk. It is
home to Shahr-e-Gholghola, an ancient city, first Buddhist, then Muslim, and now a pile of ruins,
a large built-up hill-fortress with multiple spires emerging from the ground, which was destroyed
by the Mongols. Gholghola is located just a five-minute walk through the potato fields behind
the bazaar. These sites are constantly visible from all parts of the central bazaar area. The
Buddhas are now invisible ghosts staring out of massive, empty niches, and the ruins of
Gholghola are a pile of rubble with remaining impressive spires. They cause you to wonder
about Bamyan’s past splendor, if you know something of the history of the area. They also stand
for all of the central highlands and for all of the Hazarajat, homeland of the Hazaras. The Buddha
niches and Shahr-e-Ghoghola represent ancestors who, depending whom you talk to, were
Buddhists and Mongols, or one or the other, or neither. Yet the emptiness of the Buddha niches
and the ruination of Gholghola, serve as a metaphor for the travails of a people who came to call
themselves Hazara. The landscape is written over with past violence, as is traces of Bamyan’s
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“cosmopolitan” history, that is, the history of the Silk Road era, when peoples of many identities
and religions mingled. Being Shi’a, and descendants of the Buddhists, and descendants of the
Mongols all come together in one merged Hazara identity. Even for those for whom being
Hazara now holds preeminence over all other identities, including that of Shi’a Islam, both the
past violence and the cultural mixing stand at the heart of what it means to be Hazara. Even as
this Hazara identity is not simply given but must be built, the place, Markaz Bamyan, symbolizes
all of this — at the very least to the activists embarking on an identity building project, and many
others, as well.
Given the importance of the above, which many Hazaras, activists and others, expressed,
I found it strange that Markaz Bamyan has only recently been restored as the seat of the Hazara
homeland (Figure 1). After the Pashtuns subjugated the Hazaras more than a century ago, they,
and their allies, dispossessed the Hazaras. Sunni Tajiks maintained control of the bazaar and
relegated trade. It is unclear whether the Tajiks were transplants or small minority communities
who had lived for a long time in the region but they quickly took on the arrogance of wealthy
merchants, according to my informants, treating Hazaras poorly, charging them high prices and
excluding them from trade. The cultural trauma about which I write relates in large part to this
Hazara history of being removed from one’s place, then reclaiming it.
What is known about the history of Hazara identity suggests that it has changed
significantly in the last hundred years. My reading of this history shows that a majority of
Hazaras previously considered their adherence to the Twelver Shi’a faith7 the most important
aspect of their identity. Now, many Hazaras consider their ethnic identity most important — that
is to say, the aspect of their identity which seems to motivate them to action or which they
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FIGURE 1
Afghanistan’s Provinces

Source: Afghanistan Online Map of Provincial Districts.
http://www.afghan-web.com/geography/provincial_divisions.html
44

themselves describe as most important. It was clearly stated to me that in the past, Hazaras viewed
themselves as Shi’a first, Hazaras second, and this governed political decisions but that, at a certain
point during the war years, the importance assigned to these two identities was flipped.
In this background chapter, I seek to accomplish three things. I will first describe what
has happened in Afghanistan to make land such an important issue for Hazaras, and to tie it so
closely to trauma. In connection with this, I will show how the land itself can remind Hazaras of
traumas suffered. Of course, other issues related to discrimination are now seen as extremely
important as well, but the story started with a history of a loss of control over a homeland.
Second, I will show what political developments led to a change in how Hazaras understand their
identity. Shi’ism and ethnicity, as well as nationality (as citizens of Afghanistan), compete
among Hazaras as the most important “groups” they consider themselves to be a part of. For the
moment, ethnicity is winning out to a degree not seen among other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
Third, I seek to give an idea as to what kind of place Bamyan is, while also going into greater
depth about why certain issues encountered in the field may have resonated with me.
Markaz Bamyan is located in the center of Bamyan district (Figure 2). The “tribal map”
is by no means exact but does show in rough outline the general geographical location of
Afghanistan’s different ethnic groups. Besides showing concentrations of ethnic Tajiks in the
region, the map also indicates where the Sheikh Ali Hazaras reside, who are exceptional among
Hazaras as they are mainly Sunni and do not always maintain good relations with their Shi’a coethnics. Shi’a Hazaras often accuse the Sheikh Ali Hazaras of having worked with the Taliban,
even though those from Sheikh Ali are not actively fighting against the government.
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FIGURE 2
The Districts of Bamyan Province.

Source: Afghanistan Zendabad. http://www.afzenda.com/Report%20of%20Bamiyan.html
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The Importance of Place
During my eighteen months of fieldwork in Markaz Bamyan, Afghanistan, I would often stand,
not far from the village, Saroa-e-Syob, where I lived, on the top of a nearby cliff to take in the
view. On one of my last walks before leaving my field site, I was accompanied by my friend and
long-time informant, Jawad. We were reflective, sometimes commenting and sometimes looking
out in silence, as we viewed many of the heritage sites and landscape features of this small
bazaar town. Across the valley, almost directly north, I saw the larger cliff face that contains two
huge niches, roughly human-shaped, which once housed two giant Buddha statues from the 5th
and 6th centuries, famously destroyed by the Taliban in March 2001 as un-Islamic idols. I
remembered Jawad telling me months earlier, “the Buddhas are our biography, we have the same
faces, so they prove we belong here.” The Buddha cliff face, high mountains rising and
extending behind it, also houses at least a thousand caves which were once cells of Buddhist
monks living in the monastery that thrived in the valley during the time that the statues were
built. People still inhabit the caves, sometimes building additions which make their houses seem
to emerge from the cliff face. Life in the caves is hard, but they provide a warmer space in
winter and cooler space in summer to people who might otherwise have only flimsy shelter
against the elements.
Jawad said, “The history of the land shelters the people who live there.” For Jawad, the
land belongs to the people, and the people to the land, inseparably. And yet, the land has a
bloody history. Something about this bloody past seemed to indicate to Jawad that there was
protection, because in the end, the people had survived.
Activists use the violent past experienced by Hazaras in an effort to ensure that such
violence will be avoided in the future (despite misgivings that this might be an impossible
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project). But, if bringing attention to what had happened to Hazaras in the past on that land can,
indeed, somehow protect them, the land offers protection not only through sheltering caves, but
also through promoting awareness about the very past that has been wrought upon Hazaras. By
displaying their traumatic pasts, activists hope to find protection — from the government, from
international institutions. Having been a victim means one had survived, and displaying
victimhood is a strategy to seek continuing survival. Victimhood, in Bamyan, is written upon the
land.
Returning to my reflections with Jawad, to my right, to the east from this overlook, I
made out a huge mound, ancient structures and towers reaching from its heights, rising from
potato fields. This is Gholghola city, Shahr-e-Gholghola, or the City of Screams, whose
construction began in the 6th Century and is said to have been destroyed by the armies of Chingiz
Khan in the 13th Century. I knew that further in this direction, as one follows the main road out
of Bamyan, is a similar cliff top fortress, Zuhak City, Shahr-e-Zuhak, built sometime between
the 5th and 9th Century. Jawad and I looked straight down, to the main street of the bazaar, one
and two story mud shops stretching in a line between the river and the potato fields. The bazaar
is pressed in between inhospitable foothills and mountains, and a high plateau, which rise on
either side of it. Hardly anyone builds houses in the actual valley — besides the bazaar,
structures that make up surrounding villages cling to hillsides, so that every bit of arable land is
in use during the short growing season. This bazaar is relatively new. The ruins of the old bazaar
— deteriorating, roofless mud walls that now look almost as ancient as Gholghola or Zuhak city
— are closer to the Buddha cliffs. They stretched to our left along the road that leads out of town
to the west. The old bazaar, mainly run by Tajik merchants, was destroyed in the fierce fighting
that took place during the civil war of 1992 through 1996 and during the resistance against the
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Taliban. Behind us, to the south, extending from the cliff on which I stood, more potato fields
and Saroa-e-Syob village are located on a plain that was also the base of the New Zealand
Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT, until the New Zealanders withdrew in 2013. The local
airport — a gravel runway while I was there — is also located on the plain. This high plain is
also home to many international NGOs and development organizations, as well as government
institutions, including the governor’s house. One can drive over winding roads to villages in the
southern direction, such as Shah Fulladi, where people live at higher altitudes. The road climbs
through the foothills, heading up towards the mountains, and encounters several villages on the
way. Directly behind us stood a huge billboard with a picture of Abdul Ali Mazari, the martyred
Hazara leader, seeming to look down protectively on his people.
Other important villages were nearby. On the road to Kabul, to the east, is Shash Pul,
mainly inhabited by resettled refugees who told me they are in a disagreement with the nearby
landowner who seems to be a remnant of Hazaras’ feudal past. Closer, to the southeast, is
Sayedabad. Sayeds are descendants of the Prophet Mohammad, but I was told that no Sayeds
lived in this very large village. Rather, the founder, over one hundred years ago, revered them.
To the northeast, directly off the end of the bazaar and built upon a dusty hill with no vegetation,
is Zargaron, a village I lived in during my pilot field project in summer 2010. It is also relatively
new, made up mostly of returned refugees, and no one could tell me why its name meant “gold
smiths.” Taking the road west out of town, you pass the large village Surkhrud. Other important
villages in this area include Mullah Ghulam and Azhdar. Azhdar is named after a particular
geographical feature, a small rocky ridge that appeared to look like a dragon. The dragon’s “eye”
is forever crying as a small spring bubbled out from the spot that would be his head. Local
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legend said that Imam Ali had killed the dragon to save the people nearby, and that is why it
cries. In all of these villages live people who work in Markaz Bamyan.
Bamyan has long attracted outsiders to visit its remarkable sites. In the 7th century the
Chinese monk Xuan Zang traveled to the area and left behind a diary detailing the kingdom,
including the Buddha statues. European, mainly British, explorers in the 19th century also left
travel accounts. In the 1960s and 1970s, Western tourists followed the “hippy trail,” including
Afghanistan, and enjoyed the natural and heritage sights of Bamyan. Today, Bamyan is one of
the safest provinces in Afghanistan and because of this and its many unique sites, tourists of a
different type visit. The provinces surrounding Bamyan are dangerous and travel by road into the
province is risky, but for internationals working for NGOs that allow them access to
humanitarian flights, Bamyan becomes a place for a sort of “R&R” in Afghanistan. Commercial
flights can also now take you to and from Kabul.
The beauty of Bamyan does not stop in Markaz. As one leaves heading west, one passes
Shahidon, a nearby town that features a qala, or fortress-house, on top of striped red and cream
cliffs. Further, one enters Yakawlang District, and within forty-five minutes after leaving
Bamyan one comes to Band-e-Amir, a six-lake complex of astounding beauty which many
inhabitants love to visit for a picnic, possibly a swim, and a ride on the swan paddle-boats that
still remain from the days when Bamyan was truly a tourist destination on the hippy trail.
Continuing further, you reach the seat of Yakawlang, Nayak, and slightly further, you get to the
chaman, a grassy plain where the narrow river valley widens and land changes from farms to
pasture.
Hazaras know that this landscape was only recently a battlefield. Beitamoshkin and
several adjoining villages, located in this lush river valley just past the district center of Nayak,
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were the site of one of the worst instances of Taliban brutality in Bamyan Province. Taliban and
Hizb-e-Wahdat forces fought for control of the district in 2000. After the Taliban won, around
three hundred men were massacred, the victims having been Sayeds, who do not consider
themselves Hazara but Arab. Some activists claim that the Sayeds sought to join the Taliban, to
save themselves, and were, as they approached the Taliban forces, easily cut down. Today, a
small memorial stands on top of a wind-swept hill, listing the names of those killed. This
incident points to the intricacies of ethnically-based conflict, as much of the outside world, the
Taliban included, did not differentiate Shi’a Sayeds from Shi’a Hazaras.
I was taken to the site by a local woman, Parvin, who lost several family members in the
massacre. We, and several other people around us, went from one marker to another, paying our
respect in silence. Like the ruined bazaar in Markaz Bamyan, ruined houses serve as a daily
reminder of past violence in Beitamoshkin, except in this case the victims continue to inhabit the
ruins. Visiting Beitamoshkin, before I viewed the memorial, I was surprised by the construction
of the houses into a small cliff face, on top of older houses, now used for livestock or simply
abandoned. In these old houses you can see broken dishes, water carriers, and old clothes,
bearing silent testimony to the old life, rapidly left behind. To get to the new living areas, you
scramble up the steep cliff face. I asked Parvin, “Why were the houses built like this?” She told
me a brief version of the story. “After the Taliban massacred the people, they went from one
house to another, burning them. Every family lost at least several male relatives, fathers, uncles,
sons, nephews, brothers, husbands.” She quickly fell silent. It became clear to me that Parvin did
not want to talk about the details of the event very much, even, or perhaps especially, as the
remnants and ruins of the old houses can be seen from the veranda of her current house. Visiting
a nearby house, where a widow lived with several children, revealed to me another story. “How
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can I live like this? My children must weave carpets all day, every day, with me, to survive. My
husband was killed. My children can’t go to school. What can I do? What will life bring?” When
I climbed to the memorial for those killed in the massacre, the widow’s voice echoed in my head,
as did the pained look and deeply etched creases on her face. What Kathleen Stewart writes of
West Virginia could easily be said of this Hazara village: “the hills find themselves reeling in the
dizzying, diacritical sensibilities of the local and the transnational, the past and the present, the
all-too-real-effects of history” (1996:137). As in Stewart’s rural West Virginia, so much collides
on the Bamyan landscape: past and present, local and international, soldiers and aid workers,
sites of beauty and reminders of horror all coincide in the steep mountains and river valleys and
farming villages. Sometimes one comes across the ancient ruins of a Buddhist stupa, or an
ancient Muslim fort rising above an idyllic village.
The further you go, however, the less likely the people are to have seen a foreigner. Aid
projects seem to focus where monitoring is logistically easy, and most expats looking for a
relaxing weekend are easily satisfied by the tourist sites nearest to Markaz Bamyan. Deep in a
trip into Yakawlang with friends who worked in Bamyan but hailed from a distant village, an old
man approached me and said, “A foreigner! You are so brave!”
I answered, “Yakawlang is secure, safe. Why am I brave? I am simply visiting my
friends’ families.”
“Maybe. I never saw a foreigner here in this village, though. It must be frightening, to be
so far from the others.”
I laughed and told him I was not frightened, I was with trusted friends, and also knew that
the people of Yakawlang were hospitable and would not do me any harm.
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A reflection of my self
As I write this, my Hazara Afghan friends are posting on Facebook about the 23rd anniversary of
the Afshar Massacre (1993). During the Afshar Massacre, during the 1992-1996 civil war,
hundreds, maybe thousands, of Hazaras were killed. Right now, my civil society activist friends
are posting pictures of this area of Kabul which is now just a desert of buildings only half
standing. It looks like an ancient archaeological site, not a site from a war 23 years ago. None of
my informants were at Afshar. Very few even know someone who was. Few have gone to the
place. But Afshar has come to represent, in their imagination, the killing, the massacre, the
genocide of their people. They no longer have to have been there. They are all part of the ingroup that has vicariously experienced the event.
Then I think of myself. I have long mourned my own lack of ancient roots, something I
suppose is common among Americans. I grew up in Ohio and moved to Arizona when I was
twelve. Neither is my place. My mother comes from New Jersey but the roots there start with her
father and grandfather, who moved from Canton, Ohio — and prior to this, I am not sure,
although her mother was a World War II war bride from Hull, England. My father comes
originally from Tennessee. My family owned a farm in Tennessee going back hundreds of years,
up in the hills and hollows, where they grew tobacco and corn, raised horses and other livestock.
As a child, I visited often and loved it there. I felt it was mine, the only place I could have any
real claim to. There was a giant tree that my great-grandmother planted when she was a child.
The hills behind the house were untamed, with bobcats and deer and all kinds of wild things.
Every ploughing, ancient arrowheads would be turned out of the moist earth, reminding us we
were not the first to claim this place. Is it really my place? I have family who, unlike me, actually
stayed and grew up there. I can’t really say I am a Southerner, much less a person of Tennessee. I
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feel ties to it because it is the only place I can possibly feel ties to. Except now I don’t have it.
Several years ago, my great-grandmother passed away, at the age of 104. The heirs decided to
sell the land. Yet if that land was ours, to be honest, our claim was shallow. It seems to have
been a hunting ground for several tribes, Shawnee, Cherokee, and Chickasaw up until my family
would have arrived, a few hundred years ago. I might argue that these transient tribes also had a
shallow claim compared to even more ancient inhabitants, who left their arrowheads. Perhaps it
is the shallowness of my roots which motivates me to go to other places — Kyrgyzstan and
Russia, before Afghanistan — to get to know the people there and learn how they create a sense
of their own rootedness.
Somehow, discussing the hollows and hills of Tennessee brings me to Bamyan, or rather,
Bamyan once brought me back there. On sunny spring day during my research, I was crossing
the fields from Saroa-e-Syob, where I lived, to the bazaar. I saw a Hazara man working in a field
with a wooden plough and oxen. I saw the sweat streaming down his face, I saw how close one
becomes to the land when work is done in that way. All of a sudden, I was transported. I
remembered my great-uncle telling me a story about how his father offered him a small field to
cultivate in order to make some extra money. He chose tobacco, a common and lucrative crop in
the area. Having seen the plough that he used, I know that it was only slightly more sturdy than
the one I saw in Bamyan. I started thinking about the timelessness of this place, of the ancient
ways of working the land, of the ties family formed to soil. But my family is no longer working
land in Tennessee. They sold it, and even before, for many years, my great-grandmother lived
alone in a house on a hill, renting the surrounding farmland to others to farm. Now a car factory
has been built nearby, and many residents are not related to agriculture at all but just want a
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“country” way of living. Things change, and the question remains open whether Tennessee and
Bamyan are timeless places or ever really were.
One of the most prominent anthropologists who worked in the region, Robert Canfield,
discussed with me how Markaz Bamyan was largely controlled by Tajiks in the past. His
fieldwork examined how the politically privileged Tajiks occupied the center, with Shi’a Hazaras
in the periphery. On a boat on the Charles River in Boston, and later through emails sent from
various spots around the world, we spoke of Bamyan. He told me his surprise in learning that
Markaz Bamyan was now full of Hazaras, not Tajiks. I also realized that most of the Hazaras I
know in Markaz Bamyan are from somewhere else. They have come to work in government, in
NGOs, in business, or to attend university. Many are returned refugees. There are Hazaras who
have lived in surrounding villages for longer periods of time, but the civil society activists are
physically in the Markaz.
Thinking back to the Markaz Bamyan of Canfield’s time, I began to ask what happened
to the Tajik merchants. Tajik farmers still live in their family houses on farmland they had
owned for more than a hundred years directly behind the bazaar. And in neighboring districts,
even those with a Hazara majority, villages of Tajik subsistence farmers can be found. Beyond
the obvious fact that the actual ethnic composition of the area has changed, due to displacement,
the exact details are hard to understand from within the field site. My informants in Bamyan
either did not know, or did not want to tell me what had happened to the Tajik merchant class
described by Canfield, at least not initially. For some time, I knew only that the Tajiks had been
displaced at some point during the wars, but exactly when, and how, was unclear.
Looking to secondary sources, Mousavi (1997) writes that Pashtuns, particularly nomads,
were moved in to colonize the area after a series of Hazara uprisings. He also writes of a
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campaign of “Sunnification” by the Afghan state, involving the building of Sunni mosques and
dismantling of Shi’a structures, accompanied by pressure on the Shi’as to convert. The king who
subjugated the Hazaras in the late 1800s, Abdur Rahman, quite successfully carried out his
campaign to destroy Hazara social structure. Encouraging traders loyal to him to take advantage
of the Hazarajat would have been one part of this project. Ethnicity is a fluid thing, and religious
affiliation can be switched. Was everyone displaced? Or did some switch sides? Could the Tajik
“label” have even included Hazaras who converted, long ago? And once the tide changed, could
some Tajiks have re-adopted Hazara and Shi’a identities? With much open to conjecture, I
clearly needed to get the story from those who has been there.
Canfield (1973), speaking about the situation in the 1960s, describes the flat, basin area
where Markaz is located, that area where farming is most productive, as controlled by Sunnis,
with “Imamis” or Shi’as, in the outlying, less productive areas. Moreover, the basin in which
Markaz is located has more connections to the Kabul government and trade opportunities,
making it all the more valuable to whoever maintains control over it. Canfield very clearly
referred to sect as being the most salient feature of a person’s identity, and also that which
determined one’s social status as well as the value of the land one lived on. Therefore, not
coincidentally, the most unorthodox group, the Ismailis, occupied the most isolated areas of the
region, with the least chances for agricultural or commercial success. Canfield indicates that any
who converted from Shi’a to Sunni Islam would also begin calling themselves Tajik; in fact,
Canfield (1973) was struck with the large number of Tajiks with what appeared as Hazara
somatic features. So, perhaps it is possible that some Tajiks moved to the area, while other Shi’a
Hazaras converted to Sunnism and began calling themselves Tajiks. Yet when Hazaras regained
control, it is known that many of these Tajiks, whatever their background, did flee.
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What caused religious sect to be the main feature of identity is something we cannot
know for sure. It certainly wasn’t the case for all in the region: Pashtuns, for instance, clearly
gave more import to ethnicity, as Barth (1969) noted in his chapter on Pashtuns in Ethnic Groups
and Boundaries; in some cases “tribal” affiliation was very important, too. Tribal allegiances
were likely much more important for Hazaras before they were subjugated by the Afghan state.
Yazdani (1989) describes a feudal society in which each person gave allegiance to a tribal leader,
worked his land, and fought for him when necessary. Amir Abdur Rahman smashed this feudal
system when he defeated the Hazaras. Abdur Rahman’s reliance on an anti-Shi’a jihad to rally
troops to carry out this war can be speculated to have heightened the importance of all sides of
sectarian affiliation as an identifying marker.
It was clear that my friends in Markaz Bamyan knew about the Tajik merchants even if
they didn’t want to tell me what had become of them. When I asked about the destroyed
structures at the base of the cliff where the Buddhas had stood, I was told, “That was the old
bazaar. The one the Tajiks owned.” Ahh, I thought, this was the bazaar where Canfield told me
he drank tea while discussing the Buddha statues. “What happened to the Tajik merchants?” “I
don’t know. They left.” The “mystery” of the Tajik merchants stuck with me (despite knowing
that for some in Markaz, it was not mystery at all). The unveiling of the mystery sheds light on
the contested nature of Hazaras’ claim to Bamyan as their homeland. But before I can unfold the
oral history that I finally learned while drinking endless cups of tea with an old man, the father of
a friend, who unlike most whom I knew had remained in and around Markaz Bamyan throughout
the years of war, I first say more about the place itself.

Bamyan: The Place, and Life as a Researcher
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The plateau of Markaz Bamyan is surrounded by the high mountains of the Hindu Kush, the
most significant being Koh-e-Baba, whose peaks are white with snow year round. The smaller
cliffs which housed the Buddhas, reddish-yellow in color, shoot straight up from the ground,
right at the edge of town. Bamyan is a high desert, with little precipitation, many sunny days and
little vegetation. Canfield (1973) suggests that at one time poplars were harvested in the area, but
around Markaz Bamyan today the poplars are few. Possibly initially a naturally growing tree, the
forests came to be managed for extraction. Today, some line parts of the newly-paved streets.
Bamyan inhabitants indicated that the years of war and hardship caused people to overharvest the
poplars, so while they are still a local resource, many have been used as firewood, simply to
survive. In fact, years of war and poverty have resulted in severe deforestation in much of
Afghanistan, including Bamyan, where even the small shrubs that cling to hillsides are much
fewer in number than they should be. Summers are mild, and winters are very cold, although
during the day often the temperature rises to right around freezing, only to plummet twenty or
thirty degrees as soon as the bright sun sets. A few settlements around Markaz Bamyan manage
to support some farming, mainly subsistence, on riverbanks or watered with a canal system dug
into the dirt, most with no sort of concrete reinforcement. Most plowing and threshing is done
with oxen, as few people can afford tractors.
While I conducted fieldwork in Bamyan, there was no running water and no electricity.
People used common water taps, wells, or the river for water, depending on the exact location of
their house. Electricity was provided by an individual’s solar panels or community generators
that a group of residents agreed to pay in to. For this reason, most houses, businesses, and
organizations only had several hours of electricity each evening, if they had any at all. During the
total of 18 months I spent in Bamyan, I lived in three different areas. In Zargaron, the suburb that
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extends up a dry dusty hill at one end of the bazaar road, I paid a teenage boy to bring me
buckets of water from a common tap, which only provided water for a couple of hours each day,
and I paid into a community generator, for two hours of electricity each evening. I later lived
with a family that ran a guesthouse in the suburb of Saroa-e Syob, which sits on the plateau
slightly above the bazaar, but closer to it than Shahr-e Nau. There, water was provided for me,
and a solar panel provided several hours of electricity at night, with a generator for backup on
cloudy days or when the house was full of travelers who wanted to use their phones and
computers. Finally, for the last few months of fieldwork, I rented a house in Shahr-e Nau where I
lived alone. I pulled up water by hand from a well, and I purchased a single solar panel, which
provided electricity for two lightbulbs and a charge for my phone and computer each night.
Travel in and out of Bamyan is difficult. There are two routes from Kabul, both of which
go through a high mountain pass. Both also pass through areas where Taliban insurgents are
active, and drivers of shared taxis and mini-buses had to make constant calculations as to which
route was safer in the summer. The warmer summer months are the fighting season, both
because travel was easier and the growth of vegetation provided greater cover for the insurgents.
When I first started going to my field site, the route that went through the Haji Gak pass, to the
south, was considered safer. It does travel through the problematic Wardak Province, the Jalrez
district being particularly dangerous, but we were in that area for such a short time it seemed
worth the risk. Unfortunately, Haji Gak is completely impassable in winter. At a certain point in
my fieldwork, the other pass, the Shibar, which is more directly to the east of Bamyan and
therefore slightly faster, came to be considered less dangerous. It goes through Parwan Province,
and there, the Shinwar district is known for harboring insurgents. The Pashtun Shinwari tribe hail
from Nangarhar Province in the east, where I did my master’s fieldwork and where my husband
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did his fieldwork. I knew the Shinwaris of Nangarhar well, but even they said that those in
Parwan cause problems. They speculated that the Parwan Shinwaris were discontented ever since
having been moved there by Amanullah Khan, as punishment for rebelling against him in the
1923 uprising.
During the initial stages of fieldwork, I traveled by shared mini-bus (always a tunus, or
Toyota Town Ace), wore a full burqa, and hoped I would not encounter a Taliban checkpoint.
An Indian airline began a commercial flight partway through my fieldwork, and this was a relief
for me and for the inhabitants of Bamyan who could afford it. The flight is only half an hour and
treats you to spectacular mountain views. For those who cannot afford the flight, travel is
stressful. A Talib, or even a simple bandit, can set up a checkpoint at any moment. Passengers
might be robbed, or even kidnapped or murdered if their ID shows they work for the government
or a Western-affiliated NGO. (A Provincial Council Member, Jawad Zuhak, was stopped and
beheaded while traveling from Kabul just days before I arrived for my first stint of fieldwork).
Later on, there was an increase of incidents of Hazaras being stopped and murdered simply
because of their ethnicity. This might be because more insurgents are choosing to adhere to
Daesh (Islamic state) ideology rather than the Taliban.

Hazaras in Afghanistan
Bamyan is a small, underdeveloped town. This does not make it unique for provincial capitals in
Afghanistan, though some others are larger, more developed and more like cities. Bamyan is one
of the most well-known provincial capitals in Afghanistan, however, because of the Buddha
statues. The presence of the statues, or what remains of them, reminds one that Bamyan was the
seat of an important Buddhist civilization in the sixth and seventh centuries. It was also an
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important stopping point along the Silk Road, before sea trade displaced the ancient land route. It
remained important, as the Afghan state was founded, as the gateway to the Central Highlands,
the Hazarajat, homeland of the Hazara people. For this reason it is an important market town.
To understand Bamyan, and the history of Hazaras in the region, as well as the reason
that activists choose certain issues as important, it is necessary first to know certain basics of
Hazara history, a history that I will touch upon throughout the dissertation. Certain events and
processes I will examine in greater depth in the context of civil society activists’ narratives of
cultural trauma. A sense that non-Hazaras have gotten Hazara history wrong sits very much at
the center of the activists’ work of correcting and revising Hazaras’ knowledge of who they are
as a people. Here, let it suffice to offer a simple, short framework rather than a comprehensive,
in-depth history, a historical summary that is intended to give readers points of reference. I will
attach particular emphasis to historical events which support Hazaras’ belief that they are the
most oppressed group in Afghanistan.
While the rule of the king Amir Abdur Rahman is mentioned by many Hazaras as the
start of the most egregious oppression of their people by the Afghan state, many insist that earlier
rulers laid the framework for this. The first antagonist they bring up is Ahmad Shah Durrani. He
managed, after the assassination of Nadir Shah Afshar of Iran in 1747, who had himself taken
power in Iran after the Safavid Dynasty fell, to make off with much of Nadir Shah’s treasure
(Barfield 2010:98). Using this as leverage, he built an army that deposed his Pashtun rivals and
took over all of Afghanistan as well as much surrounding area. “It was with Ahmad Shah Baba
that Afghanistan became a Pashtun state, and that we lost control of parts of the territory”
Firuzan, one of my main social activist sources, once told me. Ahmad Shah ruled from Kandahar
and collected riches from wealthy, marginal areas such as Sindh, Punjab, Kashmir, and
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Khorasan. Likely the resource-poor central highlands were not considered worth the effort of
subjugating. The problem for Hazaras was that, now, their lands were claimed by Pashtuns.
Ahmad Shah controlled the borders of Hazara lands, leaving the inner central highlands largely
to self-rule. But even these central regions were now nominally considered part of a Pashtuncontrolled state, a development which Hazaras today trace the beginnings of their loss of
autonomy. Conrad Schetter (2005) uses the term “ethnoscapes” to describe how the imagined
historical homelands of different groups in Afghanistan overlap with each other and may often
seem larger than expected.8 Hazaras today do not look back at the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani,
as he came to be known, as the ruler who actually removed them from their land.9 But, almost as
bad, they do see this founder of the Afghan state as the one who began today’s pattern of Pashtun
domination. In hindsight, many say that this was the start of their loss of autonomy.
Far more violent tragedy would come under the rule of King Amir Abdur Rahman
(r.1880-1901). The upheavals wreaked by Abdur Rahman’s policies would threaten to destroy
Hazara social structure, culture and livelihoods. Ibrahimi (2009a) goes so far as to claim that the
massive ethnic cleansing, enslavement, and killing of Hazaras was genocide. Hazara social
structure and culture would never be the same. Abdur Rahman leveraged religious sectarian
identity to call Sunni Afghans to arms against the Hazaras. Devastatingly, the Hazaras were
treated after defeat as “infidels,” meaning that their property could be plundered and the people
enslaved. This brutal defeat stands at the heart of Hazara cultural trauma constructs today.
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan sought to centralize his authority in Afghanistan, targeting
many groups but none more horrifically than the Hazaras, due to the anti-Hazara campaigns’
Jihadist roots. Layered onto sectarian conflict, even then, was a quasi-racialized distrust. Abdur
Rahman himself wrote, “The Hazaras had raided and plundered the neighboring subjects for
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about 300 years past, and none of the kings had had the power to make them absolutely
peaceful” (Khan 1900[2005]).10 The campaigns began in 1881, were carried out through
strategies that included pitting certain tribes, as well as Sunni and Shi’a Hazaras, against one
another, and ended around 1893, when resistance was largely crushed (Mousavi 1998).
And yet, looking at some of the history books that have been written about this period in
Afghanistan, it becomes clear why so many Hazaras complain that their history has been erased,
covered up by the Pashtuns. Many of these works are likely read by those foreigners who work
in Afghanistan. I will give two examples that were used in a course I took on Afghanistan at
Georgetown University in Washington, DC. Many of my fellow students would go on to NGO or
development work, work for the US government, or were members of the military.11 From
Stephen Tanner (2002), they learned that Abdur Rahman was in power during the Second AngloAfghan War. Then, he set about a centralization campaign, seeking to weaken the ability of his
main tribal rivals for the throne, the Ghilzai Pashtuns, and to weaken tribal and feudal power
holders throughout the country. No mention is made of Hazaras. Earlier in his narratives, when
he describes a period of upheaval among the Afghan monarchy in the 1820s and 1830s, he does
mention that tribes such as Hazaras were largely unaffected. And yet, he gives no mention of
what happened to the Hazaras as a result of Abdur Rahman’s conquest. Martin Ewans (2001) at
least adds that in response to Abdur Rahman’s campaigns, many revolted, the most serious of
which were carried out by the Ghilzais, the Uzbeks, and the Hazaras. He mentions an anti-Shi’a
jihad and subsequent enslavement and loss of lands (Ewans 2001). The deep ruptures to Hazara
social fabric, and its impact today, in missing. Neither of these authors says anything untruthful;
their error is simply to have left out how extreme the violence of Abdur Rahman was and how
devastating this was for the Hazaras and others.
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Thomas Barfield’s history gives a much more in-depth look at the implications of Abdur
Rahman’s policies for the Hazaras. Barfield (2010) writes that until this time only the border
areas of Hazarajat were directly controlled by the state. When Abdur Rahman demanded formal
submission of all the Hazaras, it was not exactly clear what he wanted. Not just the threat of
losing direct control but even more, “the behavior of the officials and troops that the amir sent to
the region” sparked the rebellion of 1891 (Barfield 2010: 150). Barfield continues:

The war quickly took on a religious overtone when the amir had the Shi’a Hazaras
declared infidels. This allowed both his army and the tribal levies that he raised to ignore
the usual Islamic laws of war. In particular, the army could enslave those that they
captured, and keep their land and property. This was especially important in recruiting
Pashtun tribes, which agreed to participate in hopes of plunder. The amir mobilized a
hundred thousand troops for this campaign, more than any other. The army broke the
power of the Hazaras, many of whom were enslaved, while a large number fled to Persia
and Baluchistan, where they formed refugee communities. The amir’s government reaped
a large dividend from taxing this slave trade. Hazarajat itself was impoverished as
neighboring Pashtun tribes expanded their territory into lands formerly controlled by the
Hazaras. The war also opened vast new stretches of summer pasture land to Pashtuns.

Barfield elaborates on the forced removal of people that followed. Ghilzais were forced to the
north where they were thought to be less of a threat. And the demographic make-up of Kabul
was completely changed by the sheer numbers of Hazaras who moved there. The same occurred
in other large cities, such as Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat.
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While Barfield gives a very clear overview as to what happened to the Hazaras during
this extremely pivotal event, one must turn to Hazara authors such as Sayed Askar Mousavi, and
later, Naimatullah Ibrahimi, to get to the details of what happened to the Hazaras during this
time. Mousavi states outright that hatred for Abdur Rahman continues to this day, an attitude
which I can confirm.
The Hazaras, in fact, were subjected to two main methods of attack as Abdur Rahman
sought to extend centralized control. An initial area of concern was that known as Yaghestan
(land of the rebels) according to court historian and Hazara Faiz Mohammad Kateb in 1916. This
area included parts of today’s Uruzgan, Ghazni, Zabul, Kandahar, and Helmand Provinces. Other
Hazara tribes, co-opted by Abdur Rahman, took part in quelling this uprising, and problematic
Pashtuns who might have challenged Abdur Rahman’s rule, such as those of the Ghilzai tribe,
were forcibly moved in to settle these areas. In fact, these are places where Hazaras and Pashtuns
noticeably live side-by-side today. Initially, sectarian differences among Hazaras were also
played upon, and the Sheikh Ali Hazaras were used to this purpose (a Sunni Hazara group closer
to the seat of power in Kabul). Additionally, Pashtun groups were brought in from the east to
populate Hazara areas as well, and there they remain today, in areas such as Uruzgan. (Mousavi
1998, Gharjistani 1988).
Hazaras were then subjected to high taxes, which they accepted (Ibrahimi 2009a).
However, their political structure remained in place, which state of affairs was still viewed as
threatening to Abdur Rahman, and which heralded the first main thrust of his efforts to subdue
the Hazaras. Hazara mirs, community leaders, and religious leaders were summoned to Kabul in
the early 1890s, where some of them were imprisoned or exiled. Others, usually those who were
weaker and might seek to empower themselves, he used against the now leaderless stronger

65

tribes, in order to sow discord among the Hazara community. After having “beheaded” the
stronger tribes, he could strategically divide not only along sectarian but also tribal lines
(Ibrahimi 2009a). Abdur Rahman then sent his own governors, administrators, and commanders
of battalions in the place of those he had removed. These representatives indiscriminately fined
people and imprisoned them with little reason, while torture was widespread — according to
Mousavi (1998), torture won promotions for those who carried it out. Large scale massacres
occurred against those who could not pay taxes. The Dai Chopan tribe lost hundreds of members,
including women and children, for non-payment (Mousavi 1998). Mousavi claims that there are
thousands of documents listing such evidence.
During the second phase, Abdur Rahman decided to bring the region under even tighter
control (Ibrahimi 2009a) and almost all of the Hazarajat was defeated by 1892. This happened
after the jihad against Hazaras, mentioned by Barfield and Mousavi, managed to bring together
the previously divided Hazara tribes. The Hazaras rebelled against this “jihad,” which started as
a popular uprising and then quickly gained support by those prominent Hazara leaders still in
place (Mousavi 1998). These leaders, at the Jirga-e Au Qaol, a planning meeting, actually
declared war on Abdur Rahman. They attracted Hazaras serving in the state military to defect, as
well as a number of Uzbeks, who were also a minority which experienced discrimination, if not
as extreme as that of the Shi’a Hazaras (Ibrahimi 2009a).
As a result, Abdur Rahman then embarked upon his all-out religious crusade against the
Hazaras, promising land, riches, and women to those who participated. Mousavi claims 30,00040,000 government troops, 10,000 cavalry, and possibly 100,000 civilians took part, as well as
nomadic kuchis. Barfield states that 100,000 troops were raised for the campaign, a number
greater than those used in any of his other campaigns (2010: 150). The Hazaras did not have a
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chance. The main leaders were captured and executed, and all of Hazarajat subjected to intense
fighting and laid to waste. Thousands were sold into slavery, and it was decreed that Hazara
slaves would be especially cheap (Temirkhanov 1993). Such heavy taxes were levied that many
had to sell family members, or themselves, into slavery (Mousavi 1998). An exodus of more than
half a million people streamed into Iran and British India (now Pakistan), where Hazaras had
previous trading ties. Smaller numbers fled to the north. Mousavi, as well as the Hazara activists
whom I interviewed, call this stage genocide.
But when commanders were ordered to collect all of the names of the mirs, Sayeds,
khans, begs, as well as any other sort of leader in a non-inherited position, as well as names of
their families, rebellion spread again. Initially, they made gains (Mousavi 1998), but Abdur
Rahman used their de-centralized tribal structure against them. Some he enticed to fight on his
side, while others, he conquered.
Hazara society, then, was completely disrupted. No longer were there the rich feudal
lords who carried a large amount of political authority as in the past. Rulers were no longer
independent, mirs disappeared, or at least, did not advertise their identity for a period of time.
Arbabs or maliks (locals chosen by the government as their representatives) were put in their
place.12 Attempts were made to convert people to Sunni Islam (Mousavi 1998). My informants
say that many did convert, and then also chose to refer to themselves as Tajiks rather than
Hazaras. Many also practiced taqqiya, attending Sunni mosques while hiding their true Shi’a
faith, a practice allowed for Shi’as (Emadi 1997). Dupree’s (1980) description of Abdur
Rahman’s policies as internal colonization seems apt.
The loss of land by Hazaras to Pashtun kuchis, or nomads, is another point of contention,
particularly as bloody feuds with kuchis continue to this day. Klaus Ferdinand (1962)
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documented the process by which Hazaras came to lose much of their land to kuchis. Initially, a
large amount of Hazara land was given to kuchi tribes who helped in the subjugation of the
Hazaras by Abdur Rahman, which assistance was given not only because of promises of land,
but because of tax breaks and other benefits (Ibrahimi 2009a). As kuchis only appeared in
summer months, some Hazaras remained on their land and continued to attempt to farm it —
leading to conflict, as kuchis now officially owned the land. Kuchis also served as itinerant
merchants, but gave Hazaras prices they could not pay. Eventually, Hazaras lost livestock, and
then land rights, to these kuchis to pay such debts (Ferdinand 1962). It is not surprising, then,
that Hazaras still resent kuchis and associate them with the Pashtun state that has long subjugated
them. Today, encounters between Hazaras and kuchis can result in bloodshed, with Hazaras
claiming kuchis are at best trying to trample their crops and steal their land, and at worst, are
Taliban-associated terrorists, with kuchis, on the other side, explaining that they are simply
claiming land rights that are, after all, legally theirs.13
The activists I worked with in Bamyan knew this history quite well. Some of them,
especially those whose ancestors were mirs, or begs, know specific areas of land which belonged
to their family, which is now owned and farmed by others. Usually, it is the richest land. No one
among my informants suggested they resented the loss of this title, as after all, they now espouse
a philosophy of equality as civil society activists. They know these things partly because of
memory, and partly because more recent opportunities have allowed a few, such as Mousavi and
Poladi, to become scholars and start uncovering this past.
Schools in Afghanistan are not allowed to mention ethnicity. In addition to conducting
interviews with teachers, school directors, and students, I examined history books, in which
Abdur Rahman’s wars are justified as a suppression of a series of rebellions. The government

68

claims this elision is to avoid current ethnic tensions; Hazara activists think the lack of attention
to these issues just adds to the tensions. One of the key aims of Hazara activists is to tell these
stories, which have been written by several authors, to as wide an audience as they can. They
want to make sure that it is known that their land was stolen, they were enslaved, and what little
was left to them is soaked in their ancestors’ blood. This history seems all the more important to
remember because, as I explain the next section, Hazara blood continued to be spilled in fighting
in the years after Abdur Rahman.

After Abdur Rahman: Calm, then Revolution
Except for several small and unsuccessful rebellions in the early 1900s, Hazaras remained
largely pacified after Abdur Rahman’s campaign (Gawecki 1980). For most of the century,
Hazaras were excluded from most educational opportunities and relegated to the lowest classes
of society. Under the reformist policies of King Amanullah slavery was outlawed in 1923, a
reform that clearly improved the situation of Hazaras who were slaves. It is not known how
many of these freed Hazaras and others continued to be poorly treated servants and manual
laborers. Some improvements were made between 1963 and 1973 under Zahir Shah’s reforms,
including the entry of two Hazaras into Shah’s cabinet (Khalilzad 1987).14 Yet the systemic
social exclusion, created under years of oppression, has been difficult to overcome even in the
present (Karimi 2011).
The Saur Revolution, the communist coup of 1978, and subsequent years of communist
rule until the civil war period began in 1992 does, in fact, mark a time when Hazaras’ situations
improved, particularly in the cities. Educational opportunities increased as did access to business
and government positions. The communist PDPA of course, in line with the rhetoric of the
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Soviet Union, espoused a policy of equality and opportunity for all ethnicities. As in the Soviet
Union, this narrative was rather haphazardly applied, with Russians in the USSR and Pashtuns in
Afghanistan remaining the most powerful groups. However, gains were made by Hazaras, from
the appointment of Sultan Ali Keshtmand to prime minister, to many other smaller-scale
opportunities.
Why, then, do activists remain silent on this point? On the one hand, it clearly does not fit
in with their narrative of a near unbroken period of oppression from the time of Abdur Rahman
to the present. When I asked, several activists told me that, in fact, it had been Hazara missteps
which had not allowed them to fully benefit from communist ethnic inclusionism. Hazaras
tended to choose Maoism when they joined any urban revolutionary group during this time of
upheaval. This means that while they might have benefited from some policies of the PDPA,
they also suffered from PDPA purges if they were affiliated with a competing, Maoist group.
Those who were familiar with the situation in the countryside explained that Hazaras had almost
immediately revolted against the PDPA, as they saw it as a threat to their right to practice
religion as they wanted. Rural Hazaras were deeply influenced by the Iranian Revolution of the
same time, from which they initially hoped they might benefit. This precluded collusion with the
communists in Afghanistan. All the same, the activist silences on what gains were made by
Hazaras during this time, which were not in any way insignificant, can only be understood as a
selective telling of history that focuses only on Hazara oppression.
However, the wars in Afghanistan, set off by the communist coup, or Saur Revolution
(April 1978) and subsequent Soviet invasion (1979-1989), did offer an opportunity for Hazaras
to establish themselves politically. At the same time, they were sidelined by many of the
mujahedin groups fighting the Soviets. Pakistan played a major role in determining which groups
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would receive United States, Saudi and other aid, funneled to the mujahedin (Maley 2009, Rubin
2002). The increasingly Sunni dominated regime of Zia al-Haq had no interest in funding a
largely Shi’a contingent.
At this time, in fact, Hazara political action was still mainly motivated by affiliation with
the Shi’a sect. Hazaras tended to look to Iran for leadership, and most of their leaders were either
religiously trained or had some ascribed religious status, such as the Sayeds (Mousavi 1998,
Harpviken 1997). Political developments did occur, in which competing Hazara groups, some
religious, some influenced by Iran, and some secular, engaged in armed conflict with each other.
Eventually the largely ethnic-based association, the Hizb-e-Wahdat party, emerged as victorious.
It is an open question whether the majority of Hazaras managed to unite under this overarching
ethnic principle. Hazara politics today has splintered into several political parties. Having noted
that, I was often told that Hazaras would unite on an ethnic basis, should they again be
threatened as a group. In spite of internal fault lines, the Hizb-e-Wahdat party did manage, at the
time, to unify most Hazara groups for a period. And today, much political and social capital
among Hazaras is gained by association with the former leader of the Hizb-e-Wahdat, Abdul Ali
Mazari, who was killed by the Taliban in 1995.
Hazaras in Bamyan were among the first to revolt when the Saur Revolution, or
communist coup, occurred in Afghanistan in 1978 (Canfield 1984). Early rebellions were largely
local in nature and led by secular community leaders and power holders, those mirs who still
retained some authority (Harpviken 1998). Yet, the Soviet invasion largely overlooked the
central highland region, focusing its attention on urban areas (Maley 2009). Pakistan funneled
foreign money, weapons and logistical support to Sunni resistance groups of its choosing,
maintaining a virtual monopoly over the channeling of fighters and assistance (Maley 2009) over
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its borders with Afghanistan, while such movement was barred across the Soviet and Iranian
borders (the Shi’a, Islamic revolution in Iran put it at loggerheads with the United States and
Saudi Arabia). This gave the mainly Hazara region of Bamyan a reprieve from the ruthless
attacks suffered by urban populations. It also allowed the Hazaras to work out political, religious,
and ethnic issues, which, although preceded by a bloody internecine war, gave rise to and
continues to influence what Hazara identity means today.
After the initial reaction against the communist government, led by what remained of the
mirs, the Shura-e Inqelab-e Ettifaq-e Islami, the Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance,
consolidated Hazara political authority in the Hazarajat to create an anti-communist organization
(Harpviken 1998). The Shura was led by Sayeds, who derive social and religious status on the
basis of their claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammad. Even as Pashtun Sayeds are
considered ethnically Pashtun, Sayeds among the Hazaras claim to be of a different ethnicity,
perhaps to distance themselves from the low social status of Hazaras.15 As descendants of the
Prophet, they claim to be Arab, although they do not speak Arabic. The Sayeds, using this
religious identity, cross-cut the localized power of the mirs and created a more regionally based
organization.
The Sayeds drew also upon the momentum of the Iranian Revolution (Harpviken 1998).
Iranian-inspired groups such as Harakat-e Islami and Sozemen-e Nasr, and later Pasdaran, began
to also build a following. Harakat was a more moderate Islamist group, led by Ayatollah Asif
Mohseni,16 and had more military power. Nasr was more strongly Islamist and Khomeinist, and
was initially followed by many Hazara labor migrants returning from Iran (Harpviken 1995).
Nasr continued to play a strong role in Hazarajat politics, while Harakat was stronger in the
northern edges of the Hazarajat, where there was a more ethnically mixed population, and
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became a mujahedin group in its own right and the main non-Hazara Shi’a alternative for what
would develop as the major Hazara resistance group, Hizb-e-Wahdat.
Starting with the Soviet invasion and on into the early 1980s, the Shura acted as a sort of
para-state, instating taxation and military conscription, playing on people’s fears of the
communists and Soviets. As these threats failed to materialize, due to the strategic irrelevance of
the area, Shura levies were seen to be a burden by the people, diminishing its legitimacy
(Harpviken 1995), because the Shura’s demands yielded no perceptible security dividend
(Ibrahimi 2006). Islamist shaykhs, with ties to Iran, challenged the Shura, leading by 1982 to an
internal civil war in the Hazarajat (Harpviken 1995). This situation was further complicated
when Iran decided that Nasr was not effective, and began to mainly support Pasdaran (Harpviken
1998).17 After a period of fighting, the Islamists unseated the Shura from power.
Seven different Shi’a based parties were in operation by 1987, under a loose coalition, the
Shura-e Ettalaf, not to be confused with the Sayed-led Shura above (Harpviken 1998). Pakistan
excluded all from foreign assistance. A decision was made, ostensibly brokered by Iran, to unite
the parties into one, Hizb-e-Wahdat, the Party of Unity (Harpviken 1998). Harakat remained
outside of this alliance. Wahdat came to be based on Hazara ethnic, rather than Shi’a, alliances,
and Harakat served as the non-Hazara, Shi’a alternative.
Clergy dominated Hizb-e Wahdat, but it was very clear in a policy of opening up
membership to those who were not Islamist as well. Abdul Ali Mazari, who had been the leader
of the Nasr faction, is credited as its founder and first director. Trained as clergy in both Qom,
Iran and Najaf, Iraq, the two major centers of Shi’a learning, Mazari, my informants all agree,
broke with Islamist leadership and turned Wahdat into an ethnicity-based group. He then, they
say, became the champion of Hazara rights, and the father of all Hazaras. His importance to the
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movements I studied cannot be overstated. It might be the case that the break at the time was less
clear than my informants said. Mazari, even when incorporating those Hazaras who were not
religiously motivated, maintained an Islamist framework in order to appease Islamist supporters.
His relationship with Iran is also contentious. While William Maley (2009) has no problem in
stating outright that Iran pushed for the unification of the squabbling factions into Wahdat, my
informants state the opposite: Iran wanted the factions to continue arguing, to make them easier
to control. The Islamic Republic, they reason, would naturally not want a party based on
ethnicity rather than Shi’ism. Mazari, they claim, intentionally turned away from Iran, and in
response Iran refused to send needed money and arms.18 He is remembered as the one person
who most fostered this change.
Wahdat invited sidelined mirs back into the fold. Wahdat also offered secular, urban
elites a place in the organization (Harpviken 1995), particularly those affiliated with Maoist
groups advocating for Hazaras, and others, in cities. Wahdat realized it needed members who
brought skills lacking in its rural base and largely madrasa-trained leadership. Clergy remained
important, and Iran did have a strong hand in the initial formation of Wahdat. However, it tended
to be more ethnic in the character of its membership, and less Islamist in its political decision
making-processes.19 Additionally, its leaders may have recognized that a Shi’a based party might
have been alarming for the other, Sunni, parties; so, a nationalist party based on ethnicity was
instead stressed (Ibrahimi 2009a).
While this was pursued as a possibly effective strategy under Mohammad Najibullah’s
communist regime, the situation in Afghanistan was quickly changing. After the Soviet
withdrawal in 1989, Hazaras, now almost exclusively represented by Wahdat, found themselves
without strong alliances. The civil war in Afghanistan began after Najibullah was removed from
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office, in 1992, and would continue until 1996. Wahdat distrusted the post-communist
governments of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, and then Berhanuddin Rabbani, backed by Ahmad
Shah Massoud, as well as lesser figures such as the Wahhabi Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf. When it
seemed that it would soon be asked to disarm, Wahdat chose to fight against the government.
Strengthened by the large number of Hazaras already living in Kabul, Wahdat allied with
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami. All sides, including Wahdat, bombarded each other with
ground-to-ground missiles. In 1993, Hazara civilians were subjected to a particularly brutal
massacre in the Afshar neighborhood of Kabul, an episode which has become central to Hazara
cultural trauma narratives. Cracks within Wahdat had already begun to appear, based on old
party alliances. Mohammad Akbari, an ethnic (Shi’a) Kizilbosh who had headed the Pasdaran
faction before unification, was co-opted by Rabbani and left Wahdat (Ibrahimi 2009a). Harakat
under Mohseni also supported Rabbani. These splits did occur along earlier faction lines within
the group, but it might also not be a coincidence that they seem to split along ethnic lines as well,
as Mohseni and Akbari were both not Hazaras. A party mainly affiliated with Sayeds did not
emerge.
As the civil war wound down, and Hazara Wahdat seemed sure to be on the losing side, a
last-ditch attempt to create an alliance not only failed, as a new group, the Taliban, moved to take
power, but resulted in the death of Mazari. In discussions with both Wahdat and Harakat, the
Taliban promised some degree of autonomy and recognition of Shi’a jurisprudence. Hence
Hazaras, engaged in a conflict with the mainly Tajik-run government of Rabbani, offered little
resistance to initial Taliban encroachments (Ibrahimi 2009a). Mazari ventured to meet Taliban
leaders in 1995, but instead of making a deal with him, they captured him, tortured him, and
killed him. Karim Khalili took over Wahdat leadership after Mazari’s death and retreated to a
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stronghold deep in Yakawlang district. Khalili’s resistance resulted in a near complete blockade
of Bamyan province by the Taliban. As people faced starvation, the only route to obtain food
was the long journey north, to the city Mazar-e Sharif. As the Taliban closed in on this city too,
fighters, many of whom were Hazaras, put up a strong resistance. In early 1998, anti-Taliban
fighters, including Wahdat and Uzbek Junbesh troops, killed hundreds of Taliban while chasing
them from the city. They locked many Taliban in shipping containers and left them to die in the
desert south of the city. When, less than a year later, the Taliban finally took Mazar-e-Sharif,
they in turn massacred five to six thousand mainly Hazara civilians in retaliation, while others
were captured and taken as slaves, sometimes for sexual abuse (Ibrahimi 2009a). Hazara activists
today refer to the civil war events as yet another genocide, a continuation of the one perpetrated
by Abdur Rahman. This was the first of several massacres the Taliban carried out. Khalili never
gave up fighting, so that, even as the Taliban controlled Markaz Bamyan until they were
removed from power, fighting moved back and forth across Bamyan and Yakawlang districts,
sometimes a few kilometers away from Markaz Bamyan. The population fought, hid in the
mountains, and suffered. Everyone I met who was in Bamyan at this time told of hiding from the
Taliban in the mountains. The fighters, some of whom were young teenagers, were more
reluctant to discuss their experiences.
Today, Hizb-e Wahdat has disintegrated further, after the first break with Akbari. Khalili,
who served directly under Mazari and then continued fighting, seemed a legitimate heir. But at
the same time, many of my informants criticize him, saying he carried out heavy-handed purges,
and even killing, of political rivals during the years he led the fight against the Taliban. He was
challenged by Mohammad Mohaqeq, who was a leader of Wahdat in the north, and ran in the
2004 presidential election won by Hamid Karzai. The split between these two leaders led to two
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further, personality-based factions, Khalili’s Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan and
Mohaqeq’s Hizb-e Wahdat-e Mardom- e Islami Afghanistan. Akbari leads Hizb-e Wahdat-e
Millat Afghanistan. A fourth group is that of Qurban Ali Erfani, the Hizb-e Wahdat-e Millat-e
Islami Afghanistan (Ibrahimi 2009b). In spite of the factionalism, all parties claim ideological
“descent” from Mazari and celebrate his values. The civil society activists I worked with are
suspicious of all these parties. They believe that none has lived up to Mazari’s legacy, and that
working with the government would mean compromising their ideals.

Return to Bamyan
Taking up where I left off earlier, looking for some sort of first-hand account as to what
happened to those Tajik merchants, the history of political divisiveness among Hazaras and of
violence between ethnic groups helps explain why even my friends in Markaz Bamyan were
hesitant to explain. Hazaras in Bamyan hold the Tajiks responsible not only for general
mistreatment and prejudice but also for collaborating with the Taliban. Latif is an acquaintance
working as a local journalist for a news agency. He is one of my few contacts in Bamyan who
was born in one of the nearby “suburbs” and who has stayed there his whole life. His parents,
except for a few short years in Karachi, also spent their entire life in the region. I asked Latif if
his parents would tell me the history of Bamyan. On a chilly day at the end of January, we made
the trip to his parents’ house. Latif’s mother and father, as well as one uncle, were kind enough
to sit and talk with me for hours, about their lives and local history, on a porch enclosed with
heavy plastic, creating a sort of greenhouse. I will never forget their kind, wizened faces. Though
in their 60s, they appeared much older.
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Latif’s mother and father started with a familiar refrain: the cruelty (zulm) that others
demonstrated in their relations with the Hazaras. Latif’s father spoke of the Taliban coming and
killing people, burning their houses, tying their hands and chopping them off. “Old and young
were both killed,” he said. “We had to run to Dukhoni, a secluded mountain valley, to escape
them.” At times, his story of zulm would wander and he would mention Abdur Rahman. This
tendency to jump in a non-chronological fashion between different stories of cruelty I had
noticed even among more highly-educated civil society activists, and I found it interesting to
hear much the same from an old man who had been a farmer on the same piece of land for most
of his life.
At a certain point, I told Latif’s father that I was particularly interested in knowing what
had happened to the Tajiks. “The Tajiks,” he said,

were moved here on purpose by Abdur Rahman. They owned the bazaar, and they were
kept in place, supported, by later governments. It was not explicitly stated that Hazaras
could not own shops, but whenever a Hazara offered to buy a shop that was for sale, they
were told an extremely high price. In that way, they were kept out of the bazaar. Later,
before the Taliban came, during the civil war, Khalili managed to push the front all the
way to Markaz Bamyan. The Hazaras who were part of this offensive remembered how
the Tajiks treated them, and they knew what was happening in Kabul with Ahmad Shah
Massoud (the alleged perpetrator of the Afshar massacre). The Tajiks, knowing what they
had done in the past, thought that it was likely they would be massacred, and so they fled
before Khalili arrived. The Hazara fighters with Khalili saw this bazaar as a symbol of
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their humiliation, they did not want to just take it over, so they destroyed it. They built a
new bazaar, Shahr-e Nau.20

We then continued the discussion about what happened during the Taliban period. Latif’s father
said:

“When the Taliban came, they took control of the Markaz. The Tajiks returned with
them, and they cooperated with the Taliban. They took part in the injustices the Taliban
carried out against the Hazaras. Khalili kept attacking during the Taliban period, but he
never managed to take the Markaz back. Only after the Americans came was Khalili
successful. Then the Tajiks ran again. They were wealthy you know. They all had second
homes, in Herat, in Kabul. They went there. Some of them sold their Bamyan land, some
did not. But mostly they are gone.”

I pointed out that I knew some Tajiks in Bamyan, and that they certainly were not wealthy. The
answer was simply that the poor Tajiks could not leave. “But,” said Latif’s father, “we have no
problem with them. They are just trying to get by. They did not help the Taliban.” This was not
in agreement with what I was told by Tajiks I knew in the area. They claimed a significant
amount of job discrimination and harassment from the Hazaras.
Bamyan is appealing for Hazaras for a number of reasons. Historically, it represents a
sort of prize, an important area that was taken from them, a symbol of Hazara subjugation. Now
it is an economic and political seat, with government, NGO, and merchant jobs not found in the
rest of the province. It is home to the only state university in Afghanistan that is attended by a
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Hazara majority (although there are several private Hazara-majority universities in Kabul and
other large cities). Its landscape recalls an ancient past, with its Buddha statues and ruins of
archeological sites, a past which Hazaras want to claim.
The story that Latif’s father told me brought to life all that I knew about Bamyan as a
place of unrest. The Bamyan I lived in was at peace, but the stories I was told were haunted not
just by the past but also by the possibility of a return to bloodshed in the future. This is what the
activists told me, and talked about in their speeches and protests. This is also what many ordinary
Hazaras in Bamyan told me. The people of Bamyan are terrified, feel haunted, are traumatized,
by their history, and by their knowledge that they are still not seen by many as true Afghans. The
activists’ narratives carry pain and suffering, and activate these same feelings among the people
who hear them speak. As I will go into in greater depth in the chapters to follow, sometimes the
narratives bring up old memories which people might want to forget; often they build upon a
religious-cultural framework that emphasizes suffering and victimhood; at times, they make
collective experiences personal, promoting the cultural trauma.
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Chapter Three
Cultural Trauma Among Hazara Civil Society Activists

It was a clear sunny day, not a single cloud in the sky — the perfect day to welcome spring.
Today was Nowruz, a Central Asian celebration of New Year that predates Islam. I had traveled
with several friends from Markaz Bamyan to a village in the nearby district Yakawlang.
Hundreds had gathered here for a rare day off to celebrate. The weather was still cool, bordering
on cold, but the deep freeze of winter was mostly behind us. My husband Andrea, who is an
anthropologist and was conducting research in Nangarhar Province at the time, was visiting. For
us, as well as my Afghan friends, the festive atmosphere was intoxicating. My husband worked
in an area with a large number of insurgents, and the ability to be outside in a village, openly,
was a heady experience for him. I could travel safely in Bamyan, and yet as a woman alone still
kept a low profile and presented myself as modest and married. But someone heard I was able to
ride horses, and offered to let me ride one of the mounts used for buzkashi, a game somewhat
like polo in which a goat carcass is used as the ball. I galloped the horse up and down the field,
let go of myself as people cheered my ride, not expecting it from a foreigner, much less a
woman. My veil blew back and my hair streamed in the wind.
But it seemed we could never fully escape the fact that Hazaras felt precarious,
vulnerable . . . their collective trauma was always a part of them. I walked along the top of the
hill, barren of vegetation like most of the landscape, with my friend Sajjad, a young Hazara
activist who was born in Quetta, Pakistan. His family originally hailed from Yakawlang, and had
left several decades ago. Sajjad had returned to Afghanistan, to Bamyan, for university, because
he wanted to be in his homeland, to which he felt a strong sense of attachment, and he was
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currently seeking work. But he felt uncomfortable. He was not fully Afghan, not fully Pakistani,
and trying to understand what it meant to be a Hazara, especially a Hazara who belonged to two
nation-states, but felt part of neither. We looked across the valley. To one side was a rousing
buzkashi match. To the other, four- wheel-drive trucks kicked up dust, attempting to race to the
top of one of the steep hills, all slowing and holding for a moment in stasis until rolling back
down without actually cresting the top. Sajjad, feeling reflective, began to contemplate his place
in Afghanistan. “You know, Melissa, I am Hazara, my family is from Afghanistan originally. I
came back here because I want to be Afghan. I feel myself Afghan. I want to help rebuild
Afghanistan.” But then, as so often happened, I noticed a slight, ironic smile as his voice turned
playfully sarcastic, yet slightly bitter. “But what about our Pashtun brothers? They are my
brothers, they are Afghans too, right? What do they think of me, of us Hazaras? Are we Afghan
to them? After what they have done to us?”
This chapter provides a broad overview of the ways in which cultural trauma relates to
Hazaras, and particularly to Hazara civil society activists. I introduce points to which I will
return in subsequent chapters: how trauma relates to issues such as religion, history, and human
rights. The main idea is that activists are promoting ideas that “induce” collective and cultural
trauma in a bid to gain recognition of Hazara suffering and, it is hoped, address and find
solutions for Hazara exclusion. Yet, in setting Hazaras apart as “the most traumatized” group in
Afghanistan, activists may antagonize members of the other ethnic groups in the country, and
alienate themselves further.
In this chapter, I explain the specific historical context that has given existence to a group
of collective agents, civil society activists, working to promote cultural trauma. Among the key
questions: How can we understand the strength of ethnicity as a major identity marker among
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Hazaras, particularly when in the context of Afghanistan, among other groups, other markers,
such as tribe, local affiliation, or religious sect might be stronger? How do cultural trauma
narratives sustain such a long historical timeline, extending back into ancient history and into the
future? Finally, how do the activists express collective trauma, find a ready audience, and
influence the emotions of those they want to reach?
Versions of my conversation with Sajjad were repeated often throughout my fieldwork in
Bamyan with Hazara civil society activists. Almost completely uninvolved in the current antigovernment insurgency, Hazaras seem to be very much invested in the Afghan state. They attend
school in numbers higher than any other ethnicity (Oppel and Wafa 2010), and they seek work in
the government and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), working in the spheres of
development and state-building. It is a rare exception for a Hazara to take up arms against the
current Afghan government. Criticisms of the government are common, but they concern issues
related to democracy, civil society, meritocracy, human rights, women’s rights, and sometimes
Shi’a rights. Hazara activists voice their criticism through protest — writing articles or taking to
the streets — not through open or violent rebellion. These protests do not preclude working from
within the state, through which the activists believe that they can improve their situation. Yet
they feel rejected by the Afghan state at the same time, and speak hopefully of a federal system,
whereby they could be both full members of the nation, and at the same time retain autonomy as
Hazaras. Federalism is held out as a remedy both for Hazaras’ rejection by other groups and the
gap between Hazara core cultural values and those of many other groups in Afghanistan.
Because of the length of the conflict in Afghanistan, which affected all geographic
regions of the country at some point, it is very difficult to find a group that remained untouched
by violence. Most Afghans, and historians of Afghanistan, agree, however, that Hazaras

83

occupied a low social status before the current conflict began in 1979, and were more likely to be
targeted with violence historically prior to that. With a majority adhering to the Shi’a sect of
Islam (a relatively small minority in Afghanistan), and displaying distinct Asiatic somatic
features, Hazaras experienced victimization that relegated them to the lowest rungs of Afghan
society — servants and manual laborers, subsistence farmers, and at certain times, slaves. The
current conflict, dating back to the 1979 Soviet invasion, has provided them with an opportunity
to rally politically and in some ways better their situation.21
Still, Hazara efforts to become full members of the Afghan nation seem to have stalled.
Their desire for greater inclusion has been partially fulfilled but the activists hoped for more
progress, faster. They continue to feel excluded from state institutions and from certain positions,
both inside and outside of the government, because of their ethnicity. Hazaras attend school in
high numbers, while many believe that they suffer from discrimination in the university system.
Activists and many others believe that development efforts in Hazara-majority areas are
intentionally inadequate, especially when compared to efforts in other areas. Hazaras are targeted
by insurgents, usually when traveling outside of their majority areas. They are victims of
kidnappings and murders, and they believe that the state intentionally avoids increasing security
measures in insurgency-affected areas through which Hazaras must travel. Some such fears
might be exaggerated, and some are completely valid, but it cannot be denied that Hazaras suffer
from continued, systemic social exclusion and prejudice that has not been fully countered by
improvements in the post-2001 period.
Hazara activists, expecting more from Afghanistan, particularly after buying into rhetoric
and promises set out by the international community (as reflected in Sajjad’s decision to return
from Pakistan), build and promote a cultural trauma that draws upon the past of exclusion and
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oppression. Hazara culture has been threatened by the policies of a Pashtun-dominated Afghan
state since the late 1800s, but a cultural trauma is developing now, both because of the current
disappointment with what was hoped to be a new, post-2001 Afghanistan, and ironically also
because the current political and cultural climate make it possible. Hazara activists, finding a
platform in the language of civil society development, continue and expand upon past projects
that sought to establish a Hazara political force. Current disappointment with the rate and degree
of Hazara integration, as evidenced by Sajjad’s concern with what his “Pashtun brothers” felt
about him, are compounded by concerns about lack of development and security. This fosters
disappointment and the development of an identity based on past traumatic collective
experiences. Hazara culture, believed by many to be lost to historical upheavals, is being
reshaped by the activists around a narrative of collective trauma.
Another aspect of the current situation that encourages Hazaras to embrace a collective
victimhood is the introduction of a discourse of human rights from the international community.
This is not completely new to Afghanistan: part of the Western rhetoric against the Soviet
intervention, and hence the pretext to supply extensive assistance to resistance groups, was that
not only of Afghan sovereignty but also universal human rights were being violated. And, given
that one of the main tactics of the Soviets was the “clearing of the population” from rural areas
(Maley 2009), as well as the use of land mines, and even “butterfly bombs” (which, looking like
playthings, were appealing to children), this was not unfounded. The post-2001 invasion was,
after the initial push for revenge against the regime which harbored Bin Laden, rationalized as a
way to provide rights denied by the Taliban, particularly for women. Subsequently, many of the
development and aid projects provided by the West focus on training in issues relating to human
rights, again with a strong emphasis on women’s rights (Farrell and McDermott 2005; Hesford
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and Kozol 2005).22 The organizations that bid on and administer these programs in Bamyan are
often the ones for which civil society activists work. The views expressed by the activists
towards the international community indicate that such international interventions and programs
create a sort of “script” which rewards victimhood.
In what might seem a paradox, the religious-cultural context specific to Hazaras and
Shi’as confirms the script of victimhood. Shi’a religious narratives praise suffering and
martyrdom. Thomas Barfield pointed out that a major reason why collective trauma narratives
are common among Hazaras, and yet seem to be lacking among Pashtuns and other groups — all
who have also suffered during the years of conflict — is that Pashtuns tend to value revenge for
wrongs committed against them, and do not emphasize a trauma narrative.23 This is despite the
fact that in the more recent 35 years of conflict, they have suffered as much, if not more than,
Hazaras. On the other hand, Pashtuns have politically controlled the country, and do not have the
same history of oppression, marginalization, and enslavement that Hazaras experienced. I argue
that the combination of already present religious tradition and historical context make the
Hazaras more receptive than other groups in Afghanistan to the influence of imported scripts
victimhood.

The Historical Context of Cultural Trauma
A specific historical context in Afghanistan led to a situation in which civil society activists,
working as collective agents, or social/moral entrepreneurs, could begin working towards a
representation of events and situations around which cultural trauma can coalesce. I propose this
context relates to the continuous conflict experienced since the Communist-led Saur revolution
and the subsequent Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1978-1979. It is in this context that earlier
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events, such as the wars Hazaras fought with Abdur Rahman’s central Afghan state, their
subsequent enslavement, and relegation to a lower class, appear as further evidence of trauma.
Had certain political developments and other instances of targeted killings not happened in the
more recent wars, the catalyst for a collective trauma may not have materialized. Hazaras
arguably suffered less than many other groups in Afghanistan during the early phases of the
communist takeover, Soviet invasion, and subsequent conflicts, as the areas of the country where
they predominate were largely left to their own devices during its initial stages. This situation
ultimately allowed for the remembrance of earlier traumatic events, which were experienced a
century ago, as continuous with more contemporary targeting of Hazaras.
During the civil war and Taliban years, the extent and severity of Hazara suffering can
hardly be overstated. Hazara-majority areas in Kabul, such as Afshar, were razed in April 1993
by intensive shelling from several sides. During the Taliban years, when much of the country
was relatively peaceful, fronts existed in the north, and in Bamyan itself, mostly in Yakawlang
district and Bamyan district, where a front moved back and forth for years, causing a cycle of
displacement, recuperation of lost territory, and return of the displaced. Even those who are now
students in local high schools remember these events first-hand.
“Did you ever have to escape the Taliban?” I asked Fatima and Hakima, two sisters I
befriended. They were from Yakawlang, on the fairly wide valley known as the Chaman, where
a river created a grassland for animals to graze. Fatima had married a friend of mine, Ali, who
worked in Bamyan at Sakhi’s guesthouse as a manager. Sakhi also had a job with an NGO and
needed extra help for his business. The two, Ali and Sakhi, were, in fact cousins, and since I was
very close to the mother and sisters of Sakhi, who I visited often in their village, I easily became
friends with Ali’s female relatives, as well as his new wife. Ali went back to his village for his
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arranged marriage, which was a long time coming. He had previously traveled as an asylum
seeker to Switzerland, had his claim rejected, was jailed for nine months, and agreed to return to
Afghanistan. He was not illiterate, but neither had he completed his high school education, so a
job managing a guesthouse was a good one for him. I was invited, and so spent several days of
festivities at the wedding, where I got to know Fatima, his new bride. She had finished high
school, and Ali was working to have her enrolled in courses at Bamyan University — it was very
common that male activists would support the higher education of their wives. Hakima was
staying with Fatima for the first few months after she moved to Bamyan with her new husband,
to help her settle in.
The village this family came from was not too far into the interior of Yakawlang, and so
easy for me to access. I thought perhaps in the past it was easier for the Taliban to access, too.
“Yes, when we were children, it happened a lot. They came in their pick-up trucks. We ran into
the mountains. We were so scared. If they caught us, they would kill us. We had to run. We had
to escape,” said Fatima.
I asked, “Just the mountains? There were no houses, any structures?”
The two young women explained, “Well, we have summer grazing pastures there, with
basic structures for the shepherds, but they are very cold, with no facilities. And every time the
Taliban came, we couldn’t bring enough food, or blankets. We would see their trucks coming,
and we had to leave quickly! We were so hungry! You know, our little sister, Anara, here, was
born up there. That was so hard.” The smaller girl in question smiled shyly at me.
“Well, why didn’t the Taliban follow you up the mountain?” I asked. “I mean, there are
trails, and it is not too far to the summer pastures.”

88

At this point the brother of the girls, Hassan, who was also visiting at the time, broke in.
“Those Taliban, those Pashtuns, they were so stupid! They came here in their light shalwar
kamiz, their sandals…how could they make it up into our mountains?” We all laughed, a
moment of levity when discussing a serious situation, a situation that marked these young people
for life with fear, as people who had been hunted, and marked Pashtuns, too, as the enemy.

Hazara: Ethnicity or “Groupness”?
The analytical category “ethnicity” rightfully arouses criticism when used as a static entity,
particularly in a place such as Afghanistan where ethnicity, local affiliation, religious sect, and
class all carry importance, depending on the context. At one level, my emphasis on ethnicity
reflects the activists’ choice to stress the ethnic category “Hazara,” as the most important marker
of their identity. Yet that only raises the question of why ethnicity came to be so important to
Hazaras. It is certainly not a given that there exists a coherent ethnic group, “Hazara,” nor that
the people of this group tend to act in concert or consider “Hazara” the most salient aspect of
their own identity. Yet for the people I worked with in Markaz Bamyan, ethnic Hazara-ness is
the marker most used to make sense of their affiliations and political actions. Civil society and
development in Bamyan are certainly based around ethnicity, as a contrast is made with the
higher levels of development that activists imagine are found in non-Hazara areas. The political
parties that most Hazaras follow are certainly ethnic in nature, and descended from the original
Hizb-e Wahdat. Status as a refugee according to international law also enhances the importance
of Hazara as an ethnic category, as many seeking asylum make the claim that ethnic Hazaras are
a particularly vulnerable group in Afghanistan.

89

Sociologist Rogers Brubaker writes of the need to question ethnic, national, racial, or
religious groups as static groups, to which one either does or does not belong:

Much talk about ethnic, racial, or national groups is obscured by the failure to distinguish
between groups and categories. If by ‘group” we mean mutually interacting, mutually
recognizing, mutually orientated, effectively communicating, bounded collectivity with a
sense of solidarity, corporate identity, and capacity of “group,” it should be clear that a
category is not a group. It is at best a potential basis for group-formation or “groupness.”
. . . We can ask how people — and organizations — do things with categories (Brubaker
2004: 12-14).

A category, in these terms, is any descriptive feature one uses for oneself or others, whereas a
group is a bounded number of individuals to which one must either belong, or not belong. The
problem is, while groups are not static, categories are used in different ways depending upon
need, and given different import depending on context. One might be female, and Shi’a, and
Hazara, but depending upon particular historical and social exigencies one may or may not
choose to act in concert with others who also have the possibility to lay claim to any one of these
categories. Therefore, Brubaker perceives “group-ness” as an individually-felt sentiment which
emerges in the wake of specific historical and socio-political circumstances.

Shifting attention from groups to groupness as variable and contingent rather than fixed
and given, allows us to take account of — and, potentially, to account for — phases of
extraordinary cohesion and moments of intensely felt collective solidarity, without
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implicitly treating high levels of groupness as constant, enduring, or “ontologically”
present. It allows us to treat groupness as an event, as something that “happens”
(Brubaker 2004: 12).

Groupness can then crystallize and cause individuals to act in the name of a particular
category, whether it be ethnic, religious, political, or other. Furthermore, the “groupness event”
is often encouraged and exploited by “political entrepreneurs,” who can engage in a groupmaking project (Brubaker 2004). I argue that the figure of the political entrepreneur can
potentially overlap with Jeffrey Alexander’s collective agents who promote cultural trauma, or
the “carrier groups” (in Weberian terms) of religious movements, depending upon what their
goal is. “Carrier groups have both ideal and material interests, are situated at particular places in
the social structure, and have particular discursive talents for articulating their claims — for what
might be called “meaning making” in the public sphere. Carrier groups may be elites, but they
may also be denigrated or marginalized classes (Alexander 2004: 11).
The achievement of Hazara crystallized groupness relies upon historical factors that both
impact and are acted upon by Hazara political actors. In other terms, the Hazara activists claim
that the people they represent are a passive target of traumatic historical events, even as their
own efforts are turning them into active participants in an identity-building process premised on
these same traumatic events. By using trauma to build identity, a new way of understanding
cultural trauma comes about. The identity, even the culture of Hazaras can come to be premised
on trauma and victimhood. As I will also argue that Shi’a religious practices also do some of the
same work, this becomes all the more salient for Shi’a Hazaras. Shi’ism informs how the
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activists promote their messages, and in turn, the audience might be more receptive to traumatic
narratives familiarized through Shi’a images and metaphors.
Such “newly-created” identity will, activists hope, allow Hazaras to become legitimate
and functioning members of the Afghan state — that is, to be “Afghanistanis” as well as Hazaras.
I use here “Afghanistani” because the word Afghan is, in fact, synonymous with Pashtun.
However, my informants are at the same time aware that the promotion of the memory of past
traumatic events within the collective consciousness may not alone be sufficient to achieve the
full membership in the Afghan body politic to which they aspire. The trauma the activists are
experiencing and addressing is represented precisely by the denial to Hazaras of such
membership on the part of the dominant ethno-political categories in the Afghan state (mainly
Pashtuns, according to them). Subverting the status quo will, in their view, allow the greater
Hazara population to overcome the trauma, and open a new era of political and social
participation for Hazaras in the country. Thus, while I speak of Hazaras as an ethnic category, I
analyze the possibility for the emergence of a particular type of Hazara groupness as a
consequence of the politico-ideological work of the activists who were my informants.
Fredrik Barth’s (1969) model of ethnicity as a function of social boundaries and cultural
diacritica — the everyday cultural practices and material artifacts that index belonging to an
ethnic group — can be used to understand certain other aspects of ethnic belonging, parallel to
the view I am proposing. Barth makes the point that it is not only a group’s internal cultural
characteristics but also the policing of borders done by insiders and outsiders, which determine
who belongs to a certain ethnicity. This does not preclude one changing their ethnic affiliation,
of course — Barth himself discusses Pashtuns in Balochistan, Pakistan who, when their territory
was overtaken by ethnic Baloch, “switched” identities to Baloch themselves. They did so, he
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claimed, because, once under the sway of Baloch landholders, they could not hold up Pashtun
norms of behavior, making it no longer possible to sustain the “diacritica” that defined them as
Pashtuns, and so made the decision to “become” Baloch. This was only possible had the Baloch
also accepted it as such.
The activists express the opinion that their efforts to be “Afghanistani” at the moment are
inconclusive, and that their ideal objective might in the end prove unattainable. This is because
they are aware that their project rests on its acceptance by their social and political adversaries,
who may potentially never acknowledge Hazaras as possessing the “right” diacritica to be fully
inside “Afghanistani” boundaries based on egalitarian premises. This comes within a context in
which the state has attempted, with more or less intensity depending upon who is in power, to
implement different sorts of “Pashtunization” at various points in Afghan history. Hazaras can be
excluded and ridiculed because of certain diacritica, such as looser purda restrictions of Hazara
women, less of an emphasis on honor (although this concept is still important), somatic features,
and even denial of particular types of physical culture such as song and dance as not legitimately
“Afghan.”24 The activists are reacting to perceived and real boundaries set up by other ethnic
categories in Afghanistan, many of whom reject any sort of commonality with Hazaras. As a
result, they are also maintaining their own boundaries against other groups, by focusing on a sort
of Hazara “exceptionalism.”
If, per Benedict Anderson (1983), a nation is an imagined community, a community of
people who believe they have something in common with one another (even should they have
never met one another individually), and if one of the goals of Afghanistan today is to
strengthen, even build, such a nation, then the Hazaras present a problem. An Afghan nation will,
by definition, have to be something that is somehow inclusive of the extremely multiethnic
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nature of the state — after all, even Pashtuns, the most numerous ethnic group, make up a
plurality, rather than a majority, of the population. Tajiks, the next most populous group, have
been more successful in seeing themselves as members of the Afghan nation. While they have
not controlled the top echelons politically, they have maintained a strong, wealthy, and
politically connected upper and middle class, something denied to Hazaras. Afghanistan has a
multitude of minority ethnic groups, but it may be that Hazaras, with their different sectarian
affiliation and their different somatic features, are just too “other” to be accepted by the other
main groups.
Hazaras represent the danger of the minority that is analyzed in Arjun Appadurai’s Fear
of Small Numbers (2006), especially when they are portrayed as descendants of Chingiz Khan,
that Mongol who is most known for bringing death and destruction wherever he went. And,
having been oppressed seems to have the effect of creating a perception by others that they are
all the more dangerous. Appadurai supposes that a nation-state is built upon peoples who must
have something in common, whether it be shared ancestral background or adherence to certain
values which are embodied in a sort of foundational myth. If people within a nation state do not
manage to somehow adhere to one of these two qualifications, they become dangerous. A nationstate is only held together by its mythological foundations, or shared blood, or of shared values
expressed by a foundational story. People who do not fit into these categories, even if a small
minority, are hence perceived as dangerous, and cause discomfort, and even fear, among the
majority, who consider themselves related by blood or foundational myth-values.
Not only is Afghanistan home to many different ethnicities. It is also hard to pin down
what the shared foundational myth of Afghanistan might be and what values bond all its people.
One answer might be religion, but Hazaras, as mostly Shi’as, do not even fit in this way. And
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most Afghans have concerned themselves more with tribal, local, familial, and sectarian
affiliations than with national affiliations. Even attacks from the outside did not unite the country
as a nation, as evidenced by the Soviet invasions, followed by a civil war. Today, Afghans of all
ethnicities wish to embark on some sort of national project, espousing a belief in the strength of
their armed forces against the Taliban, for example.
Ironically, the Hazara cause may be hurt when their activists proclaim themselves the
most suited for a nation-state along modern lines and the ones most invested in rule of law and
rights of all citizens. The more they seem to work within the state and make demands as citizens,
the more their minority status seems to be thrown back at them and their difference from others,
stressed. They are Shi’a. They are descendants of Mongols. They have occupied the lowest strata
of society for a long time. They do not keep the same strict rules of purda (gender segregation) as
others do. They are just too different, and yet they make these demands. They will not be quiet
but work to make themselves heard — so, they are feared by other Afghans. Even as they try to
assert themselves as members of the Afghan state, their demands for remembrance of past
injustices may work against them, as do all the other ways they are different. But they have no
other state, no other place, to claim. Located in the middle of the country, with only diaspora
populations which comprise even smaller minorities in Iran and Pakistan to flee to, they cannot
be easily excised. They are hence something to be feared as a possible spoiler to an Afghan
nation state, looked at through the lenses of the fear of small numbers evoked by Appadurai.
A Pashtun friend put succinctly what others alluded to, during many conversations about
my work with Hazaras. “Of course we know what we did to them in the past! That is why we
cannot let them get power now. Can you imagine how they will want revenge? What they will do
to us?” While this might seem like a projection of a more characteristically Pashtun cultural
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attitude onto Hazaras as an abstract group, some Hazaras do express the desire for revenge
against those who had placed them in the lowest rungs of society, who had enslaved and
massacred them, seemingly without a second thought.
These fears can also be tied to Conrad Schetter’s conceptualization of the ethnoscape
(2005). If Hazaras imagine that their homeland, their “ethnoscape” encompasses fertile farm
territory they were removed from as early as the 1700s, under the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani,
whereas Pashtuns’ ethnoscape also encompasses this land, which they currently inhabit (and part
of Pakistan, another nation state with a large Pashtun minority), then it becomes understandable
that Hazaras and Pashtuns fear each other based on ethnic animosities. Pashtuns and Hazaras
hence have both real and imagined grievances against each other, and different ideas about what
the ethno-national make-up of the other includes. These grievances work against Pashtuns
accepting that Hazaras can be part of their nation, and against Hazaras wanting to be members of
that nation.
Such grievances seem to be so deeply rooted that even the most rational persons cannot
resist them. “Taliban, Pashtuns, they cut off women’s hands! They committed such acts of
cruelty (zulm)!” declared an old woman from a village outside Bamyan, who had remained there
during all of the years of conflict. Meanwhile, a very open-minded Pashtun from a village south
of Jalalabad told me, “Hazaras are cruel (zulm)! When they fought against us, they nailed our
ears to the wall, to ensure our suffering!” Both sides claim zulim, cruelty, against the other. And
Tajiks, for whom ethnic groupness is not as crucial, and for whom identity is based upon
language and place of origin, also get caught up in these narratives. Hazaras were cruel, they say
(“Just look at Hizb-e Wahdat, who bombed Kabul during the civil war!”). Pashtuns, they say, are
also cruel — the Taliban never did any real favors to Tajiks, after all. Yet the Pashtuns rebuke
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that the Northern Alliance, after it pushed out the Taliban, took all the important government
positions except for the very top, the president. So, a Pashtun cannot really succeed in today’s
Afghanistan. Of course, I am describing a situation in which everybody has grievances against
everybody, but these complaints and squabbling have turned into a real memory of trauma only
among the Hazaras.
Those who are part of the “category” Hazara currently feel that this is the most
significant aspect of their identity, leading to a strong crystallization of Hazara “groupness” at
present. This, however, does not mean that other categories to which my informants belong do
not significantly impact their actions. Also extremely important, both to their self-representation
and for the judgments leveled towards them, are other factors, such as sectarianism. From the
subjective point of view, being Shi’a is of varying importance to my activist informants. Some
believe strongly, while others have gone as far as to renounce Islam. However, Shi’ism remains
(almost unconsciously) relevant for many, with its cultural, narrative, and iconographic patterns
based on suffering and personal sacrifice. Hazaras find that they can present themselves as a
people persecuted in Afghanistan for their ethnicity as well as for their affiliation with an Islamic
sect (the Shi’a), which itself originates from the history of suffering and persecution of two of its
founding figures. Hazara groupness and Shi’a groupness can overlap, and sometimes are wholly
intertwined. In fact, Sunni insurgent groups (the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Daesh/Islamic State) still
target Hazaras both for their ethnicity and their religious affiliation, which they consider
heretical. While Afghanistan is often lauded as a place where few instances of sectarian violence
occurs, there have been in the past years some egregious examples of precisely such events (e.g.,
the 2011 bombing of a Shi’a mosque in Kabul during the most important Shi’a holiday, Ashura
[Nordland 2011], and the 2016 bombing of Shi’a mosques in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, also on
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Ashura). As Daesh’s ideas gain traction in Afghanistan, sectarian acrimony may increase as well
(Goldstein and Shah 2015).

The History of Hazara Groupness
The political developments experienced by Hazaras during the Soviet invasion, civil war, and
Taliban period, as well as the post-2001 conflict, provide the setting in which Hazara ethnicity
has crystallized as an analytical (and experiential) category, and in which Hazara activists find it
possible to promote their ideas about cultural trauma. This process, by which the sense of groupness centered on the category “Hazara” emerged, was likely set in motion by Abdul Ali Mazari’s
decision, after founding the Hizb-e-Wahdat political and mujahedin party, to focus on ethnicity,
rather than sectarian or political affiliations (Harpviken 1995 and 1998; Ibrahimi 2009a and
2012). Previous to this, Hazara political activism was minimal. Following Hazara society’s
decimation by Abdur Rahman’s policies, a few Hazaras did seize leadership opportunities,
particularly with Communist groups struggling for control in Afghanistan in the period leading
up to and during the Saur Revolution and Soviet invasion, but there was not yet a movement
inclusive of Hazaras as a whole. Mazari, a member of the Shi’a clergy trained in Iran, initially
appealed as a sectarian leader but later made a decision to include secular, including many
Maoist, Hazaras, in the Hizb-e-Wahdat (Party of Unity). Some, particularly Shi’as of other
ethnicities, such as Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Kizilbosh (a Turkic minority who have long held an
elite position in the Afghan state), saw this move as closing the door on mobilizing around Shi’a
identity and abandoned Mazari’s leadership for a party that was more Shi’a oriented, Harakat-eIslami, led by a non-Hazara, Mohseni, who became a rival to Mazari. All of this political
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maneuvering on the part of Hazaras was made possible by the fact that the Central Highlands,
homeland of Hazaras, was left largely to its own devices during the Soviet invasion and
communist period. Mazari emerged as the leader after a period of internecine fighting, as
Hazaras sought to define themselves politically (Harpviken 1995, 1998).
During the civil war period of 1992 to 1996, Hazaras entered the political and military
scene more fully. Large numbers of Hazaras were threatened in cities such as Kabul after the
Soviet withdrawal led to fierce fighting within Afghanistan for control by the many various
mujahedin groups. After the communist regime of Najibullah collapsed in 1992, Wahdat tried to
establish themselves as an effective fighting force, and initially Hazaras were moderately
successful in gaining control of a large part of Kabul due to its large Hazara population.
However, other factions soon joined the fight and Hizb-e-Wahdat was not satisfied with the
power-sharing agreement offered. Taking a gamble, their leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, allied
himself with the anti-government force of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. This led to the retaliatory
shelling of Hazara areas such as Afshar, and corroborated the narrative of the Hazara-as-victim.
When the Taliban began to take control of Afghanistan, Mazari took another gamble and
attempted an alliance. He was promised a meeting with Taliban leadership, and instead was
kidnapped, tortured, and killed (March 1995), further establishing a Hazara martyrdom rhetoric
along the lines of the Karbala Paradigm. This indicates that even should people mobilize around
one particular category, patterns for understanding the world, other cosmologies, are not simply
forgotten. With Mazari gone, Hizb-e-Wahdat as a unified political party fragmented, and in fact
today there are four distinct factions descended from the original party. However, the idea of
Hazara ethnicity as a defining category for political action was firmly established and continues
to this day. Although there are exceptions, most Hazaras I spoke with agree that despite current
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fragmentations, when confronted or threatened, Hazaras would unify politically once again along
ethnic lines.

Collective Agents
In Ron Eyerman’s description of cultural trauma, collective agents are intellectuals who
“mediate between cultural and political spheres . . . not so much representing and giving voice to
their own ideas and interests, but rather articulating ideas to and for others.” He clarifies that they
are not necessarily educated individuals, but are “movement intellectuals” whose “role in
articulating the aims and values of a movement allow one to call him by that name,” (Eyerman
2001: 4). Mazari can hence be understood to be the founder-intellectual of this particular group
of collective agents. It is Mazari’s ideas that civil society activists interpret for the basis of their
platform and activities. This, even as other political groups in Afghanistan remember Mazari as a
mujahedin leader or warlord.
Hazara middle- and upper-class businessmen became a force in the 1970s, providing a
counterpoint to the political activities of Wahdat in the central highlands. They, too, focused on
issues of Hazara identity, parallel to, not at odds with, and sometimes overlapping with, Wahdat,
and helped to create, or give voice to, certain identity narratives (Ibrahimi 2012). While these
businessmen were successful financially, they were able to support scholarly and academic
projects, led by Hazara intellectuals, who wrote histories of Hazaras’ place in the greater history
of Afghanistan, accounts stressing Hazara suffering and oppression (Ibrahimi 2012). These
histories are today used by activists in their activities which promote cultural trauma. They serve
as a historical basis for speeches and narratives promoted by the activists.
A third event that led to the particular creation of the Hazara activists as collective agents
of this cultural trauma was the introduction of Western “universal” ideals as United States and
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NATO activities in Afghanistan commenced in Afghanistan in 2001. Alongside the military
activity came a massive attempt at state building and the building of civil society. Worldwide,
the development sector had shifted from a focus on large-scale projects such as infrastructure to
so-called soft-projects, which allow at least the appearance of local stakeholder control and
involvement.25 Furthermore, they promote sustainability in that they focus on human capacity,
and not infrastructure, which will collapse without the correct maintenance. They also can be
completed without full reliance on the host state, and so, in theory, cut down on governmental
misappropriation of resources. Commonly, these projects work through civil society
organizations, developed to address the needs of local communities. Many members of the
current young generation have been shaped by taking part in civil society and capacity building
projects of various sorts, and many have adopted these ideals as their own. For many Hazaras, an
alliance with Westerners, indexed by the full embrace of such ideals as human rights, gender
equality, and so on, which are promoted through such civil society and capacity building
projects, is highly appealing. Other influences entering Afghanistan are less appealing to
Hazaras. Sunni extremist ideas which arrive through Pakistan, such as the ideals of the Taliban,
al-Qaeda, and now Daesh or the Islamic State, are obviously not attractive to a largely Shi’a
group. And Iran, which has tried to attract Hazaras because of their shared Shi’a identity, finds
that Hazaras are distrustful. Iran did not fully support Hizb-e-Wahdat because of its focus on
ethnicity rather than sect. Also, Iran in the 1980s simply did not have significant resources to
spare from the war with Iraq. Iran inspires mistrust for the discrimination and mistreatment
encountered by Hazara refugees there, who began arriving during Abdur Rahman’s time and
continue to this day. This leaves the “Western option” for Hazara activists. While Westerners
find it easy to believe that their narrative is the strongest, and underestimate the appeal to
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Afghans of more orthodox and even radical Sunni and Shi’a narratives,26 the particular social
and historical context that Hazaras have experienced make Bamyan one place where Western
narratives are the most appealing.
All these factors make the current period an ideal time for the narrative of a Hazara
cultural trauma to spread. Hazara activists question the dominant narratives concerning their
history, and, on the basis of trauma, suffering, and martyrdom, seek to change what their future
might be. One irony here is that if Hazaras fully accept the activists’ narratives of victimhood,
martyrdom, and trauma, they might find it difficult to go beyond such narratives should their
situation improve. In other words, it might prove difficult in the future to change one’s selfrepresentation premised on victimhood, regardless of what the future might bring for Hazaras.
This argument can also be problematic, because an improvement in their situation in the last 15
years (or even 25, if we count the political formation of Wahdat, or 45, if we count the fortunes
of the businessmen who became successful in the 1970s onward) cannot easily counter more
than a hundred years of social exclusion and suppression (Karimi 2011). If trauma narratives are
limiting neither can the historical experiences on which they are based simply be undone; other
groups who have suffered genocide (Jews, Armenians, Cambodians, and Ukrainians, for
example) seek ways to remember and grieve even as they move on. Conversely, Hazaras face
difficulties when enacting these narratives because they do not have a monopoly on suffering in
Afghanistan. And when compared to the suffering faced by other groups who have experienced
genocide, the suffering of Hazaras seems of a lesser magnitude. They have simply experienced a
particular suffering to Afghanistan.

The context and scope of the Hazara trauma
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The emergence of the feeling of a cultural trauma, and the way in which it is created, is
predicated upon the historical and cultural context in which a group exists. This determines the
form it will take, the way it will be experienced, and whether it will be accepted or rejected by
the group.
In the case of the Hazaras, there can be no doubt that understandings of the past 35 years
of war are backgrounded by the fact that this group occupied the lowest rung on the social ladder
for at least 150 preceding years. The subjugation of the Hazaras by the Afghan state, under the
Pashtun ruler Amir Abdur Rahman, indelibly changed Hazara social life. The social structure of
the Hazara people was destroyed, ripped apart, as the Afghan state sought to ensure that further
rebellions would not occur. These events serve as one sort of background, so that more recent
instances of violence against Hazaras can be portrayed against them as an unending persecution,
integral to Hazara identity. Cultural trauma confirms the fatalistic attitude that things cannot
improve, even as the civil society activist agents of its transmission try to bring about positive
changes to the community. The overarching paradox is that Hazaras may feel they cannot
become full members of the Afghan state, no matter how they try; the more they succeed in
becoming functioning members of Afghan society, the more push-back they receive from other
groups.
One thing that stands out about the trauma described by Hazara activists is that it spans
an incredibly long period of time. Most activists start with a description of Abdur Rahman’s
consolidation of Hazara lands when describing their traumatic past, and propose that what
happens today is a continuation of what happened under Abdur Rahman. The wars waged
against them by Abdur Rahman certainly fit the criteria set out by theorists of cultural trauma
such as Alexander (2004; 2012) and Eyerman (2001; 2004). The events happened over a few
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short years, and although we can’t know what the emotional impact was for the people at the
time, we do know that Hazara social and cultural life was forever changed as a direct result.
Among the activists, knowing that much if not most of their previous culture and way of life
were lost has left an indelible emotional mark. It can be argued that while the event was sudden,
the repercussions continue to this day.

On a summer evening early in my fieldwork, I had dinner with a couple of friends, Sakhi,
the owner of a guesthouse who also worked at an international NGO, and Jawad, the
manager for the local Lincoln Learning Center, a US Embassy-sponsored English
language and American culture resource center. These were two of the informants I was
closest to, as I had made contact with them during my initial summer doing a pilot project
the year before, so we were all quite relaxed and the conversation was easy. Neither was
originally from the Markaz Bamyan district — Sakhi came from a village in Yakawlang.
Jawad was from Shahristan, a remote part of Daikundi province, and he and his older
brother were the first in their family to receive an education. After a large meal, we
leaned back on brightly colored pillows and cushioned mats on the floor. Sakhi plucked
lazily at a dombra, a traditional stringed instrument, as we chatted. He said that he did not
know how to play, and that he was teaching himself. Jawad chimed in that he had always
wanted to play, but because of the Taliban presence, Hazaras were not allowed such
traditional symbols of their culture, so he never got the chance. Some friends of his, he
said, managed to hide out in the barns of their household and escape Taliban detection, to
play this way. They both said that songs had been lost because of this.27
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I wanted to learn something of what Hazaras thought about their own history from
Sakhi and Jawad, although I was unsure how to start. So, I started with the obvious.
Sakhi’s guesthouse is situated beneath the cliffs in which the famous giant Buddha
statues once stood, and the empty niches can be seen towering over his courtyard wall.
So, I asked him to tell me about the history of the Buddhas, intending this to be a sort of
icebreaker. The story I was told was much more than I bargained for.
Sakhi began by telling me that there were ancient civilizations that thrived in the
valley before the Buddhists came to power. He spoke of a time when Zoroastrianism
thrived, and related this period to certain traditional practices done in his home region,
Yakawlang, if not today, then in the very recent past. Sakhi then stressed some
continuities between Buddhism and Zoroastrianism, and explained that in these ancient
times, a third religion, Mithraism, also thrived. People belonging to the three faiths, he
said, lived side by side in the very valley in which the guesthouse was located, where we
currently relaxed. Sakhi explained that the coming of Buddhism to the valley was
achieved by missionaries, but that these missionaries were peaceful, and convinced others
to join them by words and explanations — not by conquering the area in a warlike way.
They showed, he said, that the Buddhists were educated and brought many skills, and this
was how people were convinced to join their religion. It seemed clear he was setting up a
contrast between this, and the coming of Islam, which happened in a warlike fashion. He
stressed that during this time, when the three religions existed peacefully together, the
valley experienced a golden age. Advances were made in metal working, and in art.28
As Sakhi continued to speak, it became clear that he was telling me a story that
spanned epochs, and did not simply cover the Buddhist people. In fact, he fairly quickly
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glossed over the building of the Buddha statues, and the foundational legend the Hazaras
put forth about them, as male and female figures named “Salsal” and “Shahmama”. Sakhi
forged ahead, seeming to want to fit in all of the history of the valley into this one
meeting, even though I had already visited him several times over the course of several
years and even though I assured him that this visit would last for a full year. Sakhi’s
speech seemed to take on a fervor of someone who needed to tell something, and who
was not willing to give up a chance. This happened often with my informants — many
would get on a roll and speak faster and faster, making it hard for me to ask questions,
because they had so much to say and seemed to fear they had only one chance to do so.
When Sakhi began to describe the “Arab period” I found him to be very much to
the point. “When the Arab people came,” he said, “they destroyed many things, but most
importantly the destroyed our history.” Sakhi attributed a specific intent to this. “When
they were first sent out as missionaries, away from Arabia, they were first sent to those
places that had ancient things, those ancient places that had valuable treasures. Sending
missionaries was only a secondary goal. They robbed our history in more than one way.”
(I understood this to mean they robbed both the multicultural, peaceful environment that
thrived as well as the riches this civilization produced). “At the end of the 7th century, a
group of Arabs, under a leader named Yakub Lais, took 300 loads of camels laden with
treasure, statues, jewelry, anything of worth with him. What they couldn’t take they
destroyed, such as some of the smaller Buddha statues in the cliff. They tried to destroy
the two large statues, but were unable to.” This story, in many ways, fit in with the larger
historical context. Sunni Muslims, under Amir Abdur Rahman, under the Taliban, had
also persecuted the Hazaras. This seemed like it might be described as religious or
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sectarian based persecution. But then Jawad continued, as Sakhi nodded and chimed in
his agreement.
“By the 13th century,” Jawad said, “Jalaluddin, a Muslim, governed the valley,
and lived in the city of Gholghola.”. I knew well the city of Gholghola, as I could see its
ruins from my house, and walked closely past it on my way to the bazaar or to another
“suburb” of Markaz Bamyan known as Zargaron. Gholghola was a giant earthen mound,
with ruins of towers reaching from all parts of it. One city after another after another
seemed to have been built on top of this mound. Sakhi briefly explained that the base of
the city had been built by Buddhists, but that the current ruins of towers one could see
were built by Muslims. Jawad continued, “During Jalaluddin’s rule, in the 13th century,
the Mongols under Chingiz Khan attacked and the locals made a stand. Gholghola was
surrounded at the time by a deep moat and had supplies to wait out the assault. But a
daughter of Jalaluddin saw Chingiz as a great, brave warrior, and decided to help him, in
the hopes that she would become one of his wives. She got a message to Chingiz
explaining how to cut off the water supply to the city, so that the defenders were quickly
flushed out. The inhabitants of Gholghola, fought fiercely, and one of the grandsons of
Chingiz was killed, right here. In retaliation, every living thing, even the birds, of the
valley were killed. For many years it was empty. Just as it was empty when the Taliban
drove everyone out. We call it Shahr-e-Gholghola, the city of screams.”

It became clear to me that the “truth” of this history of the region inhered in the lesson it seeks to
impart as much as in its factual accuracy. Even in those early days of my fieldwork, and even
when I knew much of the oppression of Hazaras, these extraordinarily far-reaching narratives
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pointed to unending oppression, which began in ancient history and has never stopped.
Oppression and suffering have become a core part of Hazara identity, through stories passed on
by activists such as Sakhi and Jawad.
This episode of history-telling shows that activists and other Hazaras do not only talk
about Hazara history for political and instrumental purposes but sometimes do so simply out of
interest in their history and wanting to share information. Jawad was a deeply involved activist,
whereas Sakhi did not consider himself an activist at all, but was friends with many of the others
because of his position with an NGO. Though my presence and status as s foreign anthropologist
surely influenced their account, these two were close friends of mine and had not sought me out
for an interview but just as friends enjoying dinner. And it was I, not they, who turned the topic
of discussion to my research. Even more, it was the avid but relaxed interest with which both
Sakhi and Jawad engaged the topic of Hazara history which marked for me that theirs was an
impromptu and not a calculated account.
The scope of the trauma, then, is huge, greater than epic in scale, with a baseline much
earlier than the obvious start point of the centralizing efforts of Abdur Rahman, but which
reaches back rather into pre-history, when peoples of different ethnicities and faiths co-existed,
and which was allegedly destroyed by the coming of the Arabs. Hence, Hazara activists put forth
the idea that their group suffers a timeless oppression.
What is more, there is no end date. Each version points to a start time for this oppression
— the coming of Islam, and also the wars waged by Abdur Rahman, depending on the audience
and the setting — but one larger lesson is that they still suffer, and will continue suffering for as
long as they live surrounded by enemies who, unlike them, are unenlightened, who do not enjoy
the cultural resource of an early history of mixing and cosmopolitanism, in which three religions
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peacefully coexisted and diverse cultural groups met on the Silk Road. Hazara suffering is
boundless, not just because it is ancient but because there is no end point to it in the future. Had
Hazaras achieved a place in the Afghan state they felt was stable, had they truly believed that
they had managed to escape this past, then perhaps the cultural trauma of discrimination,
exclusion, and persecution would not have been propagated. My activist informants possibly
could have accepted the entrance of Western forces after 2001 as the end of their persecution.
But their future holds the dread (even the anticipation) of a return of Pashtun/Taliban rule during
which things will become much worse. Hazaras have hence already lost a culture, a history, a
way of life, in a historical past. They expect to lose their current culture and way of life, because
of their perceived failure to integrate into the state. Activists could speak of these issues in an
almost contradictory way. Hazaras are the ones who are enlightened enough to introduce
Afghanistan to “universal” values such as human rights and gender equality. And yet, their nonHazara national “brothers” would never be able to accept them. Examples of enlightened,
forward-thinking Pashtuns could always be found, they said, but most of the others would prefer
Hazaras did not exist in Afghanistan. And with a homeland right in the middle of the country,
there is not a chance for a separatist movement. Hazaras are caught in a bind from which they
cannot escape, say the activists, even as there is something inherent to their mindset that makes
them work for better things.

The Haunting Presence of the Past
So far, the cultural trauma whose rhetoric is advanced by the activists clearly relates to their
status as an oppressed people. There are two aspects to the cultural trauma of Hazaras, I argue.
First is suffering related to the war. This trauma was experienced by most Hazaras of a
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certain age. People who remained in Bamyan remember firsthand the Taliban incursions into
their valleys. Hazaras from Kabul, for example, speak of being beaten, and even shot in the street
simply for looking like Hazaras. Refugees in Pakistan and Iran suffered from discrimination
from their hosts as well as from growing up not having seen one’s homeland, only to experience
difficulty in trying to fit back in when they returned. These sorts of psychological and/or physical
sufferings, experienced personally or by someone close, may be traced back to Abdur Rahman’s
persecutions as well. The land policies of Abdur Rahman meant that Pashtuns and other ethnic
groups more accepting of his rule were given Hazara lands. Ahmad, who had been a successful
agriculture professor at Bamyan university and a sought-after consultant in agriculture
development, due to an MA degree from India, told me, “I visited my ancestral land. Where my
family comes from, near Ghazni. I saw Pashtuns farming our land. But I know it is ours.” Ahmad
has a wife and young daughter. But not long after I left the field, he left everything, including his
young family, to further study in Japan. He says he misses Bamyan, but he never seemed fully
attached to it — he made it clear his home was elsewhere. I speculate that his move to Japan,
although not easy, was perhaps facilitated by his feeling that his “real place” had been overtaken
by others. Unmoored, he might go anywhere.
These traumas become collective when they are told and retold. This comes easily when
you have lost someone in your family, or been gravely injured yourself, or suffered the anomie
which accompanies displacement. You can then add to and take from this history, both building
it and making the larger history one’s own. When influential members of the group say that what
has happened was an attempted genocide, then each person becomes a survivor of a genocide.
Here, the civil society activists have been very successful in their campaigns.
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A second type of cultural trauma relates not to the erasure of the people themselves, or
the grave harm done to them physically and psychologically, but to the destruction of their way
of life, of their cultural artifacts, stories, songs, and so on. This is harder for the activists to
convince people of because, if one takes at face value all that has been lost since the time of
Abdur Rahman (and if even half of the history told by the Hazara historians is true, then it is
significant) then the population cannot even know what it has lost.
Other things people may not care to recover. A system of mirs, khans, and begs who
served as feudal rulers to an indentured population has been lost, but no one wants a return to it.
Individuals know if they come from a family of mirs, khans, or begs, but today descent from
these groups carries, according to all I spoke to, little to no social capital. They are remnants of a
past system that is seen as being out of line with the “universal” Western ideals many Hazaras
today want to embrace. Sayeds, who also used to have a high degree of political control due to
their ascribed status as descendants of Prophet Mohammad, are both revered and distrusted at the
same time as they maneuver for political capital they have somewhat lost.
The more tangible aspects of the culture are mourned by more. As referenced earlier,
there is a feeling that traditional music and songs are in danger, and their loss relates to the
internal colonization suffered at the hands of the Pashtun state, which my informants made clear
they consider continues in an unbroken line from Amir Abdur Rahman and subsequent kings, to
the Taliban and even Ashraf Ghani today. Celebrations, types of clothing, art forms and ways of
weaving, were described repeatedly as traditionally Hazara and as lost. People see these things
are lost, and so the activists are able to engage them at this level.29
In some ways, the loss of the very ancient Silk Road culture, of the variety of religions
that once thrived together, is harder for the activists to convince the more general population of,
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particularly as most Hazaras do remain devoted to their Shi’a faith. In some cases, however, it is
easy for the activists to make the case that the loss of pre-Islamic cultures is part of the trauma,
given that they are operating within a physical space literally surrounded by archeological
remains and ruins. We were living in a valley in which the staring, empty niches of the Buddha
statues were visible from pretty much every vantage point. They are hauntingly beautiful, but
they are also horrific in their deadly emptiness. They are horrific because of the symbolism they
hold for the people, something of theirs which was taken from them. This was done by Taliban,
by Pashtuns. But the trauma narrative is quickly expanded if one turns around and gazes upon
the ruins of Gholghola, and recalls the legend of Chingiz Khan destroying every living thing in
the valley. The descendants who managed to return still live in a nearby village, Sayedabad,
inhabitants of that village told me.30 Hazaras, then, easily became the eternal sufferers. Their
cultural trauma includes the destruction of their social structure, the destruction of their way of
life, the destruction of the monuments that represent them.
There is a third aspect still to cultural trauma, which the activists did not want to discuss
but whose presence was clear to me.

I took a walk with one of the civil society activists, Bilal. He was one of the most
involved activists, one who was always involved in some project. He ran an organization,
which was shut down for political reasons, and he then devoted himself completely to
civil society. Towards the end of my fieldwork, he started an English education center.
Bilal was well-educated, with a university degree, and his English was impeccable. But I
always felt somewhat ill at ease with him, although I could not tell you the exact reason
why. Sometimes I felt that he was one of the few who was crafting the stories he wanted
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me to hear and tell to others with great care. Sometimes I felt there was something
dangerous lurking beneath the surface. Not a danger to me, but some dark past, some
hidden demon, that his polished looks and accent and carefully crafted narratives covered
over. That day was different, though. We climbed a ridge and looked over the valley as
the sun set. Bilal began to talk of the fights he participated in against the Taliban, rather
than of the protests coming up or of the problems faced by Hazaras, the topics he
normally focused on. “I was in Mazar”, he said. “During the massacre. We shot them.
Lots of them. We helped put them in containers and left them in the sun.” He paused and
looked over the valley. “After all my people have been through, do you really think I
would not fight against the Pashtuns again, despite what we have built here? Do you
think I would not do it again?”

The third, secret trauma comes from every group in Afghanistan being both victim and
perpetrator. We can play at assigning blame, at tallying numbers dead, at trying to apportion out
fault and say who wronged who more, but in the end, this is an impossible exercise. Each group
deals with this differently. Hazara activists maintain their innocence, they maintain that their
leader never targeted civilians, even as stories abound among other groups of Hazara cruelty, just
as Hazaras tell of the cruelty of others. To me, activist reluctance to deal with this issue might
also be what Galia Plotkin-Amrami terms “ideological trauma” in her work with a center
providing psychiatric services to Israeli settlers made to disengage from the Gaza strip. PlotkinAmrami indicates that the settlers, forced to move from their land and disengage from their
religious-ideological belief concerning the land, were traumatized because of “identification with
a threatened ideological project,” (2013:54). Hazara activists have become such proponents of
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human rights and ideals, that the dissonance between this and the involvement of Mazari, their
founder, in the shelling of civilians or other war crimes, may generate another kind of collective
trauma, perpetrator’s guilt. Activists purport that Hazaras are the one group in Afghanistan who
carry an almost inborn cultural competence regarding human rights. When confronted with
evidence that suggests otherwise, they themselves seem to react with denial, and are reluctant to
face this reality.
One occasion on which the tensions between victimhood scripts and perpetrator guilt
became clear involved dissent among the community concerning wanton killings of Pashtun
civilians perpetrated by a Hazara Local Police Commander. Hakim Shujayi is, or was, a
commander who was initially supported by United States special forces through the Afghan
Local Police program.31 This project empowered local militias, giving them uniforms, weapons,
and some amount of training, in the hope that they would work within their local communities to
battle insurgents. Shujayi was operating in an area with a mixed population of Pashtuns and
Hazaras. He was accused of brutally torturing, raping, and killing Pashtun civilians. Shujayi was
supposedly sought by the government for arrest, but many claimed he was also being protected
by high level Hazara officials so he would not actually be arrested.
One of my friends who was a reporter wrote an article which detailed these accusations,
citing an Australian piece (McGeough 2013). When the article was published, all hell broke
loose among the activist community. The reporter received death threats, and considered
working with an organization in Kabul that protected threatened journalists. None of the activists
would talk to him. When I questioned the activists about the incident, they told me that the
reporter had made the story up to get asylum. Worse, they actually expelled him (temporarily, as
it turned out) from the Hazara community. They othered him. Most activists I asked began to say
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he was not Hazara at all. The reporter himself was completely distraught. “I never wanted to hurt
my community,” he told me. “You know, my managers, are Pashtuns. They made me do this.”
And this claim is what saved him. The organization that helped reporters intervened with the
news source, and a retraction was made, with the claim that it was the managers who wrote the
story, and put the reporter’s name on it. This was enough for the activists and the rest of
Bamyan. The reporter was accepted back into the fold. Those who had said he was not Hazara
denied having done so.
None of this sat well with me. I was working with people who claimed to support human
rights, and said that a genocide had been committed against them. And now, when claims were
made that someone from their ethnicity was torturing civilians, women and children, they not
only did not consider the claim but even seemed to endorse Shujayi’s cruelty. “Why?” I asked
one of the main civil society activists. “You have to take it seriously, these are serious claims,
and they are credible! Why are you doing this? Why are you treating the reporter like this? You
are supposed to stand up for people’s rights!”
“Melissa,” he said, “You can’t understand. You did not go through our history. You did
not live through what we lived through. Maybe it is true, what Shujayi did. But we are
vulnerable. We were the first group that was disarmed. If the Taliban comes, they will kill us.
We need strong figures like Shujayi.” Could I accept this answer? Still I had an uneasy feeling
that there was some satisfaction in revenge. Hazaras do not uphold the concept of badal, that
revenge is something mandatory, that it must be carried out, that it is actually a sort of system of
exchange, as do Pashtuns. However, the urge to seek revenge is a human need to seek justice on
behalf of the injured, and so Hazaras all the same might do this, outside of the concept of badal.
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So many Hazara women and children were killed, tortured, raped that now, it was the Pashtuns’
turn. No one told me explicitly, but I felt it, inferred it, when Shujayi was the topic of discussion.
Shujayi was like a ghost who followed me out of the field. His initial actions were in
Uruzgan Province. In 2015, thirty Hazaras were taken from buses by the Taliban. They were
separated from the other passengers and taken away. For months, their fate was unknown. Some
were eventually recovered, but not all. I continued to speak with my informants, and when such
tragic events were ongoing we spoke more often. On one phone call, one said, “Melissa, I need
to tell you something. It is about Shujayi. He is planning something, because of the kidnapped
Hazaras. He is going to take his revenge.” I actually felt ill after this conversation, disappointed
and somehow let down. This was someone who claimed to be a strong proponent of human
rights — and in most cases, I believe he was.
“I thought Shujayi was dead?” I said.
“No, he is not. He will do it.”
I do not know if Shujayi did anything. Reports surfaced of Hazara local police, for some
reason stationed in a region fully Pashtun, committing abuses. I never got an answer as to why
they were there. Ostensibly it was to guard a particularly dangerous stretch of road that Hazaras
are often threatened on when they drive to Kabul from Bamyan, but the local police is not
supposed to be deployed this way. Another friend had brought up Shujayi’s name regarding this
incident.32
Shujayi kept haunting me. I was writing about activists who defend human rights, and my
mind kept returning to Shujayi and the protection he was receiving. I called a trusted activist and
asked him point blank. “I need to know. You say you defend human rights, but everyone,
including you, defended Shujayi. You did not even question his actions. And I know some
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activists were happy about these stories concerning what he did. How can you defend him, and
defend human rights? How are both things possible?”
Our conversation was long, but again it came down to two points. “Melissa, we need
someone strong. Shujayi knows how to fight. So few of our people know how to fight anymore.
We are not fighting every day like the Pashtuns. We need his knowledge.”
“Fine,” I said. “But he is accused of doing really terrible things. There are others who can
fight besides him. Why him?”
“Melissa, let me tell you, those things can’t be true. Shujayi, he is a religious man. You
know our religion. You know we are Shi’as, that Shi’as are the Muslims who are more peaceful.
We are not al-Qaeda, or the Taliban, or the Islamic State. A true Shi’a would never do such a
thing. This I know. I believe it.”
I came to the conclusion that something was haunting my informants too, even as Shujayi
was haunting me. I do believe most of them, at least, are sincere when they speak about human
rights. But they are also terrified. The history they had uncovered shows a mass ethnic cleansing
and possible genocide against them. They see a clear connection between the perpetrators of
these acts, and many of the Pashtuns who seemed to, and continue to seem to, threaten them at
every turn. This past haunts them, and a future that would be a return to this past haunts them. A
limit to the embrace of rights for everyone is crossed when it comes to giving rights to Pashtuns
who might themselves deprive Hazaras of their rights. This is part of the ideological trauma.
Unable to confront this inconsistency for what it is, they try to explain it away, to banish the
specter.
Talking with a Hazara who had gotten asylum in Europe ten years ago, when he was a
fifteen-year-old unaccompanied minor, I found other echoes of this. This person is completely
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integrated into German society. He studies at a German university, and has a wife of Turkish
descent who stresses her full assimilation into German society.

You know, I know all these activists, and they want me to join them, but I don’t want to
be a part of it. I don’t want to live their suffering. Plus, all this stuff about how Mazari
was a great man . . . I don’t like it. He did some good things; he said some good things.
But he was also a mujahedin, like the others. He decided to bomb innocent people, like
the others. And in the beginning, the activists knew this. They talked about the problems
in Mazari. But only in the beginning. Then, they stopped. They had to see him as pure, as
a great man.

I will later discuss Mazari in greater depth, but this Hazara refugee’s insights cast further light on
the kind of forgetting needed for the activists to pretend that the ghosts of Hazara-perpetrated
violence do not exist.
I am limited here by my interviewees’ understandable reticence to talk about Hazaraperpetrated violence. I could not even ask most of my informants about this, because after
witnessing what happened to the journalist, I did not want to be shunned. I did ask a few very
close friends, and I have recounted their answers. I also include what hints were given when I
can, in order to be honest in telling what happened to the Hazaras, what are the various forms of
their own cultural trauma, while also acknowledging the suffering of others. Some types of
trauma, whether collective or individual, are certainly repressed, and this is likely one such case.
At the same time I will stress, here, and repeatedly, that this does not diminish the oppression,
the suffering, the trauma the Hazaras themselves experienced, which stretches much further back
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than the beginning of these last brutal wars that started with the Soviet invasion.

The Hidden Wounds
In Afghanistan, the people of every group have suffered. I have already written of the way in
which many or most Hazaras have suffered, and how this seems to make it easier to spread
vicarious cultural trauma. Of course, this is not always the case — sometimes people want to
forget, and sometimes people simply want to lead a normal life, unburdened by the memory of
the past. There are degrees to which those outside the activists’ circle are receptive to their
message. Some, in Bamyan, echo the sentiments of the refugee in Europe I mentioned above.
They want nothing to do with it, and tell me that the activists’ efforts do not reflect what they
want. Some are sympathetic but not vocal. When I ask, they say they generally agree with the
activists but are not going to stand on the street shouting slogans with them. And others outside
of the circle of activists do join them on the streets, and shout slogans, but do not go so far as to
plan any events. Certain narratives, like that of the Afshar Massacre, receive a wider audience.
Most people who know about the event manage to identify with it. It might also be that just like
some people hide their physical traumas if they can, some people hide their psychological
traumas.
I knew a shopkeeper for a year before I knew he was a victim. He had an excellent shop,
and was always smiling and happy, so I tried to frequent it most often when I needed to buy
certain goods. One day, when I went to buy some things, he was being filmed by a reporter. I
asked him why. He pulled up his shirt, and I saw his body was horribly scarred. “They are
interviewing me about this. I was in Kabul, during the Taliban. I was walking along near the
grain silos (one of the most notable landmarks of Kabul, where bread was made). Some Taliban
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drove by. They shot me, because I was Hazara. I almost died. But, I didn’t.” And he smiled at
me, always kind, and helpful.
Sakhi was another friend I had known for three years when a traumatic story came out. I
knew him, and his family, since my initial summer of fieldwork in 2010. I loved getting away
from Markaz Bamyan and spending time in the village with his family. His father had run off
with another wife, and his mother and five sisters lived in her ancestral house, which was one
hundred years old. While uncommon among Hazaras, a female-centric household of this kind
would be completely impossible among some of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Among
Hazaras, it was accepted, and the family was respected, I came to understand from what others
told me. The village life was something different, busy with chores, but not the frantic rushing to
meetings and protests I experienced in Markaz Bamyan. Sakhi stayed in Bamyan with his guest
house, where he always welcomed me. He had studied sociology at Kabul State University, so
we built a rapport as fellow social scientists. As far as I knew, he was simply a quite intelligent
boy who had left his village study in the capital, and then returned to Bamyan to set up a
successful business. On one occasion, near the end of my fieldwork, my husband was visiting.
We went visit to Sakhi with Abdullah, another activist. By this time we had all become friends,
and my husband would come to the safer environment of Bamyan not only to visit me, but to
enjoy a place where security was not problematic, and where people were more open and
trusting. (By contrast, many Pashtuns in Nangarhar, where the American military conducts
operations regularly, wondered whether a foreigner who seemed to have no job and spent his
days asking questions was a spy). We ate and laughed, speaking a mix of Dari, Pashto, and
English (I speak Dari, while my husband speaks Pashto). Abdullah then suggested Sakhi tell
some of his stories from the time of the war with the Taliban.
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“You know Sakhi was a fighter, right?” he asked.
I was shocked. I had no idea. “How old were you? What did you do?”
Sakhi answered, “I was around fourteen, fifteen, sixteen. But Khalili trusted me, because
I was from the area, I knew it well. I guarded some important areas.” I noticed he began to look
uncomfortable, and I did not want to push him into telling what were surely terrible experiences
for a young teenager.
But Abdullah said, “Sakhi has some really funny stories from that time! Tell them the
funny stories!”
At this, Sakhi lit up a bit. “Yes! One time, the Taliban were coming, and everyone was so
scared and we were helping them to run away. And one woman was so scared, she thought she
grabbed her baby, but really she grabbed a pillow! A pillow! We were driving away, and we had
to go back and get the baby!” Sakhi and Abdullah collapsed in peals of laughter. My husband
and I exchanged uncomfortable looks and laughed politely.
Sakhi continued, “One time, there was a farmer near his house, and another in the field.
The farmer in the field noticed the other farmer’s cow was going to escape, so he started to
motion with his hand. The farmer near his house thought the other one was telling him he saw
the Taliban coming up the valley! He was so scared, he immediately grabbed what he could and
ran to the mountains. And then the other farmer saw this, and ran home, and got what he could,
and also went to the mountains! They were there for more than a day, and finally one asked the
other, ‘Why are we here?’ And the other said, ‘You motioned the Taliban were coming!’ And the
first said, “No! You motioned the Taliban were coming!’ Then they understood the mistake and
went home.” Once again, the two erupted in laughter.
“That’s not true . . .” I ventured.
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“No, it is! These hings happened all the time! People were so afraid, they had no idea
what they were dong.”
I wondered if my friend Sakhi, successful in business, in full time employment at a
development organization, and who held a prestigious degree for someone of his background,
was not emotionally scarred underneath his amiable exterior self. I cannot say how much, as the
opportunity never presented itself to ask further about these stories. Without over-analyzing,
several issues seem to be at play. One, Sakhi seemed to be reacting to these stories like the
fifteen-year-old boy he had been, not the man he had become. Somehow, when it came to these
events, he was stuck in the past, and had not moved forward. And two, these stories seemed to be
covering up something deeper, some wound I could only guess at. Someone later mentioned he
may have witnessed the death of a close friend while fighting, but I did not confirm this.
The point is, the shopkeeper hid serious physical scars. Sakhi hid emotional scars. Some
Afghans talk about their scars, physical and emotional, openly, some wear them as almost a
badge to be shown off. And some hide them. A collective trauma, a cultural trauma, might also
be hidden by some individuals affected by it. If someone does not join protesters or attend
speeches, does the past not move them, all the same? There are surely those who embrace
trauma, and those who dismiss it, but dismissal does not mean it is not existent, at least not for
every individual. Just as dismissal of ghosts one does not wish to confront actually does not
banish them completely, at least not for every individual.
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Chapter Four
Who are Hazara Civil Society Activists? Relations with Local, National, and
International Political Institutions

On an early spring day in Bamyan in 2013, I sat with a group of civil society activists preparing
to travel to the neighboring province of Daikundi, the only other Hazara majority province, to
visit civil society organizations there. The meeting was a chance for the core group of civil
society activists living in Bamyan to discuss what they believe are the most important tasks to be
completed and subjects to be brought up with the activists in Daikundi. The activists convened in
the sunny meeting room of one of the main civil society organizations in Bamyan, on the second
floor of a business center located in the main bazaar. Only a few of those in attendance were
officially affiliated with this organization. Others worked full time at various other civil society
organizations but most of the attendees held jobs in education, development or journalism, or
were students, and dedicated their free time to civil society activism. We sat around a long
conference table in the bright sunlight that streamed through the window, drinking tea and
listening to everyone’s thoughts.
Abdulhakim suggested what he believed was the main problem which needed to be
addressed during the trip. “These civil society activists in Daikundi simply are not as advanced
as we are in Bamyan,” he stated. “We need to teach them to work more like we do. We have
more experience here in Bamyan, there is a lot they can learn from us.”
Everyone around the table, about fifteen men and five women, most in their twenties and
thirties, agreed.
“In Daikundi,” Abdulhakim continued, “civil society activists don’t understand how
necessary it is to remain independent, separate from political activities.” Seeking elaboration, I
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later questioned him further. “Melissa, the whole point of civil society is that it remain
independent, from the government, from the political parties, and if possible, even from outside
donors. We try to fund as much as we can ourselves. Well,” he qualified, “most of us do. But
even this organization, where we have met today, they rely too much on outside donors. It means
that they lose control of their actions. Of course, they have the best intentions, but they are not
doing the right thing completely, as those of us who are more independent do. And in Daikundi,
they really have ties to the government, to outside donors.”33
Unfortunately, due to a late-season snowstorm, the roads and passes we would have
crossed in the journey to Daikundi were closed, and the trip was canceled, to my disappointment.
It was not rescheduled due to the busy schedules of the activists. This discussion, however, led
me to consider more deeply, and question more specifically, what the activists believed were
better practices for civil society, and what practices should be avoided. It led me to realize that
Hazaras as a whole, and particularly civil society activists, have an ambivalent relationship with
various institutions — state, aid and international organizations, foreign governments, and others
— that they promote, denounce, and use to redress problems, both those specific to Hazaras and
those which affect Afghans more broadly. In general, I found that there is a tendency among
these informants to classify certain ideals as positive: education, democracy, and human rights.
Yet when these ideals are promoted through state institutions — elections, state-run schools,
political parties — they come to be seen as corruptible and open to discrimination. When they
are promoted through international organizations — the UN, U.S.-funded projects, international
human rights organizations — they are seen as being promoted in much purer form, uncorrupted
by internal Afghan politics, whether at a very local or a national level.
It is true that independence from the government is widely accepted as one definition of
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civil society and as one guarantor that civil society groups will stand for the people’s interest.
But is complete independence necessary? This is disputed among Bamyan’s activists. Many
struggle with reconciling civil society ideals with the need to get things done by allying with
groups that are not purely civil society.
Questioning institutions of education, elections, and formal justice just because they are
affiliated with the state, which is viewed as corrupt, can be understood through Jeffrey
Alexander’s proposal that discourse surrounding the civil sphere can be understood in terms of a
binary. Civil/democratic values such as cooperation and rationality are found on one side, and,
anti-civil/non-democratic values such as aggression and irrationality are on the other. The civil
side of the binary is viewed as the legitimate side, and the non-civil side is not only illegitimate
but polluting (Alexander 2006). The civil society activists place the Afghan government squarely
in the non-civil side, and as such, they reject institutions administered by the government as
polluted. One might even take this argument a step further, and say that international
organizations, such as the United Nations, and even the United States government, are in line
with civil values and hence might even be considered purifying.34
From the point of view of the Hazara activists with whom I worked, the Afghan state is
the institution, in its different manifestations, which has consistently betrayed Hazaras.
International organizations, on the other hand, promote ideals such as equality and human rights,
which ostensibly benefit Hazaras. While a unified Hazara political bloc did not survive the
creation of the current government, awareness of the need to counter and act against the
historically-rooted social exclusion faced by Hazaras is one of the most important legacies
Hazaras carry with them from the years of war. Even more importantly, according to the activist
point of view, it is the state that has traumatized, and still traumatizes, Hazaras. Therefore,
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activists view alliances with the state as dangerous and polluting. Many Hazaras and other
Afghans consider the post-2001 period as a turning point, when real opportunity and integration
into society became a possibility. Many have benefitted from educational and employment
opportunities relating to an influx of foreign NGOs and funds. Yet Hazaras continue to distrust
their own state, even as they adhere to the goals and ideals of the international community,
which, they believe, will result in real inclusion if left to work without interference from the
Afghan state. In spite of this, Hazaras will work for state institutions which promote ideals
championed by the international community. These they see as universal values,35 clearly on the
“civil” side of Alexander’s binary, but which they also believe the state itself does not value.
Universal ideals which are pure when promoted by outside organizations and institutions are
polluted when touched by the corrupt Afghan state. And yet, Hazara activists continue to work
towards these ideals, ideally independently but through state institutions when necessary, with
the hope that somehow this situation will change and that their dedication to civil values might
have a purifying effect. This does not exclude the possibility that those who work for the state
are also motivated by getting good jobs with a high degree of social capital, and possibly good
pay as well. One can find Hazaras who work for the state and with civil society, and they do not
receive much criticism for this, likely because people know that others can be self-interested and
idealistic at the same time.
In this chapter, I consider Hazara civil society experiences with and views of Afghan
state justice, education, and electoral systems, and try to shed light on the points of view of
young Hazaras, concerned with overcoming ethnic exclusion. A counterpoint is provided to the
examples of activist interactions with the Afghan state by examining a protest involving an
international body — a Hazara appeal to UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission to
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Afghanistan) on the part of activists seeking to bring attention and provoke a response to mass
killings of Hazaras in Pakistan in early 2013. By providing this point (activists’ views of state
institutions) with a counterpoint, it becomes clear that the Afghan state is viewed as polluting
what should be pure ideals.

Who Are the Activists?
It is difficult to describe an extremely diverse group of people who have come together around a
certain mission, particularly when the importance placed on that mission might differ from
person to person. Still, certain characteristics can be defined as common among civil society
activists, which help illuminate what motivates them. The biographies of a selection of the
activists whom I got to know well highlight both commonalities and variation among them.
Civil society is generally considered everywhere to be a “third sector,” outside of
government and private business institutions, the sector that reflects the will of the people. All of
the activists believe it is important to do something to make society better, bring awareness to
problems, and, when possible, attempt solutions. Many work in the NGO and development
sector. Others are journalists or professors. Others still work for organizations specifically geared
towards civil society, usually foreign-funded NGOs whose express goal is to develop a strong
third sector. Many are students. A few hold government positions, but the idea seemed to be that
they can still very much consider themselves civil society because they are involved in local
institutions like the Provincial Council, voted directly by the people (albeit without any real
policy-making ability, but simply an advisory role). Or, alternatively, that they can try to change
government from the inside while still adhering to civil society principles. Most of the activists
are men, but several of the most well-known and influential are women as well, and women do
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make up some of the more rank-and-file numbers, too. Activists espouse gender equality, but
deep-rooted cultural norms make it more difficult for women to take on such a public role.
The civil society activists all see themselves as very much in line with Western and U.S.
intervention. They all, to a person, decry Iran as a meddling country that has no interest in
helping Hazaras.36 The United States and United Nations, they believe, implement human rights
and democracy programs and hence are the Hazaras’ natural allies. In my presence, at least, they
never criticize any U.S. action but blame “the Pashtuns” for giving the Americans wrong
information. The United Nations is held to greater accountability, but the United States is always
off the hook as not fully understanding the situation.
While activists claim to defend human rights, work for gender equality, promote
development, and improve access to education (among other issues), they are very clearly
concerned first and foremost with the rights of Hazaras. This can give rise to a sort of ethnonationalism, which to Western eyes does not seem in line with the universal ideals they publicly
espouse. Any sense of contradiction is resolved through the belief that Hazaras are still being
victimized in an ongoing genocide, and that the only way to counter discrimination and social
exclusion is to put Hazaras, the most vulnerable group, first. But it also means that when a
person from another ethnic group is targeted, they do not always necessarily respond in the way
one might among people who stand for human rights. I have already mentioned the support
shown for Shujayi. Likewise, when Malala Yousefzai was shot and nearly died, Hazaras
expressed sympathy but a few also wondered openly why this Pashtun girl deserved the world’s
sympathy while Hazara children, including those working to expand educational opportunities,
have been targeted by militant Islamists for years. There is debate about such issues, but activists
are quick to say clearly that, among the many who have suffered in Afghanistan, Hazaras have
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suffered the longest and the most intensely. Worse, Hazaras are still at risk not because they live
in zones of heavy insurgency, as Pashtuns do, but simply because they are Hazara.
The activists hold regular meetings to decide how best to approach the problems they feel
are most pressing. They might work at a grassroots level if they are affiliated with an
organization, bringing information about rule of law and rights, particularly women’s rights and
human rights, to the larger population. Through protest, activists attack perceived government
inability or unwillingness to address specific structural issues, such as the lack of state-delivered
electricity in Bamyan, or security problems on the roads leading in and out of Bamyan. They also
protest incidents when Hazaras are targeted, such as the kidnapping and killing of Hazaras
during travel or when Hazaras appear to suffer discrimination in university. In these cases, they
want to bring awareness to the problems faced by other Hazaras, in the hopes that those not
experiencing these problems will join them. Likewise, they bring attention to mass killings and
massacres of Hazaras, whether from several hundred years ago, to more recent incidents during
the civil war (1992 to 1996) and Taliban period (1996 to 2001). They also address the present
situation, when Hazaras are sometimes kidnapped and even killed when travelling or fall victim
to targeted killings and even large-scale suicide bombings. Not only in Quetta, Pakistan, but
more recently in Kabul, Hazaras have been the targets of mass suicide bombings, such as that in
July 2016, claimed by Daesh (the Islamic State) the deadliest suicide attack in Afghanistan since
2001. Activists also seek to bring awareness about a Hazara history, which they believe shows
them to be a once great people, subjugated and oppressed by the Afghan state. All of these
activities are done to spread knowledge and political awareness through the larger population.
In this sense, the activists serve as a sort of vanguard, almost in a Leninist sense, to the
rest of the Hazara population. Their success remains to be seen; some among the general
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population embrace their ideas, while others are wary and reject what might be perceived as a
movement that foments ethnic divisions. Their goal, first and foremost, is to teach Hazaras about
their history of suffering, which continues to this day. In this way, they hope to mobilize a larger
population. Those who are part of the movement can find it difficult to change the views of those
outside. Certainly, some causes draw more general support than others. Often the more
“extreme” activists, especially those with more ethno-nationalist tendencies, cast out those who
question the dominant narrative that Hazaras have suffered more than any other in Afghanistan.
Tensions linger around whether leaders are mainly self-aggrandizers or act out of genuine
concern for their people. The perception that activist leaders work for their own political gain can
hurt their cause among other ethnic groups. For those lower in the ranks of activists, there might
be some social network gains, but most work for the betterment of their people and country.

Activist Biographies
Most Bamyan civil society activists are fairly well educated, and come from middle-class, rather
than elite or extremely poor backgrounds. However, several have a rather poverty-stricken
family background, and are finding ways, such as seeking education and then work with the
international development sector, to escape this. Some of the stories that follow in this section
seem shocking, so I should clarify that I chose them as representative biographies rather than
intrinsically interesting stories. Perhaps it is those who have had extraordinary personal
experiences who are most likely to become devoted to the cause of civil society. Or perhaps they
are more likely than people with more normal jobs to open up and reveal terrifying, and likely
traumatizing, individual experiences. Some uncertainty, then, must linger around the question of
why some people become activists and others do not.
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Hussein
Hussein, age 44, is one of the most approachable people I worked with in Bamyan, although
because he is older than many of the activists, we never formed the type of friendship I did with
others. Hussein has dark black hair, a neatly trimmed black beard, a slight stature, and sparkling
dark eyes. An intriguing aspect of his biography is that, in addition to his civil society work, he is
also well known for having trained to be a mullah. In addition, he makes women’s rights issues a
priority in his work. He comes across as less of an “ethno-nationalist” than some others, more
committed to rights and equality in general.
Though he is Hazara, Hussein was from the village of Kalo in the Shibar district of
Bamyan, which has a large Tajik population. Hussein began training as a member of the clergy
in the madrasa at age five, and was sent to Iran and Pakistan at age nine, to study while living in
a dormitory. He told me he suffered a lot during his childhood, as he felt very alone. His family
believed a religious education was important for him, and yet for a small boy, this was extremely
unsettling if not trauma-inducing. He missed his family and the social support he knew in Kalo
after he was essentially ripped from his natal social environment at an early age and placed
among strangers. He returned to Afghanistan by the time of the civil war and was working for
the Ministry of Education and as a teacher back in his home district in Shibar. He was a member
of the political committee of Hizb-e-Wahdat, in Mazari’s inner circle of advisers, and stresses
often that the party included women on the political committee.
Hussein says it was because he was a champion of women’s rights that he was put in jail
by the Taliban. He made public speeches denouncing the Taliban’s restrictions on girls’ school
attendance. Girls’ schools were not entirely shut down but many were closed and girls’ education
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was highly discouraged. For speaking out on this issue, Hussein was imprisoned for eighteen
months. Hussein says these were the worst months of his life. He was tortured, was beaten with
cables on his hands, had his teeth broken, and was given very little food. At a certain point, he
said, the ICRC intervened and his family was able to bring him food. They campaigned for his
release, and he was eventually freed.
Several of the other activists complain that Hussein, running an organization dedicated
entirely to civil society, has stepped outside of the bounds of civil society and become corrupt.
They do not see it appropriate that he writes grants and accepts money from international and
domestic donors for projects in the name of civil society. However, it is hard to know whether
these complaints were legitimate. It is very common for people to speak poorly about others and
try to improve their own reputation in Bamyan; “backbiting” is endemic in many fields. Plus,
many civil society activists can be quite blasé about forming NGOs, writing mission statements
and submitting grant proposals for stated aims that conform to donors’ priorities more than
community needs. As I once struggled to help a group prepare a mission statement and initial
grant proposal, one said, “Melissa, these projects are all just lies. You tell them what they want
to hear, they give you money, and then you do whatever you want with it.” Since Hussein’s
organization seems to be carrying out legitimate projects, there would seem to be little for others
to grouse about. Hussein’s sin, more likely, is that he is doing development projects, which
require cooperation with donors and with the government, under the umbrella of civil society.
For some activists, civil society needs to be completely unencumbered by the expectations of
outsiders, whether Afghan or foreign.

Firuzan
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Firuzan works in an organization dedicated to civil society activities, and focuses on women’s
issues in particular. Firuzan, 29 years old when I did my fieldwork, has long, thick, dark hair, a
serious face, and an even, measured tone when she speaks. She is the only woman who regularly
gives speeches at protests. While other women do sometimes give speeches, take part in
planning, and certainly join the protest marches, Firuzan has a particularly public role. Firuzan,
like many, was born in Iran, in the city Mashhad, which is where most Hazara refugees in Iran
settled. Her father was originally from Yakawlang and her mother from Ghor, but when the war
broke out, they fled first to Pakistan, and then on to Iran. Firuzan was able to go to school in Iran.
Firuzan’s life experiences led to her commitment to work for women’s rights. She was
married at age 14. “I returned home from school, thinking it was a normal day. But when I got
home, the house was full of people. I understood what was happening, and I fought my mother,
but she still made me marry. My husband was five years older than me. We never had a good
relationship. In the past few years, it has improved somewhat, but we still only stay together
because of family and because of social pressure. I had my first child when I was 15.” I
commented that this must have been difficult, and she replied, “Yes, but those who marry at 9,
they have it much harder. Afghan women have no choices.”
Firuzan was 19 when her family returned to Afghanistan, in 2003. She stayed in the
village in Yakawlang and taught school to support her husband while he attended university in
Markaz Bamyan. This choice caused many in the community to speak poorly about her, a
woman alone in the village. Usually, it would be expected that she accompany her husband, or, if
this is not financially possible, stay home and help her in-laws but not pursue an independent
career as a teacher, particularly not in a village setting. This choice did lead to many
disagreements with her husband and in-laws, but Firuzan stood firm. After he finished university,
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she traveled to the Markaz and started university herself, studying history. Not long after, in
2008 or 2009, she became involved in civil society and women’s rights, a decision informed by
her own life experiences. “In Iran, there were many problems, but relations between men and
women were better. In Afghanistan, girls are kept down, deprived. Sometimes they cannot even
go out of the house. Things are better for men. Women can only talk to their family and give
input, but not make actual decisions. Women don’t have basic rights, they have no choice at all,
they have no rights at all. If they go against what their family wants, they are shamed, their honor
is hurt. Everything is up to the husband, and marriage is like being sold for sex. The first thing
that must change for women is that they must have choice.”37
Of course, Firuzan took her fate into her own hands in many ways, and made many
choices, after her experiences when she was younger. She decided to attend university without
her husband’s support. She decided to become involved in civil society activities, without her
husband’s blessing, causing a deep rift, and is one of the most vocal and most visible of the
activists. She visits the homes of other activists, men and women, without her husband, not
caring what others (including her husband) may say. She runs seminars and projects designed to
inform women of their rights, and to inform men of women’s rights. These seminars are usually
carried out in conjunction with Hussein’s organization, and are designed to provide education, so
women know the law, know when their rights are being violated and understand which
organizations they can turn to should they need assistance. After I left Bamyan, Firuzan ran for a
high local political position. She has become an influential politician by her own right, and not
through family ties, as is often the case for women in such positions. She was running against
men, and men were voting for her.
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Although it appears Firuzan is mainly involved in Afghan women’s issues, she is
extremely concerned about problems facing Hazaras as an ethnic group, as well. She maintains
that Hazaras are the original people of Afghanistan, whose land had been taken by Pashtuns. She
promotes the idea that there was a Hazara genocide. While not quiet about these issues, as a
woman, she seems more likely to address the problems of women directly, rather than simply
paying them lip service, as some male activists do. From Firuzan’s point of view, women suffer
in Afghanistan, and Hazaras suffer, and she knows something from personal experience about
both.

Abdulhakim
Abdulhakim, in his early to mid-thirties, has stylish hair and excellent English skills. He grew up
in Iran, and became a “jihadist” (mujahedin) when he was 15 or 16. Well educated and urbane,
he seems to have little problem charming foreigners who come to Bamyan. His mujahedin
experience was, not surprisingly, something he does not much want to talk about with
Westerners, hence my knowledge of his past is sketchy. After 2001, he worked with the U.S.
military on psy-ops projects, intended to change the point of view of Afghans via media and
other means, and then moved on to civil society.
Abdulhakim, I should point out, is one of the most respected activists. He does have
disagreements with some community members, as all did. For example, he ran a project out of
the university that the dean shut down, apparently for personal disagreements. Abdulhakim
bounced back, becoming involved in cultural activities, starting an organization that would
provide cultural speeches to whoever wished to attend (I and my husband both contributed
speeches). His intent is to broaden the knowledge of any Hazara who wished to listen on a
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variety of subjects, which range from social science to natural science, history, politics, and
more. He throws himself fully into civil society activities, even planning, directing, carrying out,
and serving as a main public figure for visible protests. His lack of pay for this work is not an
issue, as his wife has a well-paying job with an international organization. Abdulhakim is fully
devoted to gender equality, not only in theory, but in his personal life as well. He had a love
marriage, having met his wife online while she was living in Iran. They have one son, now about
eight years old. His wife actually came to the United States on a training program several years
ago and applied for asylum, which was granted. Abdulhakim’s work with the United States
military should allow him to get a special immigrant visa, but he has been unable to discover the
location of the American commander who can vouch for him, a requirement of the program.

Rustam
Rustam, in his late 30s, is another activist who was involved with the mujahedin, although he
seems to have been more of a victim of the fighting than Abdulhakim. With cropped hair, rough,
almost sunburnt skin (even in winter), face covered with stubble, and a perpetual scowl, Rustam
may seem intimidating. Contrary to his thuggish appearance, he is always, once you know him,
extremely kind and approachable.
Rustam’s family, his wife and children, were living in Herat while he was in Bamyan. He
comes originally from Panjab district, in an extremely remote area where everyone was,
according to him, a subsistence farmer. His own father, through madrasa study, was the only
person in the village who was literate and gave lessons to the children during the idle hours of
winter. In this way, Rustam learned to read and write. When he was 14, his father passed away.
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His brothers, himself, his mother, and his father’s second wife traveled to Mazar in the north
around the time of the civil war, about the time Rustam was 18.
Rustam found himself caught up in the fighting between the Taliban on one side and
Hizb-e-Wahdat and Junbesh-e-Milli, Dostum’s Uzbek forces, on the other. Rustam, by then in
his early 20s, remembers the Taliban massacre of Hazaras. “They just went around looking for
Hazara men to put in jail or kill. If you were a little fat, or had a nice haircut or seemed well-off,
they just killed you. I think they killed between six and twelve thousand people. It went on for
three days.” Rustam went into hiding, and his uncle came up with a plan to escape to the
mountains. A Pashtun friend of his uncles, however, offered to take the family in, along with
several others, for a few days to hide them and then find a way to escape. It was not clear
whether this friend turned them in or was caught, but when they made their escape, they were
taken instead to a place with a mass grave. Rustam spoke of seeing body parts partially buried
and sticking out of the ground, and of the intense fear he felt. “I felt so young, looking at the
light bulbs rigged up that shone light on the scene.” An argument ensued as to whether they
should be killed, but their lives were spared as they were apparently under the protection of an
important Pashtun commander, this friend of Rustam’s uncle who was doing the family a very
risky favor. They were tied and beaten. Rustam’s uncle tried to bargain, to offer a jeep he owned
in exchange for freedom, but it was discovered the Taliban had already taken the jeep. In the end,
his uncle was released because, as a man in his 60s, he was not considered a threat. Rustam,
however, was kept in a horribly crowded prison full of Hazaras and Uzbeks for a period of time.
Five hundred were moved out to another prison in Jowzjan in containers, and Rustam claims he
learned only seven survived the trip in the summer heat. Rustam was moved with 200 prisoners
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in a tarp-covered truck. He stayed in prison for three years, and the prisoners arranged classes for
each other; in this way, Rustam learned English.
He was released shortly after September 11, probably when the Taliban realized they
would soon need to retreat into Pakistan and could no longer hold thousands of prisoners.
Rustam returned to his village in Panjab to pay respects to all he knew who had died. After a
couple of weeks, he joined Khalili’s forces and took part in the final push in which Hizb-eWahdat drove the Taliban from the Markaz. He had told Khalili that he knew English, and so
worked together with U.S. Special Forces when they arrived to assist. He stayed on in Bamyan to
work as a translator for the Provincial Reconstruction Team, headed by New Zealand, and then
worked for the American Correctional Support System Project, concerned with reforming
prisons in Afghanistan. He married, but as most of his family had resettled to Herat he sent his
immediate family with them. Rustam has since been granted asylum because of his work with
the U.S. military and is residing in Maryland with his family.
I give this much background on Rustam to show what a complex individual he was.
Abdulhakim shared much less with me, but I always got the impression that he was as much
concerned with his own self-aggrandizement as with helping the community. Rustam, despite his
rough appearance, truly seemed to want to help. Through a hunger strike, for example, which I
describe at the end of this chapter, he sought to bring UN attention to Hazara problems. He
strongly believes a genocide is being carried out against Hazaras, and after what he has
witnessed, I understand this. But when he speaks, it is never with bravado but rather in a soft,
gentle way.

Latif
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Latif was one of the few people I knew who spent most of his life around Bamyan. (His father,
whose account of the fate of Markaz’ Tajik merchants I referenced in Chapter Two, filled in
much of my missing knowledge about the events which had occurred in Markaz Bamyan.) Latif
has a good job as a journalist, and for this reason he is quite well respected in the community.
Barring a few years that he spent as a child in Karachi, during the worst years of the civil war,
Latif spent his entire life in a town located close to Markaz Bamyan. Twenty-five when I was
completing my fieldwork, he had attended university in Kabul to study journalism. His father
only owned two jeribs of land (two and a half jeribs are equal to one acre), due to the division of
larger land holdings among sons in previous generations. His father had done fairly well with
this small amount of land and through work as a trader in Karachi, while the positions of the
non-farming sons also contributed to the family finances. Of the five sons in Latif’s generation,
two worked the land, and the rest had to find other jobs.
Latif, too, is materially relatively successful. He owns his own car. He is also engaged to
be married in a “love match” to another reporter who works at a local radio station. This seems
to be more common among activists than in the general population, although for couples to meet
and court on their own, rather than through arranged matches, is by no means the most common
situation. Latif is not one of the most committed activists but he always attends their activities as
a reporter, and is often in attendance for planning events, straddling a divide between the role of
a journalist who documents and an activist who provides input. Latif suffers because of his
commitment to journalism, as evidenced by the criticism he got for first publishing, and then
retracted, the story concerning the abuses committed by the local police commander, Shujayi.

Zeinab
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Zeinab is another journalist I came to know quite well. A student at Bamyan University, I met
Zeinab initially at a human rights conference, and later at the same radio station where Latif’s
fiancé worked. A features reporter with her own talk show, she reports on issues concerning
merchants and others around Markaz Bamyan. I accompanied her as she gathered interest stories,
such as the problems facing bazaar sellers. Zeinab has thick dark hair, a round face, and dark,
engaging eyes. Her Dari is quick and difficult to understand, unlike Latif, whose every word,
carefully enunciated, I could catch, and with whom I would carry on long conversations.
However, after multiple meetings I learned much about Zeinab, and I managed to become adept
at understanding her tempo of speaking, as well.
Her family originally hails from the remote Waras district in Bamyan province, but she
grew up in West Kabul, where most Hazaras in the capital live. Her father became a successful
shopkeeper. She was interested in civil society activities, and was involved in the formation of an
organization which intended to help the development of Waras. Her activities with the main
body of activists I worked with, however, seemed to develop from her association with me. We
were picked up by chance while walking in the bazaar to go to a spontaneous planning meeting
(as most meetings were due to security). From that point on, Zeinab was always in attendance at
the various events. Yet, Zeinab understood herself to be a Kabul girl and thought she would do
better in that city, rather than in Bamyan. She approached one of the more important Hazara
political leaders, pleading that she was a poor girl from Waras (not exactly the truth) and that she
needed funding to attend a private university in Kabul. She was convincing and has now moved
to Kabul, though I can see from social media that she is still involved in activism through
journalism: as a television reporter, she keeps up with civil society activities.
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Latif and Zeinab likely are not involved with the activists’ only for idealistic reasons.
They have careers as journalists which fit well with the needs of the activists, and both have been
very successful in their careers. Of course, activists may gain indirectly from their civil society
activities, politically (even as they decry politics), through the creation of networks, and simply
by becoming recognizable members of the community. This last point could also be a drawback,
as threats and violence may also follow from those who do not like their activism, including the
politicians they criticize.

Jawad
More than any other, Jawad became, and remains, my close friend. I could discuss with him the
difficulty of fieldwork and the direction my research might take. When I was sad or discouraged,
I went to him to discuss my problems. I think he is the only informant who saw me cry because
of my frustrations. He shared with me some very personal aspects of his life, as well. He was
also always willing to help me with setting up interviews, helping me with translations of texts,
and informing me when a protest was about to happen. Such friendships between members of
different sexes are uncommon, but Jawad and I related to each other as brother and sister, and I
also became close to his wife.
Jawad is from a district known as Shahristan, in Daikundi province. His brothers were the
first in his lineage to receive a formal education. As we were so close, I know more about his
family’s past than about the others’. His grandfather, he told me, was a very important and wise
elder. People came from afar to seek the knowledge of his grandfather, to have him solve
disputes. “Even Pashtuns came for his advice,” he told me. “He managed to help a lot of people,
people said good things about him.”
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Jawad’s father was an only son among daughters. Jawad said, “My father was different.
He lacked my grandfather’s charisma, he could be moody.” He also described his father as quite
religious. Unlike most of the people in this rural district, he had learned to read and write some,
through religious training. Jawad’s father had three wives. Four wives are permitted in Islam at
one time, if the husband provides for all equally, although he only had two living wives at one
time. The first was an arranged marriage, which produced two sons and a daughter. Then his
father fell in love with the daughter of a nearby farmer. “My grandfather did not approve of this
relationship, but my father married this woman anyway. He had two sons and one daughter with
her,” Jawad said. “Soon after, the first wife died, and my grandfather’s wife could not assume all
the duties she needed to, in order to provide for the guests who often came to visit my
grandfather. So my grandfather found a third wife for my father. She was very young. She was
my mother.” Eventually, his father divorced the second wife, and had six sons and two daughters
with the third. All of the six sons have gotten an education. The eldest, and Jawad, the second
eldest, regularly traveled six hours away to attend a school, staying in a rented room, and had to
stay there for extended periods of time as travel back and forth each day was not possible. Living
without his family was difficult, Jawad told me, but worth it. Jawad stressed that it was his
mother, the last of three wives, who pushed her sons to get their educations. Jawad completed his
university education and then also finished a two-year degree at a private business school while I
was in the field. He also worked for the Lincoln Learning Center, a United States Embassy
resource center for Afghans.
Jawad got married before I met him. He had an arranged marriage with Tahira, a sixteenyear-old girl from their village. But he believes so strongly in equality, he wanted to be sure she
received an education too. They delayed having children, and Tahira completed her high school
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education during the first several years of her marriage. She then took the state exam for college
entrance and was accepted at Kabul State University. Jawad agreed that she would study there,
living in a dormitory (in fact, I suspect he pushed her), while he remained in Bamyan.
Eventually, Jawad lost his job with the Lincoln Learning Center, as he was too involved in
activism, something discouraged by the embassy for its political implications. He went to Kabul,
where he has had difficulty finding work. Tahira, on the other hand, won a scholarship from the
government of India to study English. Tahira then gave birth to a baby girl, and cares for her in
India while she studies while Jawad works in Kabul. Probably, few Afghan men who claim to
support women’s rights would have gone so far as Jawad has in helping his wife achieve her
potential.

Hassan
Hassan approached me because he wanted to talk with me about a very important issue. He is
from one of the two districts with the name Behsud in Wardak Province. Wardak is majority
Pashtun, but the two Behsud districts are majority Hazara, He wanted me to understand that the
people of his district feel under attack every time kuchi nomads came through the area, with allout battles erupting and people being killed on both sides. For him, of course, the kuchis are the
instigators, and I was unable to make him see things from the kuchi point of view. Hassan asked
me multiple times to discuss these problems. Along the way, I managed to gather his life story.
Hassan’s father was a farmer in Behsud. When he was 30, he married Hassan’s mother,
who was 16. His father managed to get an eighth-grade education, but then because of the war
had to stop studying, while his mother was uneducated. Hassan has four brothers and four sisters,
with one brother and one sister older than him. His older brother left school to work as a farmer,
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as the family is completely dependent upon cultivation and livestock raising, while his older
sister quit school to marry. Hassan finished a geology program at Bamyan University, and the
rest of his siblings plan to continue their studies. He was working at an English language center
he had cofounded, and has since gotten work doing geographical information system studies with
an NGO, and has moved on to expand this type of work with the UN in Kabul. If he continues to
be so successful, I am sure he can help support the education of the rest of his siblings. However,
he is also very passionate about the problems with the kuchis. His family has had several
disagreements with them on their land, and he remains concerned about the issue. When it came
to that matter, he is very intense, wanting to be sure I understood the Hazara side of the situation
completely.

Sajjad
Sajjad was one of the informants I met with most often during my time in Bamyan, and I learned
extremely useful information from him. Our meetings were always difficult, however. Sajjad’s
mind seemed to work more quickly than his ability to speak, and so our conversations could
jump from one point to another, leaving me scribbling my notes, trying to keep up, and trying to
interject a question once in a while as well.
Sajjad is one of those Hazaras whose families have lived for several generations in
Quetta, Pakistan. He comes from a middle class family, his father was a businessman, and he
went to school in Quetta. The Hazara community in Quetta is very firmly established, as it has
been there for several hundred years, based upon trade relations, and later the movements of
refugees who escaped during the time of Abdur Rahman and later years of war. Sajjad knows
that his family came from a particular village in Yakawlang, however, and maintains some ties to
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relatives there, and hence he wanted to return to Bamyan, the family’s homeland. So, he attended
university in Bamyan, and then found work with an international NGO.
In Pakistan, Hazaras and Shi’as in general have become targets of Sunni Islamist
extremist attacks in recent years. Sajjad told me that he had, in fact, been a “Shi’a extremist”
when he was younger. “At that time, I would never have helped Sunnis. I only wanted revenge.”
When I asked what changed, he said that he had, in seventh grade, become angry at a female
classmate for sitting too close to him. His female teacher then reprimanded him, telling him he
was living in a modern world, and that anyway, he was Hazara first, and then Shi’a. He went
home to complain to his father, who sided with his teacher. He then apologized to his teacher,
who encouraged him to start reading, including the speeches and writings of Mazari. Sajjad
joined a Hazara student association, and his political involvement took off. He maintains ties to
the most important Hazara political parties in Quetta. Many of Sajjad’s stories include the theme
of learning from a teacher, who pointed him towards further reading that shaped his outlook.
But Sajjad is a study in contradictions. Is he Pakistani, Afghanistani, or Hazara? Are
Hazaras Turkic, as he argues often, or Mongol, as the Quettan Hazaras, as opposed to the
Bamyan Hazaras, were at that time claiming? He finally decided that he himself is of Mongol
descent, but that this incorporated only a small portion of Hazaras, most of whom are Turkic.
Sajjad is extremely charismatic. Although young, he always gives speeches at civil
society events, his uplifted voice heard at every type of protest, and his speeches, effective. His
tone, his body language, as well as his message, led me to believe I was watching a true future
leader. I remember joking to a friend at home, “He will be a great leader, or he will be
assassinated. Or both.” But I quickly sobered when I realized I was not really joking.
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These activists’ relationships with state institutions is fraught, because the very state in which
activists are trying to induce change is seen by them as a corrupting, polluting entity. Activists
want to base Afghanistan on a Western model, focused on democracy, rule of law, equality, and
education, all “institutions” that very much fall within the purview of the state. For example,
even as activists use protests to speak out and demand change, they never call into question the
ideas behind the institutions: it is never asked whether democracy will work in Afghanistan.
Rather, the activists demand that the state change, to allow the positive aspects of these
institutions to actually emerge and become relevant.
In the next section, I ask how activists balance their distrust with the state with their
desire to support institutions, of electoral democracy, justice through law, and public education,
administered by the state.

Electoral Processes and Political Parties
Before the 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan, ethnic Hazaras were featured prominently
in multiple international media outlets, whose reports stressed the important role they would
play. Hazaras, deeply invested in the democratic system, voted in higher percentages than other
ethnic groups, such articles stated. A reading of such media suggests that Hazaras are possibly
the Afghan group most invested in cooperation with the state, even as they distrust it. The only
way they can change it is by reforming it themselves, and so they launch themselves
wholeheartedly into elections. In fact, leading up to the 2014 elections, many of my Hazara
friends posted declarations on Facebook (a key way civil society activists spread their ideas)
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emphasizing their commitment to democracy and to elections.38 Hazara turnout in elections has
been consistently high in past elections as well. Votes received by ethnic Hazara candidate
Ramazan Bashardost, who achieved third position in the previous presidential elections (ahead of
Ashraf Ghani, current president) also indicated Hazaras’ influence, winning them greater
attention in 2014. At first glance, this does not seem to be a group totally disillusioned by the
state itself.
Yet an examination of Hazara activist attitudes towards these elections demonstrates that
activists can believe fully in an ideal while distrusting the way this ideal (here, democracy) is
implemented by the state apparatus. Several Hazara civil society activists contacted me after the
2014 election and expressed concern that nearly every Hazara majority area had run out of
ballots, including Bamyan, Daikundi, West Kabul, and Hazara-majority districts in Pashtunmajority provinces like Wardak, Uruzgan, and Ghazni. This was interpreted as a systematic
attempt to marginalize the Hazara vote.39 But Hazara civil society members’ distrust concerning
elections and politics runs much deeper. Bashardost was not affiliated with a political party when
he achieved third place, and many stated this was part of his attraction. He was considered clean,
unsullied by affiliation with the main Hazara political parties, which are considered problematic.
The creation of Hizb-e-Wahdat in 1980 by Mazari is considered by Hazaras in Bamyan
today as the first time Hazaras displayed political and military strength by uniting most of the
population under its umbrella. Of course, actual unity was short-lived. Today, the original
Wahdat has split into four parties, based on personality politics and leadership’s squabbles.
Hazara activists see the original Hizb-e-Wahdat as something pure, describing it, and its
leader Mazari, as not only interested in bettering the situation of Hazaras but also in promoting
the same universals the activists now espouse: democracy, human rights, gender parity,
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education, and equality for all Afghan citizens. For them, the dissolution of the party into
something based on personality and patronage networks is especially painful. Few of the selfproclaimed civil society activists associate openly with any of these parties.
Evidence points to this distrust of the political parties being widespread. Among the
youth in Markaz Bamyan, association is often kept a secret, as if it was something to be ashamed
of. I tried unsuccessfully to find youth who did affiliate with the parties to interview, but so few
would come forward that I had to abandon this approach. As I tried to arrange interviews, one of
my main informants explained, “No one wants to be associated with one of these parties, they are
corrupt, unjust, not really working for democracy.” At one point Sajjad asked my advice because
he had been pegged to lead a youth group of Mohaqeq’s party. He was clearly torn: on one hand,
this would give him access to patronage networks and the chance to influence the youth; on the
other, he told me it was “wrong” for an activist to accept such a position. In the end he did
accept, but I sensed he was afraid that he, or at least his image, would become polluted by this
affiliation. Civil society activists believed that it is they who have inherited the ideals, if not the
party of Mazari. From the activists’ point of view, the original Wahdat ideals have been
destroyed by those who broke up the party in order to enhance their own personal position, and
they are being kept alive by the activists and by the very nature of Hazaras in general, who they
claim display a rare open-mindedness as a group.40 The general population of Bamyan is wary of
parties, and activists seem more able than the parties to mobilize the population as a whole.
When I attended Mazari’s birthday celebration at the headquarters of Khalili’s Wahdat
compound, for example, only a modestly sized crowd turned out. I later attended a celebration
staged by the civil society activists, at which hundreds of people packed into Mazari Square and
the surrounding fields to listen to several hours of speeches, singing, and poetry. It was clear in
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which setting they preferred to remember their martyred leader.

An Unjust Justice System
When I first arrived in Bamyan to conduct the main part of my research in summer 2012, many
of my informants were eager to tell me about an event that had happened several months earlier.
A sixteen-year-old Hazara girl, Shakila, was shot and killed while staying with her brother-inlaw. Their house was within the compound of a Provincial Council member, who happened to be
a Sayed. Sayeds are descended from the Prophet Mohammad and hence considered by some to
be of Arab, not Hazara, descent, though they speak Dari. Sayeds live among all ethnic
communities in Afghanistan and indeed in most Muslim communities throughout the world.
However, understanding them to be of a different ethnicity seems to be fairly particular to
Hazaras, likely because of their low social status. Authorities initially suspected Shakila’s
brother-in-law, although he had an alibi. The Provincial Council member, who was at home,
claimed he was alone praying when the murder occurred. When the investigation shifted away
from Shakila’s brother-in-law, the crime scene was no longer viable. The case was closed, and
although later reopened under a new prosecutor with pressure from civil society groups, no real
headway had been made at the time of writing. An American lawyer who was carrying out
trainings in the justice system sector expressed to me his opinion that the case had been handled
badly.
For many, Shakila’s case represents an ethnic divide that was opening between Sayeds
and Hazaras, although it should be noted that a number of civil society activists deny that this is
an ethnic issue, but rather a gender issue. That summer, I met with three activists in the living
room of the house where I was staying to discuss this and other issues. Firuzan stated clearly
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when asked if ethnicity impacted the activists’ response, “No. This is an issue in which a young
girl has been killed, and has not received justice. This is a crime against women, against
humanity in general. This issue must be understood in this context.” But Sajjad quickly jumped
in. “Sayeds think they can get away with anything. The first prosecutor, he was Sayed. How
many working in the criminal justice system are Sayed? This case should have received attention
nationally, but all of the Sayeds throughout the country mobilized against us.” People are
ambivalent when interpreting cases such as Shakila’s. Some blame a generally corrupt judicial
system, targeting weak strata of Afghan society cross-ethnically, while others emphasize malice
against Hazaras in particular.
The power and influence of the Sayeds is somewhat ambiguous, and has changed
throughout the years of conflict. Pre-conflict, Sayeds maintained leadership influence from the
social capital they gain from their ascriptive position. Kopecky (1982) wrote that, in the 1970s
and before, Sayeds were able to unite divisive Hazara groups, as evidenced by the para-state
Shura that emerged after the Soviet invasion. The Shura and its Sayed leadership lost power
because the population felt that Shura demands for taxation and conscription were burdensome
(Harpviken 1998). Today, relying upon their status as descendants of the Prophet, Sayeds retain
enough power for many Hazaras to resent them, although many Hazaras do support them for
reasons of religion and tradition (and these two feelings are not always mutually exclusive).
During my fieldwork it became clear that there is an ambivalence among Hazaras as to whether
Sayeds are actually a “special” holy group deserving respect, or a group that plays upon the
superstitions of the people to reap benefits for their own profit. While Sayeds seem to have
peaked in terms of political power in the 1980s, they certainly still retain the ability to mobilize
enough supporters — whether to vote for them or even act violently in their interests — to
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remain important political players, though they cannot monopolize the very top echelons any
longer.
I did not find any activists who are satisfied with the justice system — whether in the
Shakila case or more generally — although I did find that specific individuals working within the
justice system are acknowledged for their integrity. And yet, these activists stress the importance
of the rule of law, emphasizing that conflicts must be resolved by the state apparatus and not
through community-based conflict resolution. Informants explain that traditional dispute
resolution systems might restore harmony but would not provide justice. In order for these
traditional, extra-state institutions to work, both sides in a disagreement need to feel some
satisfaction, meaning also the one who was seen to be at fault in the dispute would receive
benefits, especially should he be the more powerful party. To my informants, such a system is
not justice; justice, they said, comes from a strong rule of law implemented impartially. Hazaras
historically lived under a feudal system and after integration into the Afghan state occupied the
lowest rungs of society. Hence, activists say that they do not see any benefit in a system that
favors the actor with more power, even should he be in the wrong. They saw themselves as the
underdogs most likely to lose in a dispute resolution system aiming to restore harmony. Better,
they told me, to work towards a more just state system, something that, if it does work as it
should (even as it still does not now), will in time provide better outcomes for the least powerful.
Before the current conflict, Hazaras might try to stay away from the state system because they
knew it would be, in many if not most cases, prejudicial against them. In today’s setting, state
justice systems on paper should act fairly towards all groups, and ostensibly have the backing of
the international community. Hazaras consider their best possibility to be supporting justice
within the state and criticizing the justice system when it clearly is not living up to the standards
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set for it by supra-local authorities. Such authorities, in the Hazara activists’ eyes, clearly include
international actors who they know are working to reform the system, and can hence be counted
on more than the Kabul government.
And yet, there is a sense among Hazara civil society activists that politics is inherently
unclean, impure, and that in seeking to adhere to values of human rights, gender rights, and
democratic values, politics must be avoided. Rather, means such as development and civil
society must be utilized, with the paradox remaining, although overlooked by the activists, that
these groups are also, in some fashion, politically involved. They must work to reconcile these
two issues, and demonstrate that they are not contaminated by the political institutions which
they feel are repressing them. This tightrope seems to me to be one of appearances: going
beyond the fact that the activism often seems inherently political, activists will, on occasion, ally
with certain members of the political establishment. Maintaining their purity means, then,
keeping these sorts of alliances to a minimum, and being sure to openly criticize established
political leaders when necessary. At the same time, ideals such as justice, as interpreted through
the trainings and messages given by foreign (often American) contractors who work with
developing the justice sector in Afghanistan, make it clear that justice must be delivered through
the state apparatus. But it is not only those working in the justice system who receive these
trainings. Activists, development workers, and some university students are also invited to attend
(I myself observed five such training sessions). The tendency of Hazara activists to accept what
international and foreign organizations teach them almost without question means that these
ideals are internalized, but the actual institutions, that is to say, the Afghan judicial system,
police, and so on are still seen as corrupt, whether more generally or more specifically relating to
Hazaras. The belief that such institutions are still corrupt clearly relates to the past experiences of
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Hazaras, prior to and during the war (in addition to real corruption that certainly currently
exists). Informants often spoke of their almost complete exclusion from or lack of fair
participation in such institutions.
Hazara trepidations about the justice system do not stem solely from the state overthrow
and state collapse of the conflict years in Afghanistan, but also from their own particular
problems as a marginalized minority trying to navigate this institution. Yet no matter how
apolitical Hazaras activists might claim to be, the political movement of Mazari-era Hizb-eWahdat is their idealized version of what politics, including justice, should be. And the current
conception of justice that Hazara activists promote is essentially the same rule of law project
promoted by international actors working in Afghanistan today. Hazaras’ own political trajectory
combined with these outside influences result in a situation whereby activists repeatedly demand
justice be served in the face of patronage politics and a corrupted justice system.

Educational Institutions
When activists talk about their history within the Afghan state, they almost always begin with the
wars undertaken by Abdur Rahman. Hazaras were included in the state, but, they point out,
institutions were used as weapons against them. Abdur Rahman appointed his own rulers to
Hazara lands, replacing Hazara leaders, and taxation was heavy (Gawecki 1980: 67). Gawecki
further reports that in the 1970s (likely with the influence of communism), more Hazaras were
afforded some access to institutions, such as elementary and secondary education, although there
were few schools in rural Hazara regions, and higher education would have been even more
difficult to obtain. Several of my own informants told me that according to the law while
Hazaras did have a right to education during these periods, they were often denied admittance on
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the basis of names or places of birth or residence that identified them as Shi’a or Hazara. Since
2001, many more Hazaras receive education, although many also claim that, especially within
state universities, a high degree of discrimination still exists.
In recent years Hazaras have received much attention as the ethnic group in Afghanistan
with the highest attendance rates among both male and female schoolchildren (Oppel 2010;
Larson 2008). Pre-conflict, Hazaras in the rural areas had very little access to schools because
few existed. According to Mousavi (1997), during times when a Pashtun-dominated state was
promoting language and educational opportunities in Pashtun regions, Hazaras were left isolated.
In the 1970s, during the rule of Daoud and Zahir Shah, as well as during the communist period, a
few schools were created but reached a very small percentage of the population. Many Hazaras
relied on religious madrasas for schooling, but a secular education was much more difficult to
obtain. This changed drastically with the push to bring schools to all rural areas after 2001.
Schools are now present in all parts of Afghanistan, but Hazara regions are significant in that
they face less insurgent activity and less social-cultural pressure that could discourage
attendance. Rather, many Hazaras now consider it a key aspect of their identity that they support
education for boys and girls.
What is taught in those state schools, however, can be a point of contention. A common
refrain in Bamyan is “Pashtuns have stolen our history.” Most historians from Afghanistan, I was
told, have been Pashtun, and they have written histories that entirely leave out the Hazara point
of view. Worse, they said, non-Afghan scholars rely heavily upon these historians when writing
their own histories in Afghanistan, and the result has been that Hazaras are often left out of the
story, when not shown in a negative light. Of course, there have been Hazara scholars in more
recent years who have done much to fill this gap, by writing a history of the Hazaras: for
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example, Hassan Polladi, Sayed Askar Mousavi, Mohamad Isa Gharjistani, and Hussein Ali
Yazdani. Many Hazaras in Bamyan say that with access to schooling, members of the
community are becoming much more interested in reading the works of these historians and
others.
I sought out teachers, school officials, and students in Bamyan after I began to hear about
the frustration many Hazaras harbor about their history. I wanted to understand what was taught
in Afghan schools regarding history and ethnic issues. According to teachers, school
administrators, and professors I spoke with, the Ministry of Education made a determination that
bringing up any issue relating to ethnicity would potentially give rise to greater ethnic problems.
As a result, within the official curriculum and textbooks, no mention of ethnic issues is made. In
fact, I was given the chance to inspect history textbooks from several grades, and I did not find
mention of ethnicity in any case, even when it seemed necessary in order to understand historical
events. The fact that Abdur Rahman played up the Shi’a aspect of Hazara identity is left unsaid,
as is the fact that ethnic Hazaras were one of several groups singled out for his centralization
campaign. Abdur Rahman’s wars are rather described as a justifiable suppression of illegitimate
revolts against the state, and ethnicity and religious affiliation of any of those revolting is absent.
Hazaras resent this policy, seeing their history being overlooked in favor of a history that focuses
on kings and the development of the Afghan state, which is, to them, the same as a history of the
Pashtun elite.
As a result, Hazara activists and students in Bamyan are setting out to teach themselves
their own history. Several people in the community are considered “historical experts” as they
have (usually independently) studied those historical works that have been written by Hazara
historians. They meld and interpret these histories, and then retell them orally. When I first
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arrived in Bamyan, these retellings seemed informal, taking place in dorm rooms and around
bazaars, listened to by whichever students happened to be present. However, it soon became
apparent that they were becoming more formalized. History experts are called upon to speak at
such events as the birthday and anniversary of the death of deceased Hazara leader Abdul Ali
Mazari, at Hazara Unity Day, and even in conjunction with the presidential elections in the
United States. During my stay, several programs were held at educational institutions in Bamyan
to show how democracy worked in America (usually with U. S. Embassy sponsorship), and at
most of them, one of the “historical experts” would give a speech, often comparing Hazaras, the
formerly enslaved people of Afghanistan, to formerly enslaved African Americans. If the United
States could come to have a black president, went a narrative I heard several times at these talks,
then the same could happen for a Hazara in Afghanistan one day.
Hazara concerns about educational institutions in Afghanistan also extend to more
concrete issues. In Bamyan, I was often told, one does not have the same opportunities for
augmenting one’s schooling with private classes as people enjoy in other areas. Schools
themselves are of lesser quality, especially in the districts and areas located even a slight distance
from Bamyan center. After visiting a number of schools and speaking with teachers and
administrators, I learned that teachers often have little training, schools are horribly
overcrowded, and there are not enough supplies for either students or teachers. Furthermore, in
the more high-altitude areas, schools are forced to close for six months out of the year because of
the intense cold (the schools are not heated and many students have to walk two hours or more to
rural schools, which in winter months becomes an impossibility). Several school directors I
interviewed told me they simply had to do their best, cramming a nine-month curriculum into six
months. They expressed regret that their students then have to compete with students all over the
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country on the standardized konkur (university entrance exam), believing that they cannot
prepare their students sufficiently. It is certainly true that this is not simply an ethnic issue, as
Hazaras in Bamyan are not the only Afghan citizens to live in high altitude locales or extremely
rural areas. Yet Hazaras in Bamyan strongly believe they are more affected by this problem than
others. Furthermore, Pashtuns are believed, by many Hazaras I interviewed, to live mainly in
warm areas where this is not an issue. Other problems that prevent Pashtuns from attending
school, such as societal pressure and pressure from insurgents, are seen to be a problem within
Pashtun society (not stemming from state neglect), and earn little sympathy.
In Bamyan during the summer of 2013 allegations of discrimination against Hazaras at
Kabul University flared. Hazaras claimed that they were systematically given lower grades by
professors in certain faculties. The professors claimed that Hazara students were simply not
performing up to standard. Hazaras held protests in response, demanding that the professors in
question be removed. Eventually a resolution was reached. At the same time, a large number of
Hazaras study in private universities and schools, where they are less constrained by state
curriculum. Many of these universities, such as Ibn Sina and Kateb University in Kabul, employ
mainly Hazara professors trained in Iran. In these environments, both students and professors
feel they are better able to reach their goals. Even non-activist Hazaras have concluded that
education, believed to be a right and a way to achieve success honorably, is implemented by the
state in such a corrupted way; because of this, most believe that reliance upon state educational
institutions will never result in their advancement. Hazaras hence take it upon themselves to
remedy this situation — by writing, learning, and retelling a Hazara-centric history and by
opening, promoting, and supporting private schools. The truth of these histories is augmented
because they are promoted outside the auspices of the polluting state, which has, in their eyes,
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proved unable to present knowledge that might work against its own interests. When state
educational institutions are necessary, Hazaras pride themselves on their performance even if
they do not believe them to be ideal, and protest what discrimination they believe still exists.

Appeals to UNAMA
In winter 2013, I met with a number of my informants who were protesting the January terrorist
bombing of a market in Quetta, Pakistan which resulted in the killing of approximately one
hundred Hazaras. The activists had decided that the best way to approach the problem was to go
straight to the UN (i.e., the Bamyan headquarters of the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, or UNAMA). My friends set up tents outside of UNAMA headquarters in Bamyan
and several went on a hunger strike. I visited them throughout their protest, both to give moral
support and to continue my research. During the day, we sat outside in the sun on carpets, talking
for long periods of time about the reasons for their protest. During the night they set up bukharis,
or wood-burning stoves, inside the tents and huddled under sleeping bags.
One young man, Salim, became quite emotional as we spoke. He kept repeating, “We
have been the victims of a systematic genocide for over one hundred years. They have to listen to
us!” Initially, wanting to help, I decided to point out what I considered weak points of their
campaign. I tried to highlight those problems that in my opinion were inherent in trying to get the
UN to recognize any mass killing as genocide, because the UN would avoid using the “G-word”
if it meant becoming entangled with the internal problems in Pakistan. I was met with
disbelieving stares.
“We have been killed since the time of Abdur Rahman . . . ,” Salim trailed off.
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I agreed, but pointed out that from the dry, bureaucratic standpoint of the UN, the
century-long predicament of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan would probably not gain the
same consideration and acknowledgment that other historical traumatic events have received
(such as the Jewish Shoah, the Rwandan genocide, and the mass killings during the formerYugoslavia civil war).
Several people asked “Why does that matter? We are being killed, even today…we are
killed in Pakistan, we are killed in Afghanistan, and there has never been a stop to this killing!”
It was clear that my informants did not consider the UN to be prey to the same internal
problems that they believe plague Afghan state institutions. When I tried to explain that the UN
was also concerned with political issues, and that it was unlikely to rock the boat by focusing on
investigating a Hazara “genocide,” I was met with what seemed to be quite genuine shock.
Almost all Hazara civil society activists, at least those that I spoke to, believe that the UN is
primarily concerned with humanitarian issues, and do not recognize the political wrangling that
goes on within the organization. I was met with either a complete lack of understanding, or an
unwillingness to understand, how the Security Council, for example, works, and what it would
take to have the UN take any concrete steps concerning the situation of Hazaras. Hazara activists
have come to believe that the UN will surely help them if the organization can only be made to
understand what is happening, and how it is part of a larger pattern of oppression and mass
killing. Activists have read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and they have read the
definition of genocide, and thus believe that if given the chance to explain themselves, the UN
will respond. These are pure, civil ideas, promoted by an organization also believed to be pure.
The activists would not accept that there is in fact room for pragmatism alongside the defense of
such ideals at the UN. Unfortunately, when a UNAMA representative came to meet them, they
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were told they did not have any concrete demands that UNAMA could address, and they should
just go home. The hunger strike, which was a dry strike, meaning they also abstained from
liquids as well as solid food, ended quickly and the activists went home after several more days.
They were sad that they had not succeeded, but convinced that once again the fault was
misinformation given to the UN about their situation. They were not disheartened, and continue
to appeal to the UN on other issues.
The complete trust in the intentions of the United States is another area where Hazara
activists seem unable, or unwilling, to acknowledge the factors (political, economic and strategic,
among others) that shape policy. Many, when speaking of the United States, focus on civil rights
issues, on the importance of having a black president today and how that directly relates to
Hazaras in Afghanistan. Of course, there is a good amount of propaganda put out by the United
States on these issues, and Hazara activists work closely with U.S. Embassy outreach programs,
such as the Lincoln Learning Center, to promote these ideas. And yet, they are not happy with
their rate of progress, even as they attribute what progress they have made to international
intervention. They often complain that they know Pashtun areas receive more development funds
and attention, and they believe Pashtuns are being unfairly (and paradoxically) rewarded for
participating in an insurgency, while Hazaras have worked hard to help the nation building
projects. The blame is never placed upon the United States or the UN, however, but on Pashtuns
who work with these organizations and “spread lies” about Hazaras, such as the rumor that “they
are all Iranian agents.” The United States, in its efforts to promote civil ideals, has managed to
place itself, in the eyes of the activists, if not in the eyes of the population at large, on the “pure”
side of the binary, so that blame when things do not appear to be fair is displaced onto those who
are perceived to be against Hazaras.
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Conclusion
Many Hazaras have long viewed the Afghan state as a Pashtun-run enemy that is corrupt and
oppresses Hazaras even today, despite the fact that they see themselves as one of the groups most
invested in the state-building project. Why Hazaras decide to invest in a state that they believe is
corrupt, even polluting, largely stems from the fact that they see no other choice. Independence is
clearly not an option for a people who are concentrated in isolated central highlands, in the
capital, and the rest scattered throughout the country. To try to change the state, as insurgents
from other groups do, is also not an option. For ideological reasons, Hazaras and the insurgents
want something quite different from a new state. Furthermore, the current state, corrupted as it is,
was put in place by the international benefactors with which Hazaras align themselves.
Generally, they believe the international community does care about Hazaras and their
difficulties, and that it is actors opposed to Hazaras who ensure that the state remains corrupt.
Hence the paradox. The state is corrupt, because many staffing it are corrupt, but it symbolizes
the efforts of those outside benefactors who do have their best interest at heart. Perhaps it is
better, then, to say that the state itself is not polluting but rather has been polluted by those
politically-motivated actors working within it. Hazaras, particularly activists and their
sympathizers, continue to try to reform the state from within, to purify it, while at the same time
remaining mistrustful in their dealings with it. And yet those who do work within the state, even
in the name of civil ideals, risk pollution. Hazara activists in Bamyan are equally distrustful of
the locally elected Provincial Council. A Hazara who becomes affiliated with state institutions is
in some way sullied, and most of the Provincial Council Members are considered to have
achieved their positions based on patronage networks, or as one informant told me, “through the
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means of the mafia.” They do not believe the provincial council has changed over the past 14
years either, except with the loss of one member, Jawad Zuhak, who is thought to have worked
hard for the development of Hazara areas, and was murdered by the Taliban in 2011. Zuhak
appears to have been able to maintain civil ideals during his time in office. As rumors circulate
that a Hazara rival was complicit in his death, the possibility grows that memory of his violent
death will come to be “purified” as a kind of martyrdom.
Hazaras, then, are contributing to the state-building project, because the ideals of such a
project are in line with the democratic ideals they have come to embrace, and because at this
point they see no other way to improve their situation than to seek education and work to
improve things from inside the very apparatus they distrust. Indeed, they also believe a federal,
rather than the current centralized, system, would better serve their needs. But in addition,
Hazara activists are spreading the message that human rights, civil rights, the pursuit of
knowledge through education, justice, and even gender equality are universal ideals and rights
owed to every human being. They believe that these ideals have been brought and promoted by
foreign actors such as the United States, UNAMA, and other various international organizations
working in Afghanistan. However, civil society activists also promote the ethno-national view
that these ideals are somehow inherent culturally to Hazaras and had already been promoted by
Mazari before the NATO intervention. Even as they exercise their right to protest, their right to
civil disobedience, against this state, they also wholly work for its betterment from within, while
paradoxically believing that these ideals can only be polluted when administered by the state.
Having discussed how Hazara activists view Afghan state institutions as impure and
corrupting, while the ideals they are supposed to stand for — democracy, rule of law, and
education — are pure, I turn in the next chapter to another area that Hazaras view as sometimes
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corrupting and sometimes purifying, religion. The next chapter will show that much as Hazara
activists are wary of state institutions, so also are they wary of Shi’a religious institutions. And
similar paradoxes apply in the Hazaras’ perception of and use of religion: many claim not to be
religious, or state that religion should be a private matter; and yet, religious themes became
apparent in many of their protests and memorials, sometimes intentionally, and sometimes
through a cultural pattern of giving heightened meaning to victimhood, oppression, and
collective trauma.
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Chapter 5
Shi’ism: History, Activism, and Iran

“Melissa, let me tell you, those things can’t be true. Shujayi, he is a religious man. You know our
religion. You know we are Shi’as, that Shi’as are the Muslims who are more peaceful. We are
not al-Qaeda, or the Taliban, or the Islamic State. A true Shi’a would never do such a thing. This
I know. I believe it.” So said an activist in discussing Shujayi, the local police commander
accused of torturing and killing Pashtun civilians. In this same conversation, the activist added
his views on Shi’a morality: “At the heart of Shi’ism is justice and peace. Shi’as only fight when
forced to. Shujayi attended madrasa, and he truly believes, more than many of us. It is not
possible that such a person could have done these things.”
I expected that educated, mainly middle class civil society activists, such as my
informants, would tend to espouse more secular views; many do claim to be secular. Yet, as I
became closer to them, had more in-depth conversations, and observed their protests and
speeches, I understood that, emotionally, morally and cosmologically more than consciously,
they are very much guided by Shi’a Islam. Some acknowledge this openly, while others,
seemingly wary of organized religion, use Shi’ism as a pattern that allows them to make sense of
right and wrong, justice and tyranny. What almost all of my informants are wary of is
institutionalized religion. This, like Afghan state institutions, is something which corrupts the
pure ideals people should follow. But Shi’ism, according to most activists I spoke with, is very
much in line with their adherence to human rights and justice. Some state this explicitly, while
others show it through their actions.
This chapter will demonstrate how the activists’ particular brand of Shi’a spirituality is
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conceptualized. I start with a brief history of Shi’ism, as this provides a blueprint for Shi’a
Hazaras as they incorporate their religion into their fight for justice. I then describe some of my
informants’ attitudes towards religion and spirituality, letting their own detailed and eloquent
words take primacy. Finally, I address the problem of institutionalized Shi’ism, distrusted by my
informants both because of geopolitical and local concerns.
Shi’ism for my informants provides a blueprint both to interpret trauma and express it
publicly in a way that will affect others. The ways that the activists present the Hazara past,
present, and future, the methods of activism, and the types of emotions they seek to evoke are in
many ways based upon Shi’a tradition. And Shi’a tradition is premised on loss, upon always
being the ones subjugated to tyrants. Not only is Shi’a tradition used by Hazara civil society
activists to reach their audience. It also makes the activists — and possibly the greater Hazara
community — more receptive to a message based on a collective trauma. Having been already
exposed to trauma narratives of Shi’ism from a young age, they can weave themselves
seamlessly into this paradigm as Hazaras. Collective mourning for the historical founders of
Shi’ism resembles collective mourning for the events that have historically traumatized Hazaras.
Not the institutions of Shi’ism (with which activists feel disillusioned as one more group of
power-holders taking advantage of them), but the narratives and iconography of Shi’ism provide
building blocks for cultural expressions that have at their roots narratives of trauma. In what
follows, I give a background of the basic story of Shi’ism to illustrate trauma narratives within
Shi’ism, before going on to explore how my informants described their relation with their faith.

The Karbala Paradigm
Michael Fischer (1980: 21) writes that for Shi’a Muslims the Karbala Paradigm has become a
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model for life, a “mnemonic for thinking about how to live.” Karbala, located about sixty miles
south of Baghdad, and just west of the Euphrates river, is a city of about 570,000 people. In the
year 680 AD, a nearby desert plain was the site of the final battle and death of Hussein. Hussein
is considered by the Shi’as to have been the legitimate leader of the Islamic world of that time,
because of his descent from Prophet Mohammad. Hussein and his followers saw the Caliph
Yazid as an illegitimate and oppressive ruler. In the battle, Hussein and many of his family
members and followers were slain. Hussein had until that point remained quiescent, choosing not
to seek to head the Muslim community in order to preserve unity. He entered into battle after
being called by the people of Kufa, another city close to the Euphrates, to stand against the
tyrant. The Kufans were then convinced by one of Yazid’s generals not to assist Hussein in battle
(Jafri 1981).
In yearly processions, Shi’as commemorate this tragedy through displays of intense
sadness, breast beating, self-flagellation and even cutting with razors, knives and swords, all
meant both to atone for the Kufans’ treachery and reenact the pain of Hussein and his followers.
Fischer states that the remembrance of this event, which features multitudes of side stories and
vignettes, can be used by Shi’as during every part of the year and just about every life situation.
The tendency to make use of the event as a series of parables, Fischer states, leads him to refer to
it as a paradigm rather than a passion.
The remembrance of Karbala by Shi’as resembles certain Christian commemorations of
Christ’s Passion. There is an emphasis on sharing the suffering of Hussein and his followers,
experiencing what they experienced. Christ-like, Hussein knew that he would die at Karbala, his
death having been foretold by Allah, but he went willingly, knowing he would model for his
people an example of holding up one’s righteousness against injustice.41
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During Muharram, the Islamic month when the Battle of Karbala occurred, and Ashura,
the tenth day of that month (on which Hussein was killed), Shi’as listen to stories of the suffering
of Hussein and his family, and they, too, suffer. Part of their suffering is based on mourning and
part on sharing in the pain felt by Hussein and his family. Many told me that their suffering is to
feel what Hussein felt, and some criticized people who they claimed were not truly suffering in
empathy with Hussein, as was required of them religiously. The mullahs who lead the majlis, the
assembly of worshippers who listen to stories and sermons related to Karbala, clearly work to
bring people to a state of intense suffering, brought on by stories of the pain of Hussein and his
family. A number of earlier analysts have written that the intent implicit in Shi’a Ashura rites is
to bring about emotional pain, whether to feel the same pain that Hussein did or atone for the
Kufans.42 The atmosphere during Muharram and especially Ashura is extremely emotional. In
Bamyan, I saw people sob for Hussein, cry into their hands, and rock back and forth from the
overwhelming emotional pain. Some beat their breasts, while teams of boys gather at a shrine
and beat themselves with chains. In essence, they come to experience Karbala as Hussein did. In
Bamyan, no one I spoke with mentioned atoning for the Kufans, but rather the importance of
Hussein’s suffering. The passion element of the Karbala Paradigm brings people emotionally
close to Hussein, and his family. Ashura and the Muharram processions are hence collective
trauma events.
Before Fischer’s explanation of Karbala as a paradigm, scholars tended to describe these
rituals solely in terms of their resemblance to the Passion. Important as the example of the pain
and suffering of Hussein and his followers is for Shi’as, they also use other aspects of Karbala to
make sense of their life predicaments. Fischer makes clear that Karbala is about not just
suffering, but also justice, truth, and more. More specifically, Fischer holds high both the affect
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that Shi’as experience and the symbolic meaning of Karbala. This symbolism is so multifaceted
that it, more than the commemoration’s emotional impact, explains Karbala’s influence on
today’s Shi’as. For Fischer, the emotional responses, while extremely important, simply do not
take into account all aspects of the larger paradigm.
Hence, civil society activists promoting scripts of cultural trauma among Hazaras make
use of the Paradigm in a more measured way, looking to Hussein pragmatically as they seek to
transmit their message. The suffering of Hussein and his followers is compared to the suffering
of Hazaras. Some activists are rather secular, while some consider themselves quite religious.
All, however, grew up with the stories of Ali, Hussein, Yazid, Abbas, and Zeinab. All witnessed
and took part in the emotion-laden Ashura and Muharram ceremonies, whether openly as
refugees in Iran or Pakistan, or secretly, in whispers, during the years when it was either
prohibited or discouraged, depending on the leadership, by the Afghan state. Karbala, through
the ceremonies of Muharram, provides an inner framework that informs their view of the world,
influences which stories about Hazaras are considered most important, and styles protests and
rhetoric. Sometimes activists explicitly invoke Hussein; at other moments he is a subliminal
presence. Activists also invoke Hussein to support human rights; according to more religiously
inclined activists, Hussein, a just leader, would have supported the modern concept of human
rights.

Ali, Hussein, and Karbala
The story upon which the Karbala Paradigm is based is one of tyranny and oppression, depravity
and justice. The story begins long before the battle, when the Prophet Mohammad died, in 632,
and the community of Islam, the ummah, had to choose his successor (Pinault 1992). Some

168

claimed that Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, was to be successor, citing the Prophet’s
own stated wishes. Others claimed that the successor should be chosen from a consensus of the
community, a sort of tribal council as had been tradition among Arab tribes at that time. The
second group won. Abu Bakr, close advisor to the Prophet and the father of Mohammad’s
favorite wife Aisha, was chosen (Jafri 1981), despite protests that the family of the Prophet had
been left out of this council (Hyder 2006). Ali stayed quiet in order to preserve the unity of the
community (Jafri 1981; Pinault 1992). Abu Bakr died within two years, and leadership passed to
Umar. Umar led for ten years, and from the Shi’a perspective, he was unfit to rule, as he made
decisions which were un-Quranic, such as stoning pregnant women and mad people, and
outlawing temporary marriage and the “little” Hajj pilgrimage, done outside of the official Hajj
season (Fischer 1980). Abu Bakr was assassinated by a Persian slave in response to the conquest
of Persia (Siddiqui 1993). Then, Uthman reigned for twelve years, before he, too, was
assassinated. He was perceived to have governed unwisely, triggering conflicts in Kufa, Basra,
Mecca and Medina (Fischer 1980).
Ali was then offered the caliphate and, though he had disagreed with Uthman on religious
law, he initially turned it down, only accepting leadership after other possible successors had
declined and being pressured from all sides to take on the role (Jafri 1979). Those responsible for
Uthman’s death claimed his killing had been legitimate, as he had not ruled according to Islam;
others, most importantly Aisha, the Prophet’s favorite wife, and Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria
and the brother-in-law of the Prophet, demanded that Ali avenge Uthman’s death (Fischer 1980).
Mu’awiya of course also had an interest in achieving a premiere place as a leader of Islam after
Uthman’s death. Ali refused to avenge Uthman, and Mu’awiya and Aisha rose against him.
Aisha’s forces were defeated at the Battle of the Camel in Basra in 656. Although this is known
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for being the first civil war between the followers of Islam, it went even further in establishing
Aisha as an extremely important and influential female figure (Mernissi 1992).
However, Mu’awiya continued to fight. At the Battle of Siffin, he used a ploy, placing
Qurans upon his lances and causing a stalemate (Fischer 1980: 16). Mu’awiya and Ali then
entered into arbitration, and Mu’awiya declared himself caliph. Ali did not accept this usurpation
but chose not to continue the fight. Rather than those who fought Ali alongside Aisha and
Mu’awiya, it was an extreme group of former Ali supporters, the Kharijites, who then sought
Ali’s and Mu’awiya’s deaths, in outrage that arbitration had even been considered (Dabashi
2011). Mu’awiya escaped their efforts; Ali did not. A Kharijite assassinated him in 661 in Kufa.
For the Partisans of Ali (Shi’at Ali in Arabic), Ali was a first major martyr, having
inherited the caliphate in 656 only to be killed five years later (661). He knew it was predestined,
he even knew who would carry it out. But he went to it willingly. Ali told others it would be Ibn
Muljam the Kharijite who would kill him, but he refused their proposal to kill the assassin first
(Fischer 1989). Ali told his family he would be killed the next day, and refused their pleas to stay
home. He went to the Great Mosque in Kufa, where he found Ibn Muljam sleeping. The two
stood to pray together, and on the second prostration, Ibn Muljam struck Ali with a sword
(Fischer 1980). Ibn Muljam was captured and brought back to Ali, who comforted the man, gave
him food and water, and declared that should he, Ali, live, Ibn Muljam would be released. Before
dying, Ali specified that Ibn Muljam be killed with a single blow, as that was equal to what the
assassin had dealt Ali.
If Ali was the first important martyr, it is the martyrdom of his son, Hussein, which holds
the most importance for Shi’as. Mu’awiya assumed the caliphate uncontested, as Ali’s older son,
Hassan, was too weak to stand against him. It is widely thought among Shi’as that Mu’awiya had
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him poisoned (Pinault 1992). The understanding upon Mu’awiya taking power had been that rule
would return to the Prophet’s family once Mu’awiya died, yet Hassan’s likely murder was
followed by Mu’awiya’s insistence that his son, Yazid, inherit his rule, not Ali’s younger son,
Hussein, as should have happened. Mu’awiya did not force the issue when Hussein refused to
declare allegiance to him, but when his son Yazid came to power, this changed.
In 680, Hussein was called by the people of Kufa (southern Iraq) to lead a revolt against
the tyranny of Yazid. Hussein, like his father Ali, foresaw his own death, and released most of
those in his service. Only his family and seventy-two men, mostly his personal guard, stayed
with him (Pinault 1992). As he journeyed to Kufa, Yazid managed to co-opt the Kufans so that
they did not come to Hussein’s aid. Hussein and his small troop were trapped on the plain of
Karbala on the first of the month Muharram. The suffering was intense. The troop was not
allowed to approach the river for water, and the children’s thirsty cries could be heard. Hussein’s
half-brother, Abbas, attempted to bring a water skin and was cut down before helping the
children. Children and youth were killed, including three of Hussein: the infant, Ali Ashgar,
pierced by an arrow in his father’s arms, five-year-old Jafar, and twenty-year-old Ali Akbar
(Pinault 1992; Hyder 2006). Hussein himself was beheaded, his body desecrated, his head
brought back to Yazid and struck by the tyrant, showing the dead Imam the greatest disrespect.
Only two men survived, the sickly twenty-two-year-old Zayn al-Abidin (the fourth of the
twelve Imams of the twelver Shi’a tradition), and his four-year-old son, Muhammad al-Baqir
(who would be the fifth Imam) (Pinault 1992). The women, too, were taken in chains to
Damascus. Hussein’s sister, Zeinab, shamed Yazid for what he had done to her brother, and for
her family’s treatment as prisoners, as she was held in his court. She is credited with keeping
alive the movement of the Partisans of Ali until the fourth Imam was able to take over leadership
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of the nascent sect (Fischer 1980). From that point, inheritance was passed from one Imam to the
other, until the twelfth Imam, a child, Mahdi, inherited the Imamate in 874. Under threat, he
went into hiding, the “minor occultation,” during which he contacted his followers through four
deputies. After seventy-two years, he entered “major occultation.” Today’s Shi’as believe that
he, the last of the living Imams for Twelver Shi’as, is hidden by God’s order, and will return at
the end of times (Fischer 1980).
It might seem improbable that a minority group could survive for such a long time among
a hostile majority. Shi’ism survived as the Imams practiced quietism and did not interfere in
politics, and their followers practiced taqiya, the hiding of their faith, so as to blend in when
threatened, though holding protest in their hearts.43
Today, Muharram and Ashura processions commemorating Karbala are common
throughout the Shi’a Muslim world, even as many states discourage certain of the rituals, viewed
by some as “barbaric.”44 There has been a difficult relationship between states and Ashura
rituals, when leaders felt threatened by Shi’a believers taking to the streets and displaying great
religious affect and fervor.45
During the first ten days of Muharram, culminating with Ashura (the tenth day),
mourners attend mosques or peoples’ houses in the evening, listening to sermons that focus on
the tale of Hussein’s martyrdom and encourage empathy with its victims (Pinault 1992; Hyder
2006). Mourners cry and moan, and may become so overwrought that they pass out. Young men
join processions in which they practice matam, the beating of the chest, or hit their backs until
they bleed with a whip of metal chains. Often the marchers are organized by mosques, and have
practiced beforehand. Some of the most extreme followers will cut their faces with razors or
knives, and attend with blood running down. These are the “penitents,” standing in for the people
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of Kufa, who failed to come to Hussein’s aid (Hyder 2006). In some places, ta’aziyas are held,
passion plays which reenact the death of Hussein and his followers.

An Ashura in Bamyan
In Bamyan, the azadari, mourning, begins with the first of Muharram. As Muharram approaches,
black banners with slogans for Hussein, Ali, Hassan, and others start to appear outside shops.
Gates covered with black cloth are erected over the road, also bearing slogans and images such
as Hussein’s riderless white horse, Zuljanah. Yet the main gate near the most important mosque,
the Baba Mazari Mosque, featured at its apex not a picture related to Karbala, but rather one of
Abdul Ali Mazari. I was told this was intentional. Mazari and Hussein were to be related to each
other, their similarities emphasized.
On the days preceding Ashura, I attended a majlis, a commemoration assembly to recall
Hussein and Karbala, with my friend Zeinab. We went to one Hussainiya, (a gathering place for
such assemblies among Shi’as, similar to a mosque), found they would not be giving a sermon
for several hours, and so walked for forty minutes through dusty streets to another Hussainiya
whose sermon would start soon. The interior was dark and crowded, and the wooden beams that
crossed the ceiling seem to press down from above. Women had their own room in the building,
so the sermon was piped in via a sound system. The room was packed, women sitting shoulder to
shoulder, hip to hip, upon the floor. The Hussainiya had women volunteers roving about, keeping
the rowdy children in line with the threat of a thwack from a stick. As the sermon began, it
became clear that its focus was the moment in which those surrounded at Karbala felt intense
thirst after several days of resistance, especially the children. Of course, Yazid’s forces prevented
them from reaching the river (the Euphrates) to sate themselves. Teshna (thirsty), was repeated
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over and over by the mullah. The children were thirsty, the women were thirsty, the children
cried because they were thirsty, thirsty, thirsty . . . . It was painful for even me to listen to, and
my friend Zeinab rocked and moaned. The mullah related how Abbas, son of Ali and halfbrother of Hussein, could not stand the suffering of the children. He bravely went to the river,
and Yazid’s army allowed him to pass, to reach the river, and to fill his water skin. Abbas did not
drink, the mullah said, wishing to get the water to the others as quickly as possible. Abbas
returned, and he was struck in the back, multiple times. The water skin was pierced, and the
water was lost. Then, the mullah exclaimed, a death-blow was dealt to Abbas.
By the end of the sermon, Zeinab was sobbing into her scarf. Most of the women around
me were as well. Hearing about the children, so thirsty, about Abbas’s valiant attempt, about the
way that Abbas was toyed with, the water lost and then Abbas struck down, left no doubt as to
the cruelty of Yazid and his troops in the minds of those attending. One woman became so
overcome during the sermon, she became ill and passed out. The volunteers quickly trampled
through the people sitting down towards the exit route holding the woman. We all moved out of
the way in a panic, so they could assist the sick woman, remove her into the fresh air, and give
her water. At the end of the majlis, while we ate nazr, charitable food provided for all attendees,
I asked Zeinab about her feelings. “I was so, so sad,” she said. “I was sad for Hussein, for his
family. And I was thinking also of my own problems, and hoping that Hussein could help me.” It
is believed in Shi’a Islam that the family of the Prophet can offer intersession for pious believers
(Pinault 1992).
I was repeatedly told, “Here in Bamyan, we discourage matam (ritual self-flagellation).
That is often done in places where people want to make a political statement to Sunnis, to show
their strength, but not here.” However, some younger boys told me otherwise. One, who worked
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in the house where I stayed, said “Yes, in my village, we practice matam, in the mosques. Some
plan it. But last year I was so overcome, I did not plan it: I just grabbed the chains from someone
and began to beat myself. Because I was doing it for the right reason, for Hussein, for Ali, I did
not feel any pain.”
A day later, Arif, a neighboring high school boy who knew I was interested in the
practices surrounding Ashura, knocked on my door and told me to hurry. “At one of the shrines,
the boys are singing and doing matam. They are from different mosques, from villages nearby,
come on! Quickly!” We rushed together to the shrine, and the crowd was kind enough to insist I
move to the front of the spectators. Each mosque would be introduced by a mullah serving as a
sort of master of ceremonies. As one boy chanted a song associated with Muharram, the others
struck themselves and moved around the shrine area in a sort of choreography, sometimes
striding up and down, sometimes dropping to their knees. This continued for hours. In Bamyan,
matam done as part of large processions starting from the main mosque through the bazaar might
not be encouraged, but people still found room to keep these practices alive and public. Activist
friends told me these ritual practices lie at the “margins” of socio-religious life, both figuratively
and physically (in shrines located some distance from the heart of the bazaar), while their own
activities (protest marches and public gatherings) hold center stage (in the central bazaar). No
matam happened in the main mosque or in the bazaar, which very much does seem to be the
secular center of Bamyan, where shops, offices, inns and restaurants are plenty. Yet I wonder
whether a shrine that predates the bazaar and stands directly beneath the Buddha niches might
not actually occupy a place symbolically closer to the center of religious life as a whole. The
answer seemed to depend upon each individual’s sensitivity and how each decided to practice
Muharram ceremonies. Bamyan is in a country where for many years these rituals were
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discouraged or banned. People are bringing them back into the open, with the help of returned
refugees from Iran and Pakistan. Perhaps because of this, too, there did not seem to be one,
prescribed way people were expected to celebrate.
On the morning of Ashura, I was ready to spend the day out and about, absorbing all that
I could. I woke early to find my host family already busy. Fatima, the wife, made shula shirin, a
sort of sweet rice she distributed among the neighbors. I also was given some. She showed me
that she had burned several candles on a rock nearby as she was cooking it to emphasize the
sacredness of the event. Mohammad, her husband, slaughtered a sheep in the yard of our house.
The meat, he said, would later be distributed to the poor. I promised to return in time for this,
then headed to the bazaar.
The day was extremely bright and sunny, although already somewhat cold, as it was
November (the first snow of winter would fall a few days later). I started at Abdul Ali Mazari
mosque, where not only mullahs, but also public officials, were giving speeches. The mosque
was packed, so we listened from outside. The governor (who in Bamyan at this time happened to
be a woman, Habiba Surobi) was giving a speech. We ran into several of my civil society
friends, including Hussein, and he suggested that we stroll along the bazaar. Despite the gravity
of the celebrations, there was a festive atmosphere. Mosques were giving out tea to anyone who
asked. People smiled and laughed as they greeted each other in the bazaar. From time to time, a
caravan of cars and vans and motorcycles from one of the outlying villages would drive through
the bazaar. They were decorated with green and black flags and banners with the slogans, “Ya
Hussein! Ya Ali! Hussein is justice!” They played loud religious music. The activist Hussein was
not comfortable with these displays. “If you were in Kabul, it would be worse,” he said. “They
drive around the whole city, into areas where there are no Shi’as living. Now that they can, they
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want to make their presence known, to show they can be strong. Sometimes there are fights.”
This was repeated by several I knew, Hazaras and non-Hazaras. Thousands of Shi’as would
gather and march in a political statement, and most were Hazaras. In reaction to the times when
observing Ashura had been discouraged, today Hazara participants take to the streets, on foot, on
motorbikes or in cars. They drive around Kabul, flying flags similar to those I had seen in
Bamyan, and playing music as I had heard. Tacitly, these Hazaras are making the point that they
are a force to be reckoned with, no longer an oppressed minority, from whom there will be
consequences if they are harassed. The unease such displays cause among others cannot be
denied. “Don’t go to West Kabul,” I was told when I was in Kabul during an earlier year’s
Muharram. “It could get dangerous. They get out of control.” Yet most well known, and most
serious, incidents of real violence seemed to be against the Shi’as — including a mosque
bombing in 2011 when about sixty were killed, mostly Hazaras, and an incident in the university
in Kabul while I was residing in Bamyan. A group of Shi’a and Sunni students argued over the
use of a mosque at Kabul University, and the groups finally confronted each other violently. Two
young Hazara men, not part of the fighting, were studying in their dorm rooms. A group of
Sunnis found them there and threw them from the window, killing both (Osman, 2013).
So, in many ways, Muharram and Ashura indicated an ambivalence among my
informants. Some wanted to tone down the political aspects, to focus on the social justice lessons
learned from it, while other emphasized the chance to give charity. Some wanted to celebrate in
the way their grandparents did, keeping tradition alive. I never managed to talk to those who
were using it for political reasons, but their presence was clear as well, as they drove their
motorcades through the bazaar in Bamyan as well as the streets of cities such as Kabul. And
everyone had an opinion, as to whether others were celebrating in the right, or wrong, way.
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During the latter part of the day, I returned home to meet Mohammad and distribute some
of the meat from the slaughtered sheep. I found that much of the meat had already been given to
neighbors. All the same, we took Mohammad’s van and set out to give away what was left. We
delayed the trip to pick up an American who was doing government sector training. He had to
lose his security detail, as Ashura is apparently considered to be a day particularly dangerous to
foreigners (I am not sure why this was the case in Bamyan, as everyone I ever interacted with
was very welcoming to a foreigner who wanted to learn about their religion). So, the sun
beginning its descent, my husband (who was visiting), the American trainer, Mohammad and I
set out to where the poorest lived, the caves, once cells for Buddhist monks and now home to
those who have nowhere else to go. It was actually the first time I saw the inside of the cave
houses. I was impressed by the ability of the people living there to make the caves homelike.
Curtains hung in entrances. Some had actually built doors. Laundry lines stretched outside. We
stopped at a few places, distributing meat. The American trainer gave away some goods like
flashlights, a sleeping bag, and a pair of boots, in almost mint condition.
I later asked several friends what Karbala meant to them, and got a variety of answers.
Arif, the neighbor and high school student I had mentioned earlier, says that he participates in the
majlis as much as his school schedule allows. That year, he had attended six or seven of the
gatherings. His family, he told me, was very involved. “We cook meat and rice and donate it to
the mosque as nazr, for the entire Muharram period.” Arif knew that I had heard it but he wanted
to tell me the story again. “Ashura is about the martyrdom of Hussein by Yazid. Also, Hussein’s
children died. Little Ali Askar died, he was shot in the throat by an arrow, can you imagine?
Karbala was dry. There was no water. Karbala is a desert. They could not even get water for the
children. Seventy-two people were killed, and it was the darkest night for Hussein. It makes me
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feel so, so sad. The children should have had water. But the enemy was too numerous.”
At first, I found it interesting that Arif considered this to have been the darkest night for
Hussein. Hussein was, after all, a martyr who knew he was going to his own death. He had
knowledge of his martyrdom. I later came to understand he thought it was Hussein’s darkest
night not because of his own death, but because of the suffering of the children he was made to
watch, which was a theme I heard repeated in Bamyan, at both majlis I attended that year, and
which was recounted to me by others, too. Having released all from his service, because Hussein
knew the futility of his battle, only his seventy-two personal guards, and his family, remained.
His family’s presence is a central element of the story. People cry desperately for Hussein when
the moment of his death is recounted. But, they also sob when thinking of thirsty children, crying
for water, and never sated, only to be cut down by a tyrant. The whole story, with its many parts,
resonates with the traumatic experiences gone through by its hearers and others whom they
know. Surely, the theme of suffering children would resound particularly strongly with those
who had been in a situation when their own children were in danger or faced (and still face) food
insecurity. I now wonder if this theme, evocative as it is for all Shi’as, might be particularly
emotive for Hazaras who had run into the mountains to escape the Taliban, or survived the
Taliban blockade, or lived in precarity as refugees in Iran or Pakistan.
Arif’s own life history is rife with parallels to the Karbala story. He lived his whole life in
Saroa-e-Syob, where I stayed for part of my research, located on a large plateau above the bazaar
area, so he definitely experienced the Taliban blockade when he was a small child. While the
Taliban was in control of Bamyan, a massacre occurred in the village. Seventy-some men were
killed. This event impacted Arif profoundly as a child. His demeanor reminded me of the
symptoms of PTSD. He had trouble looking me in the eye when talking, he would seem to move
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in a shaky, jerky, manner, and his ability to navigate social situations seemed somehow inhibited.
He remembers when the Taliban knocked on his door looking for his father. Knowing what was
happening, his father had hidden, along with most of the other younger men, so it was the old
men the Taliban killed. As a child, Arif must have been scarred by watching the oldest, respected
adults in his community marched away, and then hearing the shots. Was his concern about the
children of Hussein projected back to the child he had been?
Why one should cry upon hearing the martyrdom story, I found, was a point of
disagreement. Arif said that people do cry for their own predicaments, but this represents a
different type of sadness. He seems not to condemn those who cry for their own reasons but
believes tears for Hussein are more “valuable.” Sajjad spoke disparagingly of “women who just
go there to cry for their own problems.” As a professed secularist, his interest is not whether their
worship is correct but whether they are being sincere. If you claim to be religious, he pointed out,
then you should concern yourself with religion and not worldly issues. Mohammad took a much
more understanding approach: “People, and especially women, are not allowed to cry in
everyday life. They have to remain strong, always in control of their emotions, even when in
private. These mourning rituals, they give them a chance to cry for their own problems. When
else can they do that?”
Muharram and Ashura, then, were experienced in a variety of ways, which is very much
in line with the idea that Karbala provides a sort of paradigm for life, something which can guide
one’s actions and one’s responses to many different events and circumstances. For some, it
represents a purely religious event. For others, it is a time to feel pain that had been felt by the
founders of their faith. For others still, it serves as a catharsis for nagging problems, a chance to
feel at peace with the world, or a moment to sustain the traditions of one’s forefathers. Many at
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the same time take the opportunity to connect with their neighbors and help the needy. And for a
few, it is a chance to make a political statement.

Activists Views on Religion and Muharram
Beyond their disagreements about religious attitudes and motivations, nearly all of the activists
hold in common a distrust of organized, institutional religion. This came through both when we
spoke about Ashura and about religious faith more generally.
Musa is from Daikundi and worked both as a student and in a guesthouse. He expressed
attitudes held by many activists as he recounted his experience of a talk by a writer (who goes by
the pen name of Mohammad Ali Arzada) titled “Mirror of Islam.” The event was attended by
about 150 people. Musa was incredibly enthusiastic about the talk, as were others with whom I
later spoke. The most important point that Musa took from the talk, which was directed at
students, were that crying and sadness are neither the only way, nor the best way, nor even the
right way, to experience Ashura. What one should do instead, explained Musa, is to think about
the message of Hussein, and Hussein’s goal, his reasons, in standing against Yazid. “Crying in
itself doesn’t solve anything,” Musa explained.
“What did the speaker say you should do, then?” I asked.
“He said we should try to be good people, to value other human beings, to respect each
other, and to be sure not to do anything that might cause violence or insecurity. We should never
accept when others act in a cruel way, or corruption, or any kind of misuse of people. Hussein’s
message was to be against crime, violence, cruelty, misuse of others, and corruption. So in
essence, his message was a very political message.” Musa continued, “When we see these things
in Afghanistan, we cannot accept them, just as Hussein did not accept cruelty and violence.
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These things that people do, going to the mosque, hitting and crying, just don’t make sense for
real followers of Hussein.” Here Musa seems to be saying that true followers will take action that
will affect social justice in a society, and not simply partake in actions, no matter how pious, that
does not affect the greater good of the community. Musa continued:

There were three main points we should have taken away from the speech of Arzada.
First, there are people who do not really understand what Imam Hussein stood for. These
are uneducated people. And yet they try to make things sacred that aren’t really sacred,
and this takes away from the more important ideas of Hussein. Second, there are people
who criticize what others do without really understanding what Imam Hussein stood for.
So third, to avoid these problems, one must really seek out knowledge, analyze it wisely.
If one analyzes and understands the knowledge of Hussein, of Ali, and then uses these
ideas for the good of human kind, then one has reached a certain, correct, pure point of
knowledge oneself. Some people are bad, and some people are good, and it is the bad
people who cause limitations in what the good are able to do. It is not the fault of the
truly good people, they are inherently good and will find a way to seek the right path.
Groups like the Taliban create limitations for good people to achieve their goals. Only
other humans prevent good people from reaching Hussein’s goals, his purpose, by taking
the rights of others. The biggest evil of people is corruption and cruelty.
Often, those who want peace, who work for it, who demonstrate it, they are the
ones put in prison. They are sacrificing themselves, but at the same time, they are
working to do good, to bring peace. So this should be what we do. This is Hussein’s
message. Ashura exists to show these messages. We need to stand up against those who
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are making problems. Like Karzai. Arzada did not mention Karzai by name, but it was
understood, from what he did say, that Karzai is part of the problem, that we must stand
up to people, to politicians, like him.
Sometimes, it is good to cry during Ashura, but only for the right reasons. I was
reading the website of Ayatollah Mohaqeq Kabuli. He says you should go to majlis, you
should take part in the ceremony, but only in order to pass on the message of Imam
Hussein, to make sure that his qiyom, or uprising, defense against those who did wrong
things, is understood. When I pray, it is never blindly. It is only for the right things, with
the right thoughts. It is better not to pray than to pray without the right intent.

In this one conversation, two main themes came up, which would be repeated to me by
other activists. The first was that Muharram and Ashura are times to be devoted to Imam
Hussein, what happened to him, and what he stood for. Generally, with a few exceptions, they
believe that this is a period in which you should mourn for Hussein, and not focus on your own
problems. Yet this does not mean you should leave your thinking in the past. The battle against
tyranny, the need to stand up for what is right, even against impossible odds, is happening in
Afghanistan and many other parts of the world, today. Civil society activists see what they do as
directly related to and descended from the ideals for which Hussein stood.
Civil society activists see themselves as participating in this battle. They have a message
of respect for human rights. They believe that Hazaras had suffered a genocide, and that in order
to prevent more horrors for their people, they have to bring attention to this. All of their actions,
all of their protests, are done in the name of righteousness, which descends directly from the
authority of Hussein. They might not be able to talk to everyone in the community about human
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rights, distrusted by some as a foreign import. But if Hussein is justice, and human rights
represent the ultimate example of universal justice, then the activists are able to weave these two
ideas together.
A second point I saw reflected here, and in other conversations with activists, was a sort
of play on the ideas of authenticated Islam, as explained by Lara Deeb (2006), Saba Mahmood
(2005) and Mandana Limbert (2010). One prays and practices a religion not just because it is
one’s tradition but with intent, focusing on the message. For those activists who are religious,
intent can include civil society work, in which they see themselves carrying out the precepts of
Hussein. For them, becoming an activist, putting yourself on the line, and openly declaring what
you believe, is a practice fully in line with what Hussein stood for, making you perhaps the most
authentic Shi’a of all, even if you drink alcohol and never attend mosque.
The story of Hussein’s martyrdom while standing up to tyranny affirms the activists’
determination to stand for what they believe is right, even in the face of danger. Some have been
beaten or shot at. Even as they want allies, activists reproduce a lonely subject position as eternal
victims, their religious traditions running parallel with their retellings of history and their
portrayals of the situation of Hazaras today, and the real danger they face.
Those who grew up in Iran had the stories of Karbala and Hussein presented to them
publicly: the Islamic Republic requires people to take part in certain public majlis ceremonies.46
Those who grew up in Quetta, Pakistan, could also practice openly. Today, of course, the
religious and political situation in Pakistan has changed such that people might practice Ashura
rituals but risk being targeted by violence and terrorism. This has, in all likelihood, made the
rituals all the more meaningful, as Quettan Hazaras and Pakistani Shi’as in general find
themselves once again caught standing up for their religion against blood-thirsty terrorist groups,
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such as Lashkar-e Jangvi and Lashkar-e Taiba. In this way, Quettan Hazaras can now view
themselves as victims of a tyrannical ruler, as Pakistani militant Islam groups don the mask of
Yazid.
The religious parallels are at times made explicitly, as when the Afshar Massacre is
spoken of as the “new Karbala.” Hussein, the former mullah who had been jailed by the Taliban
for supporting girls’ education, shared his views of religion at some length during an interview in
his civil society office.

What we are doing, it is a new Karbala. Karbala was where Imam Hussein, a Prophet of
Islam, was killed. His sister Zeinab carried on for him. He was killed for his people, and
for his God. Mazari was also killed for his people and for his God. He was also defending
his people and he was killed. It is true that Mazari did have some characteristics, some
ideas that changed throughout his life, which would lead some to say he was not really
like Hussein. He was always changing. Every day as he thought, and he considered
things, he changed his position on things to be better. In the 1980s he was in Iran,
cooperating with their government. But then he realized, Iran only thought of itself. It did
not think of the problems of all Shi’as around the world. Iran wanted to put its own type
of government here in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan is not Iran; it would not have
worked. So, Mazari changed his ideas about Iran. All the same, all Shi’as share a certain
kind of compassion. You can see this when you understand how both Imam Hussein and
Mazari were killed in mass killings, in massacres. All Shi’as had something of the same
experience.
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I asked what practicing mullahs might think about what he was saying.
“Well, of course, they would not all like it. They would think that I am taking the religion
too lightly! But from my point of view, I am taking it the most seriously. I have always tried to
do the right thing, to stand up for those who needed someone to help them.” For a moment, I
reflected upon not only all of the activism work I had seen Hussein do in Bamyan, but his story
of being jailed by the Taliban, the horrors that he endured — all because he insisted girls should
study. And yet he was still willing to work for justice as he understood it.
Hussein hinted that his ideas sometimes put him at odds with the Shi’a establishment in
Bamyan. “I believe that only one God made the world.” But Hussein continued, “Because there
is just one God, I see all people as one, too. And this has influenced my decision to work on
social issues. All people are deserving. Sect is not important to me, but rather the belief in God,
that one God that made all the world. It is not possible that one part is more right than another
part. God sent Prophets but there were more than one. God does not see much difference
between them, Mohammad and Isa (Jesus) are just different, one is not above the other. Showing
the right behavior and seeing how good people behave is a very important part of religion, this
can help all people. All people are good, there are no sects but just different ways
to the same goal that all people must travel. People are traveling this road to help others, and at
the end is religion and God.”
Hussein’s need is to help others, to devote his life to doing things that he believes will
help those in his community. To him, this is what religion is about. He was trained as a mullah,
but he rebelled against the establishment. He does not have a particularly bad relationship with
the clerics, but they do not approve of all he says. In deciding how to live his life, two points
stand out to me. First, he believes very much in Karbala and that Imam Hussein died for his
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people. This is in no way at odds with the idea that Mazari also died for his people, and Hussein
wholeheartedly believes that Mazari is the martyr of Hazaras, and his picture, he told me,
belongs on display during Muharram. Hussein does not prioritize one above the other. Some
would say that Mazari is an emulation of Imam Hussein, some would say that Mazari is even
more important that Imam Hussein, because he was a more recent leader, a more recent martyr.
Hussein does not want to prioritize, and he sees them all as important. He believes, somehow,
that Mazari had modeled himself after Imam Hussein, and they somehow were devoted to the
same thing, in that they both stood for justice. This might even be in line with what Hussein says
about Jesus and Mohammad. Both were important Prophets to Islam. Mohammad is not more
important than Jesus per se, according to Islam, but simply because he came later he is a more
“complete” prophet: he had more knowledge, and thus what he says should be given priority.
While Hussein does not seem to go quite that far in his comparison of Imam Hussein and Mazari,
those who do prioritize Mazari, in fact, stress that he was more recent, as Mohammad is more
recent than Jesus, and that he is concerned with “their own” people. I am not saying that any
Hazara went so far as to suggest Mazari was an Imam or a Prophet. This would be complete
blasphemy as the last Imam, Mahdi, is in occultation, or hiding, alive and waiting to return at the
end of time. But it is not foreign to the cosmology of the Hazara Shi’as to think that a more
recent leader, who was able to leverage a significant amount of political and, in a way, spiritual
influence, should also be held high and emulated.
Hussein’s seeming rejection of sect, and even of the prioritization of one religion (at
least, those in the Abrahamic tradition) implies that he sees all people as inherently equal. This is
in line with other bits of information I know about him. He was less ethno-nationalistic than
some of the other activists. He is deeply committed to women’s rights. He is very spiritual, very
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religious, even, but he lives his life by his own interpretation of these moral values.
Hussein’s somewhat mystical view of religion was echoed by some who were not
particularly religious at all. Nawruz, student and “expert historian,” told me about his
relationship with religion when we met in the bazaar to talk. In a crowded men’s dorm, we had a
conversation on the topic of religion. “I am not against religion but like anything else, it should
not be under human control. All people from different religions say that their religion is the best
but they are wrong. Religion is under the control of people and yet, if it can’t solve people’s
problems, it is useless.”
I asked Nawruz what he meant by, “Under the control of the people.” He was referring to
organized religion, religion with a hierarchy and a clergy, and not a religion simply practiced by
individuals. “All religions around the world come from all parts of the globe and meet in one
place. These different aspects all have some problems but the problems are caused by humans,
not by the religions themselves. When they reach the ocean, that is, God, they have no problems.
So all religion should be plurality.” Nawruz then continued:

As for me personally, I do not act as if religion is God, but I trust in God. God is
the one thing there is, and all other things, including religion, are created by
people. Religion should not be a game in which we defeat people, although so
often this is what it turns into. I myself do not pray and I do not fast. These things
are not clear in the Holy Quran, and so I believe they are created by people. If I
were Christian, I would not go to church. To my way of thinking, the importance
of religion should be that people come together and embrace humanism; they
should focus on helping each other. If religion is keeping people from acting this
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way as a group, or is not encouraging them to act this way, it is much better to act
as an individual. I went on the Hajj, but while I was there, it was clear to me I
could not see God. And then, after starting to study, I had so many doubts, I began
to doubt my own self-existence. But I realized, one’s own mind must believe one
exists, and this helps the soul. I believe that people who pray in an exact way, at
the same time every day, have a different way of thinking. They are more narrowminded. They see praying as a movement and a habit, but this is not real praying.
Islam and Christianity have both defined paradise, but given a choice, I would
never go there. I believe one can make paradise on this earth. And, for example,
Mexico City is a place worse than hell, so hell exists in this world, and not the
metaphysical world.

Nawruz’s views on religion were so similar to those of Hussein in some ways, and then,
in others, different. God is important to Nawruz, and like Hussein, God is at the end of all paths,
or rivers flowing to the ocean, as he puts it. But, organized religion has not only let him down, it
has let humanity down. Organized religion leads people astray, leads them away from God,
makes them closed minded. For Nawruz, God is a personal thing, but religion should also be
about coming together and helping humanity. And yet he doubts that it can achieve that. And so,
in this case, one must act alone to help others. Again, Nawruz is not forsaking God, something
he believes in. It is a religion corrupted by people that he cannot abide.
A criticism that some level against those who are most demonstrative in their suffering is
that they were not doing it for the right reasons. Some accuse others of crying simply to show the
depth of their religious feeling. “They are hypocritical,” Sajjad once told me, echoing a
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complaint he made several times. “They cry during Ashura, but they drink home-made alcohol
from the Ismailis the rest of the year.” Sajjad qualified, “I drink home-made alcohol from the
Ismailis. But I do not believe in these religious things. Hazaras have bigger problems to worry
about, and religion holds us back from addressing them.”
On an earlier occasion, as Muharram was approaching, I shared lunch with Mohammad
and Latif at Mohammad’s house. After we ate, I asked what they thought about the upcoming
holy days. Mohammad, who was religious, began to complain about hypocrisy. He was forgiving
of those who might use Ashura majlis as a catharsis for their problems. But he also believed that
it was wrong to make a public display of it. In addition, he said that when he prays, he tries to
focus his mind only on God and Hussein. Mohammad stated that, “For me, Ashura is a personal
thing. I only go to the mosque on the tenth day of Muharram. My relatives, they give me a hard
time, they tell me I have converted [to Christianity]. I say, fine, think that I have converted, if
you want, because that is only between me and God.”
Like Mohammad, Latif also complained about the hypocrisy people showed during
Ashura. “Many people just go to the mosque and pray. They pray to God, for Hussein, about
their problems, and they are fine. But some, some just want to show off that they are good
people, even if they drink and do other such things the rest of the year. Or, they pray more for
their own problems than for Hussein. Often these are young people trying to make themselves
visible during this time, to cover up all the bad things they do the rest of the year”.
A number of these activists, then, work to keep their religion pure. Some condemn those
who go to majlis and other religious events, and pray too ostentatiously, calling them hypocrites.
A comparison can be drawn with how the activists view their civil society work. That, too, is
something that must be kept pure. As religion is corruptible by some clergy members, or by
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people who participate for the wrong reasons, so, too, is civil society work corruptible by
government affiliation, or by activists who work only for political power and money, and not to
improve the lives of Hazaras.
Nawruz told me during one of our subsequent meetings in the bazaar, this time together
with my good friend Reza, that he had written an essay on Mazari. “In this essay, I make the
suggestion that Mazari is more non-Muslim than Muslim,” he said. “I compare him to the Greek
philosopher Socrates, to Che Guevara, as well as to Ali, Hussein, and Abraham Lincoln. We
must consider others’ perceptions of things in order to understand them, to understand how great
they were. The way Mazari perceived being human is that it is not so important to concern
yourself with simply staying alive. Rather it is important to concern yourself with honesty, with
ideals. Perhaps Mazari did not have some of the characteristics that these others had to the same
degree, but still, he had them.”
When I asked Nawruz again for some thoughts on religion, he said, “Hussein has not
ruled my life, this is true. But Mazari, he worked in my life, unlike Imam Hussein. Mazari is like
Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King. To Mazari, all people were important. Yes, Mazari
said that oppressors should be killed. But he also said that all humans should live, no matter their
ethnicity. Nothing is hidden about Mazari’s life.”
Let me pause to consider the “great men” that Nawruz chose to compare to Mazari, Imam
Hussein and Ali. Socrates was tried for his philosophy and put to death. Che Guevara was killed
fighting for what he believed was right in Bolivia. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated. So was
Martin Luther King. Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu nationalist. All of the heroes
mentioned were martyrs. This is not to say that Hazara activists do not find other heroes from
outside their own cultural milieu. But martyrdom fits with the Karbala Paradigm, as does the
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subsequent martyrdom of their leader, Mazari. In spite of Nawruz being possibly the most
contrarian of my informants, for him, too, the symbolic patterns of Karbala are still palpable. If
not religiously Shi’a, Nawruz is certainly “culturally” Shi’a.

Institutionalized Religion
I was told that there was a time everyone had a picture of Khomeini in a corner of their house, on
display like an icon. When Khomeini initially came to power, Hazaras thought that he would
also be their leader. But this changed rapidly. Relations with Iran soured, and Hazaras’
relationship with Iran changed, particularly among the well-educated. It also changed for the
many who went to Iran as refugees and came back to recount that they were not welcomed as
brothers in Shi’ism, but simply “dirty Afghans.” I have yet to meet a returned refugee with a
positive story of Iran.
There is a prequel to this story. Early in my fieldwork, I met with Ali Amiri, a wellknown Hazara activist, political figure, and social science professor. We discussed many themes,
including Shi’ism and Iran. While Islam tends to be decentralized, Shi’ism has a system of
madrasas, or Islamic schools, grouped into hawzas, centers of learning. The two most important
hawzas are located in Najaf, Iraq and Qom, Iran. Anyone who wishes to further their religious
studies at an advanced level must spend time at these hawzas. There sit the most important Shi’a
religious scholars, the ayatollahs, and the marja-e-taqlid himself (the sole cleric whose faith one
should emulate).47 Although there is no clear path to becoming the marja-e-taqlid, there is a
method of consensus, whereby the top scholars, the ayatollahs, slowly give approval as to who
can first join their ranks, and then be considered the marja-e-taqlid. The choice is made on the
basis of public renown, authoritativeness of teaching, diffusion of one’s publications, and more.
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However, a break in this system of reproduction of religious authority and standing
occurred. The Ayatollah Khomeini made his case for the necessity for an Islamic government to
guide the people through his idea of the vilayat-e-faqih,48 an idea promoted in a speech in Najaf
in 1970 (Khomeini 1981). After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, he was able to turn this concept
into a reality. Up to this point, political thought in Iran had concerned itself not with Islamism
but with the corrupt nature of the Pahlavi regime and by concerns about direct and indirect
Western control at all levels, from economic to cultural (Keddie 2003). What Khomeini did was
not simply to create an Islamic revolution, but through his use of vilayat-e-faqih, to revolutionize
Shi’ism as a tool for rule (Arjomand 1988). Qom then became a seat of political Shi’ism. Around
the same time, the secular, largely Sunni-controlled Baath regime in Iraq began to restrict the
activities of the Najaf hawza (Louer 2008). Najaf came to stand for disengagement from politics,
the necessity of quietism, while Qom came to stand for the opposite, political Shi’ism.
In our conversation, Amiri said,

Religion should not follow politics. This is a long Shi’a tradition, and it is the view of
Sistani [Ayatollah al-Sistani is one of the most important Shi’a clerics in the world, based
in Najaf, who should in theory be sole marja-e-taqlid had Iran not usurped political
Shi’ism]. This Najafi view of religion; it is the stronger, deeper, view of Hazaras. Of
course, after the Iranian revolution, the Qomi, the Khomeinist, point of view, was very
seductive for Hazaras and many others. So, there are a lot of ayatollahs who endorse this
point of view. You might even find that a majority embrace this point of view, but we
should really, in the case of Hazaras, pay more attention to the core, Najafi way of
thinking. We should give more prominence to Hazaras who follow Najafi principles,
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because this is our heritage. Me, I manage to be religious, and secular, at one time. And I
believe politics should not be influenced by religion, and vice versa. Otherwise, religion
is tainted by worldly things.

Amiri’s belief that many Hazaras, especially clerics, had been seduced by Khomeini’s message,
but that this was antithetical to the Hazara way, clearly echoes activists’ views of civil society. It
must not be tainted by government or religious institutions, for both had let Hazaras down.
I also met with several members of the clergy, whose views should enter at this point.
First, Ayatollah Waiez Zada Behsudi, the youngest ayatollah in Afghanistan, met me at his
madrasa in West Kabul’s Dasht-e-Barchi neighborhood. He was very kind, small framed, with a
pointed beard and sparkling eyes. He spent a great amount of time with me. We discussed all
manners of things, but on religion, he was clear: “Religion and politics should go together. This
is what the Prophet said. Religion needs to guide all things.” Ayatollah Behsudi studied for
thirteen years in Qom and two in Najaf before returning to Afghanistan. He told me he wanted to
use his standing as ayatollah to help his people. “I was briefly nominated as a vice-presidential
candidate,” he said. “I will guide my people as best I can, and that includes helping politics to be
guided by religion.”
Later, during Muharram, I met Ayatollah Sharifi, who is older, but actually has less
training — in fact, it is debated whether he actually benefits from a consensus that he is an
ayatollah. He too was kind, if somewhat gruff. Around sixty, a long white beard is the most
notable feature of his appearance. He spent ten years studying in Najaf but was forced out due to
the political problems of the Baath regime. He then spent time in Iran and Pakistan, but once the
Taliban was removed, he returned to Afghanistan. “I am ethnically Hazara. It was my duty to
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serve my people, as I felt my religious education was done. The international community was
here, serving my people, so I felt I should do the same. Plus, Hazaras were especially deprived,
particularly during the Taliban. There were several massacres against them. As a knowledgeable
person, I felt I should come back and help my society. And as a Hazara, I felt like I should come
back and help Hazaras in particular.”
When I asked about politics, he said, “Reverence of Hussein is a mix of political and
religious, and in my point of view, in following religion, politics cannot be separated. I do both
at the same time and bring awareness to both.”
All my readings and discussions support the view that major Shi’a religious figures in
Afghanistan, like Behsudi and Sharifi, want to be involved in politics in some way. And, of
course, they are getting support from the people. The civil society activist stance is very clearly
the opposite: politics and religion need to be separate — religion could be contaminated by
politics and vice versa. With a clearly politically involved clergy (uncounted more examples
could be added to the two I have cited) the distance between civil society and clergy could hardly
be greater.
But the problem extends to another issue, Iran. Not one activist I met had anything good
to say about Iran. Iran, they believed, had abandoned the Hazaras during the civil war and the
Taliban years. Yes, perhaps Iran gave some small sums of money, but not at a level close to what
the Sunni mujahedin groups were receiving. Also, uncounted stories (even today) contend that
Iran treats Hazara refugees very badly. They not only are often denied work permits, or
schooling, but everyday racism is common. “I got tired of being called a ‘dirty son of Chingiz’”
one of the female activists, Halima, told me, about her time in Iran. A taxi driver told me, “Yes,
they treated me so badly there! Once some people threw eggs at me, just out of cruelty!” A
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combination of state disregard for the needs of refugees and such racism soured Hazaras on Iran.
Many told me they would prefer to follow Ayatollah Kabuli, who though not Hazara, as an
Afghan even so knows their problems better than the Iranian clerics. When I ventured that many
clerics did, in fact, manage to remain independent, I was met with dismissal. Yes, they said, you
read that in your books, but we know what the truth is. And when I asked about Najafi Shi’ism, a
number agreed that Ayatollah Sistani, the most important Ayatollah in Najaf, was good, and that
they follow him as marja. Very few are aware that among the four most important Ayatollahs in
Najaf, one, Fayoz, was Hazara. When I asked about him, most said he had been gone for too
long (he is 85 or 86 years old).49 One or two people I knew followed him as marja. My most
secular informants told me they did not need a marja, that they were old men out of touch with
the modern world. One told me he followed as marja Abdolkarim Soroush, who is not a cleric
but an Iranian philosopher. His importance as a thinker and appointment as a visiting professor at
the University of Maryland may have been things this person found appealing. The idea of
marja-e-taqlid seems more than ever open to reinvention, in ways that would make Khomeini
roll in his grave.
To conclude, activists base much of what they do on the Karbala Paradigm. Some of this
is quite intentional, while at other times, it seems to be that Karbala serves as an almost
subconscious pattern that they put to use without realizing. But Karbala stands quite apart from
organized, institutional religion. There are several reasons activists mistrust institutional religion.
First, they tie it inextricably with Iran, and they believe that Iran approaches Afghanistan as a
pawn in a geopolitical game. Hopes that an alliance with Iran having been dashed, when Iran
does contribute something — builds a new mosque or sponsors a cultural center, for example —
it is immediately interpreted as an effort to “use” Hazaras against Iran’s enemies — foremost, the
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Americans. When the United States builds a cultural center or a school, ulterior motives are not
raised by activists. Hazaras also suffered — and continue to suffer — as refugees in Iran, or as
migrants today trying to pass through to Europe. Stories abound of migrants being forced by
traffickers to carry drugs, and then being hung if caught. Other stories proliferate of Hazaras
being pressured to fight for Assad’s Syria with Iranian support. And as long as the most
important Afghan clerics, as well as the lower clerics, continue to insist that religion and politics
must go hand in hand, Hazara concerns will persist about the Iranian and even Najafi clergy
(which many claim is also dominated by Iran).
Religion, for many of the activists, then, must not be tainted by religious institutions. It
should instead be something personal, which you believe or not on your own terms. It certainly is
a source of inspiration, as all are moved by the story of Karbala. Much like the political ideals I
discuss in the previous chapter, which are perceived to be subject to pollution by state
institutions, an anti-institutional bias positions the ideals of Karbala as something the activists
may claim to be better prepared to protect than the religious authorities.
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Chapter Six
The Afshar Massacre Remembrance as a Collective Memory Event

“We mourn Hussein and his family during Ashura, we cry for him, and hit ourselves,” Qasim
explained, as we discussed Ashura, the holy day commemorating the killing of Hussein and his
family. Qasim is the Quetta native who moved to Bamyan and found a job with Save the
Children. “But that happened so long ago, and in another place. We Hazaras are being killed
now. Genocide is committed against us. This is our Karbala. This is what we should pay more
attention to.”
In this chapter, I focus on how the Karbala Paradigm is reflected in Hazaras’
remembrance of the Afshar Massacre, the massive loss of life that happened in 1993 in the
Afshar sector of Western Kabul. Both remembrances, that of Afshar Massacre and that of the
death of Hussein, happen every year. I attended Afshar remembrance events in 2013 in Bamyan.
The events were planned and organized by the civil society activists who were my main
informants, and attended by many others in the community. The remembrance events consisted
of three components: a speech by a leading activist which related Afshar directly to Karbala, a
viewing of a film concerning Afshar, and a procession/protest through the Bamyan bazaar. The
film, which shows, sometimes explicitly, the aftermath of the Afshar Massacre, is like a passion
play — the ta’ziyah through which the death of Hussein is reenacted. It provokes profound
expressions of grief among those who view it.50 The protest march bears resemblance to the
processions held by Shi’as on Ashura. Activists make use of the Karbala Paradigm broadly to
guide their actions and to self-reference themselves as protagonists suffering at the hands of the
unjust. Afshar remembrances make the parallels with Karbala explicit, through the clear
references made within these remembrances to the sacrifice of Hussein.
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In 1993, during the civil war after the fall of Najibullah’s Communist government (1992),
the “Afshar Massacre” or “Afshar Operation” occurred. The civil war took place between 1992
and 1996. The various mujahedin factions, which had opposed the Soviets and Afghan
Communists, fought intensely, mainly in Kabul. The war ended when the Taliban came to
power. While the Afshar Massacre is often treated as a side note to the history of the civil war,
for Hazaras it was a pivotal moment in their recent history. In this episode, protracted fighting in
the streets of the Afshar sector resulted in the deaths of a disputed number of ethnic Hazaras.
Some estimate the casualties to have been in the hundreds, while others estimate the loss of life
to have been as high as 7,000; disagreement about the numbers will likely never be resolved.51
The chain of events leading to the massacre was set in motion when the so-called
legitimate government, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani as President, and the much lauded
commander Ahmad Shah Massoud as Minister of Defense, lost the support of Abdul Ali Mazari,
the leader of the ethnic Hazara party Hizb-e-Wahdat. The reason for this break is unclear, but
may lay in rumored plans by Massoud to disarm Hizb-e-Wahdat before the other mujahedin
factions, leaving Hazaras vulnerable,52 or because four fairly high-ranking Wahdat members
were allegedly killed without provocation by Massoud’s forces while returning from a party
meeting. Whatever the catalyst, Mazari then made a non-aggression pact with Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar of the Hizb-e-Islami party, the main faction fighting Rabbani’s government at the
time, allowing Hekmatyar to operate out of Wahdat-controlled West Kabul. Hekmatyar had been
shelling Kabul, resulting in scores of deaths, bringing Hizb-e-Wahdat and the Afshar district into
Massoud’s crosshairs. Hizb-e-Wahdat forces likely also committed acts of violence against other
groups at this time. In February of 1993, Massoud ordered the shelling of the Afshar area.
Subsequently, another government affiliated commander, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, led his Ittihad-e-
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Islami party forces through the Afshar area of Kabul. Many civilians were killed in the house to
house fighting. Other were kidnapped; some were later released but most never seen again. Rape
was reported to have been common as well, with the great importance attached to women’s
purity and consequent terrible social implications for the victim complicating the gathering of
evidence about these crimes. Sayyaf’s Wahhabi ideology would have led him to look down on
Shi’as as heretics or worse, apostates.
Building on Halbwachs’ theory of “collective memory” (1989 [1950]), I argue that the
story of Afshar has become a “group memory,” which provides a framework around which
Hazaras contextualize their own individual, and at times unrelated, memories of trauma. Like the
wider phenomenon of cultural trauma, collective memory is not necessarily experienced directly
by individuals but spread among the members of a group through collective memory-making
events. The Afshar memorials I witnessed were such collective memory-making events, intended
to bring awareness to and induce the spread of a collective trauma among Hazaras, specifically
relating to Afshar. While Afshar was not the worst instance of violence against Hazaras in recent
memory, it seems to capture the attention of the Hazara community more than any other.53

The Remembrance
Collective memory emerges through the memorialization of a traumatic event by a group (many
of whom, like my civil society activist acquaintances, might not have experienced the event
personally). Defined this way, the remembrance that I witnessed in February 2013, the twentieth
anniversary of the massacre, was an exercise in collective memory-building. Community
members attended the event not just to remember but to learn. The activists’ intention was to
show those in attendance that they were all targeted in Afshar, as they were all Hazaras. In other
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words, the event, both the film and speech portions, were carried out in such a way that Afshar
was presented as an attack on all Hazaras. Worse, several of those implicated in the attack still
held government positions, and so justice had never been obtained. Framed thus, as an attack
against all Hazaras as a group, Afshar remembrances serve to create and spread collective
trauma. This generalization of the event as something affecting all Hazaras changed its genre
from historical to group memory.
The event was also extremely emotional. Much of the audience cried as they listened to
what had happened and watched a film about it. I myself was moved to tears during the film.
Afshar, for activists and many other Hazaras, is somehow untouchable, something that cannot be
questioned, because it elicits such affect. The reason that it does elicit such strong emotion is
related to the fact that it is generalizable; that it is now perceived by many as an act against all
Hazaras.
Activists indicated that as Afshar is generalized as an attack against all Hazaras, it can
hence be interpreted as an act of genocide. Afshar remembrances also provide implicit support
for other victimization narratives, so common among activists. In this context, Afshar is more
than a single, solitary event; it is also an emblem of the many attacks against Hazaras in recent
history. Activists point to it as one of the most egregious examples, but only one among many
terrible events, of the ongoing genocide against Hazaras. Activists constantly stress the
existential threat faced by Hazaras, and Afshar is one of the most important proofs of this. For
the Hazara activists, one of the main features of the cultural trauma they are striving to spread is
that the threat is not over, that the targeted killings and genocide continue to this day. Feeling
unhinged from their own history, a history that is separate from that of the rest of Afghanistan,
they adopt the mantle of the victim as a main feature of identity.
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This also relates to the Karbala Paradigm as a broader cognitive schema for life. Events
memorializing Karbala at Muharram can also be extreme in the affect they elicit. But the
comparisons go further. One way to interpret Karbala for Shi’as is to see themselves as the
eternal underdog, and Shi’as have lived under (sometimes harsh) Sunni rule for long enough that
this interpretation not only has credibility, but is a main marker of political identity. The Afshar
Massacre is the event that activists compare most often to Karbala. Even as many of the protests
and actions of the activists in general seem to draw upon the paradigm for inspiration, Afshar is
explicitly and often referred to as “our Karbala.” Yet Afshar is, by many, categorized as worse
than Karbala, because Karbala was not a genocide.
One important background consideration is that people belonging to other ethnic groups
in Afghanistan express frustration with the attention given to Afshar. Many view it as a
legitimate military operation, marred by terrible excesses but not worse than what happened
elsewhere and to other groups during the conflict. After all, it is pointed out, rockets were being
fired out of West Kabul at an alarming rate, and Massoud, as defense minister, had to stop this
barrage.
And yet, Hazaras see themselves uniquely as the victims of Afshar, and they see Sayyaf,
Massoud, and even Rabbani as unjust perpetrators of cruelty aimed at them as a people. Perhaps
this feeling comes in part from Afshar’s symbolic importance in a larger strategy of Hazara
advancement: it has been reported that Hazaras thought their strong control of West Kabul might
give them one basis for claiming a fair role in governance, from which they had so long been
excluded (Maley 2009). These hopes for political inclusion were first set back by the killings of
Wahdat members and attempts to disarm Wahdat early in the post-Najibullah period, and then
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obliterated by the rockets and house to house killings by the Ittehad-al-Islami forces of Abdul
Rassul Sayyaf.
The presence of a soon to be martyred figure, the leader (rahbar shahid), Mazari, is
another parallel between Karbala and Afshar. Mazari is said to have been in West Kabul when
the attacks started. One of the most beloved parables told about him by Bamyan people, activists
and non-activists alike, concerns his willingness to stay in the area despite the danger posed by
the bombardments and Sayyaf’s forces. One of the many reasons Mazari was exceptional,
Hazaras say, is that he told the people of West Kabul, “Do not worry, I will stay with you.” His
fate was their fate. Of course, Mazari would not die in Afshar but later, at the hands of the
Taliban, but his death, like Hussein’s, involved going willingly to a likely death for the sake of
his people. While I heard the connection to Hussein stated explicitly on only a few occasions, it
is evident in the way Mazari is spoken about. Both are understood to have fought a tyrannical
ruler for the sake of justice and to have stayed with their followers even when surrounded by
overwhelming enemy forces.
Regardless why importance is given to Afshar, it seems safe to say that activists, political
figures, and others work to spread the memory of the Afshar Massacre among Hazaras as a
collective memory and shared trauma. The ways in which high symbolic value is invested in this
event include street posters and processions, speeches, and social media. This in spite of no one I
knew in Bamyan having been present in Afshar at any point during the massacre. The Afshar
remembrance was the best attended protest of all of those I observed during my year in Bamyan.
In fact, more people took to the streets for the Afshar memorial protests than for Ashura. The
Afshar memorials of 2013 put on display the means by which the activists seek to instill
collective memory.
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Several non-activists claimed to have known very little, or even heard of Afshar before
seeing the memorial protests.54 The civil society activists, acting as “memory entrepreneurs,”
were aware of the power of images in shaping collective memory, and made strategic use of
Afshar-related images to do this. In February 2013, they used a two-pronged approach. On the
night before the anniversary of Afshar, they showed a film, Baroye Tarikh (For History), which
was preceded by a series of speeches, open to the public. The film featured speeches by Mazari
about Afshar and scenes from Afshar itself. On the second day, a protest/memorial march was
held in the center of town which incorporated aspects of the film with other visual cues —
placards, political cartoons, and the image of the marchers themselves — which were later
further circulated using social media. While the actual events during the commemoration created
a public memory — a memory shared among people present at a particular time and place
(Casey 2004) — they also reached beyond the people physically present. I found many Hazaras
who claimed to have known nothing about the Afshar events before the commemoration, later to
be well-versed about it and to speak about it in terms of what “they” as Hazaras had suffered,
suggesting that activists succeeded quite well in framing Afshar as part of a larger collective
victimization.

Afshar as Karbala: An Activist’s Speech
The speech preceding the film viewing was given by Neamat, one of the best-respected activists
in Bamyan. Neamat was an older man, distinguished looking, who did not attend many protests.
When he did make appearances, other activists made sure to attend and treat him with deference.
Neamat was known as an author and a mullah, having attended madrasa for a number of years.
This point was always stressed when people talked to me about him, and it seemed to give him
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more legitimacy when talking about Karbala. On this day, the event was attended by over one
hundred people. Many had brought their children, despite the graphic nature of the topic and the
film. People wanted their children to be aware of what had happened, and what was happening,
to Hazaras.
As Neamat started speaking, he stressed several times that Afshar was part of an ongoing,
systematic genocide against Hazaras. It had started long before, during the reign of Abdur
Rahman Khan and even earlier, and continued in the present. He compared Afshar to another
example of mass killing, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. For Neamat, Afshar was even
worse, because although the Hiroshima bombing meant the murder of many people, it did not
include face-to-face stealing, burning, and killing.
The use of the word “genocide” by activists is important in that it links the killings of
Hazaras to mass killings that are recognized as being particularly heinous by Westerners.
Genocide morally demands an intervention from the international community, while distancing
the violent Orientalistic portrayals of war in Afghanistan as “tribal” in nature and therefore
without solution. Often, activists use the word in Farsi for “massacre” or mass killing, qatl a’am,
as a synonym for genocide. These two words, translated directly mean “general murder” or
“collective murder.” Another, more precise translation for genocide, nasl kushi, means literally,
“the killing of a generation” and hence does not fit exactly what happened at Afshar. Therefore,
similes to other events, here Hiroshima, where an entire city, including women and children,
young and old, was wiped out, help get the point across. Sometimes activists use the English
loan word “genocide” while also using comparisons to other historical events to make their
meaning clearer to a non-English speaking audience. At other times still, they use the word
kha’lukast, borrowed from English and of course referring to the Holocaust of the Jews in

205

Second World War Europe. However, activists also pointed out that this term was useful because
it brought to mind burning and destruction that had been intentionally brought upon their houses,
both by setting on fire and bombardments.55
Later in his speech, Neamat invoked the Karbala Paradigm directly. He said, “In Karbala,
it was certainly true that people were killed and murdered, but everyone needs to remember it
happened a very long time ago. Yet, today, people still remember it, talk about it, and mourn for
the dead. At Karbala, many were killed, many children were even killed. But,” he continued,
“Afshar was actually worse than Karbala. More people were killed. More children were killed.
For this reason, Afshar needs to be remembered just as much as Karbala. Afshar was an
extraordinarily terrible historical event, one that stands apart from other events.”
Neamat then placed the blame for Afshar upon three main actors. “First and foremost was
Sayyaf, who went house to house killing people. Second was Rabbani, who although not perhaps
directly implicated, was president and a man of knowledge and hence should have known better
than to act in such a way. And third was the actual murderer, the defense minister who gave the
order for the operation, Massoud.” Sayyaf, the one who actually led ground forces into Afshar
and likely ordered the killings and kidnapping, has, like Yazid, become a name that is
synonymous with evil among Hazara activists. Rabbani’s role was less clear, but as the supposed
head of the state, and an educated man, Neamat implicated him because he should have acted
differently. He purported to be the one who would bring peace to Afghanistan, had studied
Islamic Law at Kabul University and Islamic theology at Al-Azhar in Cairo, and lacking the
Wahhabi leaning of Sayyaf should have treated even Shi’as with more compassion. And finally
there was Massoud, whose guilt from the Hazara point of view will probably be most difficult
for Western readers to understand. Massoud has been lauded in the West as the preeminent
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freedom-fighter mujahed, a military genius who was able to keep the Soviets out of the Panjshir
Valley, from which he hailed.56 Massoud, a French speaker who engaged with Western policy
makers and reporters, was mourned in the West when he was assassinated by al-Qaeda two days
before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For the Hazaras, Massoud represents
something totally different. As the Defense Minister of Rabbani’s government, he made the
decisions, first, to attempt to disarm Hizb-e-Wahdat and then to attack Afshar.57
Neamat went on to say, “Horrible things have happened in many times and many places,
but Afshar was recent and happened right here, in Afghanistan. For this reason, this is the
genocide (qatl’ a’am) those in Afghanistan should pay attention to, not other instances of cruelty
in other places.” Other activists echo this theme, asserting that Afshar was worse than other
atrocities in Afghanistan and that the massacre’s aim was to eliminate Hazaras and not just win
strategic advantage in the fight for Kabul. All this fits with the implied message that the Hazaras
are a particularly vulnerable group.
Neamat meandered a bit, speaking about Afghanistan’s history, in general, and the
geographical location which Hazaras inhabit at the center of the country. He said that there needs
to be a place for Hazaras, a place for Shi’as, not just a geographical place, but also a place in
education, a place in the government. He stated his intention that Hazaras live as brothers with
all other groups in Afghanistan, something that until that point had been denied them. His focus
on place, both physical and metaphorical, fits also with Hazara activists’ concern with past land
removals, present land conflicts with kuchi nomads, and historical ties to the land as the region’s
autochthonous (boumi, original) people. Neamat was able to extend this concern with “place” to
one’s place in society, two issues which may seem separate but which for Hazaras are linked.
Neamat pondered,
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What are Kabul’s intentions? Mazari actually formed a government for Hazaras when he
was head of Hizb-e-Wahdat. He formed a government that worked. He formed a
government that was concerned with human rights, with women’s rights. Hekmatyar,
who led a group of Pashtuns, did not do this. Neither did Ismail Khan, leader of the
Heratis. But Mazari got Hazaras to think about equality, about rights for all, early, before
the United States intervened in Afghanistan. For this reason, Hazaras must work
especially hard to become educated, to get jobs in the government, to become leaders of
Afghanistan. Afshar was an event against Hazaras, and the enemies who did this are
clear, and they are still here, and they still commit genocide.

The link is implied in Neamat’s speech, but on occasion people directly compare Mazari to
Hussein. Like Hussein, Mazari is said to have fought for justice, for the rights of his people, and
was martyred for it. Yet if Hazaras feel righteous in their belief in human rights and gender
equality, or at least think themselves better on this score than the rest of Afghanistan, fatalism is
an even more pervasive mood. A common narrative is that Hazaras are still suffering under an
unjust government and will suffer for as long as Shi’as suffer at the hands of Sunnis. Ultimately,
the hidden Imam must return to bring justice to the world. Hence, even activists seem pessimistic
that things will ever be better for them. Even as they believe the values for which they work are
pure and just, and feel a duty to try to improve things and do what is right for Afghanistan, they
fear they will ultimately fail. Despite all the hope exhibited in the many protests I attended, all of
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the activists were pessimistic, speaking at time as if a savior could only emerge from the outside,
in the form of Western intervention.
Neamat’s words about history are imbued with this sense that Hazaras have historically
been the losing side and as such are written out of Afghanistan’s history books. “The history of
Afghanistan is not a history of all of its people,” he said (a complaint voiced often by activists).
“Abdur Rahman killed or removed sixty percent of the Hazaras, but Abdur Rahman is the one in
the history books, not the Hazaras who were killed.” Perhaps together with the local journalists
in the crowd, I felt Neamat’s next statement pointed at me.

Those of you here who write, you must write about this. You must write about those
killed. You must write about those who were pushed out of their homelands, out of the
provinces like Kandahar and Uruzgan. This story is not told in the history. Hazaras are
part of the history of Afghanistan, and it is a difficult history. But if one writes only of
military events, if one today writes of the Taliban, then that is not enough. These people,
these were the victims, the martyrs, the shahidan. This should be their history, too.

Neamat began to wrap up his speech with direct reference to Karbala:

How many people were martyred, how many homes were destroyed, how many children
were killed and livelihoods destroyed at Afshar? And yet people are not crying for this.
When people think of Karbala, something that happened many years ago, they cry. When
people think of Hussein, of Zeinab (Hussein’s sister), they cry. This is the event that
stands out for them. But just twenty years ago, Afshar happened, and it did not get the
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same attention. Mazari was the most important martyr of the Hazaras, but today, only his
own people remember him. Massoud murdered and killed, but unfortunately history
remembers him differently. Rabbani was recently killed and they named the university
for him,58 but what memorial is there for Afshar? We are guests in our own country.

Neamat, by concluding with a call for history to be re-examined, not only highlights the
importance of collective memory but identifies a memory gap, which is itself one aspect of the
Karbala Paradigm: Sunnis and Shi’as today have very different interpretations of what took place
at Karbala and of what the roles of Hussein and Yazid were.
In the end, however, Neamat’s appeal for memory is anchored more in the emotions than
in reason. He references the passion, the suffering and death of Hussein, the suffering and
humiliation of Zeinab. He knows, of course, that almost everyone in the room grew up actively
mourning these figures, experiencing emotional and possibly physical pain in sympathy with
them. He knows that the mention of Hussein and Zeinab and of the events of Karbala can strike a
deep emotional chord among his audience. He then says that Afshar was worse: more people
died, their own people, not people of the Arabian Peninsula, and it was only twenty years ago.
His final statement, “We are guests in our own country,” reminds everyone of what is at stake: a
place in the country of Afghanistan. The tacitly referenced context is that people from other
groups in Afghanistan often speak of and to Hazaras as if they should be happy to be allowed to
stay at all. The Karbala Paradigm, paradoxically, gains in meaning and suggestive power by
relating Karbala to, or even replacing it, with Afshar. Karbala, when transfigured as Afshar, casts
Hazaras as mourners for their own people and their own martyr, Mazari.
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Neamat’s words may have reached some, and not others, in the audience. Fewer would
remain unmoved by the film that followed his speech. This was truly a Passion play, moving
every person in the room to tears. Based on documentary footage of people searching for their
loved ones, finding their bodies, and crying and screaming in agonized mourning, the film
establishes that one way for sure in which Afshar was “worse” than Karbala is that its aftermath
was captured on video.

The Film: Baroye Tarikh (For History)
Made by Naim Paik, a diaspora Hazara,59 who used mostly Wahdat footage spliced together,
Baroye Tarikh features clips showing the Afshar sector after the killings took place, interspersed
with footage and voiceovers of speeches by Mazari. The title of the film, “For History,” speaks
to its goal, ostensibly to see Afshar included prominently in the history of Afghanistan. When
activists showed the film in Bamyan at the twentieth anniversary remembrance of the massacre,
it was obviously with the goals of making the audience feel that they, too, were a part of this
history and hence of fomenting the formation of a collective memory of this traumatic event. The
intent was not only to inform but to trigger emotions and promote sympathy.
The film opens with images of previous leaders of Afghanistan from the past 200 years. It
then shows scenes of education and development in the 1960s and 1970s in Kabul. The scenes
then change in nature, showing events in the Saur Revolution, or the coup that brought the
Communist (PDPA) Party to power in 1978, the Soviet invasion in 1979 to support the
communists, and the 1992 accession to power of Mojaddedi, signaling the end of Communist
rule. The scene then cuts to Mazari being embraced and welcomed by Hazaras. This visual
recitation of established historical events places the images of and speeches about Afshar, which
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follow, in the context of Afghan history, a context which implies that the film seeks to situate its
version of the contested facts about the Afshar Massacre on the same plane as the uncontested
“facts” of history, such as who led Afghanistan over the past 200 years. The opening sequences,
then, seek to situate the film as incontestable history.
The very fact that in Bamyan there are very few people who actually witnessed Afshar
places added weight on this film as a memory-creating device. The activists felt that there really
was a need for people to learn about the events. Accordingly, all viewers were welcome after the
showing to have a copy of the film put onto their own flash drives so they could watch and share
it with others.
Early in the film, the unity of Hazaras as a people is stressed. Mazari is shown giving a
speech concerning the lack of rights of Hazaras, the fact that they are subject to persecution,
when all they want is equality. Mazari also says that all of Afghanistan needs to be unified with
no one group left out. It soon becomes apparent that he is talking about the Constitution of
Rabbani’s government. This was especially evocative for the audience, as of course they know
that the film is about Afshar, and hence are quick to link the earlier acts of exclusion with the
later killings. Mazari goes on to speak about leaders of other groups who have either explicitly
displayed prejudice (taisub) against Hazaras or who have spoken of working with Hazaras, only
to turn on them. A fairly long scene depicts multitudes listening to the speech, declaring the
greatness of Mazari as leader, giving him flowers and wreaths. The crowds bow and kiss his
hand, and declare his greatness. Not only the facts of Hazara exclusion, but also Mazari’s
greatness, are things that most Hazaras agree upon today, regarding Mazari as a great leader,
who started them on the path of equality (barobari) and against oppression (mazlum). Activists
say Mazari made them conscious of the fact that they need to demand their rights. All Hazaras
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know how Mazari died, attempting to broker a deal with the Taliban that might save his people.
The scenes of Mazari also return Hazaras to a time when they were largely unified politically.
Their cohesiveness as a group is emphasized, preparing the viewer to derive meanings of general
significance for Hazaras as a group from the singular event of the Afshar Massacre. Viewers are
also prepared to become witnesses of Afshar — to not just look upon what happened, but to
report it to others.
The film continues with more speeches by Mazari. He catalogs the many atrocities of
Afshar, the people shot, beaten, their throats cut, women and children killed. The list is long. As
Mazari speaks, the film transports its viewers to Afshar. Houses burn as opposing forces fire
upon Afshar, intercut with scenes of what appear to be Tajiks or Pashtuns firing artillery. The
audience is slowly drawn into the horror. Mazari’s speech is interrupted from time to time by
testimonials of people who lost loved ones. A woman appears on the screen and says, “My
husband was killed in Afshar. His body was in a house, no one was there to bury him, for eight
or nine days his body stayed there until they buried him.” The film cuts back to Mazari, and then
another woman appears, this one more frantic and crying. “My child, who was seven years old,
his throat was cut by them.”
At a certain point, more graphic scenes start to appear. Bodies are lined up on the ground;
a giant hole turns into a mass grave as people lower bodies into it. Horrific scenes are shown of
children’s bodies, mangled by rockets or some other attack. At times, you do not even really
know what you are seeing; you just know you are looking at death, the result of a full-scale
rocket attack against a densely populated urban area, followed by a house-to-house campaign to
kill whoever was left. You have heard this is what Afshar was like but that is not the same as
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seeing it. In a dark room, surrounded by members of the ethnic group that was under attack, you
are part of it. You cannot escape it, packed in, sitting close, side by side.
The film once again alternates these scenes with Mazari’s speeches, or pairs them with
his words as voiceover. The content of the Mazari speeches shifts to the need to remember: “We
will never forget this painful event that happened in Afshar, and our future generations will feel
pain because of this event.” Hearing Mazari’s voice as we watch these images reminds the
viewer that he stayed in Afshar. You are transported to Afshar, and you can hear him there as
well. He was willing to give up everything for his people. And yet, despite the horror of what has
happened, despite the deaths, Mazari speaks of hope. After discussing the oppression of Hazaras
by Abdur Rahman, Mazari says, “You have to remember this point in history. Our people, after a
long, deprived situation, after all these sufferings and oppressions, all these things have been like
a message to the people, that they should make a decision about their destiny. Now this chance is
given to you. All you people who are here, you were hated, you suffered, now you feel free.
Don’t be afraid of anything. You should not be afraid, as you were not afraid in the past.”
Mazari could as easily be speaking to all Shi’as as to ethnic Hazaras. He speaks of
unending oppression and ongoing killing. All in the audience of the film believe that they still
might be killed, because Afghanistan is an unstable place in which many do not like Hazaras. I
wondered if those I see in the film survived the subsequent attacks, and the Taliban regime, or
were at some later point killed. Mazari calls on them to not be afraid. He does not tell his people
they are safe but that they are the right people, the just people, and need to go on unafraid.
The film cuts to a little boy who is singing, “Mazari, you are our leader, you saved us.
We all follow you.” He rhythmically beats his breast as people might do in an Ashura
procession. Several scenes later, a man says, “We can’t find any person like Mazari. Mazari is
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pure. Mazari is honest. And we don’t want anyone else except Mazari. Other people are trying to
be our leader now because the time is right, the food is ready (a metaphor meaning: we want to
be united under a leader). Where were you during the war? We want Mazari!” These scenes
underscore the charisma of Mazari, and the savior-like qualities he has among the Hazaras. The
filmmaker had access to a great deal of footage compiled by Hizb-e-Wahdat, and he no doubt
specifically tried to include footage that would stress Mazari’s heroism.
To drive home the need to remember, an image of a woman appears periodically during
the film in the lower corner of the screen, accompanied by the words, “Mo shahidon tarikh
hastim, (We are witnesses of history”). The double meaning of the word “shahid” — martyr as
well as witness — is important. Hazaras are history’s witnesses and its martyrs. This record, of
having been martyred, again and again, is their heritage; it makes them who they are.
The latter part of the film, however, takes a hopeful turn. Footage of fighting shifts the
focus to Hazara Hizb-e-Wahdat forces. The feeling it brought out in me is that there is still hope
for Hazaras somehow to win, even though anyone acquainted with the history of Afghanistan
would know that within a few years Mazari will have been killed by the Taliban and that brutal
fighting would continue in the civil war and then against the Taliban. Shi’a Hazaras would be
targeted by the Sunni Taliban, and more mass killings would occur. The fighting, which the film
pairs with triumphant music, will be for nothing. In concluding in this way, does the filmmaker
mean to suggest that Hazaras should take up a militant path again? Or that another path of
struggle, this one peaceful, is the Hazaras’ destiny? Certainly, Bamyan’s civil society activists
mostly see no future for Hazaras as another militant group; rather, they seek to promote the idea
that the Hazaras, as the group which has suffered the most, most seeks enlightened ideals.
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Gotthold Lessing makes the point that paintings or images are a particular form of art
because they must choose a specific moment in time, a moment that suggests what happened
before and what will happen after, and therefore must be the exact moment that the artist or
photographer feels to be imbued with the most meaning (1961). Barbie Zelizer expands on this
idea, pointing out that the image is also strong because it allows one to believe in the possibility
of a “what if,” an alternative outcome from the one that the viewer knows will happen. She
makes her point by examining the particular affect-laden qualities of images depicting the
moment immediately preceding death (2004). These images allow the viewer a second to wonder
if a potential different outcome might have been possible. The film similarly takes us to a
moment suspended in time, where the people in the picture frame do not know what will happen
afterward. Images of fighters allow viewers to imagine an alternative ending to the story, one
where Hazaras avoid the suffering they experienced in the years following Afshar. The images of
Mazari speaking can also capture this sense of “what if,” as people wonder what might have
been had their leader survived the Taliban years.
When I spoke with others who watched the film, these feelings were expressed and then
quickly tamped down. The “what-if” is a brief alternative universe for Hazaras. They quickly
return to a world in which they are the premier victims. The narrative they tell of the Hazara
people is one that stretches from the circumstances of their integration into the Afghan state to
problems that continue in the present, an unbroken chain of ethnic cleansing, mass killing and
genocide. Likewise, Mazari, much as he is missed, has gained an importance as a martyr that he
likely never would have achieved as a leader. As if to anchor the Afshar scenes in a time frame
immune to such wondering about “what if,” and tether them firmly to a construct of historical
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truth, only these scenes were accompanied by the reminder, “we are witnesses to history.” To be
Hazara is to be a shahid, witness and, possibly, martyr.

The Protest March
The day after the film was shown, the activists organized a march through the center of Bamyan
bazaar to memorialize the Afshar events. Fewer people than attended the film were at the march
when it began but, as we proceeded through the bazaar, more and more people joined us,
chanting slogans in a chain at least one hundred people strong. The entire bazaar was also lined
with viewers, who had stopped their daily business to see what the marchers were up to and
perhaps pay their respect. I ran along slightly in front on the marchers, trying to film the protest.
I look back at the film and see details, but I remember a kaleidoscope of faces, dark winter
clothes, banners and placards. As I hurried to keep up, I slipped on some ice, fell into a ditch,
righted myself, and ran back with the protestors in time not to lose the activists in the front, who
were leading the protest.
The marchers tied the film to the march by mounting loudspeakers to a car and playing
music from the film and excerpts of Mazari’s speeches. Quotations from Mazari’s speeches were
prominently displayed on placards carried for onlookers to see, along with several political
cartoons implicating Massoud and Sayyaf in the event.
The march for Afshar also brought to mind, and followed the same path, as the
processionals for Ashura, when Shi’as sing mourning songs and chants, wear black, some
beating or whipping themselves. The activists wanted the march, like the film, to become a
community event. Other protests usually consisted of marchers and watchers, it being very clear
who was there to protest and who just to watch. This protest differed in that the activists made a
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bigger effort to persuade the watchers to join the march or at least raise their voices in slogans
that stressed the suffering at Afshar. The slogans were thrown to the assembly in call-andresponse style, and were even practiced with the crowd before the march started. Here are a few:

Afshar ghareq khun ast, dar khuab Ban Ki Moon Ast:
Afshar is full of blood, and Ban Ki Moon is sleeping

Afshar khun e chekan ast, Sayaf dar parlemon ast
Afshar is dripping with blood, Sayyaf is in Parliament

Khun e shahid Afshar, metagh mefat bazaar
The blood of the martyrs of Afshar, is like cheap cloth in the bazaar

The Ashura processions that commemorate Hussein also include imagery of the blood of
martyrs, and in some cases, the real blood of those who self-flagellate with chains. If activists
were too modern to take part in such beatings, they still relied upon blood imagery to cause this
procession to bring Ashura to mind. Many spectators did join from both sides of the bazaar, in
response to the activists’ calls. The crowd walked the entire length of the bazaar, a little more
than a mile, to Alakain (Lantern) square, chanting. There we gathered and listened to speeches.
The speeches once again called to the people of Bamyan to be witnesses to Afshar, and
once again, some referenced Karbala directly. The first speaker was Hussein. “My dear citizens
of Bamyan,” he began. “Twenty years ago more than 4,000 people were killed in Afshar. Their
crime was being human, nothing else. They were martyred. Brothers and sisters, the disaster of
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Afshar has not been sung, but now you have to sing it, you, who know about Afshar. You have
to prove that you have been witnesses (shahidan) in the history of Afghanistan, and you will be
after this. (Pause.) It is your responsibility to say loudly (pause).” At this point, another activist
shouted, “The blood of the martyrs of Afshar runs through this bazaar!”
Hussein is in yet another way inviting those present to become part of the event. They are
witnesses to what happened at Afshar. Yet he is also subtly suggesting that they are martyrs
(shahidan), too. Hussein makes an attempt to speak of Afshar as a crime against all humanity;
other activists know that it might appeal more to the crowd if he defined it as a crime against
Hazaras. Yet the final line also underscores the participation of those present: The blood of the
Afshar martyrs is running through this very bazaar. All of those in attendance are witnesses now,
and all are also martyrs as part of the larger Hazara community.
Next, Neamat once again speaks. He again directly uses the Karbala metaphor as a way
to reach out to the people. I am sure that those in the audience who also viewed the film were
particularly affected by this. Neamat, trained as a mullah, opens his speech with a prayer. After a
lengthy introduction, in which he documents the injustice of Afshar and many other instances of
killing of Hazaras, Neamat says,

If you keep your community united, if you are aware of your destiny, if you know what
happened in the last years, you can defend yourselves, and you can prevent the next
disasters. Otherwise, you are in trouble, and the history will once again happen to you.
But in Bamyan, as the center of Hazaras and Shi’as, voices should be louder than others.
Any, all, Hazaras and Shi’as, wherever they are, they are focusing on Bamyan, and they
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are belonging to Bamyan. They listen to Bamyan whether Bamyanis are being killed or
not.

Neamat is also stressing that people must be aware of history, but they also must be aware of
their destiny. He once again focuses on the importance of place, not Afshar, but rather Bamyan,
the Hazara homeland. Bamyan occupies a special place for all Hazaras, he says. He brought up
place in his speech before the film, and now he is doing it again. He is shifting the importance of
one place — Karbala — to another, Afshar. But Afshar is not a Hazara place, rather it is a place
that they were removed to, as a product of earlier ethnic cleansing. So he must shift again,
making clear that it is Bamyan which should be the focus of Hazaras’ desire for their own place.
Hazaras do not need to make a pilgrimage to Karbala, and they do not need to make a pilgrimage
to Afshar. They should associate themselves with Bamyan, the home of their ancient past, the
home of the Buddhas, and Shahr-e-Ghoghola, and all that they evoke. He also seems to say that
people will be able to avoid further disasters if they are aware of history, although in his next
lines, he gives merit to those who are martyred:

As the Holy Quran says, if anyone is killed after being oppressed, we give their parents a
very high reward. When Imam Hussein was killed, Zeinab and Imam Sajjad [the sister
and son of Hussein] were the most vocal against Yazid. Yazid was sidelined. Zeinab was
responsible for all affairs of Hussein’s family after Hussein’s death. Accordingly, as she
did, we have to ask for the remembrance of the blood of our martyrs, those who were
martyred in Mazar, Afshar, or Bamyan. And those responsible have to pay attention.
(Pause.) We are in a good position because of our martyrs. They keep us in a high
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position. We have the right to ask the government to listen to our demands. We went to
tell them that the events that happened in Mazar, Chindawool, Afshar, Bamyan,
Yakawlang should not happen again. Oppression, genocide, killing, they should not
happen to our people. You want your rights. You have to do your responsibility to your
martyred people. You should not forget Afshar. As Mazari said, I will never forget
Afshar, and neither should you.

Neamat, like the others, calls on the spectators to remember and witness what has happened, but
he relates this witnessing to the witnessing and retelling done by Zeinab, the sister of Hussein,
after his death. Zeinab and the rest of Hussein’s family were held captive and humiliated by
Yazid, and here another parallel could be drawn to the humiliation felt by Hazaras for so many
years. And yet, Zeinab retains her pride and becomes one of the most important sources as to
what happened in Karbala, and one of the most important foundational figures of the Shi’a sect.60
Neamat believes Hazaras can use horrible events like Afshar to help their movement, just as
Zeinab did.
The last of the speakers was Firuzan. After Neamat’s speech, I could not help thinking
she became Zeinab in the flesh. Firuzan begins by saying, “A person who kills a man on the
earth, kills all human beings. This is in the Holy Quran.” Firuzan continues by asking for specific
actions to be taken. First, she asks that the Afghan government accept a transitional justice
process. Second, she asks that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission research and
report on war crimes. Third, she asks that national and international organizations come together
and form a truth-seeking court to seek justice for those martyred in Afshar. Fourth, she asks that
the government of Afghanistan set aside land in Kabul as a memorial for those martyred in
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Afshar. Like Zeinab, Firuzan is shaming the government that has given a post to Sayyaf and
honored Massoud and Rabbani. Firuzan emulates Zeinab in speaking out about the injustices her
government committed.
Having a woman end the procession and ask for specific actions to be taken is very much
in line with Shi’a Islamic tradition. Zeinab, in standing up to Yazid in his court, carried on
demanding justice when the men in her family were no longer able. And Fatima, the daughter of
the Prophet, wife of Ali, spoke against the selection of Abu Bakr as the first caliph while Ali
remained silent (Hyder 2006). Firuzan is most clearly Zeinab, but Zeinab herself, as a woman,
was not an aberration. By having two men, trained as mullahs, and then a righteous woman place
Afshar on par with, or above, Karbala, the activists are invoking Shi’a religious tradition.

Conclusion
Stories, memory, witnessing and martyrdom seem all bound together with place. Karbala is not
just the site of a religious and historical event. It is also a place of pilgrimage second only for
Shi’as to Mecca. As the activists focused on the tragedies that had befallen Hazaras, the
importance of places ran through all they said and did. The Afshar march began in the main
mosque — which is named after Mazari, the rahbar-shahid (leader-martyr). They end at Alakain
(Lantern) Square, which was created in protest to infrastructural underdevelopment in Bamyan,
perceived to be a result of discrimination against Hazaras and a common location for protests
concerning current problems. In remembering both Afshar and Karbala, the links are many. Both
are places considered to be soaked in the blood of martyrs. Both tragedies revolved around a
major martyred figure, Hussein and Mazari. The martyr and the faithful, the rightful followers of
Hussein or Hazaras, the righteous people of Afghanistan, according to the activists, suffer.
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Karbala and Bamyan are both places to which people go on pilgrimage, where they suffer, form
collective memories and perhaps consolidate cultural trauma.
The Afshar Massacre, although it happened twenty years ago, is both an ancient and a
current problem, as the persecution and mass killings, from the Hazara viewpoint, has continued
without interruption from the late 1800s to the present. Pierre Nora writes of sites of memory as
places where shared memory is lodged and experienced by a group of people, and which bear
multiple, connected meanings. Afshar fits into Nora’s schema as a site where Hazara transpose
Shi’a memorialization of suffering to their suffering as an ethnic group. Bamyan’s main mosque,
a site for religious worship, takes its name from an ethno-political leader, Mazari. This indicates
the overlap of the two registers of perception and analysis, religious and ethnic. Afshar points to
current problems, as the past and future are seen as an unbroken line of oppression and suffering,
which Hazaras still experience, both qua Shi’as and as Hazaras. Afshar itself was never rebuilt,
and is mostly abandoned to this day, obligating Hazaras to find their sites of memory elsewhere,
but activists hope for the day when a memorial is established in Kabul. Can Kabul be recognized
as a Hazara place, too? Hazaras need ties to a central homeland but they also need acceptance
and integration in all of the parts of Afghanistan and the wider region (including Iran and
Pakistan) to which they have been scattered. For the activists, this means memorials not only in
Bamyan, but in other sites of trauma as well. Collective trauma, as evidenced in the tears of those
around me and the pain in the voices raised at the Afshar remembrance in 2013, seems clearly
present. Giving Hazaras a place to mourn is perhaps the next step.
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Chapter Seven
Mazari: The Martyr of the Hazaras

In discussing Shi’a ideas about martyrs during Ashura, Rustam explained for me how Hazara
activists define “martyrs”:

According to Shi’ism, there are three types of martyrs. The first is a person who fought
and was killed for the rights of an individual or a group of people who had their rights
taken from them. The second is a person who is killed without having done any offense
to others. The third is someone who escaped from someone who was cruel, who was not
giving them their rights, and then died in escape, for example, by hunger. Or who had to
commit suicide to escape such a person.

From the Hazara point of view, the fallen leader Abdul Ali Mazari falls into the first category, as
did Hussein, of a fighter for rights. Hazaras also hold important some martyrs from the other
categories, as well. Collectively, Hazaras might see themselves as a martyred group, according to
this schema sketched by Rustam.
This martyr schema, with which others concur, parallels feminist philosopher Diana
Meyers’ (2011) distinction between “pathetic victims” and “heroic victims” of human rights
abuse. Meyers uses this schema to critique the human rights imaginary that requires those whose
rights have been violated to be either blameless but passive victims or individuals who stand up
for rights and knowingly put themselves at risk. She makes the point that this schema allows
certain victims to be excluded from concern, for example, those supposed pathetic victims who
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somehow have invited violence against themselves or those heroic victims who have worked to
save family members rather than their co-ethnics or co-religionists. Hazara activists seem both to
conform to but also push the boundaries of the categorization of the “victim,” which Meyers
reads into human rights discourse. Even as Rustam’s schema distinguishes pathetic and heroic
victims, it also insists that certain people may be both at one time. It also leaves room for
Hazaras to portray themselves as victims of genocide, even when some fellow Hazaras have
committed abuses against other groups. And by asserting that they seek to end abuses against
their ethnic group, it leaves room for all Hazaras to be heroic victims.
Importantly, Meyers explores the gendered dimensions of this schema, by explaining that
pathetic victims are seen as passive and effeminate. In relation to the gender of martyrdom,
Hazaras seem to conform closely to Meyers’ analysis. The martyrs they most often refer to as
symbols of Hazara victimization are men. In this chapter, I discuss portrayals of three men,
Mazari, Jawad Zuhak, and Abdul Khaliq Hazara, who clearly follow the heroic victim model. On
the other hand, the three women whose memorializations I examine, Shirin, Shakila, and Shukria
Tabassum, fit the model of pathetic victims.
Nearly all Shi’as are shaped by the martyrdom stories they heard since a young age about
Ali and Hussein. These martyrdoms symbolize the ultimate betrayal, as Ali and Hussein signify
justice, the right path. Assam Moghadam writes, “…..the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala has
become a central component of Shi’a identity and has bestowed an emotive notion of martyrdom
on Shi’a awareness” (2007). Karen Armstrong states, “Like the murder of Ali, the (Karbala)
tragedy became a symbol for Shi’a Muslims of the tragedy that pervades human life” (2002).
The martyrdom of key religious figures and political figures today is interpreted as a replaying of
the martyrdom of Hussein and Ali, coloring varied aspects of Shi’a political and personal
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identity. Moghadem’s point is that through the re-living of Hussein’s martyrdom each year
through the Muharram ceremonies, Shi’a interpretations of martyrdom become extremely
emotional.
The focus and subjective experience of these ceremonies is a topic of debate in Bamyan.
In between feeling truly distraught about the wrongs committed against Ali, Hussein, and their
families, at one end, and “faking” emotion to show off your religious credentials, on the other
hand, is the likelihood that for some just doing these emotional performances provokes very real
feelings. Benedicte Grima (2005) has raised this issue in her study of emotions, and particularly
gham, or sadness, (and also khushal, or happiness) among Pashtun women. Both negative and
positive emotions not only show empathy with other women but are also expected of them
culturally. Grima suggests that displays of gham are women’s version of baad, an important
norm of exchange among Pashtuns.61 Even mandated emotions are assumed to be real (Grima
2005).62
In the last chapter, I wrote of how the Karbala Paradigm allows Hazaras and other Shi’as
to take on the role of victim, and to elevate their killed leaders to the status of martyrs. This
conclusion raises questions as well as answering them. Is the Shi’a and Hazara focus on
martyrdom best characterized as a religious frame of signification for recent political events or a
secular theodicy? The answer surely depends in part on who is experiencing it. Some Hazaras
might actually place Mazari on a plane with their religious leaders. Others, less religiously
inclined, see Mazari as a leader in the struggle against injustice without directly relating him to
the Shi’a religion.
Earlier chapters have similarly highlighted another contradiction, that between activism
and quiescence. Rola el-Husseini (2008) quotes Ayatollah Fadlullah, the spiritual leader of

226

Hizbollah, as saying that “it is meaningless that those who oppose resistance celebrate Ashura.”
Yet this has not always meant active resistance. Taqiya, hiding your faith when you are in danger
or are suffering oppression, is, from a religious standpoint, always an option as long as resistance
remains in your heart. For Hazaras, resistance to Abdur Rahman led to disaster. By contrast,
taqiya is a way to blend in to the greater Sunni community when open declaration of your faith is
not an option. Yet, Hazaras feel marked by their ethnicity’s distinctive facial features. Most
activists agree that Hazaras were beaten down and kept low until political movements in the
1970s gave them a chance to try to take their destinies into their own hands. According to the
stories of the activists today, Mazari was at the center of this opening. He convinced Hazaras to
stop fighting among themselves, and turned them into a group that could fight others. Mazari
changed what it meant to be Hazara. I was told this over and over. Others played supportive
roles: Prime Minister Keshtmand of the communist government, businessmen who began to gain
wealth and influence around this time, scholars who began to write histories focused on Hazara.
But Mazari was the spark that set off a Hazara revival.
And so, among activists today, Mazari is more than a political figure. Something innate
among Hazaras already predisposed them to tolerance, but Mazari showed them democracy,
human rights, and gender equality. There was, and is, no one like Mazari, they say.
The martyr dies for the sins of others. His or her death shows them a better path. S/he
dies to make an “imperfect” humanity better, more righteous. Just as Imam Hussein died not just
because he was betrayed by the Kufans but to make the believers into more holy people, Mazari
had to die because his people are “the wrong people” in Afghanistan, outsiders who have
occupied the lowest rungs of society. One of Mazari’s most famous quotes is “Man mikhuam
digar Hazara budan Afghanistan joram naboshad (I want that in Afghanistan being a Hazara

227

will not be a crime”). This has become the activist slogan, “Hazara budan joram nist (Being a
Hazara is not a crime”), said in speeches, written on placards and signs, and shouted at protests.
Often it is written and chanted in English as well, in a play for international attention. This
phrase said for emphasis in a speech can elicit cheers from a crowd. For those who know from
whom this phrase originates, it calls to mind both Mazari and the Hazaras’ oppression. In this
way, trauma is made collective and woven into Hazara culture. Mazari’s martyrdom amplifies
the meaning of this phrase and his speeches, which some Hazaras listen to over and over, passing
them from person to person on flash drive.
The only other figure in Afghanistan to have achieved comparable adulation, in this case
among Tajiks, and even among some Westerners, is Ahmad Shah Massoud. He, like Mazari,
changed the course of history for his people, a brilliant military commander who saved the
Panjshir Valley from Russian invasion, first through strategy, and then by making an agreement
to refrain from attacking as the Soviets withdrew. And yet Massoud’s fame internationally far
outstrips that of Mazari. Fascinating, and I think significant discrepancies mark the remembrance
of Massoud among Tajiks as different from that of Mazari. In both places, the martyrs’ followers
display their pictures prominently. Yet, by my observation, Massoud is memorialized in picture
differently than Mazari. Mazari is displayed in stylized images, iconographic in character,
suggesting that he is an otherworldly figure. He is shown surrounded by fluffy clouds or white
doves, or is framed by the Buddha niches and other Hazara ancestors. Massoud is almost always
displayed as a fighter, and if not that then definitely as a man of action in this life. Mazari’s
pictures use colors of whites, light greys and blues that bring to mind the heavens, while
Massoud’s pictures tend to earthy colors. Often Massoud holds a gun or wears a bandolier. I
never saw a picture of Mazari with a weapon. Somehow even the pictures that show Massoud at
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rest, thinking or praying, suggest a man ready to leap into action. In Mazari’s pictures, he has
transcended this world. His face is beatific, full of love. Perhaps Mazari’s gentle mien
compensates for Hazaras low standing, their belief that they are looked down on as the biggest
misfits in Afghanistan. Who else would consider them worth fighting for, when people of all
other groups call them lowly, base, ugly, and worthless?
Even as one martyr may never be enough for the emergence of a “culture of martyrdom,”
and the Hazaras, in common with other oppressed people, have a significant number of martyrs
to call on, Mazari, together with Hussein, are the prototypical Hazara martyrs. Even those who
came earlier — Abdul Khaliq Hazara, Shirin — seem to remind people of Mazari’s death, and
not the other way around. Consider the fora in which Hussein and Mazari blend. The main
mosque in Markaz Bamyan is called Abdul Ali Mazari Mosque. It is there where speeches
happen on Ashura. The streets are decorated with black gates which rise above the road during
Muharram, and upon them are hung slogans and images relating to Hussein and Karbala. Yet at
the top of the largest gate in Bamyan, next to the mosque, was not an image of Hussein, or of a
riderless white horse (Zuljanah, the mount of Hussein) but an image of Mazari (Figure 1). I
asked Khadim after attending events on Ashura, “Was that intentional? I mean, was it done on
purpose, to put Mazari in a place where one expected to see Hussein? To relate the martyrdom of
Mazari to the martyrdom of Hussein?”
He said, “Yes, yes, I think it was intentional. They want to show that Mazari and Hussein
are alike. But they also want to show, we should pay attention to Mazari. Maybe more attention
to Mazari.”
Roxanne Varzi writes that Shi’a political groups have a problem when they do happen to
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FIGURE 1

An image of Mazari displayed during Ashura processions in Bamyan, 2012 (source:
Melissa Kerr Chiovenda)
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come to power. In the Islamic Revolution of Iran, she writes, those who were oppressed (by the
Shah and by the West) became all of a sudden those with authority and power over others. How
do they maintain the symbols and narratives that mobilize Shi’a people, when these symbols and
narratives focus on martyrdom and oppression? Iran solved this by stressing its status as a
wronged pariah nation, bullied by the West and by Sunni nations. Of course, the Iran-Iraq war, in
which millions of Iranians died, confirmed this state-promoted narrative. The aggressor now was
Iraq, a state led by Sunnis and backed now by the United States (Varzi 2006). Shia’s were finally
in power, but their status as a victimized group was soon brought back to reality by the sudden
and unjustified attack by Saddam Hussein’s military.
Hazaras today face a similar problem in as much as many opportunities have opened for
them, even as persecution and social exclusion also remain strong. Martyr symbolism may
paradoxically become even more important in a moment of relative peace. Hazara leaders may
now feel safer in adopting confrontational postures. And spreading cultural trauma, through
collective memory events, may motivate people not to become passive but to continue to work
for their rights, for recognition of the truth of what has happened to them, and for equality.
In trying to understand Hazaras’ love for Mazari, I was impressed above all by their
belief that he loved them because they were Hazara. In keeping with Shi’a teachings, he said all
people are worthy but he flirted with religious heterodoxy by claiming to love his people, the
Hazaras, the most. People say this is why he pivoted politically with abandon, changing allies in
a succession of deals with devils. In 1993, he left Rabbani’s civil war-era government, joining
the Hizb-e-Islami Hekmatyar. In 1995, he supposedly sought a Taliban alliance. Activists, and
many other Hazaras as well, seem to believe Mazari did these things out of love for them, just as
he went to his death, possibly knowingly, out of love. The religious parallels could not be more
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clear.

Remembering Baba Mazari
In Bamyan, stories of Baba (“papa”) Mazari are told and retold. He is the single most important
figure for Hazaras today, no matter their class, urban or rural place of residence, or level of
education. Many activists describe him as the founder of the “new Hazara.” In this, they claim
that Mazari was a proponent not only of Hazara rights but of human rights, women’s rights, and
equality for all people. He made it clear that this cosmopolitan rights agenda is part of what
Hazaras stand for. Even as activists claim that Hazaras’ descent from an ancient Silk Road
culture almost genetically imbues them with these values, they also hold that Hazaras had before
Mazari been shackled by a clergy that did not have the people’s interests at heart. Many also
contend that the clergy at that time was shackled by Iran. According to the activists, Mazari
turned Hazaras’ politics and identities from a sectarian base to an ethnic base. He was also the
founder of the “new Hazara” in this way as well, a Hazara who was more concerned with ethnic
affiliation than religious affiliation, and by extension, someone more predisposed to universal
rights. Strict interpretations of Islam do not allow for rights given by states or international
organizations, as it is believed that all true rights have already been given through Islamic
scripture. Hence, ethnicities are more likely to have a relationship with states and international
organizations in which they demand their rights, whereas religious sects may not to the same
extent (although some persecuted sects certainly do seek their rights from states).
Many non-Hazaras revile Mazari as a mujahedin who waged bloody warfare and ordered
bombardments of civilian areas. Every Hazara I know denies the more grotesque rumors of
cruelty that circulate about Mazari.63 Hazara activists and others say either that he was justified,
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or that people from other groups tell lies.
Mazari “follows” me after my return from Bamyan. I became Facebook friends very soon
with most of my male contacts, and some female contacts, too. Later more joined on Twitter and
Instagram, so that I am now Facebook friends with hundreds more Hazaras than I ever met
personally, many of whom consider themselves to be activists. My daily feed is literally replete
with the same themes I encountered in the field. On social media, the face of Baba Mazari is a
constant. He is often referred to, quoted, and portrayed in paintings and other artistic renderings.
Many of my friends make their identification with Mazari almost literal, by using his image as
their profile picture. Social media thus mirrors and amplifies what is common in Hazara majority
areas in Afghanistan, where pictures of Mazari are ubiquitous. These range in size and placement
from giant billboards to small fliers. Either way, the image also usually quotes a few lines from
one of Mazari’s speeches. A holiday calendar refreshes the supply of Mazari imagery, with
events which stress Mazari’s messages — his birthday, the anniversary of his death, or the
anniversary of the Afshar Massacre — piling on more pictorial reminders of his importance.
Social media, of course, makes possible new exchanges in real life. When Sajjad visited
the tomb of Mazari, in Mazar-e-Sharif, the closest city to the village where Mazari was born, he
posted a series of photos of himself moving through the tomb, kneeling as if praying, looking
about with an expression of anguish. Later, I asked him, “How did it make you feel, seeing the
tomb of Mazari?”
“It gave me a huge courage, to do more and be a powerful man,” he answered. “To serve
my people, that is the only way.” Sajjad said he needed to emulate Mazari, to become the kind of
courageous, influential man he considers Mazari to have been.
During a later phone call, after I had left the field, Sajjad’s voice become sad, and even
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desperate, as we prepared to say good-bye. “Melissa, promise me one thing that you will do.”
“What is it?” I asked.
“Promise me you will write about Baba. People don’t know about him. Promise me you
will tell them.”
I answered, “I promise I will write what you, and what others in the community have told
me.”

Mazari the Martyr
I will start my exposition of Mazari’s continuing symbolic and political importance at his life
story’s end, with Mazari’s death. While I was still in Bamyan, I interviewed Sajjad about Mazari.
Sajjad is so important in the activist movement, as a compelling orator, but he could be difficult
to interview. At times his thinking seemed to move faster than his words. Drawing out his cell
phone, he said, “I was here when Mazari died. I watched as they processed through Bamyan. He
was thrown out of the Taliban helicopter around Ghazni. People carried him from there, through
Bamyan, and then up to Mazar, his home.” He showed me the telephone and I recognized
Bamyan, I saw a casket being held aloft. I saw so many people, hundreds, thousands, pushing
nearer to the casket. I heard cries of mourning. And then Sajjad shut the phone off. “I can’t show
you much. I shouldn’t have shown you anything. You are not one of us. What can you
understand?”
“Sajjad, I want to understand. Don’t show me the video, but tell me.”
“No,” he replied. “You won’t understand.”
In a way, Sajjad was right: as a non-religious person, I have no comparable understanding
of martyrdom to draw upon. I cannot even fully relate to Christ. I confessed this religious deaf

234

ear with some friends and certainly with Sajjad, whom I trust and know to be broad-minded
enough not to be bothered by this. I think I told him after the incident with the phone. Other
Hazara friends thought the episode strange, and assured me that they would have shown me the
video. But none of them had it at hand. Some clips of the procession are available on YouTube.
For this reason, I am sure Sajjad was making a rhetorical point by halting my viewing of the film
clip right after it began. Rather than being genuinely worried about my seeing Mazari’s funeral
procession, perhaps he was suddenly struck that the sacredness of the event was too great for
casual viewing.
Arif, a high school student who lived close to me, and was not really involved in the
activist movement, described Mazari’s death: “He was tortured a lot. His fingers, arms, and legs
were all cut off. While he was alive.” Similar stories were repeated, if not so graphically. His
fingers were cut off. His ears were cut off. Was he alive, or dead, some wonder openly, at the
moment he was thrown from the helicopter? Even Sayed Askar Mousavi, in his book on the
Hazaras, contributes to this, as a witness, and anyone who flips through his book can also
witness. Photographs show Mazari as he is being tortured by the Taliban. It is unclear what is
happening, it seems that his captors are cutting his ears. And yet these photographs are not
widely shared on posters and placards of Mazari in Bamyan and Hazara-majority West Kabul, or
on Hazaras’ social media sites. Most prefer the living Mazari, in icon-like images that make it
appear that Mazari simply floated out of this world. Everyone knows, however, about his torture
and suffering, inflicted by the treacherous Taliban as he made a last-ditch peace overture to save
his people from the horrors of the civil war. One cannot say for sure if Mazari had an idea of
what the Taliban were really about. Perhaps he recognized that this fanatically religious group,
which based its beliefs not only on the Quran but also on Pashtun customary law, might confront
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the Hazaras with their greatest existential danger yet. And so he took a huge gamble, and lost.
Many activists are too young to remember his death. They explain it in somewhat
mystical terms, as if to make clear that to them this was no ordinary leader but someone much
greater. On a day when I was visiting Jawad in his home, I asked him why Mazari is such an
important figure. Jawad started from the practical:

Mazari, he knew we needed a federal system for Afghanistan, to accommodate the needs
of the many minority groups. He had a plan worked out for this. He drew a map that
showed how he envisioned the different regions of federal Afghanistan. You know, he
was the first who really understood that the fighting was not based on sectarian
differences, as many have claimed. He knew that it was about ethnicity, and that the
actions of the fighters themselves were motivated by ethnicity, rather than sect. For
example, once there was an interview with Moulavi Khalis and Mohseni, and the
journalist asked them if they didn’t have problems cooperating. And they said, no, we get
along and cooperate, because we are both Pashtun.

Khalis was known for being anti-Shi’a, as the head of a Hizb-e-Islami faction independent of
Hekmatyar’s. Mohseni led the non-ethnic based Shi’a resistance group, Harakat, which was a
competitor to Wahdat. Mohseni is actually very secretive about his ethnicity, but many, with
little solid basis, think he is Pashtun.
Jawad starts with the issue of ethnicity, and the change in importance from sect to
ethnicity for Hazara identity. While this was partially an internal change, as the community grew
frustrated with Iran and found a new message from Mazari, Jawad also touches upon the other
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half of this: that other ethnicities make politics an ethnic issue. This is the problem that Hazaras
are encountering today, according to the activists, although there can certainly be an ethnonationalist tendency among some Hazaras as well. It cannot be said for sure whether other
groups dislike Hazaras because of their ethnic difference or whether other Shi’as can blend in,
while Hazaras stand out. For Hazaras, there is now an understanding that even Afghans who do
not harbor ethnic hatred look at them, the Hazaras, through an ethnic lens. As if reading my
mind, the next thing Jawad talked about was the importance of Mazari’s statement, echoed now
by thousands, that “being a Hazara is not a crime.” This, Jawad said, was the most important
thing: Hazaras are demanding no longer to be treated as the lowest-class people of Afghanistan.
For him, and he implied for Mazari, the divide had always been an ethnic, not sectarian issue.
Mazari said this first and said it repeatedly, a repetition augmented logarithmically through the
replaying of films of his speeches. The young hear it and echo the cry. Mazari’s words and
accomplishments while living set the stage for him to be remembered as a heroic martyr and not
a pathetic victim.
Jawad continued,

I do remember when Mazari died. When I heard about Mazari being killed, I was a young
boy. I was actually tending the sheep with my brother in Shahristan, Daikundi. We had
not yet been sent to school. I am not sure who told us, out in the sheep pasture. I don’t
even know how I, a small boy, and my brother, really understood the importance of it.
We knew somehow, he was a great leader. We were crying so much when we found out.
I truly believe, if Mazari were still alive, Afghanistan would be so much better. He would
find a solution. The other leaders were all millionaires but Mazari lived modestly. He was
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humble. He did not have a large home, and he cared about women’s rights and
minorities’ rights.

At this point, Tahira, Jawad’s wife, broke in, “The other day Jawad’s nephew, who is
about seven years old, was watching a film about Mazari. He was unhappy, angry, and crying.
And then he turned to his mother and said that she was not crying enough for the subject of the
movie. That she should be unhappier.”
Jawad’s description of tending the sheep, and hearing about the death of Mazari, and
somehow understanding how important it was, even though at that time they knew little about
him, and were isolated, in the fields high in the mountains, away from the other mourners, gives
the impression that he somehow just knew Mazari was great, and was to be mourned through
tears. He does not know where this knowledge came from, implying that it could have come to
him through mystical means. Somehow, he also understood that this was a moment when he
needed to cry. He then turns to the idea that things would be better had Mazari lived. This might
be a common statement whenever a leader dies, but for Mazari, who already has taken on so
many attributes of the martyr, it might also link him to Hussein, and create a sort of paradox.
Hussein died fighting a tyrant. Would the world have been better had Hussein won, and taken
control of the Muslim community? From the Shi’a viewpoint, we can only imagine the answer is
yes. Likewise, Mazari is thought, by Hazaras in general, and particularly by activists, to have
been the one person who could have improved the situation in Afghanistan. It would have been
better had he lived, even though by dying a martyr his figure attained a greater importance than it
ever held in life.
Jawad’s nephew’s reaction is all the more telling. He is watching a film on Mazari, and
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he, though a small boy of eight or nine, is moved to tears. Perceiving that his mother’s reaction
to the film is not as strong as his own, he tells her she needs to cry more strongly, scolding her
just as someone might be reprimanded for not crying during a majlis for Hussein. The nephew
has already started applying the Karbala paradigm to Mazari.
Muslims reject the idea that any human can in any way also be God. Hussein, Ali, and
Mohammad were first and foremost human beings, although human beings who received God’s
blessings through messages and the foreknowledge of what fate was to befall them. As Imam,
Hussein could speak for God, as could the Imams who followed, but they were also men,
vulnerable to their human and political weaknesses. Mazari, too, was a man and vulnerable to
political weaknesses. Even if Mazari had all the answers, he was still a man, capable of error.
On a cold winter day I met with Qasim, one of the activists who had moved to Bamyan
from Quetta, in the house of the family where I was staying. Qasim delved into his thoughts on
Mazari when I asked him about the rahbar-shahid (leader-martyr).

People are always working to become better human beings each day, even politicians.
Mazari died when he was 47, and until he was 44, he was not doing the right thing. He
was part of Nasr, a political group, and Nasr killed many people, people who were
innocent. Plus, Mazari was part of the clergy, which in my opinion is a bad thing. But
after the age of 44 he really changed himself, and started to do the right thing. He created
Wahdat, and he stood up for minorities, and not only Hazaras. And he wanted a
decentralized government. He was the first to say that Hazaras were no longer servants
and no longer jokes. Like Mullah Nasruddin, Ata Sakhi was a mythical figure people joke
about here, a stupid Hazara, stupid as a donkey. In one of Mazari’s speeches he says, we
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have been a joke for too long, we don’t want to be a joke anymore. He helped Hazaras go
abroad. He sent them to the West to study. He welcomed back Hazara communists even
when other members of Wahdat said they should be killed. He said they were human and
they were Hazara, and so they must be accepted.

Mazari’s humanity and fallibility did not take away from his importance or appeal as a leader for
Hazaras. It made him more important, because the difference between right and wrong was not
divinely revealed truth, and yet he chose what was right. Even though he got power initially as a
member of the clergy, part of a group sponsored by Iran, Mazari had a realization that Iran did
not have the best interests of Hazaras at heart but was playing a geo-political game in
Afghanistan. Regardless of what Mazari’s motivations were in political maneuvers of this kind,
he earned a place in Hazaras’ memories as their most important leader, who was willing to give
up everything for them.
My friend Khadim, who helped me with translations of speeches, songs, books, and other
media, was not a leading Bamyan activist but knew them all. He said of Mazari,

He was intelligent, and he said he would always be with the people, which he is believed
to have done as best as he could until the end. He even continues to be with the people
today, spiritually. He stressed that, were he to be put in jail, or killed, he would still be
with the people. When the Taliban took him, Fahim or Dostum, I can’t remember which,
sent a helicopter to try to help him escape. One person who was with him did escape, but
Mazari said that he would not escape because he did not want to leave his people. He
martyred himself because he told his people that even if he were killed, he would stay
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with them.

It is common knowledge among the activists that Mazari was offered a way to escape but turned
it down. He would not turn away from his fate. Whether there ever was a helicopter or not would
only add or subtract marginally from Mazari’s martyrdom; what the helicopter signifies is that,
through martyrdom, Mazari would stay with his people forever. His refusal to be rescued only
accentuates that part of Mazari’s greatness which lay in his, like Hussein, having gone willingly
to his death. In sacrificing themselves, both become qurban, sacrificial victims, for their people.
How does this relate to collective trauma? Remembering Hussein, and his martyrdom, is
something that all Shi’as experience but it is surely not possible to say that all Shi’as necessarily
share in a collective trauma because of their faith. However, it is true that many do participate in
group mourning events, every year, in which they empathize with the death of a leader who died
for what was righteous, cut down by a tyrant seeking to impose a “wrong” version of the faith.
This experience might have a positive effect on people’s psyches, as described by Mary-Jo and
Byron Good (1988) in pre-revolutionary Iran. It allowed them a culturally sanctioned forum in
which to express sadness and despair. But it is also possible that others might experience
heightened emotional trauma by identifying with and vicariously feeling the pain and suffering
of one so righteous and holy as Hussein.

The Power of Images
Images are a sensitive topic in the Islamic world. Pierre and Micheline Centlivres (2010) point
out that while images have been used extensively by many Muslim rulers, others have banned
some, or all, images of people (Centlivres and Centlivres 2010). While the most extreme Sunni
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groups, including the government of the Taliban, ban all images, other religious authorities have
made use of certain images to enhance their power. The Centlivres make the case that
photographs occupy an ambiguous space in this ban on images of the human figure, because they
are a mechanical reproduction of reality and not a depiction created by human hands.
On Facebook, homages to Hazara martyrs, images of Mazari feature prominently,
whether as profile pictures or in postings that feature things he did or said, particularly around
the celebration of his birthday or the anniversary of his death. Mazari’s mother passed away in
April 2016, and she, too, is something of an on-line saint. No one spoke to me of her while I was
in the field but since then I have seen many pictures of her on Facebook and other social media,
with praise her for her kindness and strength. One person I know had visited her, and proudly
posted a picture of them together.
Mazari’s suffering is not highlighted in visual media, even though photos do exist of his
torture after being captured by the Taliban. The images of him in wide distribution show him
with a slight smile, looking into the distance. He retains a dignity that would be undercut by
public display of the torture scene photographs, in which Mazari looks not just hurt, but
confused. By contrast, Hazaras have no hesitancy to show images of the bloodied bodies of
women and children on social media, every time a mass killing of Hazaras occurs.
Images of the holy men, Hussein and Ali, provide the template for public portraits of
Mazari. Both are shown in the bloom of life in these images, looking beatifically into a distant
point situated outside the picture frame (Figure 2). I am not including the headless “body” of
Hussein sometimes borne through the streets during ta’ziya performances, as this is more a
symbol than a representation, nor the veiled actors who portray the living Hussein in the same
ta’ziya. But painted images of Hussein are common. In most of the images, Hussein’s face is
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perfect (marked perhaps by one cut across his forehead). Even as believers bloody themselves
through self-flagellation, Hussein’s image transcends the flesh.
Images of Mazari occupy the same glowing aesthetic as images of Hussein. In some,
Mazari truly is in another world, surrounded by clouds and doves, which brings to mind paradise.
The image in Figure 3 looms large above the bazaar in Bamyan, as if Baba Mazari is always
looking over the Hazaras, his children. A Quranic verse is written, “God will not change your
destiny, you can change it for yourself.” This is a message to those who read it, but it might also
be a description of what Hazaras believe Mazari has done for them, changing them first from
slaves to fighters and then to fully participating members of society.
Another image of Mazari (Figure 4) seems in some ways similar to images of Hussein: in
this, his head is wrapped in a turban, similar to the turban or hood of Hussein (such a turban is
what many Hazara men, whether of high status or humble workers, wear daily). The Afghan flag
flies behind him, but the parts that are most clearly visible are green and red. Green represents
Islam, and it is the color in which Hussein is nearly always portrayed. Red represents bloodshed
experienced through war. Hazaras, with their particular past, might intentionally foreground such
color. Mazari remains dignified in appearance but unlike Hussein, he seems fatherly: Mazari
really has assumed the role of “baba,” friendly, welcoming, with a twinkle in his eyes. This calm,
smiling, kind figure is the diametrical opposite of the mujahed, the aspect of Mazari activists
downplay, who killed and ordered men to go to their deaths.
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FIGURE 2

An image of Hussein displayed in Karbala, Iraq (source:
http://quotesgram.com/img/quotes-about-prophet-muhammad-imam-hussian/7121811/)
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FIGURE 3

A billboard of Mazari in Bamyan’s bazaar (source: Melissa Kerr Chiovenda)
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FIGURE 4

An image in Bamyan's bazaar advertising a commemoration of the 18th anniversary of
Mazari's death (source: Melissa Kerr Chiovenda)
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Elsewhere, this same photo of Mazari (Figure 5) was paired with the words, “Haq khuastan na
ma’ni dushmany bo kesi nist (To ask for rights does not mean that you are then enemy of
someone”). The words added to Mazari’s portraits consistently implore Hazaras to continue to
work for their rights. Another poster (Figure 6) features the words, “Mo huquq mardom khud ro
mikhuaom wa anhasor ro namikonim (We want the rights of our people, and to not have
limitations on these rights”). Mazari’s kindly demeanor underscores that, even when demanding
rights for his people, no violence is implied.
Activists did not always know who was distributing these flyers. A little research would
usually lead us to an activist friend with whom we were close. Activists, should they work
through a civil society network with enough funding, will print and distribute such images,
which most Hazara shopkeepers are happy to display. Competing Wahdat parties also post such
images, often superimposed with images of their own leaders, to position themselves as the
political descendants of Mazari. Larger ones, such as the billboard in Figure 3, are no doubt
placed by the local government. The images are common enough that people do not spend too
much time dwelling upon them. Baba Mazari has become a sort of ever-present, always watching
individual, who is always with his people.

Jawad Zuhak
When I arrived in the field to do my preliminary research over the summer of 2011, I was met by
an acquaintance, Zamina. Zamina is a young woman who has studied abroad as a high school
student. As I arrived in 2011, she was preparing to begin a BA program in the United States. She
had kindly agreed to help me set up a place to live, find a language tutor, and make some initial
contacts. Zamina’s family were returned refugees from Iran, and her mother had secured a fairly
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FIGURE 5

An image of Mazari displayed in a shop in Bamyan (source: Melissa Kerr Chiovenda)
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FIGURE 6

An image of Mazari displayed in a shop in Bamyan (source: Melissa Kerr Chiovenda)
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high position in the local government. When we met, Zamina was visibly upset. I asked her what
was wrong, and she said, “You know, not too long ago, something terrible happened here. The
head of our provincial council, Jawad Zuhak, was killed traveling back from Kabul. Everyone
loved him here. He was somewhere in Parwan, and the Taliban stopped his car, took him out,
and beheaded him. Now everyone is so scared.”
All that summer, people were asking, “What will happen to us Hazaras?” The United
States was planning to withdraw or significantly decrease the number of its troops in
Afghanistan. Bamyan itself was protected by a New Zealand Provincial Construction Team
Base, which was also staffed by a detachment of Malaysian military medical personnel. It was
not clear, however, how long New Zealand intended to continue its mission. That whole summer,
people approached me to ask about withdrawal, and I felt frustrated to be unable to give them an
answer. At some point in these exchanges, I would be told, in panicked voices, “Once you leave,
the Pashtuns will sweep down here. They will kill as many of us as they can!” Hazaras expected
to be the ones attacked first. Even though Bamyan has little strategic importance, people were
jumpy. In an echo of Mazari’s martyrdom, Zuhak had just been killed.
One day, in talking about Mazari with Zahra, with whom I met to trade lessons in Farsi
for English practice, we slipped into a discussion of Zuhak.

Zuhak also worked for the people, you know. He worked to try to solve our lack of
electricity. He was integral for the creation of Alakain (Lantern) Square, a symbol of our
lack of electricity. He made the award, it is a plaque, for the donkey who brings Hazaras
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water from the river, since even here in Markaz Bamyan we have no running water. He
paved all the streets with mud, to make the point that they should have been paved with
asphalt. Things were going very well for Zuhak. All the people followed him. I think that
perhaps Mohaqeq or Khalili (two of the most important Hazara political leaders) were
responsible for his death.

Questioned on Mazari, Zahra slipped into a discussion of Zuhak, seeing both as people who
worked hard and been killed trying for the betterment of the Hazara community. Her Yazid,
however, has a different face: she was sure the villain was a Hazara political leader. The
community was divided on who was really behind Zuhak’s death, some believing it was the
Taliban, others pointing to local politicians. Either way, Zuhak was still a martyr, who, though
lesser in stature, reminded people of Mazari.
Some Hazaras see Zuhak as a martyr, like Mazari. I visited my friends Nahid and
Shakila, shortly after Nahid had moved from Yakawlang to Bamyan to join her new husband. As
a child, Nahid had walked an hour and a half each day to go to school. When I met with them,
she was enrolling at Bamyan University. Shakila was also studying, and had taken a holiday to
help Nahid settle in. About Zuhak, Nahid said, “He worked with and followed Mazari, and like
Mazari, he was very smart. Like Mazari, he lost his blood for his people (khun khud ro). He
became head of the Provincial Council, and he made many annoyances for the government.”
Shakila cut in, “Yes, he told the government that the main issue for us was that the eye of
the government was not on the Hazaras (cheshm dolat kur ast, hamon cheshm dolat mardom
Hazara miz ast). He was killed because he achieved his goal of becoming head of the Provincial
Council. He was good because he was like Mazari. He said the same things as Mazari.” It was
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not clear if the girls were speaking of the local Hazara government or the central government
but, here again, the image of government is one of corruption and possibly brutal violence.
Khadim, the student from Daikundi who helped me with translations and language
training, also spoke to me about Zuhak. “I was not here when Mazari was martyred, but I was
here when Zuhak was martyred. When Zuhak was martyred, it was yet another Ashura of the
people, once again.” Struck by his directly relating Zuhak to Hussein (through the reference to
Ashura), I questioned Khadim further.

It is because of the importance placed on unity, on the importance of a people sticking
together, even if it means dying. It has to do with Shi’a beliefs, and the way that we
worship God. It has been the same in all cases. In the time of Ali, the father of Hussein,
the Shi’as and the Sunnis were separated. Since Hussein, all Shi’as have the same way of
worshipping. If the people, in the time of Hussein, were oppressed and killed, also in the
time of Mazari they were oppressed and tortured and killed; and of course their leader
was the main symbol of this. Mazari was tortured by the Taliban before being killed.
Zuhak was pulled behind a motorbike while still alive before he was killed. This is in line
with the suffering and torture Yazid carried out on the followers of Hussein.

Mazari would always be remembered for founding Hizb-e-Wahdat but it is his death which has
made him more than simply a great political leader. In the two years I was in Bamyan, I saw
people’s view of Zuhak change from important man to martyr figure.
Some activists seem uncomfortable with this elevation of Zuhak to martyr, pointing out
that Zuhak took credit for things really carried out by the activists, such as the paving of the

252

roads with mud. Others criticize the very symbolic nature of his actions, saying that someone in
his position as head of the Provincial Council should have been finding real solutions to
problems and not carrying out protests; for them, he was too much an activist and not enough a
politician.
None of these backstage criticisms kept Zuhak from being mourned in public. Several
activists published a short book on Zuhak’s life, similar to a longer one they wrote about Mazari.
Some told me they had visited his grave to pay their respects. The gravesite was located a short
distance from my house, and so I accompanied Sajjad on one of his visits there. It was twilight,
the sky changed from blue to mauve to brownish-grey as the light disappeared, the sun sinking
behind the mountains. Other mourners were there. Perhaps as many as 30 had stopped by on
their way home for the evening. The graveyard was dedicated to those who had lost their lives in
Afghanistan’s many wars, so it was unclear how many came to remember Zuhak, and how many
came to remember family members, friends, or other victims of the country’s many years of
violence. But a number, at least five, did stop in front of Zuhak’s grave, although they may have
visited other graves as well. Zuhak’s grave marker was large but not ostentatious. The dirt
mound of the grave was enclosed with black and rust-colored iron fencing, about four feet high.
The marker featured his picture, a photograph of Zuhak looking into the distance, the same as
one on display all about the bazaar. He is wearing a suit, and looks dignified, although the
picture has faded somewhat. Writing accompanied the image, although I did not manage to jot it
down. Sajjad was subdued and somber, and I did not want to upset him or the other mourners by
bringing out my notepad. Other grave markers were marked with flags of different colors, green
or red, to denote whether the person was killed in the war with the Soviets or the Taliban. Those
killed in the Saroa-e-Syob massacre by the Taliban had another sort of memorial. This long row
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of graves were marked by rock slabs, were fenced in, and decorated with many-colored flags. I
watched people arrive, pick up a rock, and knock on one of the gravestones, either entering the
massacre memorial’s gate or stopping at one of the other graves.
“What are they doing?” I asked.
Sajjad answered, “They knock on the grave so their dead friend or relative knows they
have not forgotten about them” (See Figure 7).
Islam is a religion that requires pilgrimage. For Shi’as, as for all Muslims, Mecca is the
most important site of pilgrimage but a journey to Karbala is a close second. There are also other
shrines throughout the Shi’a world, such as the shrines to the Head of Hussein and to Zeinab in
Damascus. Informally added to this list of pilgrimage sites for Hazaras in Bamyan is now
Zuhak’s grave, that of someone else killed in the fighting, and, of course, the grave of Mazari.

Abdul Khaliq Hazara: Martyr or Assassin?
As I sought to understand the importance of figures such as Mazari and Zuhak, I began to ask
people who were their most important heroes. Activists never answer Hussein or Ali, or even
Mohammad, but not surprisingly always mention Mazari first. Zuhak is also mentioned. A third
name is Abdul Khaliq Hazara.
I was stumped the first time I heard this name but, once I was told of his importance, I
remembered exactly who he was. It probably added to my confusion that a number of Hazara
men are named Abdul Khaliq. Where I had read or been told this name before, I do not
remember. Abdul Khaliq is not even mentioned by name in Mousavi’s book on the Hazaras. But
he shows up in every history of Afghanistan. Normally he is referred to simply as the young
student who assassinated King Nadir Shah in 1933.
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FIGURE 7

A mourner “knocks” on a grave of one of the victims of the Saroa-e-Syob massacre, contained
by a larger memorial area (Source: Melissa Kerr Chiovenda).
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Barfield (2010) describes Nadir Shah’s assassination as an act of revenge. In 1929, the
Tajik rebel Habibullah Kalakani became the first non-Pashtun ever to occupy Afghanistan’s
throne, if only for nine months. Capitalizing on Pashtun tribal politics, Nadir deposed
Habibullah, only to keep the throne for himself. Abdul Khaliq carried out the assassination
during the visit of a group of students.
For many a scholar, Abdul Khaliq is little more than a footnote to history; for Hazaras,
Khaliq means more. People in Bamyan dispute that he was a mere instrument of Pashtun rivals
for the throne but say he assassinated Nadir Shah for keeping Hazaras in subjugation and
pushing through an ethnic Pashtunization of the country. For Hazara activists, then, the simple
fact that the target was a Pashtun ruler and the killer, a Hazara, make this a sort of rebellion by
Hazaras. Khaliq’s death was horrible. According to some reports, his eyes were gouged out and
his tongue cut off, before being bayoneted to death. Repeatedly, people in Bamyan stressed not
only that Khaliq had been killed but the horrific way it happened. No one mentioned issues of
succession between Pashtuns. It was said instead that he had sacrificed his life to protest wrongs
brought upon the Hazara people. It was also said that his family had been made to watch as this
was done, another link to the original martyr, Hussein.
Tahira, the wife of Jawad, was the first to tell me Khaliq was one of the great Hazara
heroes. She told me he had been featured in one of the songs by Daoud Sourkhush, a beloved
Hazara singer living in Europe. She said that she then researched, and found out who this great
Hazara was.

The death of Khaliq is an honor for his mother
From whom his life blood was created
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He gave his blood like water to the plant of love
See, all the springs are like blood
He gave himself and his heart for his country
Because of his bravery we sing this song
That his blood created from life
There are a thousand people who are in a pool of blood, who are martyrs, and they are the
best
Their names are countless
We were not afraid of the face of oppression
We are dealing with all these black things
I kiss the injured friends
Stand up, those who remain
And finally, there is a solution for the problems
Mother, don’t be upset about all the things that happened
There are thousands of people (Hazaras) around you
-Khaligho64 by Dawood Sarkhush, translated by Burhani Alizada and the author

This song, listened to by uncounted Hazaras, confirms not just Khaliq’s status as a martyr but the
symbolic importance of martyrs to Hazaras, generally. Khaliq’s mother is encouraged not to be
upset, for many Hazaras may someday benefit from Khaliq’s death. Significantly, the song says
that Khaliq gave his blood “like water to the plant of love,” prefiguring the blood that Mazari
would later shed for Hazaras.
Some activists now avoid speaking of Khaliq, wishing to maintain that they advocate
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purely peaceful action. Others point out that Khaliq, like Mazari and Zuhak, who fought in war,
sought through violence to protect the rights of others, against an oppressive ruler.
Khaliq, too, is commemorated on Facebook. On the last anniversary of his death, I was
surprised to come across a picture of him, which I had seen before, likely in a book on
Afghanistan, after he has been captured. The picture is hard to look at. He sits shackled, in a
striped shirt, and his face and eyes speak of unbearable pain. Those who look at this picture are
expected to feel sympathy for the suffering of Khaliq.

Can Women be Martyrs?
Early Shi’a interpretations of Islam have a place for women martyrs. Fatima was Mohammad’s
daughter, married to Ali. When Abu Bakr was declared Caliph over Ali, Umar, who would
become caliph afterwards, went to Ali’s house to demand he, and his followers, pay his respects
to Abu Bakr. They refused, and Umar’s followers stacked wood around the house, intending to
burn it down. First, though, they did try to force open the door. Pregnant Fatima attempted to
hold the door closed. When Umar’s men broke in, several of her ribs were broken, leading her to
miscarry and die (Hyder 2006). Fatima might be considered a martyr for harming no one and
defending the rights of the oppressed.
Tahira mentioned Shirin, when asked who she thought the Hazara heroes were. So did
Aziza, a good friend who worked at one of the local radio stations. Later, Firuzan, the career
activist and later politician, also told me of Shirin. In fact, most of the women whom I asked
mentioned Shirin, and many men, too.
Some of the women who named Shirin also made mention of another Daoud Sarkhoush
song, his “Shirin Oye Oswahi Pikor Tarikh (Oh! Shirin, The Hero of History”):
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Shirin, you are like a column in history
You are martyred and you are still alive and fruitful, (meaning: having an impact on the
people)
You are like a crown of 40 girls
Your name will be in history, like a friend we will follow faithfully
You didn’t accept the oppression of the enemy
You are free and you were awakened to do what was needed in history
From your blood and that of all the girls who were with you
History will be colored by your blood
Shirin, you are a heroine and a girl of the Hazaras
Your name will be always in history
This period of time took our Shirin, hundreds of our Shirins
(Translated by Burhani Alizada and the author.)

Tahira and Aziza both told me that Shirin had been the bravest of Hazara girls, and that she lived
during the time of Abdur Rahman. As Abdur Rahman’s troops approached her village, Shirin
persuaded forty other girls to run away with her. Reaching a mountain top, they had nowhere
else to go, and valuing their purity over their lives, they threw themselves off the mountain.
Some place Shirin further back in time. For example, a blog about a women’s shelter
states that she lived when the Mongols invaded, and was, in fact, “Bactrian.”65 Others told me
that she lived recently, during the Taliban’s rule. But as Abdur Rahman embodies the worst
villain for Hazaras, it is not surprising that most versions have Shirin flee from his soldiers.
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Oddly adding to this temporal confusion, stylized paintings of Shirin often have the pursuing
soldiers dressed in First World War-era uniforms (Figure 8).
Parallels can be drawn between Sarkhoush’s song and the Baroye Tarikh documentary
film about the Afshar Massacre. The first stanza, “You are like a column in history,” suggests
that Shirin is a “shahid” in both of this word’s senses, as martyr and witness. A column remains
and reminds its viewer of the past after other ruins have been flattened. “You did what was
needed in history” points to Shirin’s stand not just for purity but against sexual slavery. And like
Afshar, Sarkhoush makes clear Shirin will not be forgotten: “History will be colored by your
blood.” When I asked Firuzan why Shirin was so important to her, she said, “Because she saved
her purity. She saved the purity of the Hazara girls.” Firuzan’s answer is ambiguous. Has she
saved the purity of the forty girls who accompanied her, or that of all Hazara girls, whose purity
is put into question by cultural differences as well as ambient racism, compounded by a past of
slavery?66
Shakila, the young murder victim whose case was discussed in a previous chapter, was,
besides Mazari, the person most talked about as a “martyr” during the time of my fieldwork. She
was killed allegedly because of the sexual exploitation she was experiencing at the hands of a
powerful man. Many Hazara activists went to great pains to explain that this was not an ethnic
issue. At issue in the case, even so, is the deference widely accorded to Sayeds, as descendants of
the Prophet Mohammad. This high status of the alleged murderer, the important politician Sayed
Wahid Beheshti, is said to have enabled him to escape being brought before the law. Shakila, in
any case, became a symbol of the wrongs committed against Hazaras and against Afghan
women. There was absolute clarity that Shakila was the innocent, killed after being abused and
having harmed no one. No one suggested that Shakila had done anything to provoke Beheshti’s
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FIGURE 8

This depiction of Shirin jumping to her death is widely shared by Hazaras on social
media (source: author’s research notes)
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violence. Even if, as some of Beheshti’s supporters implied, she became pregnant and killed
herself, she is still a martyr, having taken her own life to escape an abusive situation.
Images of Shakila’s grey, lifeless face (Figure 9), in a photo taken of her before she was
buried, seemed to be everywhere while I was in the field. The picture was featured on placards
and on fliers, and circulated on Facebook and Hazara-focused websites. This seems to be the
only picture of Shakila available for activists to put to use.
On social media as well as in local protests, Hazaras make extensive use of images of
people killed in attacks. At times, images of the living person and the dead are juxtaposed. At
other times, a photo of the living person is displayed. All of these images demand that the viewer
consider what was lost.
In 2015, seven Hazaras, including a nine-year-old girl, were held hostage for a month and
then their throats were cut with wire or kite string coated with glass (reports that they were
beheaded were apparently a mistranslation, which many activists picked up on). The incident
happened amid fighting between the newly operational ISIS group in Afghanistan and the
Taliban. The nine-year-old girl was named Shukria Tabassum. I remember initially that a few
photos were shown after her body was recovered. But it was the photo of her living face that
went viral in on-line media (Figure 10). Most of the activists I know shared her photo, which
many changed to their profile picture. In some of the photos she is smiling. The most widely
shared is one in which she stares seriously into the camera. The killing sparked massive protests
in Afghanistan, as Hazaras and others took to the streets demanding that the government provide
better security. Shukria is the ultimate example of the martyr killed in spite of her innocence.
What harm could such a small child have done?
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FIGURE 9

An image of Shakila displayed during a protest by civil society activists, demanding her murder
case be re-examined (Hazara International Network,
http://www.hazarapeople.com/2012/07/31/kabul-demonstration-condemning-killing-hazara-girlshakila/)
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FIGURE 10

This stylized image of Shukria Tabassum was widely circulated on social media following her
death (source: Hazara International Network, http://www.hazarapeople.com/2015/11/15/shukriatabassum/)
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The women “martyrs” whose stories I have come to know — Shirin, Shakila and Shukria
— had one theme in common, the preservation or defilement of purity. If Shirin died to save her
purity and Shakila’s purity had been taken from her by a powerful local leader, nine-year-old
Shukria, just a child, was the most innocent of them all.
While some might say this reduces women martyrs to “pathetic victims,” the ambient
context, in which Hazara women have historically been enslaved and abused by Pashtuns,
suggests that such representations may carry an edge of gender-based critique. The emphasis on
purity may be a way of contesting negative stereotypes of Hazaras held by other Afghans.
The existence of Hazara martyrs indicate several aspects of the activist movement in
Bamyan. The remembrance and mourning of Hazara martyrs are an indication of the Karbala
Paradigm among the activist community, as well as the greater Hazara community. While other
Afghan groups also remember their dead as martyrs, I found that the Hazara way of speaking of
martyrs reflect that of Shi’as. The classification of martyrs as sketched by Rustam at the very
beginning of the chapter, indicate that they also can be used by Hazaras to claim the role of
pathetic and heroic victim simultaneously, as some martyrs seem to fill both of these roles, and
as all martyrs, both pathetic victims and heroic victims, stand for the entire Hazara community. If
martyrs stand for all Hazaras, a collective trauma is indicated, and if a people have been so
shaken that their see themselves in the faces of their martyrs, which are widely displayed, it can
also be supposed that they have suffered cultural trauma. And in a final twist, exactly because
pathetic victims are linked with femininity, they allow Hazaras to exhibit a form of agency, and
perhaps even resistance, when such is supposedly outside of the purview of what a pathetic
victim is. By insisting upon the purity of Hazara women martyrs, Hazaras struggle against a
history of sexual slavery and stereotypes about Hazara women’s sexuality that continue even to
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the present.
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Chapter 8
Activists’ Interpretation of Hazara and Afghan History

Several months into my fieldwork, I was sitting in one of the few coffee shops in Kabul with a
well-known Hazara activist, Kanishka. The shop is frequented mainly by foreigners, many
hunched over laptops, working intently, while others talk and laugh quietly. Kanishka had
worked for foreign organizations, and recognized the coffee shop as a space where an Afghan
man and a foreign woman could meet without problems. While the environment was relaxing —
cushioned chairs, local art and carpets hanging on the walls — the conversation was difficult.
Well educated, with an MA in sociology from a university in Iran, Kanishka is a leading Hazara
activist. He has an important social media following, in Afghanistan and globally. We discussed
Marx, Kafka, Dostoyevsky, and Agamben, before I turned the conversation towards my research.
When I asked him to tell me his views on how Hazaras talk about their history, he did not
give me a narrative of this history but shared his perspective on what history is.
“Hazara,” Kanishka said,

is an invented identity. And all history is a construction. So this Hazara history we talk
about, it is also constructed. But what does that matter, since we start from the premise
that all history is constructed? Our real history was lost, destroyed by the Pashtun rulers.
We talk about this all the time. All we can do is reconstruct our history. If we talk about
this too openly, many will criticize us, but that is what they did, too, when they destroyed
our history to construct their own.
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During my time in Bamyan, activists sought me out to tell me their history, at times
making it explicit that they wanted me to bring this history to a Western audience. They said the
history of Hazaras had been forgotten, that oppressors had tried to erase it, but it was not
completely lost. They thought their history was recoverable, and voiced the hope that I could
assist them in presenting it to the world. I told them that I would be conveying how they talk
about their history and trying to understand why they do so; but even with this understanding that
I might make their words an object of analysis, they were eager to talk to me. They knew that I
would write about certain things: the genocide of Abdur Rahman, the enslavement and other
forms of abuse suffered for generations by Hazaras, the mass killings under the Taliban, and
continuing problems and discrimination. In writing, my disagreement with some of what Hazara
history-keepers regarded as fact is an unresolved tension, although I have tried to present the
Hazara explanations about their history without making apparent my own skepticism.
I was also struck by the underlying tensions concerning history’s ontological status.
Some activists believe that they are uncovering an authentic, real history, while others, more
ideologically inclined, such as Kanishka, know they are presenting at least a partially imagined
history, a construct. That construct echoes important truths but will also assist Hazaras in their
efforts to claim rights and escape oppression. In their view, history’s constructed-ness does not
make it false; it makes history a thing that will in the future be shaped by Hazaras and shape their
future. Those who construct a history with a more instrumental view believe Hazaras have been
passive agents, to whom others have assigned an identity. From this standpoint, building history
is a part of becoming active agents in the creation of their own identity.
Jonathan Friedman (1992:194) writes, “History and the discourse about making history is
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positional, that is, it is dependent on where one is located in social reality, within society, and
within global process.” Hazaras find themselves in a position as a historically oppressed people,
who, until recently, had little to do with writing their own history. Gaining access to independent
education, activists now realize that the history they find in state schoolbooks is either inaccurate
or not helpful in establishing themselves as legitimate inhabitants of Afghanistan and framing the
kind of narrative about themselves they want to disseminate among Hazaras, Afghans, and
internationally. The history-making project is an important one for them in order to position
themselves as knowing subjects of Hazara realities.
It is hardly surprising that a historically oppressed people should be left out of the
“official history” of a nation-state. This situation reflects not just ethnic but class-based biases,
equating history with the doings of political elites and not subalterns. Only relatively recently
have historians begun to inquire into the history of those who lived under the rulers and kings, to
create a “subaltern” history of non-elites and the oppressed.67 Olivier Zunz (1985:6) writes that
social history “should illuminate the complex interplay between large structural social changes
and alterations in the character of the dynamics of populations, social hierarchies, and routine
social life.” In essence, attention paid to these last three points is what Hazara activists want, all
of which have changed drastically due to the Afghan state aggression. In keeping with this trend,
Hazara activists are critiquing an elite-based history of Afghanistan in which elite Pashtuns are
highlighted and servile Hazaras are overlooked, underscoring the ethnic turn of the larger Hazara
revival.
The identity Hazara activists seek to create through history telling relates to trauma in
several ways. In content, the activists choose to focus upon a history that almost always deals
with past traumas. Some of these episodes are well-known, as with the conquest of the Hazaras
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by Abdur Rahman. Yet even events from a more distant and tangentially-related past are cast by
the activists as tragedies for the Hazaras. Activists speak of Arab invasions of Afghanistan of
the seventh century, not only as destruction and looting of cities and artwork by the Muslim
invaders but as the end of a way of life in which people of different religions and groups lived
together peacefully. This is recounted as a loss for Hazaras although there is only a tenuous link
between today’s Hazaras and the people who lived on the Bamyan plateau at the time. Loss and
subjugation mark even this deep history, for many activists, as something which feels
legitimately a foundation of their heritage, justifying a sense of connection to the previous
Buddhist inhabitants of the area.
The attention given to the Arab invasions is consistent with a larger trend among Hazara
activists and intellectuals to focus on a few events of symbolically heightened importance from
the distant past. The implicit goal is to establish their belonging in Afghanistan, not as outsiders,
descendants of Mongol invaders who brought destruction and killing, as they have long been
portrayed.68 Rather, activists tend to deny Mongol descent and claim that the Hazaras suffered
also at the hands of the Mongols. This even as they invoke connections to a more distant
Buddhist tradition, which they claim as part of their own history and the dest ruction of which
they lament.
The common features of this Hazara exceptionalist history include: (1) a focus on Hazara
belonging to the land on which they currently reside; (2) the establishment of an inherent
tendency towards peacefulness; which (3) contrasts with the supposed martial tendencies of
those they view as their main enemies, the Pashtuns. Hazaras, then, are not the warriors who took
over much of Afghanistan, killing its inhabitants. They are, rather, the descendants of early
inhabitants of Bamyan, who interacted with people of many religions and ethnicities during the

270

Silk Road era, peacefully and not aggressively, as opposed to the Pashtuns. All this helps endow
Hazara with a cultural competence in multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, qualities which
again Pashtuns are claimed to lack.

How to Construct History: The Epistemological Conundrum of Hazara Activists
When Hazaras re-tell their history focusing on particular events as defining their place in
Afghanistan, they rely upon a mix of oral tradition and an amalgamation of historical sources
they have read. Starting in the 1970s and continuing to the present, a number of Hazara scholars
have trained as historians in the West and in nearby countries such as Iran, as well as in
Afghanistan. At the same time, Hazaras recall legends concerning their origins and the Bamyan
area, some of which incorporate Islam, and some of which do not. Activists interested in history
read the academic versions and make sure they know the oral myths. They then often retell these
histories to others. Hence, their history can take on an appearance that to outsiders may seem
more mythical or legendary than historical.
As they are emphasizing their place as martyrs in Afghanistan today, often this history
emphasizes the martyrdom of the main players. Hence, an emphasis on the violent deaths of the
inhabitants of the Bamyan plateau unites accounts of Arab, Mongol, and Taliban invasions.
Sometimes the telling is more mythological, as in the story of Shireen, the girl who, realizing she
was going to be raped by Abdur Rahman’s soldiers, throws herself off a cliff with forty other
girls. Other tellings are clearly historically documented, such as Abdul Khaliq Hazara, who
assassinated Nadir Shah in 1933. The particularity of Hazara tellings here is that Abdul Khaliq is
a hero, not an assassin, for killing one of the Pashtun rulers whom Hazaras hold responsible for
their oppression. Evidence of Khaliq’s elevation to hero status is all around, in songs about him
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and the naming of many men after Abdul Khaliq.
In this chapter, I will explore how Hazaras give new meaning to certain historical events.
Specifically, I will discuss many activists’ claims that Hazaras are descended not from the
Mongols but from an autochthonous Turkic or possibly Persian people. History keepers at times
betray an awareness that the historical narratives they tell partake of both myth and history, to
outsiders’ ears, when they tailor their accounts to fit what they believe their listeners will find
most appealing. Straddling this divide between elite-validated and subaltern-preserved
knowledge, Kanishka might be said to play the role of a “cultural broker.” He obtained a
master’s degree in Iran, held a position as a guest researcher in a European country for several
months, is familiar with leading Western social theorists, and is also very aware of differences
among the various audiences to whom he reaches. To me, he seemed equally at ease giving a
speech to a group of Western academics as he was in speaking to Hazara activists of all
educational levels. He could balance and mediate between Hazaras’ needs, on one hand, to create
a history that would establish their place as rightful inhabitants of Afghanistan, and Western and
non-Hazara Afghan academic standards of validity, demanding evidence from reliable sources.

History and Myth: Oppositional or Complimentary?
What is myth? And what is history? Oral historians and anthropologists coincide in not just
blurring but politicizing the frontier between the two. Jan Vansina (1985) and Richard Price
(1983), for example, have shown that oral histories from Central Africa or the Guyana rainforest,
which a casual listener might dismiss as “myths,” may on closer study be revealed to contain
many independently verifiable overlaps with “facts” drawn from the archives but also bear their
own independent value as irreplaceable addenda to the written record. To this uncertainty, about

272

which aspects of myth might be verifiable and which, not, must be added similarities in their
social functions: history is interpreted and utilized with its present instrumentality in mind. If the
same can be said of myths, then the convergences as well as the differences between the two
categories become a valid object of ethnographic study. If history is chosen from a variety of
narratives with the intent of accomplishing something in the present, and if myth or legend seeks
to explain something about why the world is the way it is today, then the two may not actually be
that different. The difference is our own Western bias in favor of validating narratives about the
past through written sources, not oral sources, unless the latter can be independently verified.
Or not: for Westerners, too, love their own kinds of myths. Certainly, American
politicians and activists love to tell stories that turn certain figures from American history — the
framers of the U.S, Constitution and other “founding fathers” come to mind — into mythical
figures. Stories about their lives are put to use to achieve certain political aims. The question,
then, might not be which societies have history and which, myth, but rather how people within
all societies use and react to different types of “histories,” populist as well as academic. Every
nation, after all, has had to embark on some degree of myth-making (Hobsbawm 1983). Possibly
those who command a state can call their myths “history,” while those, such as Hazaras, who
have little power are just “myth-makers.” Outside of academia, “history” and “myth” may
overlap and bear similarity to each other, as I will show with Hazaras.
Similar themes emerge from Joanne Rappaport’s (1998) account of the telling of history
by rights activists among the Nasa, an indigenous people of the Andes. Nasa activists
instrumentalize their history to work against their subordinate position in Peruvian society, to
spread knowledge of the subordination they have suffered, to inform their fellow Nasa about
their legal rights, and to re-define who they are as a people. The Nasa know there is a power in
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controlling history. Echoing a refrain common among Hazara activists, Nasa rights activists feel
that their history had been stolen, or erased, by those in power.
Pierre Nora relates the same problems set out by Rappaport but sees Western societies,
too, caught in similar contradictions. He writes:

[T]he “acceleration of history,” then, confronts us with the brutal realization of the
difference between real memory — social and unviolated, exemplified in but also
retained as the secret of so-called primitive or archaic societies — and history, which is
how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organize the past.
On the one hand, we find an integrated, dictatorial memory — unself-conscious,
commanding, all-powerful, spontaneously actual-izing, a memory without a past that
ceaselessly reinvents tradition, linking the history of its ancestors to the undifferentiated
time of heroes, origins, and myth — and on the other hand, our memory, nothing more in
fact than sifted and sorted historical traces” (1989: 8).

Among “primitive” or “archaic societies,” for Nora, memory, myth and stories of heroes are all
ways to recall the past. This was the way that history was passed on before modern, Western,
academic ways of understanding history came to be. Nora posits that the “acceleration of
history” explains the change from one to the other but that in lieux de mémoire (places of
memory) earlier modes of remembering the past are retained. A place can be an archive, an
object, or an actual location which holds memory, much as the Nasa rights activists, described by
Rappaport, read the landscape for evidence. As Hazara activists navigate both the older, mythic,
memory-based history, and the modern academic history, certain lieux de mémoire come to hold
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an important place in their imagination, such as the sites of the destroyed Buddha statues or the
ruined city that myth tells us was destroyed by Mongol invaders.
James Wertsch (2002), drawing on Halbwachs, Nora and Novick, locates similar tensions
between history and collective memory. Maurice Halbwachs (1980, quoted in Wertsch 2002: 41)
contends that a significant difference between collective memory and history is that collective
memory focuses on the “stability and continuity of the group and often resists the idea it has
changed over time.” This tendency, placing emphasis on group continuity, may be evidenced in
Hazara activists’ insistence that even ancient history (for which they have very little concrete
evidence) demonstrates that Hazaras are more open-minded and concerned with peace and
equality than other groups. This sort of continuity “demonstrates” that they are “inherently” more
predisposed to uphold these values than other groups in Afghanistan. Hazara history-telling, as
Nora (1999: 8) writes about “collective memory,” is “memory without a past that ceaselessly
reinvents tradition, linking the history of its ancestors to the undifferentiated time of heroes,
origins, and myth.” Of course, the point is that this is not something that tries for “objective
historical truth” (a chimera that likely does not exist anyways). Some among the activists know
this, and speak of constructions of histories, while others do believe they are discovering a truth
that has been hidden. This complication reflects divisions in what activists think, and in what
they are willing to disclose to an outside anthropologist. These discrepancies arise when one
thinks in terms of history, but become more consistent if we consider this history to be also their
present collective memory (understood by activists to be history, whether truth or construct, as
the phrase “collective memory” did not arise in my conversations with them). Novick (1999: 34), writing of outside knowledge of the Holocaust, indicates that history at least tries to deal with
multiple and competing perspectives, whereas collective memory sees events from a “single
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committed perspective.” “Memory….has no sense of the passage of time; it denies the ‘pastness’
of its objects and insists on their continuing presence. Typically a collective memory . . . is
understood to express some eternal or essential truth about the group — usually tragic” (1999:4).
Hazara activists, in telling their history, are repeating stories that intend to demonstrate what they
consider essential truths about the group, that they are as not just oppressed but also culturally
exceptional, and hence stand apart from the other peoples in Afghanistan. What defines them as
an exceptional people, from the Hazara standpoint, is not just the unending persecution they have
suffered but their inherent “goodness.”
Building upon Salomon (1982), Rappaport (1990:2) claims that “Nasa interpretations of
the past are…… ‘chronicles of the impossible’, indigenous attempts at integrating their own
brand of historical and cosmological thought with Western discourse, both of which are effaced
in the process because they contradict each other.” Hazaras also mix types of historical
traditions, and in so doing seek to escape conventional binaries, in which history either bases
itself on hard evidence to explain things that really happened or is a mythological exercise based
on what people’s ancestors know to have happened. The Hazaras are already straddling both
worlds, mythical and academic, and try to make use of both. In some cases, there is a lack of
written historical sources. Knowledge about the Buddhist empires that once inhabited Bamyan is
scant. Hazaras’ exact relationship to the Mongols is based mainly on linguistic (and now genetic)
evidence. Even historical records about Hazaras in the centuries immediately preceding their full
incorporation into the Afghan state is limited. But sources do exist, so Hazara activists might not
only rely on myths to infer history but use history to create myths.
I, too, then, have to straddle both worlds in order to make some sense of the history they
tell. I am not a cultural broker like Kanishka, who can give a talk on Hazara history to a Western
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audience in a way that would make sense using Western theory, and then turn around and talk to
a Hazara audience about overlapping themes of Hazara history in ways that help them make
sense of the place they hold in Afghan society. Yet I have addressed both kinds of audiences, and
hence know of what I speak in a sense as a participant and not just an observer: I have spoken
about the Buddha statues’ destruction and its coverage in the media both in an academic journal
and in a speech to room packed with over 100 Hazaras. And I know on this basis that what I say
here will be understood and questioned differently by a Hazara audience in Bamyan than by a
Western audience. My focus in what follows is not to judge the merits of Hazara history telling
but to examine how Hazara activists in Bamyan make use of both Western academic and
mythical/legendary types of histories, depending on audience and setting.69
Like the Nasa (Rappaport 1998), activist Hazaras understand that there is power in
controlling history, and so they have made this a key part of their project. At one end of this
ongoing project of seizing control over their own history are historians, including Sayed Askar
Mousavi, Hassan Poladi, Kazim Yazdani, and others, who do research and publish books in
apparent conformity with Western conventions. The books published by these individuals are
read by some in the activist community, and then are told and retold orally, both informally and
in more formal events such as speeches. At this point, formal history, done in Western academic
styles, meets up with the other pole of the Hazara history project, involving the oral retelling of
history. In a fashion similar to how the Nasa patch the “holes” in their historical memory,
through myths and cyclical images (Rappaport 1998), Hazaras fill the gaps in their history,
which they claim has been intentionally erased by Pashtun rulers of Afghanistan, with reference
to cyclical images or themes.
An example of this tendency to recast history as myth emerged during a meeting I had
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with Nawruz, a Hazara activist well-versed in Hazara history, the events of which I recorded in
my field notes as follows:

I met my friend Khadim in a dorm room where we were going to listen to something
about Hazara history from a “local expert,” Nawruz. I should clarify that by local expert,
I do not mean someone with a degree, who has done their own archival research. Nawruz
was a university student, slightly older than many, in his mid-twenties with a family and
several children. He was a bit heavy-set, with a round face, and he spoke slowly,
enunciating his words in his deep voice. He had read a lot of the books that have been
written about Hazara history, committed a sort of amalgamation of them to memory, and
would recite this history.
On this day, we were in a men’s dorm room. Actually, in Bamyan, there is no
men’s dormitory. Male students rent rooms in the bazaar which are extremely basic. The
buildings are made of mud plaster. They cover the dirt floors with plastic rugs, sleep and
sit on thin padding (tushak), and cook on small propane stoves. They usually have one
lightbulb, either attached to a solar panel or a nearby generator they pay in to. They
squeeze as many men into these tiny, squalid rooms as they can, in order to keep the cost
of rent down.
Nawruz was sitting on the one raised bed in the room, and me next to him.
Everyone else gathered around on the floor. All in attendance were interested in what he
had to say, and told me they held these informal history lessons quite often. It was not
something done just for the sake of the anthropologist.
Nawruz started in ancient history, stating that two groups could be considered
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ancestors of Hazaras, “the Aryoyi (Aryans) who ruled in Balkh to the north and the
Kanishkans or Kushans, who would be the group who built the Buddha statues. Hazaras
are more closely related to the Kushans, and they came at such an early time that Hazaras
can be considered the original (boumi) people of Central Afghanistan. Hazara slang is
similar to that of the Aryoyi, but they look more like the Kushans, so they are likely more
closely related to Kushans, with whom they also have some cultural similarities. Of
course,” Nawruz continued, “Hazaras have mixed with other peoples, such as Mongols,
later. But their likeness to the Buddha statues is unmistakable, and the Kushans are the
ones who built them, so they had the strongest impact on early Hazara ancestry.”
At this point, Nawruz’s narrative began to wander, as he recounted several of the
troubles faced by Hazaras. He made a big jump in time as he said Hazaras might be one
of the earliest inhabitants of Afghanistan, but many were forced out of their homeland
during the time of Abdur Rahman in the late 1800s. “Many went to Mashhad, Iran, others
to India, to Kashmir, to all the Central Asian countries. They blended in completely in all
these places, while it is in Afghanistan they do not blend in.” Then Nawruz jumped again,
this time backwards. “The coming of the Mongols was a tragic time for Hazaras. It
brought down the whole Hazara nation, nearly destroyed it, and we see these effects in
the ruins of Shahr-e-Gholghola.
“Hazaras are the original (boumi) people. The correct question is not where
Hazaras came from, but where others came from and who mixed with Hazaras. Many of
the groups that later came to power in the region, the rulers and the kings, they were from
Central Asia and from South Asia. The Hazaras were always here, through all of these
changes. Hazaras live in the central part of Afghanistan, so this shows that they are
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original, and were beset from the outside by others. For example, the Pashtuns came in
the 16th or 17th Century from South Asia. They pushed the Hazaras inwards, to the central
mountain areas where they now live. But Hazara areas are the ones that are full of ancient
places and (heritage) sites. This is another way Hazaras know they are the original
(boumi) people of Afghanistan.
“We must recognize, there is no such thing as a pure Hazaragi nation. Ours is a
nation of mixing, built upon the original (boumi) people of Afghanistan. This mixing has
contributed to the changes and improvements Hazaras have made over the last ten years.
The fact that we are a mixture of different peoples and integrated backgrounds is why we
are more likely to be more open-minded, free thinkers. We are more tolerant, more
accepting of change, because we are a mix of different peoples from different histories.
We have a strong connection to Buddhism in our culture, but when Afghanistan became
Islamic, so did we. However, we chose Shi’a Islam, because it allowed us to have more
choices, more freedoms.”

Nawruz went on to describe in more detail the period of Abdur Rahman, and other even more
recent issues. Two aspects of his description of ancient history struck me, particularly. First is a
myth-ification of events familiar from written histories of Afghanistan and Bamyan. He takes
bits and pieces of historical fact, and ties them together in a new way to create a myth or legend,
which explains why Hazaras are the way they are today. Second is an emplacement of history.
He centers his story around the place where we were at the time — Markaz Bamyan, the site of
the destroyed statues and the remnants of Shahr-e-Ghoghola — even though he himself comes
from the neighboring province of Daikundi.
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Partaking as much of origin myth as history, the story Nawruz told has several aims. It
explains why Hazaras belong in Afghanistan, but also why they are different, more “openminded” than the people of other groups. Crucially, it circulated through several eras of
suffering, at the hands of Abdur Rahman and the Mongols. As he continued to speak that day, he
also touched upon other aspects of suffering in more recent times, during the civil war and
Taliban periods. The impression that I was listening to an origin myth, and not to history, was
surely compounded by the setting: a dorm room of mud brick walls, dim lighting, and a ceiling
made of reeds, with young men crowded about the floor, while bazaar sights and sounds went on
outside. This sense, that I was witnessing something not academic but “traditional,” if not
ancestral, left me questioning why Nawruz’s skill as a historian had been touted. Only when I
took a step back, and considered Nawruz’s and others’ more mythologized histories as being
different in style of presentation and emphasis, rather than content, than the histories presented
by Kanishka in presentations in the West (or even the histories presented in books by such
scholars as Oxford-trained Mousavi), did I realize this was too simple an understanding of
Hazara history-making. Conversations I had with individuals such as Kanishka on the very
nature of history only confirmed the over-simplification of my initial impression that I was
hearing “mere myths.”
About a month later, I received an early clue concerning my own oversimplification
when the elections for the president of the United States occurred. Jawad asked me to give a talk
about the process at his English resource center. I agreed but then became unsure what to expect
of this event when I learned that Nawruz would also be speaking. I saw Nawruz give a very
different presentation than the one I had heard him give to his fellow students in the dorm room.
Nawruz and I were in a brightly-lit room with white-washed plastered walls, speaking to students
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lined up in neat rows of chairs. The walls were covered in posters showing famous places from
the United States and United Kingdom. We had a computer and a projector, and spoke on a
slightly raised platform with a podium. After my talk, Nawruz began to speak of the similarities
between Hazaras and African Americans. He spoke of the enslavement and oppression of
African Americans, and also spoke, using well-substantiated details, about the similar history of
the Hazaras. His main point was that if Barack Obama could be president in the United States,
then a Hazara could one day be president of Afghanistan. At no point did I notice the kinds of
questionable embellishment that marked Nawruz’s dorm room talk, and, instead of making bold
leaps across time, he stuck to a narrative timeline much more familiar to me as “history.” This
talk, then, was very different, even as some of the students in attendance were the same ones who
met in the dorm room. Nawruz, like Kanishka, seems adept at this sort of code-switching.
Nawruz’s expertise, then, is not simply history but in making the adjustments to audience
demanded of a cultural broker and being able to straddle the worlds of myth, memory and
history.
Nawruz was also participating in historical retellings that took place for different reasons.
In many cases, activists were clearly instrumentalizing historical narratives to bring about some
sort of current political change for Hazaras. The talk about American elections was clearly done
with this intent. Sitting with students in their dorm room, however, seemed to be simply an
enjoyable activity for my informants, without a clear political goal. The students were enthralled
by Nawruz’s recitation of Hazara history. They remained seated, listening, for at least an hour. It
might be true they were, in part, drawn by the presence of a foreign researcher, but similar
situations where I was present seemed to attract listeners for shorter durations of time. The
students seemed to genuinely like spending their free time learning about their past.
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The Buddhist and Mongol Eras as Topoi of Hazara Activist History-Telling
Greta Uehling (2004), in her work on deported Crimean Tatars’ efforts to repatriate to the
Crimea after the fall of the Soviet Union, stresses the importance of place in forming social
relations. She describes how Crimean Tatars demanded rights upon return to Crimea, and how
relations with other residents of Crimea, and the Ukrainian state, came to be framed in
understanding of an ethnicity’s ties to a place. The Hazara historical project is similarly
concerned with place, establishing ancient ties to the central highlands which are today
considered the heart of Hazara homeland, and also with staking a claim to a larger portion, even
the entirety of, Afghanistan. The place is important to activists because certain landscape
features, such as the giant Buddha statues which were destroyed by the Taliban in 2001, are
reminders of history. If you control the telling of history and insert yourself into the history
evoked by landscape in a certain place, you can then tie yourself to that place. Even though
people who consider themselves of Tajik ethnicity have also lived for long periods in Bamyan,
the province is considered without contestation to be Hazara, and Bamyan remains important to
Hazaras in other regions of Afghanistan and the diaspora. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson
(1992) assert that the idea of a homeland may become more and not less important as people’s
relationship with a place becomes more tenuous as they live in diaspora. Quettan Hazaras and
those who were raised as refugees in Iran remember Bamyan and increasingly seek to return.
I will focus on two time periods that are of particular importance to the Hazaras, the
Mongol and the Buddhist eras. The Mongol invasion is important because Hazaras are widely
identified by others, and sometimes themselves, as Mongol, an identity that often works against
their acceptance as Afghans. Faced with the negatives surrounding Mongol heritage, Hazaras
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must either recast the Mongol invaders in a positive light or recast themselves as non-Mongols
who also suffered from the invasion along with other “autochthones.” On the other hand, the
fame of the Buddha statues, in the place the Hazaras consider the center of their homeland,
means that Bamyan is most known for being a formerly Buddhist area. When history represents
Hazaras as the descendants of Mongols, it tends to deny them a claim to the Buddhist past. In
response, Hazara activists strive to re-invent themselves as descendants of the Buddhists who
once inhabited the area. Through this reinvention, they attach to themselves positive associations
attributed to the Silk Road period, when Buddhists lived in Bamyan, and to positive associations
commonly attributed to Buddhists by outsiders.
Hazara activists’ choices of what eras of history to focus on, and what to exclude,
emphasize efforts to streamline their historical narrative. Hazaras want to connect themselves to
only certain of the great dynasities which have previously occupied and controlled the land in
which they currently reside. They choose to focus on the Buddhist empires of the past. One
familiar with the history of Afghanistan might ask, why not claim ancestry from the Ghorid
dynasty, which rose to prominence in the 12th and 13th centuries, by a Persian-speaking people
who were presumably Buddhist before converting to Islam? This empire played a key role in
Afghan history, and yet activists are largely silent about it, choosing instead to focus on earlier
Buddhist dynasties. Why do they not position themselves as descendants of the Ghorids,
particularly when Hazaras became well-known as inhabitants of the later Ghor Province of the
Afghan state? I can only conjecture, as most of my informants only ever mentioned the Ghorids
in passing. But I imagine that the choice to focus on descent from earlier Buddhist polities has at
least two reasons. First, focusing on earlier inhabitants stresses more the autochthony of Hazaras.
Second, Hazara activists are aware of, and to an extent participate in, Western prejudices
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concerning the dangers of Islam as a political and extremist force. The Ghorids chose to become
Muslims and were Muslim for most of their rule. In electing to identify with earlier rulers who
were Buddhists, rather than Muslims, Hazaras may be playing on Western impressions that
Buddhism is somehow inherently peaceful, while Islam is the opposite.
Marshall Sahlins (1985), in his introduction to Islands of History, explains the interaction
between culture, understood as the structure that undergirds a society, and history, understood as
a series of events experienced by a people. Sahlins holds that all historical events are understood
through the lens of a certain culture and mythologized. These events, on the other hand,
inevitably modify the underlying structure of cultures. “Culture is therefore a gamble played with
nature, in the course of which, wittingly or unwittingly — I paraphrase Maurice Bloch — the old
names that are still on everyone’s lips acquire connotations that are far removed from their
original meaning” (Sahlins 1985: ix). Such a play of old names and more recent connotations can
be identified behind the two main historical questions with which Hazara activists grapple: Were
the Buddhist statues idols, or important symbols of a more glorious, cosmopolitan past? Were the
Mongols ancestors of Hazaras, or conquerors of the Hazaras’ ancestors, who mixed with them as
a consequence of violent conquest?
How do such “radical innovations” (Sahlins 1985: ix) occur? Sahlins writes about
Polynesian encounters with European colonials and conquerors, encounters which surely also
were traumatic. Just as Hazara activists may be said to be constructing cultural trauma, Sahlins
describes innovation in history as a process carried out through the agency of the conquered.
“The effects of such risks can be radical innovations. For finally, in the contradictory encounters
with persons and things, signs are liable to be reclaimed by the original powers of their creation:
human symbolic consciousness” (x). Sahlins argues that this is an organic process but also one
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driven by individuals: “Meanings are ultimately submitted to subjective risks, to the extent that
people, as they are socially enabled, cease to be the slaves of their concepts and become their
masters (x).” One way of describing the process by which Hazara activists are attempting to
change society is to say that they are, as they construct new historical meanings, becoming
“masters of certain historical concepts.” Hazaras have ceased to be literally enslaved in
Afghanistan, and now they seek to escape figurative enslavement under a “received” history,
which erases their past.

The Buddhist Era
Jawad became one of my closest friends during my time in Bamyan, and neither of us was
reticent when it came to expressing our emotions. One evening we were enjoying a dinner with
an activist who had traveled to Bamyan from Kabul. We had a lively discussion, but I could tell
something was bothering Jawad. I asked him what was wrong, and he told me that he had an
unpleasant run-in with a Tajik bank teller that day.
He had gone to the bank to collect his salary, and waited for close to an hour as the teller
served people who had come in to the bank after him. Finally, losing his temper, he went to the
teller and told him that this was no way to treat customers.
The teller told him he was out of line, and should not speak to him in that way.
“I looked at him, a Tajik,” Jawad said, drawing himself up to his full height, squaring his
shoulders, and seeming to relive the moment when he put the teller in his place. He continued, “I
said, ‘who do you think you are? My people have been here for 2,000 years. My face is the face
of the Buddhas. The Buddhas are my biography. You may not speak to me in this way!”
I wondered out loud if the teller was a Tajik originally from Bamyan, and also might
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think that his ancestors had lived in the area for a similar amount of time, as my local Tajik
friends claimed.
“No, he comes from Kabul or something. He is just here for the job,” Jawad replied.
This was the first time I heard anything about the Buddha statues being important to
Hazaras in situating themselves as natives in Bamyan, but I would later on hear similar stories.
Only later did I discover that I had read a similar narrative as I was preparing for fieldwork.
Sayed Askar Mousavi has written one of the most comprehensive books on Hazaras, The
Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic, and Political Study, available in
both English and Dari. Dr. Mousavi attended Oxford University and, though well respected in
Afghanistan, some non-Hazaras complain that he displays a distinct ethnic bias. I was fortunate
to meet him in Kabul, where he had returned to teach, and he was very encouraging of my
research. Mousavi’s use of historical documents, especially when referring to the more recent
history of Hazaras, starting with the period of Amir Abdur Rahman, seems authoritative. I have
made extensive use of his work to provide historical background for this dissertation (Mousavi
1998).
Mousavi treads on shakier ground when he writes of the more distant past and critiques
various theories concerning Hazara origins.70 Mousavi reviews three theories put forward by
Western scholars concerning the origin of Hazaras: one, that Hazaras are autochthonous to
Afghanistan; the second, that Hazaras are descended from Mongols; and the third, that Hazaras
are a mix of different peoples who have lived or passed through Afghanistan. He provides a
strong argument against the first two possibilities, and then embraces the third, offering a
rationale that he claims is different from any hitherto proposed (Mousavi 1997: 21-31). Mousavi
begins by asserting, “Any anthropological research on the ethnography of the peoples in the
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region requires a step-by-step academic journey back into, and along, the migratory patterns and
ensuing geographic boundaries of the region” (Mousavi 1997: 37). This seems an antiquated
assertion from an anthropological study published in 1997, and while such a journey into the
distant past might be helpful for some ethnographies, it is certainly not a requirement for current
anthropological work.
One possible explanation is that Mousavi takes up this topic precisely for reasons that
link up with my discomfort with Nawruz’s history-telling in the Bamyan student quarters: he
wants to straddle the division between Western academic requirements and Hazara
mythological/legendary explanation for their origins. On the statues’ importance in tracing the
history of the region, Mousavi writes, “In order to do this (fully understand the origins of the
Hazaras) we need to look into the ancient history of Bamiyan, centre of Hazarajat, and its ancient
Buddha statues” (Mousavi 1997: 37). With this assertion, Mousavi skirts the realm of myth. For
him, the key to the mystery of the Hazaras can be found in place in Bamyan:

From the coins found in Bamiyan, the paintings on the temple walls and walls around the
Buddha statues, the paintings of the last Kushani kings available, together with the
physical features of the statues, it can be said that the inhabitants of the area were, until
approximately 2300 years ago, of the same facial and physical features as today’s
Hazaras. Thus it becomes possible, if not irrefutable, to trace the Mogholi appearance of
the Hazara inhabitants of northern Afghanistan much further back in history, long before
the incursion on Changiz Khan and Amir Timur (Mousavi 1997: 38).71

Mousavi goes on to provide further evidence for the autochthony of Hazaras, based on the idea,
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also championed by my informants, that Hazaras are a Turkic, not Mongol, people, or Turkic
Ephthalites, who later came to the region and also displayed similar facial features. Turkic words
appear in the Hazaragi dialect, as many as, if not more than, Mongol words. There is a reference
to a place called Barbaristan in Firdowsi’s famous Shahnoma, the most ancient example of
written Persian, which Mousavi claims is referring to Hazarajat. Mousavi then allows that people
of other origins, certainly Mongols and Turkic people, as well as Iranic Tajiks,72 have mixed
with Hazaras during later historical periods.
This reliance on the physical features of the Buddha statues as evidence, if not proof, of
Hazara ancient ties to the area echoes Jawad’s assertion that he looks like the Buddhas and hence
the Buddhas are his “biography.” This was something that I heard repeated often by Hazaras,
activists and non-activists alike. More, by saying that they are descended from the Buddhas
themselves (“the Buddhas are my biography”), the Hazaras stake a symbolic claim to be made
from the same mud and earth as the Buddhas. According to this metaphor, the Hazaras are of the
land in the sense of not only living in the Hazarajat but being inseparably tied to it.73
Hazara traditional houses, made of mud plaster, sometimes mixed with straw, at times
also seem to merge with the earth. On one of my frequent visits to the family of my friend Sakhi,
in their village in Yakawlang district, we relaxed on cushions and pillows one summer evening
in the one-hundred-year old house of Sakhi’s mother. I noticed one of the sisters had a giant
black beetle crawling along her hand. She seemed mesmerized by its movements. While I knew
these beetles lived in the walls of my own house, I held an extreme, irrational fear of them.
Seeing my gaze, the teenaged girl moved towards me. I jumped away in fear, shouting, “Keep it
away, don’t put it on me!” I expected to be laughed at, but instead she looked at me with
incredulity and a bit of sadness. “Melissa, it is of the earth (az hak ast), it is harmless, it will not
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hurt you.” Traditional farmers up in these mountains are always surrounded by earth. They
spend summers outside, working the earth, and winters inside earth houses. They spend all
summer on the land, caring for their crops, their animals, weeding, irrigating, ploughing, digging,
and most have only hand tools.
Once, the mother of this same family went with me for a walk on the plain that ran along
the narrow river valley near their house. She looked seventy, but was likely closer to fifty-five or
sixty. She wanted to cross the shallow river and spryly got a running start and bounded through.
Unsure about the depth, the mud, and leaches, I resisted. I ended up wrangling a nearby grazing
donkey and riding across (luckily my squeamishness is made up for by considerable equestrian
skills). We laughed and laughed. These people are not just metaphorically “earthy” but live close
to the earth, intimate with it in ways with which I found it impossible to identify, in spite of my
family’s rural Tennessee roots.
The Buddha statues have, if anything, gained symbolic potency after being destroyed. As
an absence rather than a presence, but one which is still clearly remembered by all adults from
the Bamyan area, the wreckage of the statues now symbolize the traumas of the Hazara past
more clearly than when they were whole. Perhaps in the controversy that surrounds the prospect
of their being rebuilt, the statues also point to the chance for Hazaras to be something different in
the future.
When I first arrived in Bamyan I lived in a guesthouse, where I had long conversations
with its proprietor Mohammad, and his wife, Fatima. Mohammad does not consider himself to
be an activist, and expresses wariness of some of the more ethno-nationalist aspects of their
projects, and yet he considers many of the activists his friends. Relaxing in their common room
one chilly afternoon, I asked him what Hazaras thought about the Buddha statues. He told me
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that there was a myth concerning them which was also a possible foundational story of Hazaras.

Melissa, you know the Buddhas had names. Salsal was the male, the larger statue, and
Shahmama, the female, was smaller. We have a story about them, and where they came
from. Salsal fell in love with the daughter of a king who lived nearby here, in the area of
Band-e-Amir.74 But back then, there was no lake. The king told Salsal, if he wanted to
marry Shahmama, he needed to do a task. So Salsal built Band-e-Amir. The marriage was
then happening in Bamyan. Salsal and Shahmama were behind a curtain, about to be
revealed to the people. When the curtain was removed, the people saw that they had
turned into the two statues. And from these people, descended the Hazaras.

A slightly different story also confirms the statues’ generative potential; according to that story,
the two statues were built in the form of Salsal and Shahmama because they were such a
beautiful couple. I do not know for how long the Salsal and Shahmama myth has been told in
Bamyan, but the names of Salsal and Shahmama were recorded by some of the early Western
explorers (Moorcraft 1825, Masson 1836, and Burnes 1842). Many Bamyan people refer to the
statues by these names instead of as “Buddhas.”
When the activists with whom I worked link the statues with the founding myth of the
Hazaras, that move merges easily with their belief that the Hazaras share the statues’ facial
features. They can easily believe that once Hazaras were Buddhists, who built those statues, and
later became Muslims. Equal weight attaches to “mythified” accounts of the historical Buddhist
past and the mythical status of Salsal and Shahmama as Hazara founding ancestors.
The coming of Islam, of course, complicates the way that Hazaras now view the statues.

291

To many Muslims, the statues are “but (idols,” in Dari), and hence belong to a heretical
polytheistic pantheon. After I had lived for several months in Bamyan and my understanding of
the language was stronger, I realized that some people speak of Buddhas while others speak of
“but.” All civil society activists call them Buddhas, or refer to them as Salsal and Shahmama.
Others are just as likely to refer to them as but. At times, this felt more factual than judgmental:
they call them idols because this is what they understand them to be. While no one ever told me
outright that they did not like the statues, some seemed unwilling to talk about them much, a
slight shifting of the eyes or posture when I raised the topic at times suggesting some unease. An
Islamic country should have no but, but because it was the Taliban who destroyed them it was
impossible for anyone openly to express approval for ridding the region of the but, even if they
might have felt it justified on religious grounds. The commonly accepted attitude is to mourn the
loss of the Buddhas as a travesty against world heritage and an attack on themselves.
I once asked Robert Canfield, one of the foremost anthropologists to have studied
Hazaras, how people viewed the statues when he was there in the 1970s. He said that he rarely
spoke to people about it, but did remember one occasion when they became the topic of
conversation. He was in the bazaar, drinking tea with a farmer. He asked the farmer about some
economic difficulties the community had been experiencing, and whether he knew why they
were occurring. The farmer replied, “I don’t know. Perhaps it is because of the statues. But I just
don’t know.” Similarly, I did ask some of the activists what the more general population thought
of the destruction. They provided a similar answer. Jawad told me, “most want reconstruction,
but some don’t. No one likes that the Taliban did it. But there are those who do not want them
rebuilt, because they were but, un-Islamic. They think it is better they are gone, anyway.”
The idea that Salsal and Shahmama were founding ancestors, perhaps an ancient prince
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and princess, surely makes them more palatable to devout Muslims than talking about them as
Buddhas, and hence, symbols of a distinct religious tradition. Calling them Hazara founders
further enables Hazaras to identify the destruction of the statues as part of a larger pattern of antiHazara aggression, running from Abdur Rahman to, some say, the current president, Ashraf
Ghani, for his alleged support for kuchi seizures of Hazara land.
And not only devotion to Islam but opposition to religious intolerance can make efforts to
rebuild the Buddhas contentious. There are many reasons to rebuild: it would restore beauty to
the area and attract tourists. And it would show the Taliban that they did not win, after all. There
are also reasons not to rebuild: money should be spent on people, not statues; the statues will be
targeted again; the cliff face into which they were built is too unstable. But, besides pragmatic,
financial considerations, one of the strongest reasons to leave the statues as ruins is symbolic.
One evening, I walked with Akbar, who worked in a radio station, as the sun set near the
niches. The light was golden but the niches, dark. I asked him, “What do you think, about
rebuilding?”
“They should never do it,” he said. “The monument is now in the destruction. The
monument is in the evil that was done against us. The monument must remain how it is, so that
all can remember what was done to us. So that the genocide against us is remembered. So people
find out about it.”
In fact, one serious rebuilding effort, the project called “Two Afghanis Donation for
Salsal and Shahmama,” led by well-known activist Shukria Neda, calls for only one statue to be
restored, Salsal. Shukria says that she agrees with those in the community who think that one
niche should remain empty, as a reminder of the evil that has been done. But she also believes
that there is powerful healing in rebuilding, and that this has been done in many other war-torn
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areas, including the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia and the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic of
Buddha in Sri Lanka. Two statues gives the ability to address both concerns. Rebuilding Salsal
will give Hazaras hope that perhaps things can improve. Leaving the empty niche of Shahmama
will be a constant reminder to all who walk across the plateau of the wrong that has been done.
Shukria believes that the empty niches only provide a message of suffering and collective
trauma. As Shahmama is female, proposing to leave her statue in ruins is envisioned as a
testament also to the suffering of Afghan women.
While the Buddha statues hold mixed meanings — when thought of, variously, as
foundational ancestors, idols, works of art, a cultural heritage site, images of Buddha, or, through
their destruction, symbols of collective trauma — identifying today’s Hazaras as descendants of
the Buddhists who once lived in the valley situates the Buddhist period, for civil society activists,
as a positive time. Sajjad, the university student who grew up in Quetta, is extremely involved
with activism, gives fiery political speeches, and is little concerned with upholding appearances
of Muslim piety. He would often share his thoughts with me about how the past impacted the
future, his words often getting frantic as he worked his thoughts into speech. Even as he talked
about Hazara identity, he also always seemed to be discussing his own, personal identity. In the
time that I knew him, he changed his last name (a common practice) several times to reflect this.
On one occasion, meeting in the sunny meeting room of a civil society organization
office, I sipped green tea, basked in the sunny light which bathed the room, and followed
Sajjad’s thoughts. “I am not a nationalist,” he said.

Nationalists believe the world starts and ends with religion. Although, Islam has been
harmful to us. In some ways it is a weakness. Hazaras are peaceful. We believe in
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brotherhood and equality. This comes from our Buddhist past. Before, Hazaras were
creators of art and beauty. Gandhara belonged to us. Islam taught us to fight and kill. You
know, before, I was an extreme Shi’a. I thought, because the Sunnis took the right to rule
from Ali, because they killed Zahra (referring to Fatima, Ali’s wife), that it was just to
kill them. I didn’t think about the general history of humanity. Hazaras changed with the
coming of Islam. Before, they were very open to learning from other religions. This was
part of Buddhism.

Sajjad said that he never thought about what it meant to be Hazara until he started reading books
by Mazari and the Soviet ethnographer Temirkhanov. Once he accessed this knowledge, he
realized that Hazaras were great, and that he must work on behalf of Hazaras, and not Shi’as.
At this point I jumped in, and asked how he learned about what books he should read.

Melissa, in school in Quetta, a girl who was namahram, not related to me, sat next to me
and I became so angry. My teacher, who was a woman, reprimanded me. I went home
and complained to my father that my teacher was not Muslim, but was Hazara, and he
became angry and told me, no, we are all Hazara. I went back to my teacher and she
started to guide my learning, told me what books to read. I became proud of my history,
my culture, of Buddhism, of the Silk Road. These are the reasons Hazaras are more open
minded than others in Afghanistan. Our history is the humanity of the Buddhists. We are
descended from all the people who mixed on the Silk Road. Because of this, we are more
open to other people. But Hazaras have lost their connection to the past. There is a loss of
identity, a loss of history. We have to find our identity in our peacefulness, in our links to
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the past.

As often happened with Sajjad, we talked late into afternoon. As dusk began to fall, I
took my leave and rapidly walked home through the early autumn potato fields in harvest,
hopping over drainage ditches, and circling fields that had not yet been harvested. Taking a path
up to the plateau of the village where I lived, I could see, through the gloom, the cliff faces and
the dark shadows of the Buddha niches. My anxiety subsiding about being out later than I
should, I reflected on what Sajjad had said and remembered similar things I heard my friend
Tahira, the wife of Jawad, say a week before: “We Hazaras are a mix of people. We were on the
Silk Road. People from India, China, other places came here. We built the Buddhas. Hazaras
were here before Islam. We are more open minded than the others.” The linking of openmindedness with awareness of Hazaras as a group, even if it is a group which has mixed
extensively with others, was a common theme. Sajjad remembers himself as narrow-minded, as
subject to a gender bias that he now fully rejects. What ended his self-perceived narrowmindedness, what in his view opened his mind, was not only the wisdom of his father and his
female teacher, but exposure to information about who Hazaras are. Once he understood the truth
about who Hazaras are, and from who they descend, he himself was able to overcome his past
and set his life upon a new direction.
What set the Hazaras apart from Afghanistan’s other peoples, in all these accounts, is that
claims to a Buddhist past lay available to them. This fits with the larger equation of history with
identity and the more specific contention that Hazaras have lost their history. When speaking of
the Buddhist era, that history was peaceful, cosmopolitan, and innovative. This is how the
activists want their fellow Hazaras, and the world, to understand their exceptionality in
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Afghanistan.

The Mongol Period
In March 2001, when the Buddha statues were destroyed by the Taliban, the event received a
significant amount of attention in the international news. Most of the stories covering the
destruction focused on the loss of an important art and cultural heritage site for the entire world,
some focused on the loss for Afghanistan, and some even focused on the loss for Buddhists (who
no longer live in Afghanistan). Very little attention was given to how Hazaras might have felt
about the loss of a key piece of their landscape and the heroes of the legend of Salsal and
Shahmama. One reason for this indifference to local perspective was the belief that the locals
were indifferent to the statues’ destruction. Paula Newberg, then serving as an adviser to the
United Nations, said in an interview with the New York Times that neither group involved in the
region had any sort of historical ties to the area (Crosette 2001). In the case of the Hazaras, the
most commonly accepted story about their origins is that they are descendants of Mongol
soldiers.
In a Skype conversation, a Hazara anthropology student studying in Mongolia smiled
wryly and asked me, “Surely, you have noticed that most international news stories concerning
Hazaras at some point mention this Mongol heritage? Foreigners are fascinated by the idea that
we are the left-overs of one of Chingiz’s units.” Western scholars have presented evidence of this
based on linguistic similarities of the Hazaragi dialect of Farsi with the Mongol language. 75 An
early Hazara historian, Faiz Mohammad Kateb (1912), who served in the court of Habibullah
from 1901-1919, also reported that Hazaras were Mongols.76 DNA mapping has shown that
Hazaras and Mongols share a high degree of genetic similarity (Hellenthan 2014). But activists
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are highly suspicious of several such studies, and several in the diaspora have had their own
DNA analyzed, which they claim shows they are more closely related to Turkic groups from the
Caspian Sea, which they point out is also called the Khazar Sea. They also cite a DNA study that
claims to show they are more closely related to the Turkic people of Central Asia (Begona 2011).
The question of descent from Mongols will not be definitively resolved by DNA tests, at least as
far as the activists are concerned.
Among non-activists, it is harder to say whether they believe in Mongol descent or even
think about this at all. Many people simply consider themselves Hazaras. Some reject the idea of
descent from either Mongols or Buddhists. The question of Hazara origins came up over lunch at
the workplace of my friends Khadija and Parvin, who do not consider themselves activists even
though they work as translators for an American project to train judges and lawyers.
Khadija said, “The idea that Hazaras came from somewhere else, that they are Mongols,
is not true. Pashtuns made this idea up.”
I asked, “So where do Hazaras originate?”
Parvin jumped in, “In the beginning of Islam, after the Prophet died, Ali was made
leader. But the friends of the Prophet did not agree with this, and so they fought against Ali. This
was the split between Sunni and Shi’a. Hazaras were among the Shi’a, and after this happened,
they came to Afghanistan.”
Parvin can’t imagine Hazaras as not being Shi’a Muslims. She therefore places the
beginning of Hazara as a people at the same location, temporally and geographically, as the
beginnings of Shi’a Islam. Others told me many Hazaras reject the idea of either a Mongol or
Buddhist past, based on the assertion that Hazara identity is inextricably linked to Islam. Thus,
many simply accept that they are Hazara and Muslim, have always been so, and do not seek
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answers about the past.
Other Hazaras disagree. I once made a weeks-long visit to the family of my friend Sakhi,
the guesthouse owner who also worked for an international development organization, where
only his mother and five sisters were currently staying. Even though there was an autumn chill in
the outside air, the family home was kept cozy by an underground heating shaft, connected to the
tandoor oven, bringing heat up through the floor. Sakhi’s mother was a thin, energetic woman
with a wrinkled, kind face and dark, twinkling eyes. I told her about some of my experiences in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and we compared the holidays and traditions of these groups with
those of Hazaras. All of a sudden Sakhi’s mother, almost mischievously said, “Well, we Hazaras
are Mongols, after all. That must be why we do some of the same things as Kyrgyz.” I was rather
surprised, because Sakhi’s’s mother is fairly religious. Yet she did not seem to find any problem
with being of Mongol descent and Muslim faith. I later found others who also share this view.
Sakhi himself disagreed with his mother, saying he did not believe Hazaras descended
from Mongols. Pushing his shaggy hair back from his eyes, he said, “She never told me about
this! I didn’t know about it!”
I asked several other activists what they think about Hazaras who claim Mongol descent.
Several saw this as Pashtun lies. “Melissa,” said Jawad, “the foreigners have written we are
Mongol. I know this. But they got their information from Pashtuns, who wanted others to believe
this about us.”
I soon found out, however, that the issue of Mongol ancestry remains unresolved among
activists. In a meeting with Sajjad, Firuzan, and Soraya, to talk about a protest, our conversation
strayed to the question of the origins of the Hazara people. Sajjad, having grown up in Quetta,
Pakistan said,
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When Hazaras were conquered by King Abdur Rahman, in the late 1800s, he used two
things to get people to fight against us. First, he said we were infidels, because we were
Shi’a. Then he said we were descendants of Chingiz Khan, those Mongols who destroyed
so much when they invaded Afghanistan. But he was wrong. Ninety percent of Hazaras
are more Turkic than Mongol. Turkic people originated in Afghanistan, they have been
here for at least 5,000 years, this has been proven by ancient archaeological artifacts.
Maybe ten percent of Hazaras are fully Mongol, and there has been some mixing, but
mostly, we are Turkic.

But then Firuzan, who later became a Provincial Council Member, chimed in, “You are
wrong. We are descended from the Mongols, and that is fine. I actually respect Chingiz. He
wanted to extend his empire as far as he could, and he succeeded. He was strong.”
Soraya, who had lived most of her life in Iran, added, “I didn’t like it in Iran. Iranians
always called us children of Chingiz. In school, when they wanted to give an example of a
criminal or murderer, they talked about Chingiz, and looked at us. They didn’t care that we were
Shi’a, only about how we looked.”
Some offer meta-commentary on the meaning of Mongol descent. Being world
conquering fighters but also responsible for the deaths of many people is a legacy that can be
spun in a negative or a positive way. It was pointed out to me on several occasions that when
Hazaras had to fight, as they did during the civil war and Taliban periods, being of Mongol
ancestry was an asset. Fighters need a strong image, and who was stronger than Chingiz Khan?
This was seen as a counter-image to the Pashtun, one of the “martial races” according to the
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British Empire, always ready for a fight, and counterbalanced the “Hazara as victim” narrative.
In Quetta, the image of Hazaras as descendants of Chingiz Khan seems to have remained
stronger, possibly because Hazaras in Quetta were more in danger than Hazaras in Afghanistan. 77
Sajjad actually said, “Yes, in Quetta, probably it will come to the point that we must fight. In
Afghanistan, we still might hope for peace.”
For civil society activists who wish to give emphasis to the idea that Hazaras are victims,
the idea that Hazaras are world-conquering Mongols seems out of place. Add to this the
experience of people like Soraya, of being called “Mongol” in a derogatory way in Iran, and it is
understandable why many want to shed this identity. The insult “sons of Chingiz” is also used in
Afghanistan by other ethnic groups, particularly when discussing atrocities alleged to have been
committed by Hazaras. The civil society activists want to promote the idea that they are peaceful
and respectful of human rights. They also want to promote their victimhood, to show they are the
most downtrodden people of Afghanistan.
Shahr-e-Gholghola, being visible from much of Bamyan, would be commented on by my
friends, who strove to bring the city’s tragic fate in line with their present sympathies. Not
wanting to identify with the destroyers of the City of Screams, they align themselves with the
residents of this city who were victims of the Mongols. One catch is that the story holds that the
Mongols killed everyone in the city. Latif, a reporter from a village next to Shahr-e-Gholghola
called Sayedabad, told me that not everyone was killed by the Mongols; some escaped and later
returned. But some Mongols also stayed and mixed with the locals, while other Mongols stayed
“pure.” According to him, his village, next to Shahr-e-Gholghola, had the most Mongol families
in Bamyan, about 20 percent. He told me this the first time I went to his house to interview his
parents.
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A few minutes later, I noticed a cow whose face was covered in warts being led by a
couple of people who looked, to me, like Hazaras. “What’s wrong with the face?” I asked.
Latif answered, “Them? Oh, you can tell! They are Mongol!” In my confusion, I did not
manage to explain that I was talking about the cow, but the miscommunication taught me
something about relations between those who consider themselves Hazara, and those considered
to be “pure Mongol.”
Sajjad perhaps most clearly illustrates the ambivalence Hazara activists feel toward being
the descendants of the Mongols. In his case, it was probably enhanced by his having come from
Quetta. Sajjad gives rousing speeches, which spur other students to action. When he gives public
speeches, I feel I am in the presence of a great leader, even if that potential has not been fully
realized. Sajjad is adamant that Hazaras are the original people of Bamyan and that they are of
Turkic descent. However, Sajjad recently changed his last name to Mughal, which is said to be
one of the few Mongol tribes that settled in the Hazara homeland, and his brother has a name that
incorporates Chingiz.78 I asked him why, since he had previously strongly upheld the Turkic
origins of Hazaras. “You must understand, only five percent of Hazaras are Mongol, and they
come from several tribes. A Hazara sociologist in Quetta has researched this. I, unfortunately,
know that I descend from one of these tribes.” Competing identities can be difficult to reconcile,
as the changes in Sajjad’s explanation of his own genealogy illustrate.

Arguing Turkic Descent and Indigeneity in Afghanistan
In discussing transnational memory-making in the Solomon Islands, Geoffrey White (1995)
demonstrates that local histories are not accounted for in the narratives of foreign World War
Two veterans, the Solomon Island government, or tour operators. Local voices are heard in the
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construction of this history, but they must fall in line with the dominant transnational narrative.
Hazaras have, similarly, had very little opportunity until recently to construct their own written
history, perhaps with the exception of Faiz Mohammad Kateb’s Torch of History. And yet now
they are trying. One aspect of this is the activists’ attempts, while I was in the field in 2012 and
2013, to stress a Turkic identity. Turkic-ness is recast as, not the result of one of the many waves
of migration which came from further east in the relatively recent past, but rather as the marker
of indigeneity in Afghanistan. I will give a condensed version as to how Hazaras have woven a
Turkic past into their history, although much of the following comes from several discussions
with and from speeches by Nawruz.
Hazara activists who want to construct a different, non-Mongol identity almost all state
that they are “boumi” or “asli” (original or indigenous people) of Afghanistan. Not everyone
professes to be Turkic: some claim Aryan descent, while others treat Hazara as a completely
separate, unrelated category. But the majority who are interested in history assert they are
Turkic, although this assertion takes different forms. Sajjad told me that Turkic peoples
originated in Afghanistan, and when I asked if there was a chance they had moved to
Afghanistan from somewhere else, he repeated that Turkic Hazaras are boumi. Sajjad finds it
difficult to reconcile the many strands of his personal and family history, as a person of
Yakawlangi origin, which many Hazaras believe to be the most “pure” in its Hazara tradition,
who had even so never known a home other than Quetta until coming to Bamyan for university.
He feels deep ties to Bamyan and Yakawlang, and yet believes himself to be descended from
Mongols.
The Hazara recounting of their Turkic-ness can result in more than just individual
confusion. It is common knowledge that Turkic people came from farther east and rode with
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Chingiz Khan (making Turkic blood conceivably also related to the Mongol invasion). In
contrast, the early people of the Bamyan plateau, the Kushans and latter Buddhists, are
understood not to be Turkic. In reconciling their Turkic background with an autochthonous tie to
their land, Hazara history keepers seem to want to turn “either/ors” into “both/ands.” If at one
moment they assert they are indigenous, Turkic, or both, then in the next they may celebrate their
mixed heritage. Much seems to come down to purported “core” heritages: at core, they are
Turkic; or something else; or something uniquely Hazara. No one even so denies that over the
centuries they have mixed with other groups: no one claims to be purely Hazara, or purely
Turkic, or purely anything. They take pride in their mixing, in their Turkic-ness and in their
Hazara-ness.
A number of activists claim that it is exactly this mixing which makes Hazaras different
from the other ethnic groups living in Afghanistan. They have acquired, they say, the good
qualities of all of their ancestors. This celebration of mixing also helps them in creating ties to
their land. They are proud of a Silk Road heritage, which is associated with the interaction and
mixing of many peoples. Travelers have come and gone, and mixed genetically and culturally
with their hosts, while the autochthones who were the ancestors of the Hazaras remained in
place. Thus, Hazaras are exceptional in claiming to be boumi but exceptional, too, in claiming to
be mixed. Hence, too, the coexistence of variant strands of history outside of the Mongol
narrative. Hazaras seem to be in no hurry to establish their own historical orthodoxy, to reject
what they or others might consider irreconcilable linkages, and are content to pick and choose
from what parts of history best serve their favored narratives. The stress on mixing and the stress
of Turkic-ness might seem a paradox but to my informants it simply shows that the roots of their
identity are plural.
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One evening, Sajjad spoke in greater depth about his roots, suggesting perhaps some
psychic conflicts about his background. During the few hours of electricity that I had each
evening, I worked at completing field notes and getting other necessary writing done. I was also
online, via a USB hotspot, and sometimes took time to chat.
Sajjad began a Facebook chat. He started the conversation by saying, “Did you see I
changed my name, Melissa? I was Sajjad Sargij, now I have taken the last name Mughal. Do you
like the change?”
I expressed confusion, remembering he had told me “Sargij” indicated someone who was
confused, or confusing.
Sajjad said, “I took the name Mughal, because the grandson of the great Chingiz was
important here.”
“So you decided you want to take a name derived from the people of Chingiz? Why, I
thought you said Hazaras are not descended from Mongols.”
Sajjad answered, “It is my tribe, Melissa. I do not like to put myself with Chingiz. But
this is the truth. Most Hazaras are from the original people here, but there are some, from other
tribes, who joined later. Today, there are two Hazara tribes descended Mongols. Most people in
Yakawlang belonged to one of these two tribes.”
Confused, I asked what he meant by this, whether all of the people of Yakawlang belong
to these two Mongol tribes?
He explained he meant most of the people had submitted, or been subdued, or politically
dominated, by those belonging to these two Mongol tribes. “Only .01% of Hazaras are related to
these two tribes,” he wrote, “and 95 percent are Turk.”
At this point I began to feel like I was back on familiar ground. He went on to say the
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other, just under five percent, are made up of a mix of other nations: Tajik, Sayed, Baloch, but all
consider themselves, and are accepted, as Hazara.
“But,” I asked, “you, in particular, are you Mongol?”
“I don’t want to be this,” he reiterated, “but I can’t escape the truth. This is what I am. I
am Mongol, and Hazaras are Turk, but now I am Hazara and of clean heart and pure human.”
Of course, I later questioned Sajjad about his assertions, and how it was he came to have
such exact numbers of Hazaras who were Mongol versus those who were not.
Sajjad began by saying that he, in fact, loves Chingiz Khan. “Chingiz, after all, did
nothing different from what other kings did. He conquered. He got more land.” Chingiz here
might be compared to Abdur Rahman, who also conquered and brought many peoples under his
direct control. “Only five percent of Hazaras are Mongol, though,” he continued, upping the
number slightly. “The rest are Turks, the original people.”
I asked him where he got these exact percentages, and he told me that one of his Quettan
teachers had conducted surveys in many villages throughout Hazara areas in Afghanistan; by
asking the people what they considered themselves to be, these are the numbers he got. Leaving
aside the methodology of these surveys, the example shows again that there is no definitive
Hazara consensus as to whether they are of Mongol ancestry or not. Sajjad’s story confirms also
that the understanding of Mongol’s meanings — whether bloody, ruthless killers or strong,
courageous warriors — is in flux in Afghanistan. What was once used as an epithet is now
recoverable as identity. Activists’ views, both in general, based on what I have read in social
media, and in personal, one-on-one interactions, towards the idea of Mongol descent, varies,
sometimes becoming more popular, and sometimes rejected. Even as Bamyan activists push one
narrative arc, and activists in Quetta push another, they are in constant communication with each
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other.
Not long before I left my field site, my landlord, an officer in the army, stopped by. Out
of the blue, he said, “You know, I know a lot about history, and there is a big question right now
as to whether Hazaras are descended from Mongols or not. We are not, although we mixed with
them some when they came here. You can tell those Hazaras who are descended from Mongols
by their faces.” This, of course, is reminiscent of the evidence given as to how we know that
Hazaras are descended from the early Buddhist inhabitants: by the way their faces appear, as
well as Latif’s assertion about Mongols’ particular facial features in Sayedabad.
Hazaras, lacking a written history that refers to them explicitly, are filling in the gaps as
best they can. They rely on the books of Hazara experts, they rely on talks and speeches given by
activists, and they rely upon their very bodies’ appearances. This is not surprising, considering
the degree of racialized prejudice they face in Afghanistan. This, too, they have learned to turn to
their own purposes.

Conclusion
In taking control of the telling of their own history, Hazaras have taken a two-pronged approach,
on one hand writing histories in keeping with Western narrative styles and source conventions,
and on the other giving heightened credence to oral and traditional sources. Hazara history
keepers have conflicting attitudes also toward what kind of knowledge history represents. Some
say history is always a construct, their own history included, while others maintain that they are
uncovering hidden truths through their new histories of the Hazaras. Rapapport’s (1998)
discussion of Nasa activist history, who borrow from both Western and indigenous models of
history, redefines these two traditions as distinct but juxtaposed “codes.” Kanishka and Nowruz
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exemplify activists who are very adept at switching between these codes. I have found that all
types of Hazara history making, whether in a rigorous academic style or a more mythologized,
oral style, focus on two main ideas. One, that Hazaras have long been victims in Afghanistan’s
history, has been referenced throughout earlier chapters. The second, that Hazaras are
autochthonous to Afghanistan, has been the focus of the second half of this chapter.
In the second part of this chapter, I dealt more specifically with two ancient historical
periods that Hazaras have had to interpret in their project to show that they belong in
Afghanistan. More recent historical events fall easily into the narrative mold of the Hazaras as a
victimized, traumatized people. When it relates to ancient Buddhists and Mongols, Hazara
historians claim more latitude in “mythifying” history, there being fewer sources and less
certainty concerning how today’s Hazaras relate to these ancient people. These histories also
serve a double, paradoxical purpose. On one hand, historical events are interpreted (perhaps
“over-interpreted”) to position the Hazaras as victims of traumatic events. Their Buddhist past
was destroyed by Islamic invaders, they say, making Bamyan a more enclosed and less open
society. And by positioning Hazara ancestors as the victims but also descendants of Mongol
invaders, they become at one and the same time original inhabitants and invaders, peaceful
people and warriors. By promoting and trying to reconcile both narratives, Hazaras achieve a
double hybridity, positioning themselves as both victims and exceptional people, inheritors of
cultural traits without match in the rest of Afghanistan. And it is exactly the murkiness of their
history and the lack of reliable written sources that make possible not just code-switching
between a Western historical tradition and locally meaningful frames of reference to the past but
a blending of the two to form a new mythified historical past, which appeals to Hazaras for both
sounding authoritative and speaking to questions that matter to them.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion

On July 23, 2016, twin suicide bombers attacked a large, peaceful Hazara protest in Kabul. The
attackers killed over 85 people and seriously wounded more than 200. This was the deadliest
single attack since the Taliban fell in 2001. Daesh, or ISIS, claimed responsibility for the attack.
Members of the Hazara activist community maintain even so that the Afghan government likely
had a hand in it; they note that many of the killed and wounded were hit not by the blast but by
the fire of security forces who shot into the crowd, ostensibly to stop a third suicide bomber. The
body of a third bomber was found but again protesters find it mysterious how the security forces
even knew he was there. Many feared the government had turned against Hazaras.
The protesters were members of the Hazara-led Enlightening, or Enlightenment
Movement. In the months leading up to the July 23 attack, this movement staged a number of
highly visible protests, some of which were attended by hundreds or even thousands. The
protests began in Bamyan and then spread to Kabul, with smaller protests occurring in other
cities, as well. Earlier in 2016, the ethnic Hazara second vice-president, Sarwar Danish, released
information indicating that the government had made the decision, because of cost and logistics,
to reroute an energy transmission line: Bamyan was to be bypassed and instead a route through
the Salang Pass, along which two other major electricity lines already ran, was to be used. The
line is known as TUTAP, or TUTA (Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan,
with Pakistan eventually bowing out from the proposal). Many Hazaras responded that this
decision to by-pass Bamyan was a clear case of ethnic discrimination. Protests against the
TUTAP re-routing started in Bamyan and were held in Kabul and by diaspora groups around the
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world.79
80

I followed the protests from the United States via social media. Many of the protesters

were acquaintances and friends. Even knowing how much of the rest of Afghanistan lacks
electricity, I was sympathetic to the issue. Bamyan is the symbolic homeland of the Hazaras. The
lack of sufficient electricity is perceived there as an ethnic-based slight designed to keep Hazaramajority areas from advancing. While I understood that many other provincial centers of similar
size suffer from similar difficulties, Bamyan is central to the feelings and perceptions of the
entire population of Hazaras.

The Enlightening Movement: From Bamyan 2012/2013 to Kabul Today
Alakain Square, or Lantern Square, makes multiple appearances in this dissertation. At one end
of Bamyan bazaar, this square features a large blue lantern statue. It is an important intersection:
one road heads north to Shahr-e Nau, one into the bazaar, and two others head out in the
direction of nearby villages. For the residents of Bamyan, the lantern symbolizes their lack of
reliable electricity. During the time of my fieldwork, most Bamyan residents relied on
community generators, small solar panels, micro-hydro power stations, or gas lamps. Most
businesses were unable to run office equipment: solar power was too weak, and generators, too
expensive. I learned from activists that the history of their work in Bamyan started largely with
protests concerning infrastructure. They spoke of unpaved roads, a lack of clean water, but more
than anything else, of electricity. They pointed to Alakain Square as a symbol of this. They
indicated that while they had moved on to what seemed more pressing issues — security, justice,
and acknowledgement of their genocide — the lack of electricity was always there. A tacit
reminder was that most protests were held in or ended at Alakain Square. When I did a bit of
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research on the issue of electricity, people had so much to say that I wrote an article on Hazaras’
perception that their lack of electric power symbolized their marginality (Chiovenda 2014).
A major complaint among Bamyan residents was that electrification was promised but
never completed. A hydro-electric dam to be built at Shash-Pul, a few kilometers from Bamyan,
never got beyond the planning stage. A USAID employee gleefully told me of his plan to create
underground generators to power the bazaar but it never got beyond planning either. A New
Zealand organization did implement a larger scale solar project but this, people in Bamyan later
told me, brought electricity to homes and did not support any sort of industry. Thus a succession
of disappointments had already happened by the time Hazaras learned that government planners
had considered routing the TUTAP line through Bamyan but then switched the route elsewhere.
At the same time, the protests were about more than electricity. Kidnappings and killings
of Hazaras were increasing, making already risky travel by road seem in some areas to be truly
putting one’s life in God’s hands. Word of every killing spread through social media, and people
were afraid. It was against this background that the Enlightening Movement was born,
demanding that TUTAP be routed through Bamyan as well as asking for security, rights and
equality for Hazaras.

Experiencing the Attack in Athens
On July 23, I was not in Afghanistan but in Athens, Greece, conducting pilot research for a
future project with Hazara refugees. I knew a big protest was planned, and so I followed social
media reports throughout the day. When news of the explosion was first reported, it did not, at
first, sink in. But after some minutes had passed, I began crying. I told myself I was overreacting. Yet this seemed a direct attack on my field site. Many activists I knew personally had

311

moved to Kabul since I was in Bamyan. As the numbers killed rose, I started trying to contact
everyone I knew who might have been on the scene.
I slowly contacted my friends. No one whom I know was killed but several were injured,
and many had lost friends or family members. I watched on Facebook as friends “checked in,”
and then recorded their movements as they collected the bodies of their relatives and journeyed
with them to their home province for burial. The next day, I ventured out to meet the Hazara
refugees I was working with in Athens. They were in shock; one had lost a cousin, and several
had family or friends injured. The Greek Hazaras recounted the event over and over. They
huddled around cell phones showing videos of the moment of the explosions. Videos showed
people running away from the bombs, and then back towards the site to attend to the wounded
and dead. Others showed people screaming and crying into the camera about what had happened.
Still photos showed bodies ripped to shreds and body parts. One Greek Hazara said, “This is our
people. This is what they do to us.”
We prepared a candlelight memorial protest that evening. Standing and sitting on the
busy Athens sidewalk near Syntagma Square, across from the Greek Parliament, refugees held
candles, lit candles on the ground that spelled “Kabul,” scattered roses around, and in the back,
stood in a line holding pictures of the ripped and torn bodies of the victims and placards with
slogans such as “Stop the Hazara Genocide.” Some refugees journeyed into Athens from
outlying camps. Passersby barely took note, only a few stopping for a moment before continuing
on their way.
I later went back to a bar where we often met and talked (men who came to Greece as
teens or in their early twenties being not too worried about Muslim prohibitions against
drinking), the refugees, the foreign researchers, the foreigners there to provide aid, and some
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Greeks who were close to the refugees. It felt like a sort of wake. This happened also to be my
last night in Athens. We were all grieving but also remembering all that we had done together, to
help the refugees in Greece in some way. We were remembering so many Afghan tragedies. For
these refugees, their very lives were a sort of tragedy, stuck in Greece, with little positive to look
forward to. Sadness was on everyone’s face, but as the night wore on and people drank, we could
joke and recall happy moments as well. I went to bed very late, and the next day left Athens, as
planned.
A few days later, I was in Afghanistan, on my first return visit since my fieldwork. I had
planned this visit much earlier but found that I was returning under very different circumstances
than hoped.

A Return to Afghanistan
When I first got to Kabul, after the attack, in August 2016, I did not know if I would be met with
happiness or sadness by my activist friends. Some met me with joy. They took me to a memorial
poetry reading for those killed. I was surprised to find I had become a sort of celebrity. People I
had never met recognized me. Through helping activists with English language editing of
announcements, articles, press releases, and so on, I had come to occupy an ambiguous space,
part local, part outsider.
After a few days in Kabul, I went to Bamyan. Returning to Bamyan was a rush of
memories, a constant search to see what had changed and what had remained the same. At one
level, nothing was different. The Buddha niches still looked out across the plateau. Farmers still
harvested potatoes and threshed wheat using oxen and hand tools. Shahr-e-Gholghola still rose
from wheat and potato fields. The bazaar had some new shops, and many of the same old ones.
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More roads were paved. The airport had a terminal building, making it not simply a stretch of
gravel people walk across unless closed for an arriving flight.
The activists with whom I met were also a mix of old and new. Some whom I knew from
2012 and 2013 were still there, their roles little changed. Some had moved to Kabul, to the
United States or elsewhere. Some who were young students just getting involved when I did my
fieldwork had become leaders in the activist community.
In Bamyan, it was almost as if a return to that land, that air, that sunlight, was a renewal,
taking my mind back to a time before my work with refugees, before the July 23rd bombings, and
even before I took on my new roles of mother, Hazara and refugee expert, and university
instructor. Bamyan seemed to enfold me. People greeted me everywhere, took up all my time to
discuss politics, walk with me to heritage sites, and laugh and cry and try to cope with the
terrible attack of just a few weeks before. I stayed in a friend’s guesthouse that is situated
directly below the larger Buddha niche, and when I wandered the flowery courtyard the niche of
Salsal loomed above. I avoided Gholghola, choosing to see it only in the distance. I spent a long
time walking along the Azhdar, or dragon, ruins. The dragon was a rock formation split in half,
once a fearsome beast that Ali had killed to save the local people. His eye is a sulphur spring
from which he eternally cries. We climbed high up the hills to touch his tears, a strong wind
blowing dust into our eyes and hair. I dined with friends, had meetings with new and old friends,
went to a calligraphy exhibition, and met with the new governor. One day I went to Band-e-Amir
and jumped, fully clothed, off a swan paddle boat into the shockingly cold water. I let myself
sink, felt the pressure change, then kicked my way upward into the light, feeling free. What kind
of paradise could this be, once freed of violence and its memory?
Experiencing Bamyan again reminded me that, for Hazaras all over Afghanistan and the
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world, Bamyan is a symbol of their people. As a colonized and contested space, Bamyan also
symbolizes the Hazara history, which also has been colonized and taken from them. As home to
Salsal and Shahmama, Bamyan may be most famous for what it has lost. Much of this
dissertation has been an argument that Hazara activists also seek to make Hazaras famous for
what they have lost. Cultural trauma means more than the experience of a threat or disruption; it
begins with the desire never to forget what has been suffered and lost; it grows by showing your
fellow people and the world that this loss is felt and is the key to the group’s collective identity.
The attack in Kabul of July 23, 2016, fits seamlessly into this view of Hazaras’ place in
Afghanistan.
People were hurting and scared. They did not know in the immediate aftermath of the
attack if they could continue their protest activities. But the protests continued, albeit in a more
subdued way. The memorial poetry reading was not done in secret but in a restaurant where
activists are known to congregate. Forty days after the attack, a significant remembrance day for
Muslim mourners, Hazaras stood on their roofs and held candles. “We can only be safe if we
protest on our roofs,” I was told. Hazaras from all over Europe traveled to Brussels in September
2016 to protest the NATO meeting about Afghanistan. Currently, a large protest in memory of
Shukria Tabassum is in planning stages for late November 2016.

Collective and Cultural Trauma
As I have been writing this dissertation, presenting at conferences, giving talks, and submitting
article manuscripts for publication, I have been repeatedly asked, “Is cultural trauma actually
spreading among the larger Hazara population? Is the activist project working?” The answer
remains uncertain and to a degree stands beyond Hazara control. What seemed clear, as
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thousands of individuals marched in Kabul before July 23, was that Hazaras had indeed been
persuaded that they need to take action. Taking action, sadly, caused more trauma: physical,
psychological, collective, and probably cultural. Only time can tell if July 23 takes on the same
symbolic weight as Afshar carries.
Trauma is used to describe a range of experiences. Its narrow meaning is severe damage
done to the body, yet even physical trauma has the potential to leave scars not only on the body
but the mind. Conversely, an emotionally disturbing experience might induce lasting psychic
harm even if no physical damage is experienced. And when a person is part of a group whose
members experience widespread individual trauma, then even people not directly present at the
scene of violence might collectively experience indirect, psychological trauma, by hearing
others’ testimony and seeing photos and videos of the event.
In all these ways, the events of July 23, 2016 were traumatic and increased substantially
the number of Hazaras who have experienced traumatogenic events. More than one told me that
they had been at the protest site in Kabul, had seen body parts and articles of clothing lying
about, had picked these up, lain them on a massive Afghan flag used in the protest, and later
transported these for mass burial. Even hearing this be told can inflict psychological distress.
Judging from the reactions of the Hazaras I was with that day in Athens — shock, tears, sadness,
sometimes yelling against injustice, sometimes becoming unable to talk — I can say that
collective trauma is real and that it can be transmitted via stories, pictures, videos, and emotively
persuasive words. For many, the scars may remain for years.
Cultural trauma also indicates that, in some way, some defining characteristic about the
group is under threat, attacked, or even lost. A shocking event, or series of events leads members
of that group to believe they, or their way of life, are threatened. But for a cultural trauma, or in
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fact any collective trauma, to spread, work must be done by mediators who deliver the message
of trauma to larger numbers of individuals. Sometimes, more people experience psychological
trauma through the work of mediators than through the events themselves. As horrific as the
attack of July 23 was, then, it matters also that Hazara activists have become skilled in
collective-trauma generation. They create images, slogans, cartoons, and carefully edited film
clips aimed to initiate maximum affective response. The Enlightening Movement has added to
this, publicizing this traumatic event in Afghanistan and throughout the world using social media
and relying on Hazara activists and allies to participate in protests in numerous countries. With
this attack, especially, I came to appreciate the power of media to traumatize people virtually,
from afar.
While July 23, 2016 may currently be the defining moment for Hazara civil society
activists, it will no doubt eventually blend in among the many tragic events that activists call
upon to claim their trauma. It fits so perfectly with the already established narratives that I have
discussed. The bomb attacks highlight the purity of Hazara victimhood, through their adherence
to nonviolence in the face of government neglect and anti-Shi’a atrocities. Not warlike children
of Chingiz, they are the peaceful, original people of Bamyan. They take to the streets in peaceful
protest, carrying a giant Afghan flag and saying they only want to be equal citizens of
Afghanistan. Having suffered violence at the hands of Abdur Rahman, other Pashtun kings and
the Taliban, and having lived in an under-developed area for generations, they now raise their
voices simply ask for human rights, the rights they know should be theirs. In asking for the
trauma to end, they expose themselves to further trauma.

Schisms and Fractures
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In August 2016 I began to learn about some of the cracks and splinters which were emerging due
to disagreements about the future of the movement, disagreements that were already emerging
about the planning of the July 23 demonstration. Some I was already aware of. I knew quite well
that some activists in Bamyan criticized others for relying too much upon the government or
nongovernmental sector. Tensions also emerged surrounding the question of who has the right to
speak for Bamyan. The organizers for the July 23 protest and of protests and memorials that
followed were not only Kabul Hazaras but also returned members of the diaspora, people who
hold two passports. Non-Hazaras speculated that people in Bamyan did not want problems, and
that it was really these outsiders stirring up trouble. My activist friends in Bamyan rejected this
notion, a position confirmed by the large turnout for protests held in Bamyan. People in the
Afghan government expressed the opinion that those movement leaders who did not stop the
protest are at fault. This criticism tacitly consigns the Hazaras to the “pathetic victim” paradigm,
who bring killing upon themselves if they stand up for their rights, and hence are not really
victims. Movement organizers continue to try to straddle both pathetic and heroic victim
paradigms, acting as both downtrodden victims and rights defenders.
In Kabul, during summer 2016, I met with Farid, whom I had known in Bamyan. He had
also been on the edges of the attack when it happened. He told me, “I supported their movement,
but not this protest. They played with people’s lives. They played, and they lost. People are
dead.”
Another activist, studying in the UK, asserted the same. “I just can’t support it anymore,
Melissa. What they did was wrong. So many people died. They didn’t have to die.”
In fact, the Afghan government had given protest organizers intelligence there would be
an attack, and the organizers decided to proceed all the same. I asked why. “Melissa,” Najib said,
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“they said that about every protest we had before, and there was no attack. They did not give us
any solid intelligence, they just gave us some vague warnings. They wanted to prevent the
protest from happening. That is why they tell us there will be an attack. The Hazaras in the
government, Mohaqeq, yes, he did not go, but we thought he was abandoning us. We really
thought we did the right thing.” My conversations with several movement leaders confirmed that
no one sent junior activists to their deaths alone; senior leaders were present right where the blast
happened and several were injured. Sooner than seeking martyrdom for themselves or others,
they seem to have misjudged how risky the situation was.
The opposite scenario seems more likely, in which Hazaras will be too scared to demand
their rights and choose instead to stay home.
Possibly fragile, too, is Hazaras’ adherence to human rights, non-violence and
cosmopolitan coexistence. One Greek Hazara told me, “My biggest dream, truly, is to pick up a
weapon and fight for my people.” Several activists in Bamyan said similar things, some saying
Hazaras had to start arming themselves against the Taliban, Daesh, and possibly even the Afghan
state. So far, armed Hazara militias have limited their actions to guarding more stretches of
dangerous road than before. But I was surprised to hear that several of my friends in Bamyan
armed themselves in preparation for a trip to Band-e-Amir. This is but one example of how 2016
seems different and darker than 2013.
For now, however, Hazara activists still want their past to be the Silk Road’s mixing of
peoples and the peacefulness of the Buddhas, and want in the future to speak the international
language of human rights. Even as they hold that their culture was lost, as a result of the repeated
external aggressions they have suffered at the hands of the Mongols, Abdur Rahman, and the
Taliban, they believe they can recover this culture by becoming the people of peace, who have
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suffered a genocide and responded by defending human rights. In this, the Hazara protest
movement’s balance between ethno-nationalism and cosmopolitanism is generalizable. All over
the world, political contests and armed conflicts are cast as a competition between these two
opposing spheres. Yet in each region where it plays out, it takes on the particularities of local
histories and myths.
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End Notes
1

It is worth pointing out that a group might not physically be at risk, but their core values could

be perceived to be under threat. One might argue that the reunification of Germany had the
potential to create a cultural trauma for those who identified as East Germans, even as the
reunification was largely viewed as a positive occurrence at the time it happened. Yet many East
Germans clearly feel that an integral part of who there are has been lost, and children of
individuals who lived in East Germany can also express these feelings of loss even if they did
not experience life in East Germany (Berdahl 1999). The same might be said for the transition
from communist to post-communist experienced by many Soviet and Soviet bloc nations in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (Sztompka 2004).
2

Novick 1999, The Holocaust in American Life, is another work that demonstrates how the

Holocaust came to be understood after the fact, how it should be remembered and memorialized.
Of course, this is always an ongoing process. In the case of the Holocaust, meaning is still
discussed, and real and fictional accounts in the form of literature, films, and television, continue
to mediate the subject. This is extremely clear in the case of the Holocaust but could also be the
case for any collective trauma.
3

It could also be said that I am siding with Eyerman, as I do believe he is attempting to take a

trauma that is clearly of long duration and make it “fit” into the model developed by the
theorists, which suggests a shorter duration by using inability to integrate rather than slavery
itself as the memory of the trauma.
4

A parallel between cultural trauma as described by Alexander, et al, is The Birth of African

American Culture (Mintz and Price 1972). This book argues that will the slave trade enslaved
people from many cultures, the trauma of slavery, and even earlier, the actual passage on slave
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ships, began to form a new culture based not only on an amalgamation of beliefs, but also the
fact that such crisis, becoming enslaved, the horrific journey, and slavery itself, was shared.
However, as with Hazaras, certain remnants did remain, were picked through and what was
useful was kept as that which was eventually became part of the “new,” trauma-based culture.
5

In fact, the project should technically be called “TUTA” because the Pakistan portion has been

dropped. However, it is usually popularly referred to is TUTAP. The decision concerning routing
is based on the report of a study by a German organization, the Fichtner Group. As the report
explains advantages and disadvantages to both routes, it is used as “evidence” by both sides in
the disagreement over the routing of TUTAP. No social scientist appears to have worked with
the organization to include potential social problems or aspects relating to one route or the other.
6

Of course, people from all ethnicities, Hazaras, Pashtuns, Tajiks, and others, engage in

activities that both create a sense of a shared Afghan nation and that work to the detriment of this
feeling of shared nation. In my now seven years of experience monitoring online discussions of
Afghan, and researching in Afghanistan with both Hazaras and Pashtuns, this has become
abundantly clear.
7

Twelver Shi’as are the most populous Shi’a group, who believe that after Prophet Mohammad,

twelve Imams lived who were his successors on earth. However, the last Imam, the Mahdi, went
into Occultation, or was hidden from view in this world, in 873. They believe that he will return
and usher in a period of peace. Other Shi’a sects include the Ismailis, and Zaidis, who believe
that there have been different numbers of rightful Imams.
8

This is a different usage of the term from that of Arjun Appadurai, who coined it initially.

According to him, ethnoscape as an idea allows a conceptualization of the way that in the world
we currently live, people are constantly moving, shifting, due to tourism, migration, and so on. A
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person’s ethnic “home”, then, is not necessarily geographically bounded, or they may not live
within a recognized geographical homeland. See Appadurai (1996).
9

This was despite the fact that some encroachments were made at this time, some of the most

fertile areas of land was lost, and the first withdrawing into the mountain strongholds of the
Central Highlands began (Ibrahimi 2009a).
10

Canfield (2004) discusses the idea that, up until a certain point, it was somehow “common

knowledge” that Hazaras were difficult, uncivilized people, and that these suppositions were
largely unfounded.
11

I often return to my time at Georgetown because a very real, alternate possibility to my life

trajectory would be that I also might have embarked upon one of these career paths, and worked
in Afghanistan. What I learned in the class would have made up the base of my knowledge about
the country.
12

In fact, the families of mirs, khans, and begs did not disappear. They simply faded into the

population. Today, Hazaras know who comes from one of these families, and might even joke
about it, but I was told that generally remembrances of such titles carry little political power or
social capital.
13

The assertion that kuchis cooperated with the Taliban is not an unfounded one, particularly as

kuchis, who during the years of the Soviet occupation and civil war, were unable to collect
arrears in rent payments owed by the Hazaras, after their traditional lands were legally given to
kuchis by Abdur Rahman. The Taliban has been known to make use of kuchi land claims to arm
and encourage kuchis to fight against Hazaras, particularly in the Behsood districts (there are two
of the same name) in Wardak province. For more on this see Ibrahimi 2009a.
14

Many also point out that a Hazara, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, also served as Chairman of the
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Council of Ministers twice in communist Afghanistan. However, activists rightly points out that
the inclusion of one person in a high government position, and slightly more access to education
during the communist period, did not reverse what decades of discrimination had accomplished.
15

Problems with Sayeds today are compounded as other ethnic groups consider Shi’a Sayeds

from Hazara regions to be Hazaras, even as Hazaras consider them to be a non-Hazara, more
privileged ethnic group. When a Sayed gains a position of power in Parliament, for example, the
state counts him as a Hazara but the Hazaras do not. This feeds into Hazara ideas that they are
underrepresented.
16

The ethnic identity of Mohseni, today one of the most important ayatollahs and marj-e-taqlid,

or source of emulation, in Afghanistan, is shrouded in mystery. From predominately Pashtun
Kandahar, he is assumed by most I have spoken to be Pashtun, and in fact claims to be a native
Pashtun speaker. Yet, in a personal communication with Solaiman Fazel, a PhD student in
anthropology at Indiana University who had an official meeting with Mohseni, his selfidentification is apparently intentionally obscured. Mohseni was careful not to answer the
question regarding his ethnicity. However, Fazel told me that Kizilbosh in Kandahar, a Shi’a
ethnic group which has long been a large minority in that city, are divided. Some claim Mohseni
is a Shi’a Pashtun, of which there are a significant number, many of whom hide their faith.
Others claim that he, like them, is a Kandahari Kizilbosh. Today, Hazara have tense relations
with Kizilbosh, who often occupy high positions as an educated, politically connected group in
Afghanistan.
17

In fact, the interaction between these two groups is a bit more complex. Nasr had been

supported, even instigated, by Iran’s Foreign Affairs Ministry since 1980, but the determination
was made that it was not effective. Pasdaran, which was supported by the Iranian Pasdaran
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(Revolutionary Guards), then became an alternative group, and the two vied for power in
Afghanistan, reflecting power struggles taking place in Iran.
18

More than a few Afghanistan experts, and so-called experts, have argued this point, as well as

non-Hazara Afghans, stating that Iran did arm Wahdat and support it financially. There is
probably some truth in the middle. Iran likely gave some support, but it was not nearly at the
level of that which was funneled to Sunni groups via Pakistan, especially as Iran became
embroiled in the devastating Iran-Iraq war. Wahdat, on the other hand, likely accepted whatever
was on offer, as do Hazaras to this day. But activists who want to foment ties with the United
States and other Western countries will surely downplay such assistance, or paint it in a sinister
light.
19

It is worth noting that in Kabul, in 1989, around the same time, Hazara elites and businessmen,

including Keshtmand, set up the Sherkat-e Khurasan, a business venture-alliance with a clear
intent to foster greater opportunities among Hazaras.
20

This is not the current section of the city known as Shahr-e Nau, but rather what is currently

simply known as “the bazaar”.
21

The Communist period preceding the invasion also witnessed a slight improvement in

Hazaras’ situation. A slightly increased number were able to attend university and school.
Furthermore, a Hazara, Ali Kishtmand, served as Chairman of Council of Ministers from 19811990, and briefly as vice-president from 1990-1991. Kishtmand is often invoked by those of
other ethnicities as proof that Hazaras did in fact have upward mobility, although the
preponderance of evidence shows that most Hazaras suffered from social exclusion.
22

Critiques of this approach are many, including Hesford and Kozol 2005, Farrell and

McDermott 2005, Davis 2005, and Kandiyoti 2007. Such critics point out that, in addition to the
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apparent disingenuity whereby Afghan women are used as an “excuse” for military actions,
development projects focusing on Afghan women often relegate them to a domestic sphere when
they may traditionally carry out more extensive roles in agriculture and other means of
production, meaning that their knowledge is overlooked. Furthermore, those very same military
actions cause great harm to women and children victims of collateral damage.
23

This discussion took place in the context of a talk given by the author on February 26, 2016 for

the Friday Morning Seminar on Culture, Psychiatry, and Global Mental Health. The title of the
talk was “Collective Trauma Among Shi’a Hazaras in Afghanistan: Variations on the Karbala
Paradigm.”
24

To give an example, a colleague who is collecting various dances from Afghanistan learned

early on that this is a touchy and even politically issue. She highlighted such Hazara dances such
as pish-po and Hazaragi on a website she made, as well as dances from other ethnic groups. Of
course, she also featured the prototypical Pashtun dance, the attan, which many other ethnic
groups do now also dance. She was taken aback when she began receiving angry comments on
the site from Afghans, presumably Pashtuns, insisting all Afghan dance was attan and that she
had missed something very important in her research.
25

This reflects a change in development practices generally from large scale infrastructural

projects, which were found to potentially increase stratification, to more targeted, grassrootsinitiated projects. For example see Gardner and Lewis 2000, Gardner and Lewis 1996 and Ellen
2002.
26

Of course, both Sunni and Shi’a outside stakeholders are playing a geopolitical game as well

—they are not simply spreading messages relating to religion, but are also trying to maintain
influence in a region which seems to be increasingly dominated by US interests. Furthermore,
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there are other players. For example, China has economic interests, particularly in mining
operations in the country, for which it has received criticism for potentially not respecting and
caring for archaeological, particularly Buddhist artifacts — for which Hazaras have a particular
affinity. And India maintains strong ties to Afghanistan, contributing aid and supporting
scholarship programs, ostensibly to counter Pakistan’s influence and also to establish itself as a
regional and world power.
27

The assertion that songs had been forgotten, and that people no longer played these

instruments because of the Taliban was one of the many times that informants seem to have
compressed a historical enemy into “Taliban”, “Pashtuns,” “kuchis”, or some other group as a
sort of shorthand. The Taliban were only in control of the central government for about six years,
and never did manage to control all of Bamyan province. Hence, it is unlikely that songs or the
ability to play traditional music were wiped out because of their actions.
28

The first instances of oil painting happened not in Europe but rather in the Bamyan valley

during the Buddhist period (Barry 2008).
29

I am not making the case that Pashtun internal colonization is necessarily the reason these

aspects of Hazara culture are lost. For example, weaving a carpet is more labor intensive and
more expensive than buying a plastic mat made in China. This might be the real reason
traditional weaving is disappearing, but in Hazara narratives of trauma all sins are placed at the
feet of the Pashtuns. And in some cases Pashtuns might be given some responsibility: for
example, Klaus Ferdinand showed that nomadic Pashtun kuchis imported the shalwar kamiz, a
type of clothing typical in Pakistan and among Pashtuns (1962). Hazaras, according to this
narrative, in debt to the kuchis, were coerced into buying such goods. Today, most Hazara men
do wear either the shalwar kamiz or Western style clothing, although they can describe, and upon
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occasion, wear their “traditional” garments. Likewise, women often wear their version of the
shalwar kamiz in towns, although it is less common and in village more traditional style dresses
are favored, albeit in brightly colored imported fabrics.
30

I realize there is a slight discrepancy as they claimed every living thing in the valley was

killed, but, that was what I was told, and when I questioned, I was told a few escaped and may
have intermarried with Mongols and others from nearby who re-occupied the valley.
31

Shujayi’s current status is something of a mystery. In later 2014, I received a mysterious email

message from someone claiming to have been in the US military. He stated that he was
interested in a short piece I had written in which Shujayi was discussed. He also claimed that
Shujayi had been killed in action. This person expressed in interest in continuing to discuss my
experiences with Afghanistan, but as he did not have an official email, and I had no way to know
who he actually was, I was reluctant, and he soon ceased contact. Meanwhile, Hazara activist
informants insist that Shujayi is still alive and still carrying out operations, although with very
few resources.
32

This same group of local police were attacked by the Taliban, and when they asked for back-

up from the Afghan National Army, little to none was received. The suffered extremely high
casualties. This incident was, for many Hazaras, yet one more instance of discrimination against
them as an ethnicity.
33

The independent nature of the other civil society organization Abdulhakim referred to meant

that it relied almost completely on the funds which members were able to donate. It had to
borrow office space from other organizations. Most of its projects were focused on awareness
building, such as protests, marches, speeches, and sometimes publications of newspapers.
Therefore, the group itself did not intend to address community problems directly, but rather to
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mobilize community members to demand rights and improvements in Bamyan. Once a year the
group did take up a collection to buy firewood for people being held in the local jail.
34

The description of non-participation by Susan Greenberg (2010_ concerning morality and

politics is similar to this argument, albeit with one main difference. Based upon her work with
Serbian youth, Greenberg suggests that individuals can leave moral responsibility with the
politicians by avoiding any participation, or possibly even association, with politics. Not
engaging allows them to take a moral high ground and avoid criticism. Hazara activists view
politics as corrupting, but that does not mean that they avoid contact. They confront political
issues head-on and demand that the state improve itself, even as they seem to have little faith that
this can actually become a reality.
35

Whether they actually are universal is questionable. They may be classified as similar to the

“North Atlantic Universals” described by Michel-Rolph Trouillot.
36

Iran is, for example, currently sending detained asylum seekers as well as Afghans born in Iran

but without proper paperwork, to fight in Syria for Assad’s regime, partly by playing on their
Shi’a sympathies and partly by way of coercion (https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iransending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria).
37

While Firuzan sees the situation of Hazaras as quite desperate, Hazara women, when

compared to women in other areas, for example, Pashtun rural areas, seem to have much fewer
restrictions placed upon them by their family members. Generally, they are less restricted to the
house, can interact with members of the opposite sex in more situations, and have more
opportunities for education. Among the remaining serious problems are that many Hazara girls
still do not go to school, and girls’ and womens’ lives are still mostly restricted by their families.
A problem with Shi’a family law in Afghanistan, which concerned rights activists greatly, is that
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it rules out the possibility of marital rape. All this while rural Hazara women seem overall to
have more mobility and choices than rural Pashtun women.
38

Many non-Hazara friends also issued such declarations, and turnout in the election was high

across Afghanistan.
39

Hazaras were well represented in the Electoral Commission, but despite this, many of my

informants believed that it was not enough to prevent this particular type of voting fraud.
40

Hazara activists claim that their “open-mindedness” stems from several sources. First, they

maintain that their heritage is mixed, inclusive of a pre-Islamic Iranic group, early Turkic groups,
as well as later Mongol interlopers. This mixing, further mixing brought by the Silk Road, and
possibly a Buddhist background, are all given as reasons some activists say Hazaras are naturally
more “open.” Second, Hazaras often say that because they have been an oppressed group for so
long, they have no reason to remain closed off to ideas that might benefit them; their ancestral
way of thinking and doing things having been largely destroyed by Afghan cultural imperialism,
they must then seek new ideas. Finally, many cite Mazari as a strong influence, quoting speeches
and writings in which he stressed equality and justice for all peoples of Afghanistan. Certainly
Mazari was most concerned with the situation of the Hazaras and his own political situation, but
in achieving his goals there are plenty of sound bites and excerpts speaking of equality, women’s
rights, education, and justice for all peoples, alongside calls that Hazaras specifically no longer
be discriminated against.
41

Also, Fatima, the wife of Ali, has been compared to the Virgin Mary for her purity and the

suffering she went through. Though she did not live to see her son’s martyrdom, she is all the
same a symbol of purity and suffering. She protested Abu Bakr as the first caliph, and as she and
Ali were confronted in their house, a door was pushed open upon her, causing her to miscarry the
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child she was carrying and then die (Hyder 2006).
42

For example, Canfield 1076; Dabashi 2011; Deeb 2006; Hyder 2006; Pinault 1992.

43

There were other Shi’a splinter groups that followed a different path, such as the Ismailis, well

known for being led by their current Imam, the Agha Khan. Because of a dispute over
succession, they have maintained a living Imam through the present. Now, the Agha Khan is a
wealthy European with one of the biggest, most effective, aid and development organizations in
the world. They have come a long way from their positions several centuries ago, the
hashishiyan (hashish eaters), rendered assassins in English, who carried out assassinations from
mountain stronghold against the Twelver clergy in an attempt to promote their own position. The
Zaidi’s are slightly different. Zaid ibn Ali claimed his descent as fifth Imam was rightful, rather
than his half-brother Muhammad al-Baqir, whom the Twelvers recognized. Zaid led an uprising
against the establishment and was killed, yet his followers continued his anti-quietist views
(Pinault 1992). Today they are most well known as making up the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
44

45

See Varzi 2006 on Iran; Deeb 2006 and Norton 2014 on Lebanon.
For example, Iran’s Shah feared the influence of the ulema, or clergy, and banned most

processions (Varzi 2006).
46

Mary-Jo Good (1988) has pointed out that the transfer of Ashura rituals in Iran from a private

practice, banned in most areas by the shah, to a public, required practice, initially resulted in an
increase of depression. The “work” as the cathartic nature of the rituals, and their dependence
upon being practiced by those persecuted, made people extremely uncomfortable. In short, the
rituals as private were the work of culture, as defined by Obeyesekere (1990). One they were
could no longer be accomplished under state-sponsorship; instead of dispelling negative
emotions through these rituals, mental health problems increased.
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47

There are obviously other ayatollahs located in other areas, but they are not the most

influential, and at any rate, they all have spent time training in at least one of these two cities.
48

Vilayat-e-faqih signifies “Guardianship of the Jurist.” Although interpreted in several ways, in

essence, it gives the jurist, or clergy, guardianship over governance of the people during the time
that the Imam, the one who should truly govern, is in occultation.
49

Although Fayoz has not visited, and likely will not because of his age, a conference devoted to

his achievements, hoping to spread his ideas more broadly in Afghanistan, was held in 2014. His
son and several other of his Najafi followers were sent in his stead (Suroush 2014).
50

In Iran, as well as in Iraq before the Baathist regime, and likely again today, taziyah actually

take the form of a theatrical play, whereas in South Asia, according to Hyder (2006) there are
theatrical story-telling events in which one speaker conveys meaning through intonation and
gesture, but taziyah refers to replicas of Hussein and his followers’ tombs. In Afghanistan, at
least in Bamyan, theatrical plays did not take place, nor were there replicas if tombs, although
whether this was because Hazaras were more in line, although not completely, with the South
Asian tradition, or because they had not been allowed to carry on this tradition, was unclear to
me.
51

Human Rights Watch has documented that at least 80 people were summarily executed, that

700 were kidnapped, and while 100 of these were possibly released after ransom, the fates of the
rest were unknown but that they likely were killed. These numbers do not take into account those
killed in the bombardment before the ground attack began. See Shuja 2015
(https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/dispatches-afghanistans-afshar-agonies-remembered),
Human Rights Watch 2005 (https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/4.htm).
Activists in Bamyan stated between 4,000-7,000 were killed. These high numbers were not
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replicated elsewhere, although they clearly also intended to include those killed in the
bombardment.
52

According to Maley (2009) the reason for the Wahdat break with Rabbani was clearly because

of Massoud’s desire to disarm them, hoping to achieve a monopoly of violence. Maley is very
much willing to give Massoud the benefit of the doubt as someone who was a great military
strategist, but not a great political strategist. My own informants mentioned the disarmament, but
also stated that several Wahdat members had been killed without provocation by Massoud’s
forces, so for the Hazaras, who had long felt vulnerable, this was the last straw. Incidentally,
Hazaras were one of the earliest groups most thoroughly subjected to (albeit willingly) the
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) campaign after US and NATO forces
invaded in 2001, and this is one reason they currently feel so vulnerable.
53

Official Human Rights Watch estimates, for example, suggest that many more Hazaras were

massacred at the hands of the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998 than were killed in Afshar, and
yet in my experience, Afshar got much more attention.
54

These individuals were referring to the 2013 memorial event in particular, as I was asking

them about it and may have hence caused them to attend. There is also the possibility that
because this was the 20th anniversary of the event, it was particularly large. Unfortunately, I have
not been able to attend another Afshar memorial. Activists tell me they always give it such
emphasis as it had in 2013, but I am unable to confirm this myself.
55

Activists who stated this were demonstrating their knowledge that the word holocaust, which

has come to be almost exclusively associated with the Jewish genocide of World War II, can also
refer to mass killings, particularly carried out with burning, more generally.
56

Massoud was a military genius, and he was aided by the narrow bottleneck entrance of
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Panjshir which was otherwise completely surrounded by mountains. He also, at a certain point,
made a deal with the Soviets to stay out of Panjshir if he would not go on the offensive,
something which is not often mentioned by those who laud him, but something for which he
cannot be blamed, either. See Rubin, 2002.
57

What likely happened was, as the many factions in Kabul, including Massoud’s, Sayyaf’s,

Rabbani’s, Mazari’s, and Hekmatyar’s, shelled the city in a struggle for control, particularly
intense shelling emerged from West Kabul, where Hizb-e-Wahdat was located. Massoud as
defense minister made the decision to heavily shell and send in ground forces to quell the attack.
The leadership of the ground forces was given to Sayyaf, however, whose Wahabbi leanings no
doubt predisposed him to take out a particularly cruel revenge for the shelling done by both
Hazaras of West Kabul and Hekmatyar’s forces.
58

Rabbani had been seeking peace talks with Taliban, and two men professing to be Talibs

interested in these talks planned a meeting with him in his home in 2011. One had an explosive
device hidden in his turban which he detonated, killing Rabbani and four other members of the
High Peace Council. The Kabul Education University was then named after Rabbani.
59

I was unable to ascertain exactly who Paik was, despite extensive questioning of Hazaras in

Afghanistan and in Europe, and online searches. Many thought he was a Hazara living
somewhere in Europe who had been close to Wahdat leadership, but that was the most
information I was able to uncover. His film is so widely circulated, that pretty much every
Hazara who is even slightly politically involved knows of it.
60

Lara Deeb (2006) has written that in traditional Islam in Lebanon, Zeinab was portrayed as a

mourning, grief-stricken mother, as her child was killed at Karbala. However, she demonstrates
that an “authenticated” reading of the literal textual and historical sources is carried out by many
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of her informants, and this interpretation shows Zeinab in this stronger position I have described.
61

Baad can refer, among Pashtuns, to the practice of exchanging girls in marriage to atone for

wrongs done to a lineage. Those wronged receive girls without the customary brideprice, whom
the young men must marry. Badal refers to revenge, and is also derived from baad, for it, too, is
a type of exchange, of harms rather than of goods. Badal is, according to Grima, the most
common exchange among men, while gham and khushal visits are the most common exchange
among women.
62

For more on similar themes, see Rosaldo 1980.

63

A story circulates among non-Hazaras that he would behead enemies, pour gasoline into the

neck cavity, and light the body on fire, to make the corpse do the “dance of the dead.” I have also
heard this attributed to a Hazara, named Mazar, who mutilated the corpses of Taliban in this
way, the close resemblance of the names raising the possibility that this rumor is based on
mistaken identity.
64

Khaligho is the name “Khaliq” pronounced in Hazaragi, the Hazara dialect of Persian.

65

See https://gyrovague.wordpress.com/2011/03/17/the-tale-of-forty-maidens/

66

Hazara women practice a form of purda, the segregation of the sexes, less strict than purda

among Pashtun women. They can be seen by and interact with men who are not their immediate
relatives. The strictest Pashtuns restrict all such interactions. These looser purda restrictions
combine with ambient racism and a past of sexual slavery to make many non-Hazaras look down
upon Hazara women as having “loose morals.”
67

Much has been written on subaltern studies, starting with the Subaltern Studies Group, which

sought to focus more on the history of the subordinated and colonized “masses” rather than the
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elite, with an emphasis on South Asia, although of course these concepts can, and have been,
applied worldwide (Chatterjee 1993; Guha and Spivak 1998; Guha 1994; Stokes 1980 and 1986).
68

Bacon 1951 and 1958; Fox 1943; Schurmann 1962; Thesiger 1955.

69

See Shryock 1997 for more on the issue of the ways informants shape their stories, particularly

for the anthropologist, concerning Bedouins in Jordan.
70

Mousavi focuses rather on reconstructing the origin of the Hazaras and their immediate and

distant ancestors, in spite of limited historical or archaeological data. In personal discussions,
Adam Kuper has told me that such projects were encouraged at Oxford University in the 1990s.
71

It must be pointed out that the statues wore wooden “masks” which were destroyed long

before current memory, meaning that no one really knows what the faces of the statues looked
like. Those who claim to “look like” the Buddhas are usually drawing on the oil paintings found
in the caves surrounding the statues, and their own supposition as to how the faces must have
appeared.
72

He does not specify what he means by Tajik, a people whose identity in Afghanistan is

negative in that it refers to Iranic speakers who are not members of any other ethnic group and
who, in reality, seem to identify more with a particular region than a shared ancestry. In fact, in
Afghanistan most people do not refer to Tajiks but rather to Farsiwan, or Farsi speakers, for the
group of people referred to commonly as Tajiks by outsiders. Farsiwan can be found in all
regions. In the north, and in Bamyan, perhaps because ethnicity issues are stronger there, they
might be called Tajiks. They also, however, are found in Pashtun regions. Not speaking Pashto,
they are not considered by Pashtuns to be Pashtun, but they follow Pashtun cultural norms in
most other significant ways. In Kabul, Farsiwan can be part of a more particular Kabuli identity,
and the same can be said for those in Herat, who claim to be Herati, first and foremost.
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73

The claim that they are “of the earth” may also counter Sayed’s claims that as desendents of

the Prophet they are made of nur (light), while Hazaras are made of soil. Hazaras take this
assertion and turn it into something positive and useful.
74

Band-e-Amir is a lake complex of incredible beauty that since 2009 is also Afghanistan’s first

National Park. The lakes are located 75 kilometers northwest of Bamyan.
75

See references in note 2.

76

Several activists discounted this report, saying that Kateb was beholden by the court to write a

particular point of view. All the same, he is considered a hero of the Hazaras for his work as a
scholar during a time when such positions were almost all closed to Hazaras.
77

Not only were Hazaras regularly targeted by Sunni extremist groups in individual shootings or

group shootings, usually when a gunman on a motorbike would approach a vehicle and spray it
with bullets, but on three occasions in 2013 large-scale suicide attacks were carried out in
Quetta. In January, 115 people were killed, in February, 73 were killed, and in June, 33 were
killed in such attacks. During the period of my fieldwork, Hazaras in Afghanistan stood in
danger of being kidnapped or killed during travel but mass killings were rare. The only large
scale suicide attack against Hazaras happened in Kabul in 2011, in which 54 were killed, while
four others were killed in an attack in the northern city Mazar-e-Sharif.
78

Electively changing last names is very common in Afghanistan, and people often choose a

meaningful name, such a “kosha”, deriving from the verb to try or to strive, “buda,” in a nod to
Bamyan’s Buddhist history, or “kia,” king or defender.
79

The Afghan government, headed by president Ashraf Ghani, replied that the decision to

reroute the line was actually made by the Karzai administration, and that provisions were all the
same in place for Bamyan to benefit from electricity, if only at a slightly later date. Activists
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responded that the plan of the government would not provide enough power to foment any sort
of industry development, which is what activists really want.
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